Text

Affidavit of Jc Kammeyer Re Tdi Diesel Generators
	ML20133B884
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/24/1985
From:	Kammeyer J; STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.
To:	;
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Surveillance and iporting programs in, place at VEGP, including those established pursuant to 10 C.F.R.- Part 21 and 5 50.05(e), will continue to identify, monitor, and resolve any I

future. problems with the TDI diesel generators..,

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Respectfully s9hmitted, A

1 By:

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, George F. Trowbridge, P.C.

Bruce W. Churchill, P.C.

. David R. Lewis Rose Ann Sullivan SHAW, PITTMAN,POTTS&TROWEitIDGE James E. Joiner, P.C.

,'.d C):arins W. W10itney Kevin C. Greeno ~

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Hugh M. Daverport TROUTMAN, S AND.*:RS, LOCKERMAN & ASHMORE Attorneys fo' Applicants b f7,

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DATED:

July 31, 3985 e,

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July 24, 1985 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DCLEETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 85 AljG -5 A10:46 GFFict e; Ent IAL In the Matter of

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00CKElihG & SEPvir F.

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SRANCH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

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Docket Nos. 50-424

)

50-425 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

)

Units 1 and 2)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN C.

KAMMEYER STATE OF NEW YORK

)

as.

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK

)

I, John C.

Kammeyer, being duly sworn, state as follows:

1.

I am employed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corpora-tion ("SWEC") as Head of the Site Engineering Office at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ("Shoreham") and as the SWEC Se-nior Site Representative.

My business address is Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, P.O. Box 604, Wading River, New York 11792.

I have personal knowledge of each of the matters set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct.

2.

Prior to my present position, I was employed by SWEC as Program Manager for the Transamerica Delaval, Inc. ("TDI")

Owners Group resign Review and Quality Revalidation ("DR/QR")

1 4

1

Program.

I acted as Program Manager for nearly one year, from April of 1984 to March of 1985.

As Program Manager, I had the overall responsibility for implementation of the DR/QR Program.

I was responsible for directing engineers and quality inspec-tors in the resolution of TDI diesel engine problems, and the design review / quality revalidation of selected en'gine compo-nents at twelve nuclear power plants, including the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ("VEGP").

3.

Prior to acting as Program Manager for the Owners Group, I was employed by SWEC as the Assistant Head of the Site Engineering Office at Shoreham.

During the construction and 1

start-up testing phase of the Shoreham plant, I was responsible l

1 for directing engineers and designers in the resolution of I

1 problems involving fluid system and related components, such as piping, valves, mechanical equipment, and equipment erection.

I also provided engineering and managerial support to Long Is-land Lighting Company for Shoreham's original DR/QR program and the plant's licensing effort.

During the plant's pre-operational phase, my responsibilities included assisting in the development of the station modification programs and engi-neering the specific modification packages necessary for upgrading mechanical systems and equipment.

My responsibil-ities specific to the TDI diesel generators installed at Shoreham included the following: a) June, 1980 to October, s

1980, principle engineer assigned to the " Plant Maintainability Study," which included a review of all major diesel engine and auxiliary components for the purpose of assuring their accessi-bility and proper physical arrangement in order to meet mainte-nance requirements; b) April, 1981 to June, 1984, principle engineer assigned to the resolution of all problems and techni-cal issues involving the TDI diesel generators during final erection of equipment and the start-up testing phase of the Shoreham plant; these responsibilities included:

(1)

Resolution of non-conformances identified on en-gine and auxiliary components; (2)

Evaluation and implementation of all product im-provements and design upgrades, including:

(a)

Redesigned jacket water pumps, (b)

Modified turbocharger supports, (c)

Upgraded pistons, (d)

New crankshafts, J

(e)

New cylinder heads, (f)

Turbocharger prelubrication modification, (g)

New pushrods, (h)

Upgraded new subcover, (i)

New cylinder block; (3)

Development of procurement requirements for re-placement and spare parts; (4)

Working with TDI in the general revision and up-grade of the diesel engine operation and instruction manu-als; J

(5)

Directing engineers and designers in the devel-opment of detailed procedures for disassembly and rebuilding of the diesel engines; (6)

Development of an engine vibration qualification program; (7)

Participation in a diesel generator " Operational Review Program," to assess the significance of diesel gen-erator modifications, non-conformances, etc., on the oper-ational capability and reliability of the diesel genera-tors; and presentation of the results and conclusions of l

this program to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC");

c) November, 1983 to April, 1984, special assignment to the Shoreham DR/QR program, which evolved into the TDI Diesel Gen-erator Owners Group DR/QR Program; areas of responsibility in-cluded the following:

L (1)

Assisted in the development of the l

Shoreham DR/QR program, including its conception, development of procedures, and structuring of the l

basic organization; (2)

Participated in the development of a computerized database chronicalling experiences with diesel engine components in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications-(3)

Participated in the identification of components to be subjected to a design review and/or quality revalidation; (4)

Expanded the Shoreham-specific DR/QR program to cover TDI engines installed at eleven other nuclear power plants; (5)

Participated in site-specific engine inspections to review the results of quality inspections at a number of plants; (6)

Participated in the review of all Phase I design review reports, generated as a result of the Owners Group Program.1/

t 1/

As more fully described beginning at 1 10. 1

My present responsibilities at Shoreham include management of the SWEC Site Engineering Office.

As SWEC Senior Site Repre-sentative, I am also responsible for project policy interpreta-tion and personnel matters on-site.

As SWEC's contact to the Owners Group Executive Committee, I am responsibl'e for SWEC's continuing support to the owners in the following areas:

a) engine startup consulting and support activities; b) special

. testing (including engine vibration monitoring); c) maintenance program development and support; d) implementation of modifica-tions or development of alternatives; and e) development of re-sponses to NRC Staff information requests.

4.

I am a graduate of Ohio State University, from which I obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineer-ing.

Prior to attending college, I spent six years in the U.S.

Navy's Nuclear Power Program.

My final three years in the ser-vice were spent as a reactor operator aboard a nuclear subma-rine.

I am a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

A statement of my professional qualifications is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

l L

I.

THE TDI DIESEL GENERATOR OWNERS GROUP PROGRAM PLAN A.

Background

5.

TDI has been a major supplier of large diesel engines for marine propulsion, gas compression, and non-nuclear elec-tric power generation for years.

The engine known as the

" Enterprise engine" of the Enterprise Engine and Machinery Com-pany (which was acquired by TDI in 1960), underwent a major redesign in the late 1960s to transform it for the current rat-ings for electric power generation offered by TDI.

The first engine of the revised design was sold in May of 1969, and oper-ated at 400 rpm.

The first engine of the four-valve design for 450 rpm operation (similar to the VEGP engines) was ordered in 1972.2/

By mid-1976, orders for over 160 R-4 engines had been placed with TDI, including over seventy V-16 engines.

When Georgia Power Company placed its orders for four TDI DSRV-16-4 emergency standby diesel generators in 1976 for VEGP, orders for 42 emergency standby diesel generators at twelve other nuclear sites had already been placed with TDI.

2/

The DSRV-16-4 diesel generators at VEGP are TDI R-4 (four valve) engines of the 16-cylinder, four-cycle, V-type design.

Other TDI engines in nuclear service include the DSR-48 design, an in-line, 8-cylinder engine, and the DSRV-20 engine, a V-type design, but with 20 cylinders. -

6.

On October 25, 1983, as a result of a number of die-sel generator operating experiences involving various nuclear power plant utility owners and various diesel engine types and manufacturers, a technical information exchange meeting hosted by Mississippi Power & Light was held in Atlanta, Georgia.

As a result of discussions at this meeting, twelve U'.S.

utility owners, including Georgia Power Company, formed the TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group to address operational and regulatory issues relating to TDI diesel generator sets used as sources of back-up power in U.S. nuclear power plants.

7.

The structure of the TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group was formalized and approved at an executive meeting held in Atlanta, Georgia on December 21, 1983.

It consisted of an

~

Executive Committee consisting of company officers from each participating utility and a technical program director.

Re-

' porting to the technical program director were the project en-gineer, the DR/QR program manager, and the DR/QR report review manager, each of whom was responsible for a different aspect of the program.

Details of the organization of the owners Group are presented in the "TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group Program Plan," which was submitted to the NRC on March 2, 1984.

8.

The Program Plan established by the Owners Group pro-vided an in-depth assessment of the adequacy of the respective utilities' TDI diesel generators to perform their intended -

safety-related function through a combination of design re-views, quality revalidations, engine tests and component inspections.

High quality technical resources were used in the implementation of the Prcgram.

Organizations and individuals with expert knowledge in the various areas requiring investiga-tion, inspection and analysis were employed to ensure that the evaluations of the individual TDI diesel generators would be thorough and meaningful.

The major technical resources uti-lized in this comprehensive Program, and their function were:

Organization Role in Owners Group Program a.

Stone & Webster Engineer-Management of quality re-ing Corporation (SWEC) validation and design review effort; Performance of design review tasks; Provision of licensing and logistical support.

b.

Failure Analysis Analysis of known Associates (FaAA) problems; Performance of design review tasks.

c.

FEV (German Diesel Con-Technical evaluation sulting Firm) of known problems.

d.

Transamerica Delaval Provision of technical (TDI) and experience data; Review of design review and quality revalida-tion results.

e.

Owners Group Provision of plant-specific technical and experience data; l

O Organization Role in Owners Group Program Provision of working level engineers familiar with diesel generator plant-specific applications; Provision of overall program management.

f.

Impell Performance of design review tasks.

g.

Subvendors Provision of technical expertise on unique components; Provision of support for investigations and site-specific disas-sembly/ reassembly of engines.

9.

The NRC Staff's evaluation of the Owners Group Pro-

~

gram Plan was presented in " Safety Evaluation Report-Trans-america Delaval, Inc. Diesel Generator Owners Group Program Plan," dated August 13, 1984.

This safety evaluation report

("SER") included a review of the technical evaluation report

("TER"), " Review and Evaluation of TDI Diesel Generator Owners' Group Program Plan," (PNL-5161) of June, 1984, which was pre-pared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory ("PNL").3/

Based on its review, the NRC Staff's overall finding was that the Owners 3/

PNL is under contract to the NRC to perform technical evaluations of the TDI Owners Group generic program, in addi-tion to plant-specific evaluations relating to the reliability of TDI diesels..

Group Program Plan incorporated the essential elements needed to resolve the outstanding concerns relating to the reliability

-of the TDI diesel generators for nuclear service, and to ensure that the TDI diesel engines comply with GDC 1 and GDC 17.

These essential elements included:

(1) resolution of known ge-neric problems (Phase I); (2) systematic design review and quality revalidation of all components important to reliability and operability of each owner's engines (Phase II); (3) appro-priate engine inspections and testing, as identified by the re-sults of Phase I and II; and (4) appropriate maintenance and surveillance programs, as indicated by the results of' Phase I and Phase II.

B.

Phase I - Resolution of Generic Problems 10.

In Phase I of the Owners Group Program, one of the first activities undertaken was the assemblage of experience data pertinent to TDI engines.

Using input from various nuclear data sources 4/ (i.e.,

INPO, SOERs, LERs, 10 C.F.R

$ 50.55(e)'s, and 10 C.F.R. Part 21's, etc.) as well as non-nuclear sources (both marine and stationary), supplemented by data obtained as a result of feedback from the utilities' own inspection and testing results (conducted as part of the Owners Group Program), TDI engine / component operational experiences 4/

More fully described at 1 76. ^ --

were documented.

A review of the accumulated data resulted in a conclusion by the Owners Group technical staff (i.e.,

SWEC, FaAA, FEV, etc.) that a limited number of components warranted consideration as significant known problems with potentially generic applicability to TDI diesel generators.

Accordingly, sixteen components received priority attention wi~ thin the Own-ers Group design review group.

The sixteen components vere as follows:

a.

Turbocharger, b.

Base and bearing caps, c.

Crankshaft, d.

Cylinder block, e.

Cylinder head studs, f.

Connecting rods, g.

Connecting rod bearing shells, h.

Pistons, i.

Airstart valve capscrews, j.

Cylinder heads, k.

Fuel oil injection tubing, 1.

Main and connecting pushrods, m.

Rocker arm capscrews, n.

Jacket water pump, o.

Wiring and termination, p.

Cylinder liner. -

1 11.

A detailed design review of each of these components was conducted by the Owners Group consultants to establish the adequacy of their design.

Specific design and/or manufacturing concerns were identified and resolved through analyses, testing and documentation reviews.

Establishment of maintenance requirements and the preparation of inspection plans for these components also formed part of the Phase I effort.

12.

While TDI drawings and certain TDI information were used as input to both the Phase I and Phase II (DR/QR) pro-grams,othe actual technical evaluations were performed indepen-dently of TDI, thereby providing an independent verification of the critical design aspects of each component.

Independent de-sign verification was achieved as follows:

a.

The attributes of the component to be verified by design review were determined by a thorough investigation of the component's service history and identification of likely failure modes.

b.

Methodology for verification of the critical attributes was established, and significant en-gine components (i.e.,

components designed by TDI), were evaluated by the Owners Group, not by review of TDI analysis.

1 l

13.

The Owners Group Program achieved independence from i

TDI's quality assurance ("QA") program by inspection and testing of the diesel generator equipment at each of the nuclear plant sites, including VEGP.

These inspections were performed by both Owners Group personnel and by VEGP personnel.

Examples of inspections performed by Owners Group personnel in-cluded field walkdowns of pipe, tubing and electrical conduit, safety-related wiring, and generator control equipment.

In ad-dition, eddy current examinations were performed on components such as the crankshaft and conne; ting rods, and material comparator and hardness readings were taken on various compo-nents.

The Owners Group recommended inspections are a specific means of verifyir.g critical aspects of each component, and as this method veriftes the suitability of the components actually installed, independence from TDI's QA program is achieved.

14.

Review findings and final recommendations on the Phase I components were outlined in thirty-six separate re-ports.5/

These reports contain recommendations for mainte-nance, testing and inspection, and recommendations concerning operating procedures and procurement specification 1

5/

Thirty-six reports (fifteen subject reports plus supple-ments) were required to address the sixteen components due to differences between types of engines (i.e.,

the DSR-48 and DSRV-16-4).

All of the sixteen components were addressed in separate reports except for the cylinder block and cylinder liner which were evaluated together.

requirements.

As these reports were completed, they were sent to the NRC Staff for review and comment.

The testing and anal-i ysis in support of these thirty-six Phase I reports represent a i

significant effort, spanning over a year's time and involving more than a hundred engineers and technicians.

The following discussion addresses each of the sixteen Phase I components, providing an overview of the problems associated with them in the past and the methodology, and conclusions of the owners Group review.

15.

Rocker Arm Capscrew.

Tne rocker arm capscrews in TDI diesel engines transmit resultant loads from the valve springs, valve opening pressure, pushrods, and rocker arm assemblies to the subcover and cylinder heads.

The rocker arm capscrews were included among the sixteen Phase I components due to isolated failures which were attributed to insufficient preload applica-tion.s/

Two rocker arm capscrew designs were evaluated by the Owners Group, the original " straight shank" type capscrew and a i

modified " necked shank" design.7/

The VEGP capscrews are of s/

Joint Intervenors identified "[e]ngine rocker arm shaft bolt failure" as a problem experienced with the TDI diesels.

