ML20133G524

Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-255/85-16 on 850819-22 & 0920. No Violation Noted.Exercise Weaknesses Summarized in App. Written Statement Re Corrective Actions for Weakness 5 Requested within 30 Days of Ltr Date

ML20133G524
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/08/1985
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Dewitt R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML20133G528	List: ML20133G524 ML20133G536
References
NUDOCS 8510160015
Download: ML20133G524 (3)

See also: IR 05000255/1985016

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OCT 0 81985

Docket No. 50-255

. Consumers Power Company

ATTN: Mr. R. B. DeWitt

Vice President

Nuclear Operations

212 West Michigan Avenue

Jackson, MI 49201

Gentlemen:

, This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. J. P. Patterson

and others of this office on August 19-22, 1985, of activities at the Palisades

Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-20 and to the

discussion of our findings with Mr. J. F. Firlit and others of your staff at

the conclusion of.the inspection and at the management meeting held at our

office on September 20, 1985.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during

the i,nspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and

interviews with personnel.

No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this

inspection.

However, several exercise weaknesses were identified which will need corrective

action by your staff. These weaknesses are summarized in the attached

Appendix to this letter. As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.F, any weaknesses that are identified must be corrected.

Acceptable corrective actions to weaknesses Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were

presented during the management meeting held on September 20, 1985. However,

weakness No. 5 was not discussed. Accordingly, you are requested to submit a

written statement within 30 days of the date of this letter describing your

planned actions for correcting weakness No. 5 listed in the appendix.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document l

Room. '

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Consumers Power Company 2 OCT 0 81985

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3 The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance

procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

W. D. Shafer, Chief

Emergency Preparedness and

j Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosures:

1. Appendix, Exercise

'

Weaknesses

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2. Inspection Report

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No. 50-255/85016(DRSS)

cc w/ enclosures:

D. J. VandeWalle, Director

i Nuclear Licensing

l J. F. Firlit, General Manager ,

, DCS/RSB (RIDS) l

l Licensing Fee Management Branch

j Resident Inspector, RIII

j Ronald Callen, Michigan f

l Public Service Commission

! Nuclear Facilities and

! Environmental Monitoring

l Section i

l D. Matthews, EPB, OIE l'

l W. Weaver, FEMA Region V

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Appendix

Exercise Weaknesses

1. Control Room participants were not given time to evaluate the emergency

conditions and make an emergency classification because a controller

gave a message to the Shift Engineer (about 0847) stating that, for drill

purposes, the toxic gas was significant enough to make the event an

Alert. Open Item No. 255/85016-01. (Section 5.a)

2. The Technical Support Center (TSC) personnel displayed a lack of

coordinated effort within the support center, as well as with their

counterparts in the Control Room. Some examples were the fluctuating

assessment of reactor conditions and the lack of addressing the problem

with the five stuck centrol rods. Those support groups involved were

the Operations Group, and the Engineering and Maintenance Group. The

Site Emergency Director in the TSC did not adequately utilize the support

groups to best mitigate the emergency and resolve conflicts with the

Control Room. Open Item No. 255/85016-02. (Section 5.b)

3. The licensee failed to adequately assess and trend radiological field

data including the magnitude, location, and composition of the plume.

(This was Objective No. 9 of ten exercise objectives). Open Item

No. 255/85016-03. (Section 5.c)

4. Poor, erratic contamination control techniques were demonstrated

throughout the exercise in the Operational Support Center (OSC). These

related particularly to participants ignoring the radiation detection

device outside the OSC, as well as poor " frisking" techniques by the few

who did observe the frisking rules. Open Item No. 255/85016-04.

(Section 5.d)

5. The present EOF facility does not contain minimum space and

communications to meet NUREG-0696 guidelines. Space must be provided for

at least fifteen federal personnel (office space for five NRC, working

space for nine NRC and one FEMA) in an emergency. At least three

outside-line telephones should be made available for NRC use. Also, the

HPN and ENS telephones should be relocated to the main E0F room, so that

communicators will have ready access to posted plant status and Health

Physics data. Open Item No. 255/85016-05. (Section 5.e)

6. The offsite monitoring team did not initiate steps to decontaminate their

vehicle upon leaving the plume. With the unusually high radiation levels

released within various sections of the ten mile EPZ, this was a crucial

omission. Open Item No. 255/85016-06. (Section 5.f)

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