ML20133L018
| ML20133L018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1996 |
| From: | Jeffery Wood TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Beach A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133K977 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9701210444 | |
| Download: ML20133L018 (3) | |
Text
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$501 N S: ate Route 2 419 249-2300 John K. Wood Oak Hartor, O*4 43449 FAX: 419 321-8337 Vce Presderit. Nuclear Dav s Besse i
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Docket Number 50-346 i
License Number NPF-3
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Serial Number 1-1113 December 23, 1996 1
Mr. A.
B. Beach Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 801 warrenville Road i
Lisle, IL 60532-4351
Subject:
Response to Operator Licensing Examination Report No. 50-346/OL-96-02
Dear Mr. Beach:
Toledo Edison has received Operator Licensing Examination Report Number 50-346/OL-96-02 (Log Number 1-3756).
This report documented the failure of four candidates in the retake exam given for the administrative responsibilities of the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) position on August 29, 1996.
This report requested a response within sixty days to provide the results of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) investigation into the failures of the four SRO license candidates along with an assessment of plant operations to determine if any similar demonstrated weaknesses exist in plant operations.
A Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report was initiated to document the failure of the four SRO candidates. The Nuclear Training Section at the DBNPS is responsible for providing the response to the subject report. To ensure an independent evaluation of the root causes for the candidates failures, the Independent Safety Engineering (ISE) Unit was assigned the task to conduct a
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comprehensive assessment of the candidates failures. The ISE Unit was assigned this task due to management concern over the repeat failure of the four candidates.
1 Based on the 100% failure rate on two occassions, the approach for this problem assessed failure modes associated with the program in which these SRO candidates were trained. The key focus was on organizational, programmatic 9701210444 961223 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G
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Dockst Number 50-346 Licanae Number NPF-3 Strial Number 1-1113 i
i Page 2 and management failure modes. Due to the breadth of the failures, individual candidate capabilities were not assessed in detail. The assessment included a review of the candidates training program, training schedule, and remediation efforts following the first Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) exam failures.
The data collection phase included a review of examinations, walk-through evaluations, candidate feedback information, portions of the Qualification Manual, audit exam information, written assessments, and NRC exam reports.
Interviews were held with training instructors, license candidates, previous license candidates, on-shift licensed operators, the NRC, and management personnel from Operations, Training, and Nuclear Assurance.
A change analysis was performed to help develop the issues and problems explored during the failure modes analysis. A sequence of events chart was developed to help realize the time relationship of events and to ensure there were no obvious deficiencies in the sequence of events.
During the failure mode determination, the issues and problems were plotted on a Management Failure Mode Chart and an Organization / Programmatic Failure Mode Chart. Failure scenarios were then developed by assessing the individual issues for identification of the key failure mode strings and the key drivers for the failure mode strings.
The assessment was completed and the ISE report was issued on December 20, 1996 to the appropriate DBNPS management personnel for their review. The results of the assessment identified failure modes associated with the 5
management aspects of the training program as the primary causes for the candidates failures. Organizational and programmatic failures provided additional insight but were not the primary causes.
This comprehensive assessment was conducted with diligence commensurate with the degree of concern the DBNPS has for the failure of these SRO candidates.
Assessment of plant operations to determine if similar deficiencies may exist in plant operations has been initiated.
In order to digest the results of the ISE report and to complete the assessment of plant operations for similar problems, an extension of time to complete these activities is needed. These activities are scheduled to be completed by January 17, 1997, at which time a summary of the findings wil; be submitted to the NRC.
Due to the extensive nature of these assessments, corrective action plans can then be finalized. Corrective actions that are necessary to ensure successful implementation of initial SRO training programs will be applied in a timely fashion. Corrective action plans will be submitted by February 20, 1997.
The management of the DBNPS has a high level of concern for the performance of the training program commensurate with the concern of the NRC and the Region III staff. Due diligence will be exercised to ensure these concerns are resolved in a comprehensive manner to assure the integrity of the initial licensed operator training program at the DBNPS.
Although the assessment of plant operations for similar problems has not yet been completed, the cor.tinued professionalism demonstrated by plant operators indicates that similar problems have not influenced the continued safe operation of the DBNPS.
The recent licensed operator requalification examination results also demonstrate that adequate training is being provided for the licensed operators of the DBNPS.
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Dockst Number 50-346
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Licanza Number NPF-3 Striel Numbar 1-1113 Page 3 Should you have additional questions on the status of investigations or corrective actions, please contact me or Mr. James L. Freels, Manager -
Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 321-8466.
Sincerely yours, K4'wcf
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D / c cc:
A. G. Hansen, NRC Project Manager S. Stasek, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector USNRC Document Control Desk Utility Radiological Safety Board I
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