See " CPG /GANE's Response to Applicants' First Set of Interroga-tories and Request for Production of Documents," December 5, 1984, Answer to Interrogatories 14-1, 14-2.

This refers to a failure of a rocker arm capscrew.

7/

A detailed discussion of the analysis performed is includ-ed in SWEC, " Emergency Diesel Generator Rocker Arm Capscrew Stress Analysis," March, 1984 and its Supplement, April, 1984, both prepared for the Owners Group.

1 the " necked shank" design.

See " Affidavit of Steve A.

Phillips" ("Phillips Affidavit"), Ex. 2.

16.

Based on the results of its analyses, the Owners Group concluded that both the original and the modified designs were adequate for nuclear service.

The modified " necked shank" design was found to be somewhat more resistant to fatigue fail-ure and less likely to lose its preload due to its lower cyclic load.

The threads utilized for both designs were determined to adequately resist distortion during preload application and the material utilized for the modified rocker arm capscrew design was determined to meet or exceed the requirements of the Ameri-l can Society for Testing Materials (" ASTM") Standard A193.

The Owners Group recommended a quality revalidation review (materi-al verification) on a sample basis to confirm capscrew material properties.

The Owners Group further recommended that all ma-i terials used in the " straight shank" design, if not AISI 4140,g/ have a minimum proof strength of 90,000 psi.

The Own-ers Group recommended that the capscrew torque be checked at every outage after initial engine operation.9/

l g/

AISI 4140 and ASTM-A193 are comparable in their require-ments for chemical composition.

AISI 4140 is a standard of the American Iron and Steel Institute.

9/

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2, for a discussion of testing and inspections already performed at VEGP.

a O

17.

Fuel Oil Injection Tubing.

The fuel oil injection tubing on the TDI standby diesel engines transfers high pres-sure fuel from the individual cylinder fuel pumps to the injec-tion nozzles.

The fuel oil injection tubing was included among the Phase I components due to leaks that developed in tubing installed on TDI diesels at two nuclear sites.

18.

Both shrouded and unshrouded tubing designs were ana-lyzed by the Owners Group.10/

The Owners Group also reviewed the TDI endurance test procedures and test results.11/

The test report from the fuel pump supplier (Bendix) was also re-viewed.

This report included tests demonstrating that cavitation and erosion were not a problem at the flow levels required in the TDI engines.

In addition to these manufactur-ers' tests, several utility engines with TDI tubing, have accu-7 mulated more than 750 hours0.00868 days 0.208 hours 0.00124 weeks 2.85375e-4 months (10 cycles) of operation.

This provides confirmation that the fatigue failures of the fuel oil injection tubing were isolated occurrences (manu-facturing flaws) and not a generic problem.

10/

Shrouded tubing is scheduled to be installed on the VEGP diesel generators, as recommended by the Owners Group.

See Phillips Affidavit, 1 7.

11/

A detailed discussion of the Owners Group review of this component is contained in: " Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Injector Tubing," April, 1984, prepared by SWEC. I

f 19.

Based on its analyses, the Owners Group determined that the fuel oil injection tubing meets the stress criteria of ASME III Class 2 piping design.

The fracture mechanics analy-sis concluded that a 0.0048 inch deep maximum flaw size could be contained on the inner surface of the tube and not propa-gate.

The testing method (addy current) used to detect cracks will assure that any flaw which might occur in the tubing does not exceed 0.004 inch deep.

The compression fittings used to connect the tubing to the pump and injector were considered satisfactory given their testing and in-service performance.

20.

The owners Group recommended inspection of the inner surface of the.high pressure tubing using eddy current tech-niques.

Maintenance instructions recommend that the tubing and fittings be checked visually each month for fuel oil leaks while the engines are operating.

Also, the tubing supports should be checked at each outage to assure that the elastomer

-inserts are functional and to check for any excessive fuel oil line vibration and deflection.

Performance of the Owners Group recommended inspections and maintenance will ensure the suitability of the engines' fuel oil injection tubing.

21.

Main Bearing Saddle, Bearing Caps and Fasteners.

The main bearing saddle, bearing caps, and the fastener assembly support the engine crankshaft in the TDI standby diesel genera-tors.

The cylinder firing pressure exerts a load on the engine i

piston which is transmitted to the main bearing saddle assembly through the connecting rod and the crankshaft.

Therefore, the entire load on the piston is supported by the saddle-bearing cap assembly.

22.

The saddle-bearing cap assembly was included among the generic concerns due to cracks observed in the bearing ped-estals of DSR-4 inline engines, a nut pocket failure in a DSRV-16-4 engine, and through-bolt failures on a DSR-46 en-gine.12/

23.

The Owners Group performed a stress analysis for both the bearing saddle and bearing caps.13/

The Owners Group con-cluded that the saddle-bearing cap assembly is ad3quate for nuclear service.

The safety factors calculated by conservative analysis were adequate to conclude that the saddle-bearing cap assembly has infinite life against fatigue failure.

i i

f i

L 12/

Joint Intervenors identified "!c] racked bedplates in area of main journal bearings" as a problem experienced,with the TDI diesels.

See " CPG /GANE's Response to Applicants' First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents,"

December 5, 1984, Answer to Interrogatories 14-1, 14-2.

This refers to problems experienced with the main bearing saddle, caps, and-fastener assembly supporting the crankshaft.

I-g13 A detailed discussion of analyses performed is included in Design Review of Engine Base and Bearing Caps for Transamerica Delaval DSRV-16 Diesel Engines," prepared by FaAA for the Own-l ers Group.

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24.

To increase the factor of safety between the saddle and the bearing cap, the Owners Group recommended that the mating surfaces of the base and cap be thoroughly cleaned with solvent before first assembly and upon any reassembly as a pre-cautionary measure to improve the frictional force resisting cap movement.

The mating surfaces of the base and cap were i

cleaned with solvent at VEGP, as recommended.

See Phillips Af-fidavit, Ex. 2.

25.

Connecting Rod Bearing Shell.

The babbitt-overlayed cast aluminum connecting rod bearing shells in the TDI standby diesel generator engines provide the oscillating / sliding sur-face between the crankpin and the connecting rod through forma-tion of a hydrodynamic film.

The cylinder firing pressure is transmitted through the connecting rod bearing shells to the crankpin.

The force is thus converted into engine torque.

26.

The connecting rod bearing shells were included among the Phase I components due to cracks found in several con-necting rod upper shells in the Shoreham DSR-48 engines.

These cracks were identified in the bearing shells after about 250 hours0.00289 days 0.0694 hours 4.133598e-4 weeks 9.5125e-5 months of full-load operation and were due to the combined ef-fects of the Shoreham-unique design (1/4" x 45 degree) chamfer on the connecting rod bearing caps and voids in the bearing ma-terial resulting from the manufacturing process.

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1 27.

The Owners Group analysis concluded that the con-necting rod bearing shells used on DSRV-16-4 engines, such as VEGP's, with 13-inch x 13-inch crankshafts and connecting rod bores with 1/16" x 45 degrees chamfer (which fully support the bearing shell) have a fatigue life of 38,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months of full-load engine operation.14/

This conclusion is verified by the oper-ating history of the engines.15/

28.

Based on the results of its analyses, the Owners Group concluded that the babbitt-overlayed cast aluminum con-necting rod bearing shells were suitable for their intended purpose.

The Owners Group analysis resulted in a recommenda-tion that the size of the voids in the casting in the critical area of the bearing not exceed 0.050 inch.

In the non-critical areas of the bearing shell, and in the lightly-loaded lower bearing shell, the void size can be as large as 0.250 inch.

To assure compliance with the acceptance criterion, the Owners Group recommended inspection of the bearing shells by radio-graphy.

This inspection has been performed at VEGP and some shells rejected.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

The shells 14/ A detailed discussion of the Owners Group analysis is in-cluded in the FaAA report, " Design Review of Connecting Rod Bearing Shells for Transamerica Delaval Enterprise Engines,"

March, 1984.

15/

For example, no failure of bearing she.l.ls was observed after 1200 hours0.0139 days 0.333 hours 0.00198 weeks 4.566e-4 months of operation of a Grand Gulf DSRV-16-4 engine.

i l

will be replaced by shells meeting the Owners Group acceptance criteria prior to preoperational testing.

Id.

29.

Emergency Diesel Generator Engine and Auxiliary Module Wiring and Termination Qualification to IEEE-383-1974.

The TDI diesel generator engine and auxiliary module wiring and termination are interconnected by instrument, control, and power circuits on the diesel generator itself and within the control panels.

The wiring and termination was included among the sixteen Phase I components because of a Service Information Memorandum ("SIM") and a 10 C.F.R. Part 21 notice issued by TDI informing utilities of two potentially defective engine-mounted cables that did not meet IEEE-383-1974 standards.

30.

The owners Group analysis included a review of,the circuit requirements.

Included in this analysis was a determi-nation of the wire insulation rating, type and rating of termi-nation, voltage, maximum temperature, current flame retardancy requirements (IEEE-383-1974), and routing.16/

Based on the re-suits of its analysis, the Owners Group encluded that the wiring and termination were satisfactory, provided that the modification referenced in TDI's SIM is implemented.

VEGP will 16/

A detailed discussion of this analysis is included in SWEC, " Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Module Control Wiring & Termination Qualification Review," July 1984, prepared for the Owners Group. i

)

be_ replacing its cables with 90"C IEEE-qualified cable, as re-quired.

See Phillips Affidavit, 1 14.

31.

Satisfactory performance of the wiring and termina-tion has been demonstrated in several utility engines with more than 750 hours0.00868 days 0.208 hours 0.00124 weeks 2.85375e-4 months of operation and over 100 starts each. This operating history confirms the reliability of the TDI-generic wiring and termination.

32.

Cylinder Head Stud.

The cylinder head studs in the TDI standby diesel generators transmit cylinder firing pressure forces from the cylinder heads to the engine block and assure the required preload on the cylinder head gasket for combustion gas and water sealing.

The cyinder head studs were included among the Phase I components due to isolated failures resulting from insufficient preload in some non-nuclear applications.

Two distinct head stud designs were evaluated by the Owners Group, the original, " straight" shank design, and a modified,

" necked" shank type.

The VEGP engines have the " necked" shank design.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

33.

A stress analysis was performed by the Owners Group on both head stud cesigns17/

The analysis included a 17/

A detailed discussion of the analysis is included in SWEC, rEmergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Head Stud Stress Analy-sis," April, 1984 and its Supplement, May, 1984, both prepared for the Owners Group., _ _ _ _

=

determination of the applied stresses, the endurance limits, a j

l fatigue life analysis, a thread distortion analysis, and a thermal stress evaluation of both stud designs.

Based on its analysis, the Owners Group concluded that both the " straight" and " necked" studs were satisfactory for nuclear service.

The

" necked" shank design (used at VEGP) is somewhat more resistant to fatigue failure and less likely to lose its preload.

The

" necked" design top thread in the block is lower than that on the " straight" stud, which means that the " necked" design will produce lower stress levels near the liner landing area than the " straight" stud.

The Owners Group recommended a quality revalidation review (material verification) on a sample basis to confirm that the cylinder head stud meets the requirements of AISI 4140.

This materials verification has been performed at VEGP.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

34.

Air Start Valve Capscrew.

The air start valve capscrews in the TDI standby diesel generators provide the 1

clamping force to hold the air start valves in place on the cylinder heads.

The air start valve capscrews were included among the Phase I components because cylinder heads were found with insufficiently drilled-out air start valve capscrew holes which could prevent the air start valve from being properly I

seated.

This was discovered during an inspection prompted by a SIM issued by TDI which recommended that users measure the ---

a

r a

l length of their engine air start valve capscrews because some were too long.

TDI recommended that the capscrews be l

shortened.

VEGP has replaced the original 3-inch long capscrews supplied with its engines with the 2-3/4 inch length.

See Phillips Affidavit, 1 14, Ex. 2.

l 35.

A stress and dimensional analysis was performed by the Owners Group for the air start valve capscrew in order to verify TDI's recommended modification to a shorter length.lg/

The analysis included a determination of minimum possible capscrew clearance-(given the specified tolerances of the capscrew and its clamped parts), the applied stresses, a fa-tigue analysis and an analysis of stresses during tightening.

Satisfactory fatigue and operational life has been demonstrated by several utility engines which have accumulated more than 750 7

hours (10 cycles) of operation and over 100 starts.

This operating history verifies that capscrew fatigue and operation-al failures will not be a problem.

36.

Based on analysis and operating experience, the Own-ers Group concluded that the air start valve capscrew was sat-isfactory for nuclear service.

The design provides adequate Ig/

A detailed discussion of this analysis is included in the SWEC report, " Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Valve Capscrew Dimensions and Stress Analysis," March 1984, prepared for the Owners Group.

safety factors against fatigue failure and failure while tightening.

The capscrew will not fail due to loss of preload.

37.

The Owners Group recommended retorquing at eight-hour intervals during initial engine operation, as specified by TDI, until no further movement is detected.

This retorquing proce-dure will assure retention of a tight seal as the copper gasket

" sets".

VEGP will perform this retorquing, as recommended.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

38.

Pushrods.

The intake and exhaust main pushrods and the exhaust connecting (intermediate) pushrods were among the sixteen Phase I components.

The primary function of the pushrod is to provide a portion of the linkage that transmits camshaft lobe motion to the intake and exhaust valves, thereby controlling the valve opening and closing cycle.

Three basic designs are in use.

These are: 1) forged head; 2) ball end; and 3) friction-welded end.

39.

The forged head design consists of a tubular steel shaft fitted with hardened steel end pieces attached to the tube with four plug welds near the end of the tube.

Cracking in the tube wall adjacent to the plug welds has been found in the forged head design.

40.

The ball end design consists of a tubular steel shaft l

fillet-welded to a carbon steel ball at each end.

The ball end !

I i

L

design has exhibited cracking at the interface of the pushrod tube and ball end fitting.

These cracks have developed in the heat-affected zone of the high carbon chrome steel ball.

Com-plate separation between the tubular steel shaft and the pushrod ball has occurred upon disassembly.

Failures of the forged head and ball end designs have not affecte'd engine operability because the valve train lash has never been suffi-cient to allow the pushrod end to escape from the tube.

41.

The friction-welded design (the design used at VEGP, see Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2), consists of a tubular steel shaft friction-welded to a solid steel plug on each end.

No failures have been reported for the friction-welded pushrods.

42.

The Owners Group investigation of the pushrods con-sisted of a metallurgical analysis of the fillet-welded ball end design, fatigue analyses and an analysis of the buckling stability and wear resistance of the forged head and friction-welded designs.19/

In addition, the Owners Group performed ex-i perimental evaluation, including fatigue tests of forged-head and friction-welded pushrods.

The fatigue tests were performed 1

at loads in excess of those expected in service to a life of 7

10 cycles.

From the analysis and testing performed, the g19 A description of the Owners Group review is contained in, Design Review of Push Rods for Transamerica Delaval Diesel Generators", April, 1984, prepared by FaAA.

i i

Owners Group concluded that the friction-welded design is the most reliable of the three pushrod designs.

