ML20134B831

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Insp Rept 50-341/96-10 on 960914-1025 & Notice of Violation
ML20134B831
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/1997
From: Caldwell J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Gipson D
DETROIT EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20134B834 List:
References
NUDOCS 9701310104
Download: ML20134B831 (5)


See also: IR 05000341/1996010

Text

. ._ . _ . _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

.- _

_

!

.

I

January 23, 1997

i

1

.

l

Mr. D. R. Gipson

Senior Vice President

)

,'

Nuclear Generation

L

'

The Detroit Edison Company

l

6400 North Dixie Highway

,

Newport, MI 48166

j

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-341/96010

Dear Mr. Gipson:

.,

j

On October 25, 1996, the NRC completed an inspection at your Fermi 2 reactor

facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

i

!

During the 6-week period covered by this inspection, operations of your Fermi

2 facility was safe. However, conduct of several activities remained

3

inconsistent.

For example, operators performed a carefully controlled

shutdown to begin the plant's fifth refueling outage. However, as the outage

progressed, several events occurred that unnecessarily challenged operators

and maintenance personnel and resulted from inadequate work planning or

4

j

inadequate procedures.

These are examples of continuing problems.

.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that four

violations of NRC requirements occurred.

These violations are cited in the

enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them

are described in detail in the subject inspection report.

The first violation pertained to a test that was not stopped as required by

the test procedure.

The test was to verify reactor core cooling by natural

circulation was established when shutdown cooling was secured. When the

4

4

output of all special instrumentation was lost before cooling was verified,

the test was not stopped as required.

[

The second violation pertained to an inadequate safety evaluation for removal

f

of General Service Water (GSW) system from service. The GSW system was

- removed from service for maintenance. The safety evaluation did not consider

the need for the makeup function of the Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS).

This

i

resulted in lowering of the UHS level. Actions were taken to provide an

alternate path of makeup. However, this demonstrated the lack of thoroughness

during preparation and review of the safety evaluation to ensure that a

safety-significant function of the system was maintained.

1 I

tb

(/[

9701310104 970123

PDR

ADOCK 05000341

G

PDR

a

. ._

D. R. Gipson

-2-

The third violation pertained to ineffective corrective actions for a previous

violation. While preparing for a safety battery test discharge, the fuses for

a test battery were not installed when it was connected to the bus. As a

result, the bus was deenergized when attempting to restore power after the

test. This resulted in ESF actuations. The cause was similar to a battery

charger testing violation in October 1995. The corrective actions to the

October 1995 violation were ineffective and did not prevent this failure.

l

The fourth violation occurred when a surveillance procedure inappropriately

rendered a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump (RHRSW) inoperable.

1

During a routine safety bus undervoltage surveillance, operators were unable

to start a RHRSW pump. The surveillance procedure was inadequate and rendered

the pump inoperable whenever it was performed. This condition was not

recognized by your staff. As a result, appropriate actions per technical

l

specifications were not performed.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions

specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will

i

use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is

necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of

this letter and its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC

Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

/s/ John A. Grobe for

James L. Caldwell, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No:

50-341

License No:

NPF-43

Enclosures:

1.

Inspection Report

No. 50-341/96010

2.

Notice of Violation

cc w/ enc 1:

N. Peterson,

Supervisor of Compliance

P. A. Marquardt, Corporate

Legal Department

James R. Padgett, Michigan Public

Service Commission

'

Michigan Department of

Public Health

Monroe County, Emergency

Management Division

(See attached continued distribution)

,

4

D. R. Gipson

-3-

Distribution continued:

Docket File /w encl

Project Manager, NRR/w encl

PUBLIC IE-01/w enci

DRP/w encl

OC/LFDCB/w/ encl

RIII PRR/w encl

SRI Fermi /w/ encl

CAAl w/ enc 1 (E-mail)

A. B. Beac h, w/ encl

H. B. Clayton, w/ encl

W. L. Axelson, w/ encl

g , .

.. ,,.es.nsprpts\\ powers.\\.f.erm\\.fer96010.d.rp

Docum.ent: R:\\i

.

- ..iwi

.

e-c.,,.is

... f

i-r-c.,,.is.t

f i =-

0FFICE

RIII

RIlijk)

b

RIII8pNb

RIIVrh7

I

klalbleb

NAME

Jordan

Crek

Kozak

DATE

01/ F/97

01/?0/97

01//B/97

\\bl/ 7)[97

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

\\'

,

g*"'%,

UNITED STATES

fo

g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ {'

S

REGION 111

E'

i[

801 WARRENVILLE ROAD

i

  • [

LISLE, ILLINOIS 00632-4351

' *****

January 23, 1997

.

.

.

J

Mr. D. R. Gipson

Senior Vice President

Nuclear Generation

The Detroit Edison Company

.

6400 North Dixie Highway

Newport, MI 48166

'

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-341/96010

Dear Mr. Gipson:

On October 25, 1996, the NRC completed an inspection at your Fermi 2 reactor

facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

,

During the 6-week period covered by this inspection, operations of your Fermi

2 facility was safe. However, conduct of several activities remained

inconsistent.

For example, operators performed a carefully controlled

shutdown to begin the plant's fifth refueling outage.

However, as the outage

progressed, several events occurred that unnecessarily challenged operators

and maintenance personnel and resulted from inadequate work planning or

inadequate procedures. These are examples of continuing problems.

Based on tlie results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that four

violations cf NRL requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the

enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them

are described in detail in the subject inspection report.

The first viviation pertained to a test that was not stopped as required by

the test procedure. The test was to verify reactor core cooling by natural

circulation was established when shutdown cooling was secured. When the

output of all special instrumentation was lost before cooling was verified,

the test was not stopped as required.

The second violatioc pertained to an inadequate safety evaluation for removal

of General Service Water (GSW) system from service.

The GSW system was

removed from service for maintenance. The safety evaluation did not consider

the need for the makeup function of the Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS). This

resulted in lowering of the UHS level. Actions were taken to provide an

alternate path of makeup. However, this demonstrated the lack of thoroughness

during preparation and review of the safety evaluation to ensure that a

safety-significant function of the system was maintained.

. - . - - . - . . --

.

D. R. Gipson

-2-

The third violation pertained to ineffective corrective actions for a previous

violation. While preparing for a safety battery test discharge, the fuses for

a test battery were not installed when it was connected-to the bus. As a

,

'

result, the bus was d energized when attempting to restore power after the

test. This resulted in ESF actuations.

The cause was similar to a battery

i

charger testing violation in October 1995.

The corrective actions to the

'

October 1995 violation were ineffective and did not prevent this failure.

The fourth violation occurred when a surveillance procedure inappropriately

rendered a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump (RHRSW inoperable.

During a routine safety bus undervoltage surveillance, oper)ators were unable

to start a RHRSW pump. The surveillance procedure was inadequate and rendered

the pump inoperable whenever it was performed. This condition was not

recognized by your staff. As a result, appropriate actions per technical

specifications were not performed.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions

specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will

,

use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is

necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

,

i

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of

this letter and its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC

i

Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

t

-

ames L. Caldwell, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No:

50-341

License No: NPF-43

Enclosures:

1.

Inspection Report

No. 50-341/96010

2.

Notice of Violation

cc w/ enc 1:

N. Peterson,

Supervisor of Compliance

P. A. Marquardt,-Corporate

Legal Department

James R. Padgett, Michigan Public

Service Commission

Michigan Department of

Public Health

Monroe County, Emergency

Management Division

i

,

. .

,

.