ML20134D179
| ML20134D179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1996 |
| From: | Myers H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134D183 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9610160271 | |
| Download: ML20134D179 (2) | |
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P.O. Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108 September 16, 1996 Hon. Shirley Jackson Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 205550 0001
Dear Madame Chairwoman:
I am writing with respect to the belated discovery of a cut wire in safety related circuitry located in the Maine Yankee control room area.
This matter raises serious doubt as to whether Maine Yankee maintenance and testing procedures have been conducted in accord with applicable NRC regulations.
The facts that the wire was cut by mistake, that the activity involving the cutting of the wire was not properly documented, and that the error was not discov-ered for a period of years suggest that other safety related errors have been committed and remain undetected.
I request that the Commission, in its consideration of the findings of the NRC Independent Safety Assessment Team at Maine Yankee, ask NRC staff, unless they have already done so, to address the following questions:
1.
What specific actions led to discovery of the cut cable in circuitry located in the environs of the Maine Yankee control room?
2.
What NRC regulations, if any, require that work on safety related circuitry be controlled by procedures requiring, among other things, documentation displaying names of authorizing officials, supervisors, workers and inspectors, and dates on which the work was authorized, performed, and inspected.
(In this case, it appears that Maine Yankee has no records indicating the names of the persons who authorized, supervised, conducted, or inspected the activity during which the wire was cut.
More-over, more than three years elapsed between cutting of the wire and its discovery.]
3.
What Maine Yankee procedures controlled the work involving removing excess wires in the control room environs?
4.
In what manner, if any, was the removal of wire not conducted in accord with procedures intended to control such activities?
5.
Do NRC regulations, explicitly or implicitly, require peri-odic testing of the circuitry containing the cut wire?
Do NRC regulations, explicitly or implicitly, specify a maximum time EDO -- GT96722 (d b 10 l(o 017
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v-Hon. Shirley Jackson 2-September 16, 1996 l
1 interval between such tests?
If so, what is that time interval?
6.
Did Maine Yankee procedures require testing of this control i
room environs circuitry during the period that the wire was cut?
If so, when was such testing supposed to have been conducted?
7.
Were the deficiencies leading to the cut wire and the delay in its discovery rooted in inadequate procedures or noncompliance with procedures?
8.
In view of the deficiencies (rooted in inadequate procedures and/or failure to follow procedures) manifest in the cut wire and its belated discovery, what is the basis for concluding that other significant safety-related defects rooted in deficient maintenance practices are absent from Maine Yankee?
Thanx you for your attention to this matter.
i Sincerely, Henry R. Myers l
cc: Senator Cohen Senator Snowe Senator Lieberman Senator Biden Congressman Dingell Congressman Markey
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