43.

The Owners Group recommended an inspection and sam-pling plan for the pushrods as follows:

a)

Verify that the main end connector pushrods are friction-welded.

b)

Perform a liquid penetrant or magnetic parti-cle test on all main and connector pushrods.

If these inspections cannot be performed, a visual inspection is acceptable if the sur-face is thoroughly cleaned to remove any coatings or deposits.

All pushrods for the Unit 1 A-train engine have been liquid penetrant tested, with satisfactory results.

See Phillips Af-fidavit, Ex.

2.

The B-train pushrods will be liquid penetrant tested prior to preoperational testing of the engine.

Id.

The pushrods on the Unit 2 engines have also been liquid penetrant tested, with satisfactory results.

Id.

44.

Cylinder Heads.

The cylinder heads in the TDI stand-by diesel generators provide a pressuro-tight cap for the en-gine cylinders and provide passages and sealing for cooling water, lube oil, starting air, iritake, and exhaust gases.

The

< ;q' ;-

. e,

{

{L I

0 cylinder' heads were included among the sixteen Phase I compo-nents bY,_cause of held defects consisting of cracks in locations such(as"the fire deck, the exhauct'and intake bridges, exhaust valve seats, and induction port.

AmEYallurgicalanalysiswasperformedbytheowners 45.

Group which included: 1) examination of casting shrinkage indi-cations found in a cylinder head taken from a Comanche Peak en-gine; 2) examination of a pre-existing shrinkage void and of a crack in a stellite weld deposit, each found in a Grand Gulf head; and 3) the examination of a crack across the wall of the fuel injector port in a head from an engine at the Catawba Nuclear Power Station.20/

46.

Based on' metallurgical evaluations of different gen-erations of TDI cylinder heads, limited analysis of the fire deck area, and review of the service history, the Owners Group reached the following conclusions'and made the following recom-mendations:

i a.

Past problems with cylinder. heads (i.e., leaks) are attributable to the manufactaring process.

I i

\\.

20/

A detailed discussion of the analyses performed is includ-edtin raAA report "Evalustion of Cylinder Heads of Transamerica s

Delaval, Inc. Series R-4' Diesel Engines," May 1984, prepared j

for 7.he Owners Group. l l I 1

-s.

. _ ~,

b.

Cylinder heads cast before September, 1980 are sub-ject to core shift, inadequate control of solidifica-tion, and inadequate control of the stellite valve seat weld deposition process.

Heads cast before October, 1978 were not stress-relieved and are there-fore subject to fatigue crack growth in thin sections and/or from fabrication-induced defects.

c.

The potential for pre-existing flaws in heads manu-factured after September, 1980 is significantly less than for heads manufactured earlier.

f d.

The heads are adequate for their intended service, provided the Owners Group recomt. ended inspections and maintenance activities are followed.

l 47.

The cylinder heads in the VEGP diesels were manufac-tured after September, 1980.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

VEGP has performed the inspections recommended by the Owners Group.

Id.

Visual inspection, liquid penetrant tests, magnet-ic particle tests, and ultrasonic tests were performed on all of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 heads.

Id.

One cylinder head from Unit 1 was rejected and replaced.

Id.

Two heads were rejected from the Unit 2 engines and replaced.

Id.

VEGP has committed to implement Owners Group recommended maintenance and surveil-lance, see id. 1 11, which includes barring-over of the engines..

k

48.

Piston Skirt.

The p4.ston skirt in the TDI diesel generators transmits the cylinder gas pressure force on the piston crown to the connecting rod.

Also, the piston skirt supports the piston crown and guides the connecting rod into the engine's cylinder.

The side thrust developed due to the obliquity of the rod is. transferred to the piston skirt.

The piston skirt provides a sliding friction surface against the 1

stationary cylinder liner.

In the TDI diesel generators, the piston crown is bolted to the piston skirt.

49.

The piston skirts were included among the sixteen Phase I components due to cracks in the skirt-to-crown stud attachment bosses in 23 out of 24 pistons in a DSR-48 engine at Shoreham.

Each of the cracked piston skirts were of the AF de-sign.

50.

The Owners Group performed a detailed analysis of the AF and AE type piston skirts.

Basically, the AF and AE piston skirts are similar in design with identical loading and func-tional attributes.

The major difference between the two de-signs is in their fabrication thermal history and the configu-ration of the stud bosses inside the skirt where the washers on the crown attachment stud meet the skirt i

)

51.

In the Owners Group analysis, a non-destructive dye-penetrant test was performed on a cracked AF piston.21/

The i

l 21/

A discussion of the analysis performed by FaAA for the Owners Group is contained in " Investigation of Types AF and AE Piston Skirts," May 23, 1984.

1 1 l

1

l analysis found that all of the cracks were similarly located and oriented on the spot-faced boss.

A destructive examination

1

was conducted and the cracks were opened up.

Examination of the fractured surfaces indicated that they were fatigue cracks.

This was confirmed by examination in a scanning electron microscope.

52.

The Owners Group experimental and analytical evalua-tions showed that the peak stresses in the AE skirts (the de-sign utilized at VEGP, see Phillips Affidavit, 1 14, Ex. 2),

are generally lower than the corresponding AE values.

This fact, coupled with the positive operating history of the AE skirt on both nuclear and non-nuclear TDI diesel engines, led the Owners Group to conclude that the AE piston skirts are ade-quaIte for unlimited life under full load conditions.

53.

Cylinder Block and Liner.

The cylinder block in the TDI standby diesel generators makes up the central framework for the engine.

The cylinder block was included among the Phase I components because of block top cracking exhibited in blocks in the Shoreham engines and other TDI engines in nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

Four types of cracks were iden-tified in the Shoreham engine blocks:

1) ligament (from cylin-der liner counterbore to head stud counterbore); 2) stud-to-stud; 3) stud-to-end of block; and 4) circumferential cracks at the liner counterbore.22/

All of these cracks connected with 22/

Owners Group analysis of circumferential cracking showed these cracks to be the result of loads applied to the cylinder (Continued Next Page) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

the block-top surface and could be detected by surface inspec-tion.

At Shoreham, one block (from Emergency Diesel Generator

("EDG") 103) was found to have a Widmanstaetten graphite microstructure.

This block also had stud-to-stud and stud-to-end cracks.

No instance has been reported where cylinder block cracks have resulted in failure of an R-4 or RV-4 engine.

54.

The Shoreham engine blocks analyzed by the Owners Group had operated a significant amount of time at or above the nameplate rating of 3500 kW.23/

As part of its engine requalification testing, Shoreham operated each engine 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months at or above the design load.

During engine disassembly and inspection, ligament cracks were found.

After inspection, unit EDG102 was operated through 100 starts to loads greater than 50% nameplate load and was then reinspected.

Eddy current examination showed no discernable extension of ligament cracks.

In general, cracks were detected and measured.using visual, liquid penetrant, and eddy-current inspection techniques.

(Continued)

I liner landing.

Liner landing pressure is primarily controlled by the interference of the liner collar (proudness) above the block top.

The VEGP blocks have been reworked to reduce this interference to current TDI specifications.

See Phillips Affi-davit, Ex.

2.

Liner crush has been maintained.

Id.

23/

A detailed discussion of the analysis performed is contained in the Owners Group report, " Design Review of TDI R-4 and RV-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks and Liners," prepared by FaAA. l l

i

~

55.

A cylinder. block strain gage test was conducted by J

the Owners, Group on. unit EDG103 following a 100-hour full power j

endurance test.

A metallurgical analysis was also conducted.

- The analysis consisted of an investigation of the microstructure, composition and mechanical properties of four TDI R-4 cylinder blocks from three engines at Sho~reham.

The four cylinder blocks investigated were EDG101, EDG102, EDG103 (original) and EDG103 (replacement).

It was established that the microstructure of EDG101, EDG102, and EDG103 (replacement) was normal for grey cast iron but the EDG103 (original) block l

was characterized by an abnormal graphite distribution (degenerant Widmanstaetten graphite).

It is generally accepted I

that the mechanical properties of grey cast iron with the Widmanstaetten ferrite are lower than normal.

Higher than nor-mal amounts of the tramp elements (lead and antimony), were present in the EDG103 (original) block.

The study described in the Owners Group report clearly showed that the original, cracked EDG103 cylinder block was characterized by an abnormal microstructure and that the mechanical properties of that mate-rial were substandard.

56.

The Owners Group fracture and fatigue life evaluation produced a cumulative damage analysis which takes into account a cumulative Fatigue Damage Index ("EDI").

This index accounts for hours of operation at each power level and the

)

33-4 1

1

-+

a y,

...-r-+.-,-n--e

-n,

.-,-..----,--,4.--.-..m--

., - -...---,,---c--..v,,---,---,------,.m-r=,-...--.~a,n-.

..a m-

i l

l corresponding mean stress and cyclic stress driving the crack at each power level.

The index quantifies the effect of dif-fering fatigue crack growth rates of different materials.

This allows comparison of the test period experience on the original Shoreham EDGlO3 block, with its documented degraded fatigue re-sistance, to the expected behavior of other type cylinder blocks having the fatigue resistance characteristic of typical grey cast iron under required test and postulated Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Coolant Accident (" LOOP /LOCA") condi-tions.

Application of the cumulative damage analysis can be used to set future engine operation limits.

Safe operation can be assured during a LOOP /LOCA based on Shoreham benchmark oper-ations in combination with past operation of the engine pro-vided proper procedures are followed as referred to in the Own-ers Group report.

57.

Based on the stress analysis, the Owners Group made the following recommendations:

Periodic inspections are necessary to demonstrate that each cylinder head block is capable of per-forming its intended function as a component in a diesel generator in nuclear standby service.

All blocks should be metallurgically evaluated to verify that the microstructure is characteristic of typical grey cast iron.

Cylinder blocks that are inspected and found to be free of ligament cracks can operate without addition-al inspections for combinations of load and time that produce less than the excess cumulative damage index l

that has been demonstrated by its operation at the...

time of the latest block top inspection.

Blocks of engines that have operated without block top inspec-tion or for a time beyond the last inspection in ex-cess of the allowable fatigue damage index should conservatively be assumed to have cracked ligaments.

For blocks with known or assumed ligament cracF,, ab-sence of detectable stud-to-stud or stud-to-end cracks between the heads should be established before returning the engine to emergency standby after any operation in excess of 50% nameplate load.

Any stud-to-stud or stud-to-end crack indications must be evaluated with detailed inspection to assure that they extend less than 1.5 inches from the block top before returning the engine to emergency standby after any operation in excess of 50% nameplate load.

It is necessary to evaluate the microstructure to en-sure typical cast iron.

The above recommendations are being implemented at VEGP.

See, e.g.,

Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

58.

Turbocharger.

The turbochargers on the TDI standby diesel generators utilize exhaust gas energy to drive the tur-bine which drives a compressor on a common shaft to pressurize the engine intake manifold.

This forces more air into the com-bustion chamber, permitting more fuel to be introduced which results in higher combustion pressures and higher net engine output than that possible with natural aspiration.

59.

The turbochargers were included among the Phase I components because of thrust bearing, nozzle vane, nozzle ring capscrew and washer, and nozzle ring failures on TDI nuclear and non-nuclear standby diesel engines.24/

24/

A detailed discussion is included in the FaAA report "De-sign Review of Elliott Model 90G Turbocharger Used on (Continued Next Page) 60.

The Owners Group performed inspections of thrust bearings from nuclear engines that had experienced a series of starts and some operating time.

The thrust bearings from an engine that used only the drip pre-lubrication system experi-enced measurable wear with a low number of operating hours and engine starts.

The thrust bearing from an engine with a before and after (b & a) lubrication system, activated manually for e

two minutes prior to start, experienced no measurable wear.25/

61.

The Owners Group concluded from its analyses that the thrust bearing would provide adequate service if a prelubrica-tion system operated with a drip provision for fast starts was installed and used during non-emergency starts.

The owners Group found that the thrust bearings were of adequate design, given proper lubrication, to operate at the loads introduced by the exhaust and induction air gases during transient, normal operating and overload conditions.

The Owners Group recom-mended that the thrust bearing be inspected at each 5-year overhaul interval.

l l

(Continued)

Transamerica Delaval DSR-48 and DSRV-16 Emergency Diesel Gener-ator Sets", prepared for the Owners Group.

25/

The VEGP turbochargers' drip pre-lubrication systems are being modified so that lube oil can be manually-added.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex.

2. - _. __ _

62.

The Owners Group found no problems with regard to the dynamic performance of the rotor assembly.

The Owners Group also reported on the nozzle ring capscrew, washer and vane failures, after investigating the failures of these components at several nuclear power plants.

The analysis concluded that the nozzle vane failures were due to high cycle fatigue intro-duced by engine vibration or exhaust gas pulsations.

The re-port concluded that while isolated vane failures may occur, they have not resulted in any degradation in diesel generator performance or a shutdown among the nuclear engines investi-gated.2s/

No cause for the cracked washer was found.22/

The failure of the capscrews is attributed to improper preload.

The single nozzle ring failure is attributed to probable impact from a broken vane.

Recommendations were made that all turbochargers be inspected for nozzle vane damage and that all capscrews be properly torqued to the 18 to 22 lbf-ft specified by Elliott.

This has been done at VEGP.

See Phillips Affida-vit, Ex. 2.

In addition, it was recommended that the exhaust temperatures be monitored and corrective actions taken if they exceed the values recommended by TDI.

VEGP will be monitoring exhaust temperatures.

Id.

Based on the results of the 2p/

Maintenance performed during every outage would permit identification of loose or missing vanes or capscrews.

22/

Failure of a washer would not cause any degradation of diesel generator performance.

I analysis and the recommendations made for this component, the Owners Group concluded that the Elliott Model 90G turbochargers will perform satisfactorily.

63.

Jacket Water Pump.

The jacket water pump, taking suction from the jacket standpipe, delivers coolant (treated water) at the required pressure and flow rate to the engine jacket water header.

The pump provides the coolant circulation needed to cool the engine cylinder assemblies, exhaust mani-fold, turbocharger, intercooler, and engine lube oil cooler.

64.

The particular water pump design used on the DRSV-16-4 engine (such as the ones at VEGP) does not have a history of failures.

However, the jacket water pump used on the TDI standby generators eqqipped with the in-line diesel en-gine, model DSR-48, has a history of shaft failures in nuclear and non-nuclear service.

65.

The Owners Group report for the DSRV-4 pump reflects the use of two different impeller diameters - either 12.1 inches or 10.75 inches.28/

This variability is due to differ-ences in plant specification and the consequential coolant flow requirement for the standby generators.

In addressing the 28/

A detailed discussion of the analysis is included in SWEC,

'5mergency Diesel Generator Engine Drive Jacket Water Pump De-sign Review," April 1983, and its supplement, June 1984. t

l impact of the difference in diesel impeller diameter on the re-view, the Owners Group used a conservative approach - one based on analyzing the system with the larger impeller.

This situa-tion represented "the worst case" in terms of shaft and cou-pling loading.

The Owners Group concluded that the DSRV-4 and the modified DSR-4 pump designs were adequate for' nuclear ser-vice.

