ML20133E282

Requests That Staff Provide Written Response to Questions Identified in Human Performance Program Plan as Discussed During 961205-07 Mtg

ML20133E282
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/30/1996
From:	Kress T Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
ACRS-R-1673, NUDOCS 9701100285
Download: ML20133E282 (6)

Text

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'g UNITED STATES ACRSR-1673 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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I ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS PDR 9

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 j$9*****

December 30, 1996 Mr. James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555-0001

SUBJECT:

ACRS QUESTIONS ON HUMAN PERFORMANCE PROGRAM PLAN During the 437th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,. December 5-7, 1996, we reviewed the NRC activities identified in the Human Performance Program Plan. Odr Subcommittee on Human Factors met on September 20 and December 3,

1996, to review these activities. After the September 20, 1996 Subcommittee

meeting, a list of questions included in the attachment was developed. These questions were provided to the staff on September 27, 1996. During subsequent meetings, the staff responded to these questions. We believe that the staff's response to questions 1, 2, 3, and 11, did not fully address our concerns.

We request that the staff provide written response to these questions.

Sincerely, J 5. Mn T.

S. Kress Chairman

Attachment:

List of ACRS questions on Human Performance Program Plan cc:

J. Mitchell, OEDO F. Miragila, NRR B. Boger, NRR C. Thomas, NRR D. Morrison, RES W. Hodges, RES

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100023 ggspke 9701100205 961230 PDR-ACRS R-1673 PDR.

ATTACl# LENT 1

LIST OF ACRS QUESTIONS ON HUMAN PERFORMANCE PROGRAM PLAN 4

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The ACRS requested that the staff provide information at a future ACRS Subcommittee meeting concerning the following questions.

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1.

What are the staff plans for developing a Human Performance Program Plan (HPPP) activities road map, which would be useful for allocating resources, scheduling, and understanding the relationship between the activities?

2.

The activities delineated in the HPPP appear to be focused on reducing the i

assumed risk-worth of human actions used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRA).

What is the risk-worth of human actions?

Why does the staff believe the risk-worth is too high and should be reduced?

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3.

How does the staff set the priorities for the HPPP activities and what does the priority ranking mean?

4.

How does the staff decide that an independent program element is required?

j Why has the staff decided that data gathering should be separated from developing guidance and that the two activities should have different priorities?

[ NOTE: The attached figures are examples of models that may be used to develop 3

a master diagram that could serve as the road map to answer many of the questions i

raised here. These figures are just the starting point; they must be adapted to j

the NRC's needs using judgment and operational experience.]

i 5.

What does the staff mean by " effective" and " adequate" as used in the objectives and goals in the HPPP? How does the staff know what must be done and when the goal or objective is achieved?

Should the staff be pushing licensees toward the state-of-the-art in human 6.

factors and human reliability rather than a proven adequate state?

7.

Numerous human errors have resulted in the misadministration of medical treatments by licensees of the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS).

Why isn't NMSS as involved with human performance efforts as the other offices?

8.

How does the staff plan to respond to the ACRS advice concerning developing metrics for organizations and managements that correlate with risk or performance?

9.

What are the technical bases for defining the staffing levels inside and outside of the main control room, and for communication procedures?

i 10.

What are the deficiencies or " holes in NUREG-0700?

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4 ATTACHMENT 1

11.

How are standards adopted by the staff formulated?

How does the staff assure that the standards are necessary and sufficient to meet regulatory needs?

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12.

The staff scheduled item 1.2.11 of the HPPP, " Develop Guidance for Computerized Job Performance Aids," to be completed "as technology is developed." What standards does the staff have for such aids that would foster the development of such technology? If the standards do not exist, what are the staff plans for developing such standards?

13.

What is the staff approach to developing a performance-based fitness-for-duty criteria?

14.

What is the staff approach to evaluating the task network model espoused by the Department of Defense, and how will the staff decide if the model is applicable and useful for regulatory needs?

15.

How does the staff decide on the allocation of resources between human factcr research and other research activities such as thermal hydraulic models?

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How does the staff assure simulator fidelity?

How important is good fidelity to Emergency Operating Procedure training? What does the staff expect an operator to do if unexpected plant behavior occurs during a severe accident?

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j safe acts, classified initially according to shether the act was intended or unintended and then distinguishing errors from violations.

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managerial /organisational sectors) and failure tokens (relating to individual conditions and unsafe acts).

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J. Reason, Huma_n Error, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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force, time, knowledge, etc.

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involving human malfunction. [ Reproduced from Ramessen -(1982) with l

permission from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.]

-*w J. Rasmussen, Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction, North-Holland, 1986.

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