66.

Crankshaft.

The crankshaft in TDI standby diesel generator engines converts reciprocating motion, component in-ertial forces and gas pressure piston forces to rotary motion and torque at the output flange.

The 13" x 13" DSRV-16-4 en-gine crankshaft was included among the Phase I components due to three crankshaft failures in non-nuclear applications.

The non-nuclear failures were attributed to torsional fatigue cracks initiated in the oil holes of main journal numbers 6 or 8.

There have been no failures of 13" x 13" crankshafts on DSRV-4 engines in nuclear service.

The only failure of a crankshaft in a TDI diesel engine in nuclear service was on the smaller 11" x 13" crankshafts on the three Shoreham DSR-48 en-gines.

67.

The Owners Group performed a dynamic torsional analy-sis of the crankshaft to determine the true range of torque at each crankthrow.

A torsional model of the crankshaft was developed to supplement TDI's conventional forced vibration i - _. _ _

calculations.

In order to compute the true summation of the stresses due to various orders, the model included computations for phase relationships between the various orders.

The first three natural frequencies of the VEGP crankshaft were calculat-ed.

The natural frequencies were found to be in agreement with those computed by TDI.

68.

Further analysis considered the harmonic loading on the crankshaft.

Gas pressure, inertial forces and frictional loading were considered for the harmonic loading calculations.

The dynamics of a V-16 engine are such that the 4th order load components from the left and right banks almost cancel.

In practice, however, due to various reasons such as manufacturing tolerances and individual cylinder timing, the balance is not complete.

To simulate the unbalance the Owners Group applied one degree delay in the right bank cylinder.

In the absence of torsiographic test data, the calculated amplitudes are not com-pared with the measured amplitudes.

The model was used to cal-culate the range of torques at each crankthrow.

The stress level was found to be highest between cylinders 3 and 4, 5 and 6,

7 and 8.

The highest nominal shear stress amplitude of 5335 psi was found to be lower than the 7000 psi allowable by the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association ("DEMA").

The Owners Group performed calculations to determine the amplitude of free-end vibration and the associated nominal shear stress at 7000 kW power and at a crankshaft critical speed of 438.4 rpm.

The highest nominal shear stress amplitude of 5128.8 psi was found to be lower than the 7000 psi allowable by DEMA.

69.

The Owners Group analysis concluded that the TDI cal-culations were appropriate and show that the crankshaft stresses are below DEMA recommendations for a single order.

The torsiograph tests performed on DSRV-16-4 diesel engines at a number of nuclear stations also show that the peak-to-peak crankshaft stresses are within the DEMA recommendations. The Owners Group concluded that the VEGP crankshafts are adequate for their intended service provided all of the Owners Group recommendations are followed.

A torsiograph test should be performed and the results compared with both the Owners Group analysis and TDI's calculations.29/

The results of the torsiograph test should demonstrate that the crankshaft stresses meet DEMA standards and that they are close to the TDI and Owners Group values.

Individual cylinder timing should be adjusted to accomplish engine balance and bring the stress val-ues in line with those of TDI and the Owners Group.

29/

Torsiograph testing will be conducted at VEGP to confirm the adequacy of the crankshafts.

See Phillips Affidavit, V 22.

Cylinder imbalance testing will also be conducted at the time af torsiograph testing.

Id.

r 70.

Connecting Rods.

The connecting rods used in the TDI standby diesel generators transmit engine cylinder firing forc-es from the pistons to the crankshaft such that the reciprocating motion of the pistons induces shaft rotation and output torque.

By virtue of the V-cylinder configuration, the mechanism required to perform this function consists of two connecting rods arranged in a master-articulated manner.

This arrangement requires more sophistication in bearing design and assembly methodology than that found with in-line type engines.

Such complexity makes the design analysis more involved and re-quires that there be substantial operating experience and/or experimtntal data to confirm the design integrity.

71.

Initially, the connecting rod assembly was produced with 1-7/8 inch diameter bolts to secure the main assembly joint (master rod box to link rod box).

Operating experience in non-nuclear applications indicated that the design was vul-nerable to failure by one of two mechanisms -- either by loss of bolt preload resulting in bolt failure or by the fatigue failure of the master rod box with cracks initiating at the thread roots.

To compensate for the loss of bolt preload, the installation torque specification for the joint bolts was in-creased.

Corrective action for the fatigue of the master rod box resulted in a design revision with 1-1/2 inch diameter bolts, torqued to 1700 lbf-ft to provide the same clamping -

I force obtained with the 1-7/8 inch bolt configuration torqued to 2600 lbf-ft.

This change in bolt diameter provided a greater material section and consequently reduced the stress levels in the master rod box.

The VEGP connecting rods are supplied with the revised 1-1/2 inch diameter bolt.

See Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

72.

The analysis conducted by the Owners Group indicated that both rod assembly designs were acceptable for nuclear ser-vice.30/

The results, however, showed that the 1-1/2 inch de-sign was not vulnerable to fatigue failure under the same en-gine load conditions as in the case of the 1-7/8 inch design.

73.

For both designs, the Owners Group recommended that each rod assembly be inspected with nondestructive techniques to confirm the absence of flaws.

In the case of the 1-7/8 inch bolt system, the inspection should be performed at intervals of 200 engine hours.

For the 1-1/2 inch bolt system, the inspec-tion need only be done initially to confirm the absence of pre-existing flaws.

Beyond these inspections, the rod assemblies need only be checked for proper bolt torque at in-stallation.

VEGP is implementing these Owners Group recommendations.

See, e.g.,

Phillips Affidavit, Ex. 2.

30/

A detailed description of this analysis is included in FaAA report " Design Review of Connecting Rods for Transamerica Delaval DSRV-4 Series Diesel Generators," August 1984, prepared for the Owners Group. l I

\\

s i

74.

The Owners Group concluded that the rod assemblies are suitable for their intended application provided the fol-L lowing maintenance recommendations are observed:

1) the bolt holes be initially inspected to verify the absence of pre-existing flaws, 2) the procedure for torquing the rod bolts reflect the importance of cleaning the threaded surfaces and using a thread lubricant as specified in the TDI instruction manual, and 3) a comprehensive inspection of the connecting rods be conducted at each engine overhaul interval.

+

C.

Phase II - Design Review / Quality Revalidation of Selected Engine Components 75.

Phase II of the Program (design review and quality revalidation), examined the components of each owner's particu-A lar engines, not evaluated in Phase I, from the standpoint of both design and quality attributes, to assess their ability to reliably perform their intended function.

These components did not have a history of problems. A Component Selection Committee composed of a component selection chairperson, SWEC representa-tive, FaAA representative, TDI representative, diesel generator specialist, and an owner's representative, formally reviewed each owner's engine components.

Based on the specific compo-nent's function and role in the overall operation of the en-gine, applicable site an'd industry experience, and the engi-neering judgment and experience of the Committee, certain

, e i

a

components were then selected for a detailed design review and/or quality revalidation.

76.

The first step in component selection, review of en-gine experience, encompassed three areas of review:

(1) nuclear industry experience; (2) non-nuclear industry experi-ence; and (3) utility site-specific experience.

Nuclear indus-try experience associated with each component was gathered and entered into the component database (a computer summary of the selected diesel generator components compiled using the "TDI Parts Manual").

Sources of information included:

a.

Licensee Event Reports (LERs);

b.

Significant Event Reports (SERs);

c.

Institute for Nuclear Power Operation

("INPO") Significant Operating Event Re-ports (SOERs);

d.

10 C.F.R. 5 50.55(e) reports; e,

10 C.F.R. Part 21 reports; f.

INPO Nuclear Plant Reliability Data Sys-tem entries (NPRDS);

g.

Electric Power Research Institute re-ports; h.

Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) bulle-tins, notices, and circulars; i.

TDI Service Information Memos (SIMs).

l

\\

The non-nuclear industry experience of the component was I

gathered on engines manufactured by TDI. } Sources of informa-l tion included:

a.

Stationary / marine engine experience; b.

Correspondence between TDI and pur-chasers; c.

Ships' logs; and d.

Engine inspection reports.

Each utility in the Owners Group, including GPC, gathered site-specific component experience which was entered into the

(

database.

Sources of information included:

I a.

Design change documents; b.

Repair / rework documentation; i

l c.

Deficiency reports; j

d.

Inspection reports; e.

Maintenance logs.

All of the information in this database contributed to the Com-mittee's selection of components.

77.

During the component selection process, engine compo-nents were classified as either Type A, Type B, or Type C.

These classifications were based on the effect the component's l

failure would have on diesel generator performance.

A descrip-tion of each of these classifications follows: t

l l

a.

Type A Component - a component, based on the judgment and experience of the Compo-nent Selection Committee, whose failure

~

would result in immediate diesel generator shut-down, or prevent start-up under emer-gency conditions.

b.

Type B Component - a component, based on the judgment and experience of the Compo-nent Selection Committee, whose failure would result in reduced capacity of the diesel generator, or the eventual failure of a Type A Component, if not detected, c.

Type C Component - a component, based on the judgment and experience of the Compo-l nent Selection Committee, whose failure would have little bearing on the effective use or operation of the diesel generator.

I Examples of Type A, Type B, and Type C components follow:

1 a.

Type A Turbocharger Crankshaft Cylinder Block Connecting Rods b.

Type B i

Intercooler Jacket Water Standpipes pipe, fittings, gaskets Base and Bearing Caps-Base Assembly Cam Bearing c.

Type C Turbo Tools Pyrometer Wire 1

Turbo Charger Air Inlet Adapter Crankcaso Vacuum Fan l

' i i

l l

i Examples of components which did not require classification were items such as nameplates and maintenance tools.

78.

The Component Selection Committee chose the compo-nents to be subjected to a design review and/or quality revalidation on the foregoing bases (i.e., component classifi-cation as to criticality, past industry and other site-specific experience, etc. as inputted to the component database, as well as the engineering judgment and experience of the Component Se-lection Committee).

Absence of adverse operating experience did not necessarily exclude a component from the DR/QR process.

The following illustrates the general guidelines for selection a.

Type A Components - design review and/or quality l

revalidation normally required.

l b.

Type B Components - Component Selection Commit-tee would determine if design review and/or quality revalidation was required.

l c.

Type C Components - design review and/or quality revalidation normally not required.

l l

79.

Engine components selected for design review and/or l

quality revalidation were then subjected to reviews, inspec-tions, testing, etc., as required by the Component Selection Committee.

The nature of a specific component determined if a Design Review alone was required, Quality Kevalidation alone was required, or both were required.

The critical attributes of a given component, and how best to verify that attribute (i.e.,

analysis, inspection or both), dictated the nature of the required review.

80.

An example of a Design Review-only component is the flywheel.

It was determined that the only attribute required for review was the flywheel's effect on the crankshaft tor-sional system.

Only design review was required to determine, for each plant, what differences, if any, existed between the site-specific flywheel and the lead engine, and to evaluate any differences.

l 81.

An example of a Quality Revalidation-only component l

is the control panel assembly terminal boards / switches / wiring.

It was determined that the only review of attributes required was a visual inspection of the control panel for cleanliness and a verification that the wire was purchased to environmental qualification requirements.

82.

Design review and/or quality revalidation require-ments were reflected in specific task descriptions (" Component L

Revalidation Checklists") prepared for each component by the Owners Group Design Review Group and Quality Revalidation Group.31/

Task descriptions included any requirements 31/

The Design Review Group consisted of consultants from SWEC, FEV, Impell, and FaAA.

SWEC was responsible for small t

i bore piping and tubing equipment.

Impell was responsible for (Continued Next Page) l specified in the selection process, as well as more detailed descriptions of procedures, standards, or design review ap-proaches to be applied.32/

The individual task descriptions were then implemented by the Owners Group technical staff, in the case of design reviewn, and by the individual owner's qual-ity revalidation group, as discussed in the Phillips Affidavit, in the case of quality reviews.

83.

The Owners Group Program is based on a lead engine and follow-on engine concept.

The lead DSR-48 engines, at Shoreham, and lead DSRV-16-4 engines, at Comanche Peak, were extensively evaluated over an eight-month period.

A full re-view was conducted on all the required components during this period, utilizing over a hundred engineers, designers and (Continued) large bore piping.

FaAA and FEV were responsible for engine components.

Each component was assigned a task leader from the various organizations.

This task leader would develop a task description which was reviewed and approved by the Design Re-view Chairman and the Program Manager.

The Quality Revalidation Group consisted of SWEC engi-neers, quality assurance engineers, and inspectors.

Based upon the inspection and review requirements, as specified by the Component Selection Committee and the Design Review Group, they would develop specific task descriptions for each component.

32/

The task description for each component reviewed in Phase II of the Program is contained in or referenced in each owner's final DR/QR report, prepared by the Owners Group.

The DR/QR Report prepared for VEGP, Unit 1, incorporates the information contained in the 12-volume VEGP report on its engine inspection effort.

SUMMARY

Mr. Kammeyer has six years of experience on nuclear power plant projects and six years experience on U.S. Navy Nuclear submarines.

Currently, as an Engineer, he is assigned as the Head of the Site Engineering Office ("SEO") and the SWEC Senior Site Representative at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Mr.

Kammeyer is responsible for on-site SWEC support at the Shoreham plant.

Since joining SWEC in June 1979, he has also been assigned to the Transamerica Delaval, Inc. ("TDI") Owners Group, as the Design Review and Quality Revalidation Program Manager.

In addition, he has completed the Career Development Program, including assignments to the 850 MWe boiling water reactor Shoreham Nuclear Power Station as a Site Engineer and as a Systems Engineer, and to the 938 MWe pressurized water reactor North Anna Power Station project as a Systems Engineer.

Prior to college, Mr. Kammeyer spent six years in the Navy's Nuclear Power Program; the final three years were spent as a Reactor Operator aboard a nuclear submarine.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS j

American Society of Mechanical Engineers - Associate Member

DETAILED EXPERIENCE RECORD KAMMEYER, JOHN C.

47182 STONE si WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION, BOSTON, MA (June 1979 to Present)

Appointments:

Engineer, Power Division - Feb 1981 Career Development Engineer, Power Division - June 1979 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Long Island Lighting Company (Nov 1979 to Present)

As ENGINEER (Jul 1985 to Present) assigned to the Site Engineering Office ("SEO") in the capacity of Head-SEO and SWEC Senior Site Representative.

Responsible, under direction of the Project Engineer, for management of personnel and activities at the site in support of initial plant startup and power testing.

As ENGINEER (Mar 1985 - Jun 1985) reassigned to the SEO in the capacity of Power Engineer and Assistant Head-SEO.

As ENGINEER (Apr 1984 to Feb 1985) on special assignment to the Transamerica Delaval, Inc. ("TDI") Owners Group in the capacity of Program Manager of the Design Review and Quality Revalidation effort for TDI diesel generators utilized at 12 different nuclear power plants.

Responsible for directing engineers and quality inspectors in the resolution of generic TDI diesel engine problems, and the design review / quality revalidation of selected engine components and participating in meetings with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its technical staff to present the overall program and provide briefings on problem component analyses.

As ENGINEER (Aug 1982 to Mar 1984) assigned to the SEO in the capacity of Power Engineer and Assistant Head-SEO, responsible to the Head-SEO for the Power Division effort.

During the construction and startup testing phase of the plant, responsible for directing engineers and designers in the i

resolution of problems dealing with fluid systems and related i

components, such as piping, valves, mechanical equipment, and equipment erection.

Provided engineering and coordination support to the client for the emergency diesel generator design revalidation program ASLB qualification effort.

Plant preoperational phase responsibilties included developmental support of the station modification programs and engineering the specific modification packages for the upgrade of

l mechanical systems and equipment.

In additien, in the absence of the Head-SEO, responsible for the operation of the SEO.

As ENGINEER (May 1981 to July 1982) assigned to the SEO, responsible for resolving various engineering related construction problems, principally with piping and mechanical components, requiring an immediate solution to support the construction schedule.

In addition, working directly with the client's start-up organization to resolve system operation deficiencies.

As ENGINEER and CAREER DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER (Nov 1979 to Apr 1981) in the Nuclear Engineering Group, responsible for preparing reactor plant flow diagrams, and update of FSAR and technical specifications.

Responsible for the interpretation of purchase specification requirements and the disposition of vendor nonconformances.

As a Career Development Engineer, spent four months at the SEO; responsibilities included maintainability study of of all plant equipment to ensure accessibility and proper physical arrangement to meet maintenance requirements for the 850 MWe power plant.

North Anna Power Station - Units 3 & 4, Virginia Electric and Power Company (June 1979-Nov 1979)

As CAREER DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER, assigned to Nuclear Engineering Group as a system engineer responsible for preparing reactor plant flow diagrams, sizing of system components such as pumps and valves, purchasing of equipment, including preparation of specifications, and preparing FSAR sections.

l U.S. Navy (Sept 1969-July 1975)

USS James K.

Polk, SSBN - 645 (Apr 1972-June 1975)

As SENIOR QUALIFIED REACTOR OPRRATOR, responsible for repair and maintenance of reactor instrumentation and supervision of division training. Received honorable discharge with ETR-2(SS) rating, commendation from Commander, Submarine Squadron Sixteen.

EXHIBIT 2 VEGP - UNIQUE REPORT TDI OWNERS GROUP for V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 CYLINDER BLOCK COMPONENT PART NO. 02-315A I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant requires Design and Quality Revalidation re-views of the cylinder blocks to determine the adequacy of design for their intended use at Vogtle.

The blocks are manufactured by TDI and are supplied under their part number 02-315-03-AE.

The cylinder block forms the framework of the liquid cooled engine and provides passage for coolant and support for the cylinder liners and cylinder heads.

II OBJECTIVE The objective of this review was to evaluate the structural adequacy of the cylinder block for its intended use at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

III METHODOLOGY In order to meet the stated objective, the following methods were used:

Review of liquid penetrant inspections of Vogtle OSRV-16-4 Engine 1 and 2 engine blocks.

Review of operating history.

1 Review of engine operating conditions at Vogtle and identification I

of any differences from those at Comanche Peak.

Performance of dimensional check and evaluation of liner / block interaction.

Evaluation of steady state

stresses, alternating stresses and stiffness in key portions of the cylinder block.

Evaluation of crack growth rate for cylinder block landing counter-bore diameter by comparison with conservative Shoreham data and analysis.

Review of metallurgical / microstructural analysis of cylinder block material.

Review of Vogtle site, nuclear and non-nuclear experience (see Appendix C).

REV. 1 V03239/1 l

~

Page 2 of 4 Review of Quality Revalidation Checklist results for acceptability.

e IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS l

A generic investigation of the structural adequacy ' of the TDI R-4 and RV-4 series diesel engine cylinder blocks for emergency standby service in nuclear power plants is summarized in Reference 1.

The investigation considers the cause, extent, and consequences of cylinder block cracking, and the inspections required to assure a sufficient margin of safety dur-ing continued operation under test and postulated accident conditions.

1 Evaluation of steady state stresses, alternating stresses and stiffness in key portions of the cylinder block was accomplished as part of the strain gauge testing at Shoreham, and the results were included in the cumulative damage and crack growth analyses.

The cumulative damage analysis is explained in Reference 1.

Diesel generators 1 and 2 have had limited operational experience.

Engine hours accumulated to date consist of factory test hours performed by TOI.

The engine operating conditions at Vogtle were compared to those at Comanche Peak and Shoreham.

No significant differences were found that would affect the structural integrity assessment of the Vogtle blocks.

Results of dimensional inspection of the cylinder liner bore and mating block surfacea were used to evaluate the interaction of the block and cylinder liner in the analysis of steady state and alternating stresses.

These results were utilized in the cumulative damage analysis.

1 The power output for this engine is 7000 kW at 100 percent load.

Maximum output required for LOOP /LOCA is 6032 kW.

The duration of a LOOP /LOCA used in this analysis is 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months .

Strain gauge testing of the original Shoreham EDG 103 block, inspection data from before and after extensive test operation and materials testing were used as a basis to predict adequate life for cylinder blocks.

The rate of propagation of cracks between stud holes during operation in the 1

original Shoreham EDG 103 block, when compared with the LOOP /LOCA requirements at Vogtle, indicates that even if the Vogtle blocks had ligament cracks they are predicted to withstand with sufficient margin a LOOP /LOCA event.

Block tops have been inspected and no detectable ligament, stud-to-stud or stud-to-end cracks have been reported.

In addition, a material microstructure evaluation has been performed on all engine blocks at Vogtle verifying that the block material is characteristic of typical Class 40 grey cast iron.

REV. I V03239/2

Page 3 of 4 Application of the cumulative damage analysis (Figure 5-1 of Reference 1) shows that the Vogtle engines can perform for 490 hours0.00567 days 0.136 hours 8.101852e-4 weeks 1.86445e-4 months at 100 percent load (or operation resulting in equivalent cumulative damage), without inspection, with sufficient margin for a LOOP /LOCA event (Ref. 2).

Engine operation in excess of the above time period without repeated inspection in justified if the fatigue damage index since the last inspection does not exceed the allowable fatigue damage index based upon I

the last inspection.

In the future this process may be repeated, and additional engine operation without inspection may continue until the additional fatigue damage index equals the allowable fatigue damage index established by the last inspection which showed no cracking.

Optionally, in the future, after additional engine operation without repeated inspection has accumulated a fatigue damage index which exceeds the allowable fatigue damage index, continued engine operation can continue without removal of cylinder heads and maintain sufficient margin to withstand a LOOP or LOOP /LOCA event provided periodic eddy current inspections described in Figure 5-1 of Reference 1 are performed between the heads.

One block of Unit 2 Engine No.1 has been found to contain a weld repair region in cylinder No. 1.

Vogtle is planning to replace this block with a new RV-5 design.

Based on review of dimensional changes m&de in this design, and test engine experience in excess of 5000 hours0.0579 days 1.389 hours 0.00827 weeks 0.0019 months , block top stresses are reduced from the R-4 levels thereby descreasing the possibi-lity of block top crack formation.

Assuming satisfactory inspection results from all Appendix B inspections, application of the cumulative damage algorithm as described above shows that engine operation, without subsequent inspections for 490 hours0.00567 days 0.136 hours 8.101852e-4 weeks 1.86445e-4 months at 100 percent power level (or operation resulting in equivalent cumulative damage) would be possible with sufficient margin remaining for a LOOP /LOCA event (Reference 2).

Therefore, the RV-5 block is acceptable for emergency standby service provided that all Appendix B inspections are completed satisfactorily and the cumulative damage algorithm as outlined in Reference 1 is applied to determine future inspection frequency period.

The informat'on provided on the following TERs has been reviewed and is consistent with the final conclusions of this repo,rt:

11-949,11-010 and 11-050.

Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B have been reviewed and considered in the performance of this design review and the results are consistent with the final conclusions of this report.

Based on the at,ove review and implementation of routine inspections, it is concluded that the cylinder blocks are acceptable for their intended use at Vogtle.

REV. 1 V03239/3

l l

Page 4 of 4 V.

REFERENCES 1.

Design Review of TDI-R4 and RV-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks.

FaAA-84-9-11.

2.

FaAA Support Package Number SP-84-6-12(j),

G REV. 1 CARRY OVER FROM PREVIOUS PAGE V03239/4

APPENDIX A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 Cylinder Block-Liners and Water Manifold:

COMPONENT Cylinder Block UTILITY Georgia Power Company GROUP PARTS LIST H0. 02-315A TASK DESCRIPTION NO. OR-11-02-315A-0 2

SNPS GPL NO. 03-315A CLASSIFICATION TYPE A

TASK OESCRIPTIONS Review liquid penetrant inspections of Vogtle DSRV-16-4 engine block tops and review engine operating experience.

Review engine operating conditions of Vogtle and identify any differences from those at Comanche Peak.

t Perform dimensional check on cylinder block and cylinder liners and evaluate liner / block interaction.

Evaluate steady state stresses, alternating stresses and stiffness in key portions of the cylinder block.

i Evaluate crack growth rate for cylinder block landing and counterbore diameter by comparison with conservative Shoreham data and analysis.

Review metallurgical / microstructural analysis of cylinder block top material.

Review of Vogtle site, nuclear and non-nuclear experiences (see Appendix C).

Review of Quality Revalidation Checklist results for acceptability.

l Review information provided on TERs.

PRIMARY FUNCTION To provide framework for engine components and to provide cooling water passages.

V03073/1

~ - -. --,

COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST Page A2 of 2 DR-11-02-315A-0 ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED That components have sufficient strength and stiffness to react major loads.

SPECIFIED STANDARDS None.

REFERENCES Mone.

DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Manufacturer's drawings for DSR-48 and RV blocks, liners and studs, including all specifications for material, torques, valve train loads and gas cycles.

Engine operating history (time vs. load) for operation prior to block top inspection, and for total engine hours.

Anticipated engine operating profile (time vs. load) for fuel cycle, including pre-operational, qualification, and surveillance testing.

Engine factory test logs that report firing pressures and exhaust temperatures for each cylinder.

.m

= PROGRAM MANAGER QC \\4a.ww, e GROUP CHAIRPERSON m

u yy-V03073/2

Appendix E Page B1 of 6 11-02-315A 4

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Georgia Power Company Vogtle Electric Generating COMPONENT Cylinder Block UTILITY Plant - Unit 1 GPL NO.

02-315A REV. NO.

2 SNPS GPL NO.

03-315A TASK OESCRIPTIONS Engine 1 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a dimensional check on the area around the cylinder liner for all cylinder block liner landings.

3.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant or Magnetic Particle test on the cylinder block liner landing along the top landing surface, fillet radius, and vertical face adjacent to the landing surface.

Four liner landings (3L, 4L, SL, 6L and 3R, 4R, SR, 6R) should be inspected with the liners removed.

If linear indications are found, increase inspection plan to all liner landings.

4.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant or Magnetic Particle test on the cylinder head mating surface on top of the cylinder block.

The area between stud hole and liner, and between adjacent cylinder stud hole should be inspected.

The inspection plan should include cylinders 3L, 4L, SL, 6L and 3R, 4R, SR and 6R.

If linear indications are found, increase inspection plan to all cylinders.

5.

Perform an Eddy Current test on the cylinder head stud holes if required (i.e., linear indications found at stud hole extending into threads).

6.

Remove a sample from each cylinder block by drilling and cutting.

The samples shall be tetraheoral in shape with a one inch square base and a height of 5/8 inch.

Attachment B shows the location where ' the samples should be taken.

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 V02798/1

l COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 6 11-02-315A ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED Engine 1 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Dimensions of the cylinder block liner landing area 3-5.

Surface integrity of the cylinder block liner landing 6.

Samples are taken from the cylinder block in accordance with Tu'.#

d 99-016.

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Engine 1 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

Review of inspection report by the Design Group 3-4.

See Attachment A 5-6.

Review of inspection report by the Design Group Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 REFERENCES Encine 1 1.

QCI No. 52 2.

Approved Site NDE Procedures 3-4.

TER#s99-004, 99-018,99-036 V02798/2

l COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 6 11-02-315A REFERENCES (continued)

Enaine 1 (continued) 5.

FaAA Procedure NOE 11.8 6.

TER# 99-016,99-031 Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Enoine 1 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-6.

Inspection Report Engine 2 Same as Engine 1

[.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON -

hk,

.td PROGRAMMANAGERI.

- gg f

[gk a

COMPONENT REVIEW Engine 1 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A dimensional check was performed on all cylinder block liner landings.

The results were reported by TER# 11-049.

3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on'all cylinder block liner landings. The results were reported by TER# 11-049.

4.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on all the cylinder head mating surfaces.

The results were reported by TER# 11-049.

V02798/3

l COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B4 of G 11-02-315A COMPONENT REVIEW (continued)

Engine 1 (continued) 5.

An Eddy Current test was performed on all cylinder head stud holes and counterbore areas with no indications noted.

This was reported 1

by TER# 11-049.

6.

A sample was taken from each cylinder block as required.

Results of the analysis were reported by TER# 11-090.

Engine 2 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A dimensional check was performed on all cylinder block liner landings.

The results were reported by TER#s11-010 and 11-049.

3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on all cylinder block liner landings. The results were reported by TER#s11-010 and 11-049.

4.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on all the cylinder head mating surfaces The results were reported by TER#s11-010 and 11-049.

S.

An Eddy Current test was performed on all cylinder head stud holes and counterbore areas with no indications noted.

This was reported by TER#s11-010 and 11-049.

6.

A sample was taken from each cylinder block as required.

Results of the analysis were reported by TER# 11-090.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION Enaine 1 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as out-lined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluatioa and conclusions in support of the final report.

Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 GROUP CHAIRPERSON. fifu. M M 6 PROGRAM MANAGE [

5 V02798/4

l Attachment A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B5 of 6 11-02-315A ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA A.

Area to be inspected 1.

Top of Block 2.

Liner counterbore B.

Reference Standard ASTM E125 C.

Evaluation of indications 1.

Relevant indications are:

a.

Hot tears and cracks, linear indications that exceed ASTM E125 Class I-2 b.

Shrink that exceeds ASTM E125 Class II-3 c.

Inclusions that exceed ASTM E125 Class III-3 d.

Porosity that exceeds ASTM E125 Class V-1 2.

All indications exceeding the specification listed above shall be documented and submitted to the Design Group.

3.

Indications that do not exceed the ASTM E125 reference regardless of size and quantity are acceptable.

D.

Non-Relevant Indication 1.

The indications referenced below shall be considered non-relevant, a.

Magnetic writing b.

Linear grain boundaries (carbon, ferrite, or graphite induced) c.

Rounded grain boundaries (carbon, ferrite, or graphite induced)

V02798/5

l Attachment B COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B6 of 6 i

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EXHIBIT 2 l

VEGP - UNIQUE REPORT TDI OWNERS GROUP for V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 STARTING AIR MANIFOLD:

PIPING, TUBING, AND FITTINGS (LARGE BORE SCOPE ONLY)

COMPONENT PART NO. 02-441A I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant requires Design and Quality Revalidation reviews of the structural adequacy of the starting air manifold piping for the effects of normal operating and earthquake loadings.

The primary function of the starting air manifold piping is to provide adequate starting air from the off-skid supply piping to each angine cylinder.

The scope of piping embraced by this report includes the large bore (greater than 2-inch diameter) piping components as noted on the as-built information obtained during Impell field verification (Ref. 1), plus small bore piping, which was included because of the configuration.

Piping components are defined as piping spool pieces, elbows, tees, flanges, Dresser couplings and the interconnecting welds.

This scope is uniquely defined in terms of Transemerica Delaval, Inc.

(TDI) part numbers in Reference 1.

II OBJECTIVE The objective of this review was to verify the adequacy of the subject piping components for normal operating and earthquake loadings.

III METHODOLOGY The evaluation of the piping components is performed in accordance with the philosophy and intent of the ASME Code Section III, for Class 3 Nuclear Piping.- Towards this end, a criteria document was developed,

" Design Criteria for Diesel Generator Large Diameter Piping for Vogtle,"

~

which describes the background and prosides the techniques for evaluating the subject piping.

These criteria are presented in their entirety in Reference 2.

Quality Revalidation Checklist results were reviewed for acceptability.

The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Component Tracking System was reviewed for the Vogtle site, nuclear and non-nuclear industry experience.

l V03376/1

Page 2 of 3 IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS All piping stresses were within the design allowables specified by the ASME Section III Code.

With respect to the Dresser couplings, Impell evaluated the couplings against the manufacturer's selection and service requirements.

These include the design service conditions, relative end displacements from both translation and rotation of the joined pipes, and shelf and service life.

The movements at the Dresser couplings are within the manufactur-er's and movement requirements (Ref.

3).

There are no service life constraints (Ref. 4) because this style of coupling has no significant history of failure.

Shelf life (Ref. 4) is unlimited as long as the gaskets remain packaged and protected from the elements (light, water, etc).

The. couplings are adequate with respect to manufacturer's service condition limits.

It is recommended ~ that support modifications be effected in order to provide stiffer load paths and to relieve thermal restraint in certain directions by partial support removal through bolt hole elongations.

The support modifications are summarized in Reference 5.

Historical corrosion data for carbon steel ' starting air systems was not available.

However, the subject starting air piping and interconnecting welds have a limiting wall thickness of 5.15 times that required (Ref.

2), which should be sufficient margin against~corrcsion.

All pipe loads on the engine have been tabulated and issued for evaluation.

These evaluations were performed as part of the develop nent of reports for ccmponent Nos. 02-315A and 02-4418.

There are no TERs ast.ociated with this component.

The Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B have been reviewed and considered in the performance (.,f this design review,and the results are consistent with the final conclusions of this report.

Based on the above review, it is concluded that the subject piping components, with the above recommended modifications, are adequate for their intended design function at Vogtle.

V REFERENC5!S 1.

" Supporting Calculations for the Evaluation of Vogtle Diesel i

Generator Large Diameter Piping and Supports," Impell Report No.

i 02-0630-1301, Rev. O, December 1984.

i l

2.

" Design Criteria for Diesel Generator Large Diameter Piping for Vogt16," Impe11 Report No.

02-0630-1300, Rev.

O, December 1984.

This is included in Appendix III of the final OR/QR report.

3.

Dresser Pipe Couplings, Pipe Fittings, and Pipe Repair Products Catalog, No. 63.

V03376/2 L

c l

Page 3 of 3 4.

Telephone Conversation between A.

Palumbo (Impe11) and M.

Riley (Dresser Manufacturing Co.), dated June 5, 1984.

5.

Letter from R. Markovich/G. Shears (Impell) to J. Kammeyer (SWEC),

" Required Modification for Validation of Impell's Design Review for Component No. 02-441A-Vogtle," dated December 7, 1984.

l V03376/3

J i

APPENDIX A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 Starting Air Manifold:

Piping COMPONENT (Large Bore Scope only)

UTILITY Georaia Power Company GROUP PARTS LIST NO. 02-441A TASK OESCRIPTION NO. DR-11-02-441A-0 SNPS GPL NO. 03-441A CLASSIFICATION TYPE B

TASK DESCRIPTIONS Evaluate structural integrity of the starting air manifold piping spool pieces and fittings for the effects of normal operating and earthquake loadings by (a) comparison to previous analyses, (b) review of previous analyses, (c) review of previous qualification documentation, and/or (d) actual performance of stress evaluation in accordance with the intent and philosophy of ASME III Class 3 and Impell Design Criteria.

Review information provided on TER.

4 PRIMARY FUNCTION Provide adequate starting air fron off-skid supply piping to each engine cylinder.

ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED Structural integrity of large bore (greater than 2 in. dia.) piping spool pieces and fittings to withstand the effects of normal operating and earthquake loadings.

i SPECIFIED STANDARDS None 4

V03324/1

COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST Page A2 of 2 DR-11-02-441A-0 REFERENCES

" Design Criteria for Diesel Generator Large Diameter Piping for Vogtle,"

Impe11 Report No. 02-0630-1300, Rev. O, December 1984.

DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Verified piping isometric, material specification, size and schedule, design parameters, (temp., pressure), contents, insulation, fitting and gasket design parameters.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON

- PROGRAM MANAGER 3 C \\4e_..s....

yV V03324/2

Appendix B Page B1 of 3 11-02-441A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Georgia Power Company Starting Air Manifold -

Vogtle Electric Generating COMPONENT Piping Tubing and Fittinas UTILITY Plant - Unit 1 1

GPL NO. 02-441A REV. NO.

1 SNPS GPL NO. 03-441A TASK OESCRIPTIONS Engine 1 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Obtain sufficient data to support the design review effort.

This may be accomplished by developing quality verified as-builts in accor-dance with Procedure OG-7, or by the Design Group performing a field walkdown.

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED Engine 1 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Information necessary for the design review effort Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Engine 1 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

Review of detailed information by the Design Group Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 V03240/1 1

t COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 3 11-02-441A REFERENCES Engine 1 1.

QCI No. 52 2.

Procedure DG-7 Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Engine 1 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2.

Quality verified as-built isometric drawings for the piping, tubing and fittings if available from the Owner.

Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 GROUP CHAIRPERSON (W h

//h,

PROGRAM MANAGER -DC W - ~ s %

s J

COMPONENT REVIEW Enaine 1 1.

No EDGCTS site experience docurents are in evidence.

2.

The Design Group will be responsible for closing out the as-built drawings as per Procedure DG-7.

The as-built drawings will be Quality verified by the appropriate site Quality organization.

The performance of an engineering walkdown by the Design Group, precludes the issuance of a quality verified as-built drawing or sketch.

Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 V03240/2

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 3 11-02-441A RESULTS AND CONCLUSION Engine 1 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as out-lined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 GROUP CHAIRPERSON ll'I4 PROGRAM MANAGER d 1(a m u-At%

U V03240/3

9 Appendix C Page C1 of 1 EDG COMPONENT TRACKING SYSTEM:

V0GTLE SITE, NUCLEAR ANO NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

COMPONENT NO.

02-441A Effective Printout Date: 12/3/84 COMPONENT TYPE:

Startina Air Manifold:

Pipino, Tubino And Fittinas REFERENCE V0GTLE EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS V0GTLE None NUCLEAR Manifold purge from turbo TDI SIM 323 TDI SIM No. 323 is concerned exhaust to prevent with purging moisture from

.noisture/ corrosion.

the starting air manifold.

Historical data on corro-sion in carbon steel start-ing air lines was not available.

However, Impell

)

evaluation of subject pip-ing determined that the nominal available pipe wall thickness was 5.15 times the minimum required.

Therefore, there is ade-4 quate pipe margin against corrosion in the subject lines.

TDI SIM No. 323 is concerned mainly with foul-ing of starting air valves from corrosion.

NON-NUCLEAR None V03376/1

s Page 1 of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 Connecting Rod COMPONENT Bearing Shells UTILITY Georgia Power Company GROUP PARTS LIST NO. 02-3408 TASK DESCRIPTION NO. DR-11-02-340B-1 SNPS GPL NO. 03-3408 CLASSIFICATION TYPE A

TASK DESCRIPTIONS Design review for this component is not required based on the following:

A review of the Comanche Peak and Shoreham OR/QR reports, which establish the acceptability of the bearing shells for their intended purpose, with a margin of safety that will account for small variances in loading.

The applicable engine dimensions and operating parameters at Vogtle are identical or very similar to those for the same component at Cemanche Peak (Lead Engine).

A review of the EDG Component Tracking System nuclear, ar.d non-nuclear industry experience. There is no site experience listed in the Component Tracking System.

Maintenance recommendations based on the Shoreham DR/QR report to ensure oroper performance under normal operating cor.ditions are as follows:

Inspect and measure the connecting rod bearing shells to verify lube oil maintenance, which affects wear rate.

The visual and dimensional inspection of the bearing shells should be conducted at the refueling outage, which precedes 500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months of operation by at least the sum of hours of operation in a LOOP /LOCA event plus the expected hours of operation between outages.

Perform an X-ray examination on all replacement bearing shells using a procedure with sufficient resolution to implement recommendations for acceptance criteria as documented in the TDI Owners Group connecting rod bearing shells Phase I Report.

No modifications are recommended for this component.

The results of Quality inspections performed for this component have been reviewed and found satisfactory.

V03036/1

COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 D R-11-02-3408-1 PRIMARY' FUNCTION Not required ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED Not required SPECIFIED STANDAR05 Not required REFERENCES Not required DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Not required GROUP CHAIRPERSON 1.5-[uhr PROGRAM MANAGER [ T M el l

fl [

/

V03036/2

c Page 1 of 7 11-02-3408 COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CH2CKLIST Georgia Power Company Connecting Rods-Bearing Vogtle Electric Generating COMPONENT Shells UTILITY Plant - Unit 1 GPL NO.

02-3408 REV. NO.

2 SNPS GPL NO.

03-3408 TASK OESCRIPTIONS Engine 1 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the connecting rod bearing shells.

3.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant test on the connecting rod bearing shells.

4.

Perform a dimensional check of the connecting rod bearing shells.

5.

Peform a Radiographic inspection of the connecting rod bearing shells.

6.

Perform an Eddy Current test as required to identify surface discontinuities.

Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED Enaine 1 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2-3.

Surface integrity of the bearing shells 4.

Proper bearing shell dimensions 5-6.

Integrity of the ber. ring shells V02922/1

/

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 2 of 7 11-02-340B ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED (continued)

Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Engine 1 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-3.

Review of inspection report by the Design Group 4.

Dimensions are in accordance with the TOI Instruction Manual 5.

See Attachments A & B.

6.

Review of inspection report by the Design Group Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 REFERENCES Engine 1 1.

QCI No. 52 2-3.

Approved Site NDE Procedure 4.

TOI Instruction Manual or applicable drawing 5.

FaAA NDE Procedure 9.3, TER# 99-011 6.

Approved Site NDE Procedures Engine 2

~

Same as Engine 1 V02922/2

)

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 3 of 7

,(

11-02-3408 OOCUMENTATION REQUIRE 0 t

{, Engine 1 1.

Document Summary Sheet

\\

2kS.

Inspection Report Enaine 2 Same as Engine 1

, GROUP CHAIRPERSON.

b f*

PROGRAM MANAGER.. M. Q..,u.

_ 2. ~

/

h

' COMPONENT REVIEW Engine 1 1.

No EOGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 11-087.

3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 11-087.

4.

A dimensional inspection was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with satisfactory results.

This, was reported by TER# 11-087.

5.

A Radiographic inspection was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with unsatisfactory results.

Results were reported by TER# 11-087 and dispositioned by NCR Nos. 84-88 and 84-34.

6.

An Eddy Current test was performed on eleven bearing shells with satisfactory results.

The results were reported by TER# '11-087.

Enaine 2 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed on the connecting rod bearing shells.

Scratches were noted for the no. 1, 7, and 8 top bearing shells.

Results were reported by TER#s11-014 and 11-087 and dispositioned by NCR No. 84-9.

V02922/3

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 4 of 7 11-02-340B COMPONENT REVIEW (contiinued)

Engine 2

- 3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with no relevant indications noted.

Results were reported by TER#s11-014 and 11-087.

4.

A dimensionaT inspection was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER#s11-014 and 11-087.

5.

A Radiographfc inspection was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with unsatisfactory results.

Results were reported by TER#s11-014 and 11-087 and dispositioned by NCR nos.84-035, 84-078, and 84-088; 6.

An Eddy Current test was performed on all connecting rod bearing shells with satisfactory results.

Results were reported by TER#s11-014 and 1.T.-087.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONI Encine 1 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above, iis complete.

The results have been fon,arded to the Design Review Grauo for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 T U f <$t b PROGRAM MANAGER

'. C \\4 GROUP CHAIRPERSON n,

,x a

l i

V02922/4

l i

Attachment A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 5 of 7 11-02-3408 Component:

Connecting Rod Bearing Shells, Upper and Lower.

Examination:

X-ray, FaAA NDE 9.2 (R-48); FaAA 3DE 9. 3 (V-12, V-16, V-20).

Examination:

Upper Bearing Shell, see attached figures:

Area R-48: 0.050 inch area, 0.4 inch inward from each side to a line

1. 4 inches inward from each side, extending circumferentially

2. 5 inches on either side of the oil hole.

This is the critical area.

V-12, V-16, V-20:

0.050 inch area, 0.4 inch inward from each side to a line 1.4 inches inward from each side, extending l

circumferentially 5.0 inches on either side of the center of the bearing. This is the critical area.

0.250 inch area, remainder of bearing.

l Lower Bearing Shell:

0.250 inch area, all of bearing.

Acceptance:

The following are unacceptable, based on 3/4 inch reference Criteria radiographs of ASTM E-155, for aluminum.

UPPER BEARING UPPER & LOWER BEARING 0.050 INCH AREA 0.250 INCH AREA Gas Holes 0.050 diameter Grade 5 Gas Porosity Grade 5 Grade 7 (Rounded) ~

Gas Porosity Grade 3 Grade 5 (Elongated) l Shrinkage Sponge Grade 3 Grade 4 Foreign Material 0.050 diameter Grade 3 Less Dense l

Foreign Material 0.050 diameter Grade 4 More Dense Cracks Unacceptable Unacceptable Shrinkage Cavity Unacceptable 0.250 i

V02922/5

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'i'p.

i-Attachment A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 6 of 7 11-02-3408 Note:

Mottling / segregation and micro shrinkage shall not be evaluated for rejection.

Radiographic features that are associated with the babbitt (lead alloy) layer on the bearing I.D. shall not be evaluated for rejection.

For further clarification of these criteria, please contact the Owner's Group.

l I

l l

V02922/6

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Attachment B COMPONENT QUf,LITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 7'of 7 11-02-3408 l.

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EXHIBIT 2 VEGP REPORT REFERENCI11G LEAD ENGIHE REPORTS TDI OWNERS GROUP for COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - UNIT 1 CONNECTING ROD BEARING SHELLS COMPONENT PART NO. 02-340B I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station requires Design and Quality Revalidation reviews of connecting rod bearing shells to determine the adequacy of their design for the intended use at Comanche Peak.

The primary function of the connecting rod bearing shells is to provide a low friction sliding l

interface between the connecting rod and the crankpin through the formation of a hydrodynamic oil film.

This interface transmits the cylinder firing pressure to the crankshaft, converting the force into torque.

The connecting rod bearing shells are manufactured by TDI from permanent mold aluminum alloy 852-T5 castings purchased from ALC0A (Ref.1).

The TDI part number for the components used at Comanche Peak is 02-340-04-AG.

II OBJECTIVE The objective of this review was to evaluate the adequacy of the connecting rod bearing shells for their intended service at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.

Specifically, the following tasks were performed:

Journal orbit analysis to determine the pressure distribution in the I

l hydrodynamic oil film.

Finite element analysis to determine the stress distribution in the connecting rod bearing shells.

Fracture mechanics analysis to determine the resistance to fatigue cracking.

Computation. of acceptance criteria for radiographic NDE of connecting rod bearing shells.

Evaluation of misterial selection and dimensional accuracy.-

A review of maintenance procedures.

TDIO896/1

/

Page 2 of 3 A review of Comanche Peak site, nuclear, and non-nuclear experience.

A review of the Quality Revalidation Checklist results for acceptability.

III METHODOLOGY As described in Reference 1, the design review of connecting rod bearing shells consisted of several steps.

First, laboratory investigations of wear patterns, chemical, metallurgical and physical properties were conducted.

A journal orbit analysis, using dimensions, weights, and weight distributions for DSRV-16-4 engines, as well as engine operation parameters, was performed.

The output of the journal orbit analysis, which is the pressure distribution in the oil film under conditions of ideal geometry, was modified based on observed babbit contact patterns to provide input data to the finite element analysis using the ANSYS code.

The stress distribution computed by the finite element analysis was used to calculate the fatigue life of the connecting rod bearing shells based on nuclear site experience.

The stress distribution was also used to calculate the maximum discontinuity that could be present without decreasing the fatigue resistance.

The material selection was evaluated with respect to friction coefficient, and resistance to corrosion, fatigue and wear.

Dimensional accuracy was evaluated from TER inspection results.

Details of the methodology and analysis are contained in Reference 1.

The applicability of the analysis to Comanche Peak was determined.

The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Component Tracking System was reviewed for the Comanche Peak, nuclear, and non-nuclear industry experience.

IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS Calculation of the maximum tensile stress in the connecting rod bearing shells in DSRV-16-4 engines, in combination with other nuclear experience, was used to predict a fatigue life of about 38,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months for the DSRV-16-4 bearing shells (Ref.1 and 3).

This fatigue life, which safely exceeds the expected usage of the engines during t. 3 operational life of the station, can be assured if an approved radiographic procedure such as Failure Analysis Associates' " Radiographic Examination of Diesel Engine Upper and Lower Bearing Shells," (Ref. 2) is followed.

Design and operating parameters for the Comanche Peak DSRV-16-4 engines (Ref.

4) were compared to the generic analysis of Ref.

1.

Those parameters were found ts be within 5 percent of the generic case, confirming the applicability of the generic analysis to Comanche Peak.

l 0

TOIO896/2

Page 3 of 3 The material selection was appropriate based on professional judgment and experience with similar bearings.

Dimensional accuracy was verified as summarized in Appendix B.

The wear resistance of the connecting rod bearings has been proven adequate in nuclear experience, provided all TDI recommended lubricating oil maintenance procedures (Ref. 4) are followed.

The connecting rod bearing shells should be inspected visually and dimensionally to verify lubrication maintenance which affects wear rate.

The visual and dimensional inspection of the bearing shells should be conducted at the fuel outage which precedes 500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months of operation by at least the sum of expected hours of operation in a LOOP /LOCA event plus the expected hours of operation between outages.

The information provided on the following TERs has been reviewed and is consistent with the final conclusions of this report:

10-079,10-008, 10-026.

Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B have been reviewed and considered in the performance of this design review and the results are consistent with the final conclusions of this report.

Based on the above review and assuming implementation of the radiographic acceptance criteria, it is concluded that the connecting rod bearing shells are acceptable for their intended use at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.

V REFERENCES 1.

Failure Analysis Associates,

" Design Review of Connecting Rod Bearing Shells for Transamerica Delaval Enterprise Engines,"

FaAA-84-3-1, Palo Alto, California, March 12, 1984.

2.

Failure Analysis Associates, " Radiographic Examination of Diesel Engine Upper and Lower Bearing Shells,"

NDE 9.3, Palo Alto, California, February 6, 1984.

3.

FaAA Support Package No. SP-84-3-1(b).

4.

TDI Instruction Manual for Comanche Peak DSRV-16-4 Diesel Generators.

TDIO896/3

?

/

Appendix A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST TEXAS UTILITIES COMPONENT Connecting Rod Bearing Shells CLASSIFICATION TYPE A COMPONENT PART NUMBER 02-3408 TASK DESCRIPTION NO.:

DR-10-02-3408-1 (SNPS PART NUMBER 03-3408)

TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

Compare and evaluate differences in design and operating conditions which are site specific.

Review NOE and other inspection results.

Review information provided on TERs.

PRIMARY FUNCTION:

Provides hydrodynamic oil film sliding surface and load transmission between connecting rod and crankpin.

ATTRIBUTES T0 BE VERIFIED:

Corrosion, fatigue, and wear resistance.

Coefficient of friction, dimensional accuracy, operation parameters.

SPECIFIED STANDARDS:

None.

TOIO199/1

Appendix A Page A2 of 2

REFERENCES:

None.

DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED:

Manufacturer's drawings, cylinder firing pressure, lubrication specifications, and reciprocating weig'its.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON: [El I PROGRAM MANAGER:

(J V k =

t f

TDIO199/2

Appendix B Page B1 of 4 10-02-3408 COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Connecting Rod Bearing Texas Utilities Generating Co.,

COMPONENT Shells UTIILITY Comanche Peak Station GPL NO. 02-3408 REV. NO.

2 SNPS GPL NO. 03-3408 TASK DESCRIPTIONS D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the connecting rod bearing shells.

3.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant test on the connecting rod bearing shells.

4.

Perform a dimensional check of the connecting rod bearing shells.

5.

Perform a Radiographic inspection of the connecting rod bearing shells.

6.

Perform an Eddy Current test as required to identify surface discontinuities.

4 D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as D.G. CP1-NEDGEE-01 i

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2-3.

Surface integrity cf bearing shells 4.

Proper bearing shell dimensions 5-6.

Integrity of the bearing shells TDIO295/1

_l_.___._________....._,____,.-

h COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 4 10-02-340B i

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED (continued)

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-3.

Review of inspection report by Design Group 4.

Dimensions are in accordance with the TDI Instruction Manual 5-6.

Review of inspection report by Design Group D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 REFERENCES 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2-3.

Approved Site NDE Procedures 4.

TDI Instruction Manual or applicable drawing 5.

Approved Site NDE procedure 6.

FaAA NDE Procedure 9.2 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Document Summary Sheet TDIO295/2

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 4 10-02-3408 DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED (continued) 0.G.-CPI-MEDGEE 01 (continued) 2-6.

Inspection Report D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 GROUP CHAIRPERSON PROGRAM MANAGER,W14m,,

4_

s COMPONENT REVIEW D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

All EDGCTS site experience documents were assembled and reviewed i

with unsatisfactory results.

NCR 80-00220 remains open.

2.

A visual inspection was performed with unsatisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-008 and dispositioned by NCR 84-0076.

3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was perfdrmed with unsatisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-026 and dispositioned by NCR 84-0076.

I 4.

A dimensional check was performed with results reported by TERs#

10-02C,and 10-008.

5.

A Radiographic test was performed with unsatisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-026.

6.

An Eddy Current test was performed on selected bearings with satisfactory results as reported by TER# 10-026.

0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

All EDGCTS site experience documents were assembled and reviewed with unsatisfactory results.

NCR 80-00220 remains open.

2.

A visual inspection was performed with unsatisfactory results.

Subsequently, the bearing shells with indications were replaced due to the Radiographic test results.

This was reported by TER# 10-079.

1 3.

A Liquid Penetrant test was performed.

Unsatisfactory bearing shells were replaced because of the Radiographic test results.

This was reported by TER# 10-079.

4.

A dimensional check was performed with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-079.

I TDIO295/3 4

_ _ _ ~... _ _ _ _.... -,.... _., _ _. _. _ -. _,. _.

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATI0l' CHECKLIST Page B4 of 4 10-02-340B COMPONENT REVIEW (continued) 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 (continued) 5.

A Radiographic test was performed with unsatisfactory results.

Bearing shells with indications were replaced with new bearing shells.

This was reported by TER# 10-079.

6.

An Eddy Current test was not required.

This was reported by TER#

10-079.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

D.G. CP1-MEOGEE-02 Same as 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 GROUP CHAIRPERSON //e<M N bdc6 PROGRAM MANAGER Y N - % x O

TDIO295/4

l Appendix C Page C1 of 6 EDG COMPONENT TRACKING SYSTEM:

COMANCHE PEAK SITE, NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

COMPONENT NO.

02-3408 Effective Printout Date 07/02/84 COMPONENT TYPE:

Connecting Rod Bearing Shells REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS COMANCHE PEAK Inspection performed NCR 84-0076 and MEE Expected condition from on connecting rod

84-005 normal diesel engine bearing shells service.

Learing suitable revealed a level of for continued use.

scratching for which bearings were still suitable.

NUCLEAR Diesel tripped due to LER Hatch 2 Not applicable.

Fairbanks-changes in oil and LER 366-82079 Morse engine does not use coolant temp. and crank-LER 820727 cast aluminum bearings.

case pressure caused by SER 67-82 initial failure of 50ER 83-1 connecting rod bearing.

Conrod big end bearing Maanshan Service Not applicable.

Dowel pin failed.

The dowel pin Report TPC Nuclear failure not related to fixing the bearing Plant No. 3, dated bearing shell design.

failed.

Dec. 9, 1983 (Fils No. T-45)

Connecting rod bearing Maanshan - Service Not applicable.

Dowel pin shell dowel pin was Report TPC Nuclear failure not related to broken.

Plant No. 3, dated bearing shell design.

Dec. 9, 1983 (File No.

T - 45)

TDIO896/4

Appendix C Page C2 of 6 REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS NON-NUCLEAR Connecting rod shells Hunton & Williams X-ray examination of were found badly worn or (12/29/83) to C.

Comanche Peak bearing unfit for further use.

Seaman.

shells excludes possible Delaval advised that Memo from M. Zbinden bad alloy.

Incorporated connecting rod shell to R. Ward dated into design review.

cracking on Columbia 11/06/80. (Mtg.)

could have resulted from Letter from M. Zbinden bad alloy makeup by (State of Alaska) to D.

their vendors.

(M/V Martini (TDI) dated Columbia).

03/19/79.

Letter from M. Zbinden to W. Hudson dated 02/02/79.

Letter contains drawings Hunton & Williams Increased clamping force in outlining connecting (12/29/83) to C. C.

connecting rod assembly rods that had cracked Seaman.

eliminates bearing cracking bearing shells, damaged Memo froun M. Zbinden from relative motion of bolts and/or threads.

to file dated master rod and rod box.

New torques values: Link 02/05/80.

rod to pin 1050 ft-lbs; new 1.5 in. rod bolts 1700 ft-lbs; old rod bolts 2600 ft-lbs; new rod box out of roundness spec: 0.004 in max.

(M/V Columbia)

Lost #8 rod bearing Engine incidence X-ray examination of (10/07/75) engine no.

report (City of Comanche Peak bearing 18.

Homestead, F1.)

shells excludes possible dated.9/30/78 (File bad alloy. Incorporated no. T-10) into design review.

Increase clamping force in connecting rod assembly eliminates bearing cracking from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

TDIO896/5

r Appendix C Page C3 of 6 REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS

6 connecting rod Engine incidence X-ray examination of bearing broke (01/10/77) report (City of Comanche Peak bearing i

engine no. 18 Homestead, F1.)

shells excludes possible dated 9/30/78 (File bad alloy.

Incorporated

)

no. T-10) into design review.

i Increased clamping force eliminates bearing cracking in connecting rod assembly from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

i

5, 7 & 10 connecting Engine incidence X-ray examination of rod bearings broken.

report (City of Comanche Peak bearing Replaced all rod Homestead, F1.)

shells excludes possible bearing with new style dated 9/30/78 (File bad alloy.

Incorporated bearings (04/05/76) no. T-10) into design review.

engine no. 18 Increased clamping force in connecting rod assembly eliminates bearing crack-ing from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

Replaced #6 and #10 Engine incidence Increased clamping force connecting rods with new report (City of in connecting rod assembly con rods due to exces-Homestead,F1.)

eliminates' bearing cracking sive fretting at bearing dated 9/30/78 (File from relative motion of fit (05/17/77) engine no. T-10) master rod and rod box.

no. 18.

Five connecting rod Engine incidence X-ray examination of bearings broken. One report (City of Comanche Peak bearing i

connecting rod bearing Homestead, Fl.)

shells excludes possible eroded (01/06/76-d.ted 9/30/78 (File bad alloy.

Incorporated 01/23/76) engine no. 19.

r s. T-10) into design review.

1' Increased clamping force in connecting rod assembly eliminates bearing cracking from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

1 i

TOIO896/6

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Appendix C Page C4 of 6 REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS The connecting rod Failure Analysis Problem related to lube bearing box babbit report no. 0135 oil system.

Not applicable surfaces were completely dated 12/10/80 (File to bearing shell design wiped off as a result of no. T-39) (M/V review.

a crankshaft failure Glencoe, MN) that occurred during a low lube oil pressure alarm.

Broken connecting rod Interoffice memo X-ray examination of bearing shells (05/82) from E. Sigrist Comanche Peak bearing engine no. 19 (TDI) to G. E.

shells excludes possible Trussel (TDI) dated bad alloy.

Incorporated 11/08/82 (File no, into design review.

T-10). (City of Increased clamping force Homestead,F1.)

in connecting rod assembly eliminates bearing cracki,ng from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

Connection rod bearing Interoffice memo X-ray examination of shell failures - in from E. Sigrist Comanche Peak bearing general.

(TDI) to J. Pabers shells excludes possible (TDI) dated 11/01/82 bad alloy.

Incorporated (File no. T-10k into design review.

Letter from A. Muxo Increased clamping force (City of Homestead) in connecting rod assembly to C. S. Mathews and eliminates bearing cracking R. J. Bazzini (TDI) from. relative motion of dated 05/13/82 (File master rod and rod box.

no. T-10). Letter from A. Muxo (City of Homestead) to C. S.

Mathews (TDI) dated 10/13/82 (File no.

T-10).

Conrod bearing shell Memo from H.V.

Manufacturing improvements rotated; cause of failure Schilling (TDI) G. E.

maintain crush and spread was sheared dowel pin-Trussel (TDI) specification.

crush and spread valves 01/04/82 (File #T-4) out of spec.

(M/V Uark AFB)

TDIO896/7

Appendix C Page C5 of 6 REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS Broken connecting rod Letter from R. Pratt X-ray examination of bearings on unit #19 (TDI) to John Smith Comanche Peak bearing (City of Homestead, shells excludes possible F1.) dated 06/17/82 bad alloy.

Incorporated (File no. T-2) into design review.

Telex from R. J.

Increased clamping force Bazzini (TDI) to C.

in connecting rod assembly Mathews (TDI) dated eliminates bearing cracking 06/08/82 (File no.

from relative motion of T-2).

master rod and rod box.

Connecting rod bearing Letter from A. Muxo X-ray examination of shells originally in-(City of Homestead)

Comanche Peak bearing stalled failed after to C. S. Mathews and shells excludes possible short periods of opera-R. J. Bazzini (TDI) bad alloy.

Incorporated tion.

A new type of dated 05/13/82 (File into design review.

bearing was installed no. T-10).

Increased clamping force and likewise failed. A in connecting rod assembly continuing effort to eliminates bearing cracking develop alternate design from relative motion of con-rod bearing shells master rod and rod box.

was begun.

Connecting rod shells Failure Analysis Increased clamping force in

10 upper & lower and #9 report no. 0116 connecting rod assembly upper had crack indica-dated 09/25/78 (File eliminates bearing cracking tions.

All cracks no. T-19) from relative motion of resulted from fretting master rod and rod box.

in connecting rod bore.

Connecting rod bolts &

TDI Failure Analysis Increased clamping force shells failed as a report no. 0127 connecting rod assembly result'of low torque dated 01/07/80 (File eliminates bearing cracking preload conditions which no. T-23),

from relative motion of allowed the assembly master rod and rod box.

to flex, joint to separate and parts to fret and crack.

Conaecting rod bearings Failure Analysis Not applicable.

Problem shell failed while report no. 0108 related to crankshaft, not engine was operating at

, dated 11/14/77 (File bearing shell design.

2500 kw load.

Failure no. T-22) was attributed to in-adnquate stoning and polishing of the crank pin surface.

TDIO896/8

Appendix C Page C6 of 6 REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS Con rod bearing failures Report "Investiga-Increased clamping force caused by movement tion of Con Rod in connecting rod assembly between the master rod Bearing Failures eliminates bearing cracking and the link rod box.

Medan-TITI Kuning" from relative motion of by Robert Gray (File master rod and rod box.

no. T-49)

Con rod bearing shoe TDI Failure Analysis Increased clamping force failures caused by rapid report no. 0144 in connecting rod assembly bearing wear from inade-dated 04/29/82 (File eliminates bearing cracking quate oil filtration and no. T-58) from relative motion of non-rigid bearing master rod and rod box.

housing from lock bolts.

Failed connecting rod Letter G. E. Trussell X-ray examination of bearings.

(TDI) from John Comanche Peak bearing Smith (City of shells excludes possible Homestead) 06/14/77 bad alloy.

Incorporated (file no. T-55) (City into design review.

of Homestead, F1)

Increased clamping force in connecting' rod assembly eliminates bearing crack-ing from relative motion of master rod and rod box.

Various reports of Chrononogical sum-Not applicable.

Problem bearing shell failures n.ary of Glencoe caused by out-of-round and replacements.

tvents - 4 pages -

connecting rod.

dated 02/20/80 eng.

S/N 72052 (File no. T-57)

+

h TDIO896/9

TDI OWNERS GROUP for SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 CONNECTING ROD BEARING SHELLS COMPONENT PART NO. 03-340-B I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station requires Design and Quality Revalidation reviews of the connecting rod bearing shells to determine the adequacy of its design for the intended use at Shoreham.

The primary function of the connecting rod bearing shells is to provide a low-friction sliding interface between the connecting rod and the crankpin, through the formation of a hydrodynamic oil film, which transmits the cylinder firing pressure to the crankshaft, converting the force into torque.

The connecting rod bearing shells are manufactured by TDI from permanent mold aluminum alloy B-852-T5 castings purchased from ALC0A (Ref. 1).

The TDI part number for the components used at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station is 03-340-05-AE.

II OBJECTIVES The objective of this review was to evaluate the adequacy of the connecting rod bearing shells for their intended service at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Specifically, the objective was to perform the following analyses:

o Journal orbit analysis to determine the pressure distribution in the hydrodynamic oil film.

o Finite element analysis to determine the stress distribution in the connecting rod bearing shells.

I o

Fracture mechanics analysis to determine the resistance to fatigue cracking.

o Computation of acceptance criteria for radiograph'ic HDE of connecting rod bearing shells.

o Evaluation of babbitt adhesion.

o A review of maintenance procedures.

o A

review of

nuclear, non-nuclear and Shoreham site experience.

TDI4-231

Page 2 of 3 III METHODOLOGY _

As described in Reference 1 Report on connecting rod bearing shells, the analysis consisted of several steps.

First, laboratory investigation of wear

patterns, chemical, metallurgical and physical properties, and fracture surface morphology were conducted.

Journal orbit analysis, using dimensions, weights and weight distributions confirmed by direct measurement at Shoreham, as well as engine operating parameters from the Shoreham engines, was performed.

The output of the journal orbit analysis, which is the pressure distribution in the oil film under conditions of ideal geometry, was modified based on observed babbitt contact patterns to provide the input data to finite element analysis using the ANSYS code.

The stress distribution corputed by the finite element analysis was used to calculate the fatigue life of the connecting rod bearing shells based on the Shoreham experience with the bearing

shells, and to calculate the maximum discontinuity that could be present without decreasing the fatigue resistance.

The influence of babbitt adhesion was assessed by inspection of bearing shells with marginal babbit adhesion after significant exposure to operating conditions in the Shoreham diesel engines.

Details of the methodology and analysis are contained in the Reference 1 Reports.

IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Comparison of the maximum tensile stress in the original and the current connecting rod bearing shells at Shoreham shows that the stress is reduced by 50 percent in the replacement bearing shells (Ref. 1).

This result was used to predict a fatigue life of about 38,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months for the current bearing shells.

This fatigue

life, which safely exceeds the expected usage of the engines during the 40-year operational life of the plant (Ref. 1), can be assured if an approved radiographic procedure such as Failure Analysis Associates

" Nondestructive Examination of Diesel. Engine Upper and Lower Bea* ring Shells" (Ref. 2) followed.

This procedure has been reviewed and approved by LILCO, and is followed at Shoreham.

The recommendation is implemented in E&DCR F-46505 (Ref. 4).

Babbitt adhesion was found to be adequate for successful functioning of the connecting rod bearing shells at Shoreham.

The normal inspection intervals are adequate to monitor performance of the babbitt overlay.

Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B

have been reviewed and considered in the performance of this design review and the results are consistent with the final conclusions of this report.

TDI4-231

Page 3 of 3 Based on the above review and implementation of the radiographic acceptance criteria, it is concluded that the connecting rod bearing shell is acceptable for its intended desir,n function at Shoreham.

V REFERENCES 1.

Failure Analysis Associates,

" Design Review of Connecting Rod Bearing Shells for Transamerica Delaval Enterprise Engines",

FaAA-84-3-1, Palo

Alto, California, March 12, 1954.

2.

Failure Analysis Associates, " Radiographic Examination of Diesel Engine Upper and Lower Bearing Shells", NDE 9.2, Palo Alto, California, February 6, 1984.

3.

FaAA Support Package No. SP-84-3-1.

4.

E&DCR F-46505 TDI4-231

APPENDIX A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST COMPONENT Connecting Rod Bearing Shells CLASSIFICATION A_

PART NUMBER 03-340-B TASK DESCRIPTION:

1 Obtain and review pressure vs crank angle data.

Perform journal orbit analysis, finite element analysis, and fracture mechanics life estimate.

Determine maximum void size in castings.

Examine GGNS bearing shells.

Evaluate babbit adhesion and thickness variation effects.

Evaluate maintenance procedures.

Review information provided on TERs: Q-42, 0-47, Q-69, Q-182, Q-216, Q-221, Q-303, Q-312, Q-332, Q-334, Q-359, Q-372, Q-436, Q-447, Q-485, DR-34, DR-110 DR-248, Q-505.

PRIMARY FUNCTION:

Provides hydrodynamic oil film sliding surface and load transmission between connecting rod and crankpin.

ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED:

Corrosion,

fatigue, and wear resistance.

Coefficient of friction, dimensional accuracy, operation parameters.

SPECIFIED STANDARDS:

None

REFERENCES:

Seismic Qualification Review, TDI Emergency Diesel Generators at Shoreham Nuclear Power

Station,

" Stone

& Webster Engineering Corp., Shoreham Project Job Book No. 244.7.

DOCUMENTATION PEQUIREC:

Manufacturer's

drawings, cylinder firing pressure, lubrication specifications and reciprocating weights.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON k //

PROGRAM MANAGER

- ~ "

Asza p v*

1o14-231

.~

APPENDIX A Page A2 of 2 COMPONENT REVIEW:

Journal orbit analysis to determine the pressure distribution in the hydrodynamic oil film.

Finite element analysis to determine the stress distribution in the connecting rod bearing shell.

Fracture mechanics analysis to determine the resistance to fatigue cracking.

Computation of acceptance criteria for radiographic NDE of connecting rod bearing shells.

Evaluation of babbitt adhesion.

A review of maintenance procedures.

A review of nuclear, non-nuclear and Shoreham site experience.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Based on the above review and implementation of the radiographic acceptance criteria, it is concluded that the connecting rod bearing shells are acceptable for their intended design function at Shoreham.

Seismic qualification for the connecting rod bearing shells is addressed in " Seismic Qualification Review, TDI Emergency Diesel Generators at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, " Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., Shoreham Project Job Book No. 244.7.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON

_ PROGRAM MANAGER kV f626c4 U"p~

m TDI4-231

Appendix B Page B1 of 5 COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST COMPONENT Connecting Rod Bearing Shells DOCUMENT NO. QR-03-340B PART NO. 03-340B INCORPORATES DOC. NOS. QR-1.Rev.1.QR-2.QR-3 TASK DESCRIPTIONS ENGINE 101 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a Radiographic Test on the connecting rods 1 through 8.

3.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant Test on all the connecting rod bearing shell surfaces for all 8 cylinders.

(Thoroughly clean with solvent only the bearing shall 0.D.

Do not use any form of abrasive cleaner.)

4.

Perform a visual inspection of the connecting rod bearing on the upper shall of cylinder 8.

ENGINE 102 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a Radiographic Test on the connecting rods 1 through 8.

3.

Perform Liquid Penetrant Test on all the connecting rod bearing shell surfaces for cylinders 5, 7 and 8.

(Thoroughly clean with solvent only the bearing shell 0.D.

Do not use any form of abrasive cleaner.)

ENGINE 103 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a Radiographic Test on the connecting rods 1 through 8.

3.

Perform a Liquid Penetrant Test on all the connecting rod bearing shell surfaces for all 8 cylinders.

(Thoroughly cleaning with solvent only the bearing shell 0.D.

Do not use any form of abrasive cleaner.)

SPARES 1.

Perform a material analysis of the conne'eting rod bearing shells.

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFTED ENGINE 101 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Internal discontinuities are within engineering guidelines for the connecting rod bearing shells.

3.

Surface integrity of the connecting rod bearing shells 4

Surface integrity of the cylinder 8 on the upper connecting rod bearing shell ENGINE 102 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Internal discontinuities are within engineering guidelines f or the connecting rod bearing shells.

4 1 shells

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 5 QR-03-3405 ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED (continued)

ENGINE 103 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Incarnal discontinuities are within engineering guide lines for connecting rod bearing shells.

3.

Sarface integrity of connecting rod bearing shells SPARE,S, 1.

Material of the connecting rod bearing shells ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ENGINE 101 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-4.

Review of Inspection Report by Design Group ENGINE 102 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-3.

Review of Inspection Report by Design Group ENGINE 103 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-3.

Review of Inspectica Report by Design Group SPARES 1.

Review of Inspection Report by Design Group REFERENCES ENGINE 101 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

SH1-089, applicable Site / Vendor Documents. FaAA Bearing Report. Alcoa Design Manual. TERs DR-110. Q-91 3.

TERs Q-216. DR-34 Q-91. LILCO Approved Inspection Procedures 4.

TER DR-248. LILCO Approved Inspection Procedures ENGINE 102 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

TER DR-110. SH1-089, applicable Site / Vendor Documents. FaAA Bearing Report. Alcoa Design Manual 3.

LILCO Approved Inspection Procedures

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 33 of 5 QR-03-340B REFERENCES (continued)

ENCINE 103 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

TERs DR-110. Q-91. SH1-089, applicable Site / Vendor Documents. FaAA Bearing Report.

Alcoa Design Manual 3.

TER Q-91. LILCO Approved Inspection Procedures SPARES 1.

TER Q-485 DOCUMENTATION REOUIRED ENCINE 101 1.

Document Sumary Sheet 2-4.

Inspection Report ENGINE 102 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-3.

Inspection Report ENGINE 103 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-3.

Inspection Report SPARES 1.

Inspection Report

[/!

GROUP CHAIRPERSON

/)

PROGRAM MANAGER

/ g, es COMPONENT REVIEW ENGINE 101 i

1.

All presssembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results.

2.

All sixteen bearing shells were subject to Radiographic Examination, five findings were reported by TER Q-372. This was dispositioned by LDR 2291 and remains open.

I

. _ ~ _ _ _ _ - _

i i-

\\ l j

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B4 of 5 QR-03-340B COMPONENT REVIEW (continued)

ENGINE 101 (continued) 3.

Liquid Penetrant Examination was performed on fif teen of sixteen shells. The upper shell for cylinder 8 was rejectable upon visual examination as reported by TER Q-312. The other fifteen evidenced indications as reported by TER Q-332 and dispositioned by LDR 2278.

The Eddy Current Examination showed that indications were cosmetic in nature and acceptable for use. LD1 2265 was generated to disposition the failed cylinder 8 shell (Q-312) intich was replaced. The failed shall was forwarded to the Design Group for further analysis.

4.

Visual inspection of cylinder 8 upper shell reported by Q-312 as noted above.

ENGINE 102 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shorehan experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results with the exception of LDR 2119 which remains open.

2.

All sixteen bearing shells were subject to Radiographic Examination.. Thirteen were accepted and three were rejected.

All results were reported by TER Q-64.

LDR 2119, generated for Liquid Penetrant indications roccamends replacement of these three shells.

Rejected shells were forwarded to Design Group for further analysis.

s 3.

Liquid Penetrant Examination was performed on the six referenced shells with three displaying indications. These results were dispositioned by LDR 2119.

ENGINE 103 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shorehas experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfacto'ry results.

2.

All sixteen bearing shells were subject to Radiographic Examination.

Seven shells evidenced findings as reperted by TER Q-182 with disposition recorded by LDR 2210.

LDR 2210 reasins open.

3.

Liquid Penetrant Examination was performed on all sixteen shells with satisfactory results on all surfaces of all shells.

SPARES 1.

Material analysis was performed on connecting rod bearing shells as reported by TER Q-505.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ENGINE 201 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this couponent, as outlined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

i

~

l COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B5 of 5 QR-03-340B RESULTS AND CONCLUSIGMS (continued)

ENGINE 102 Same as Engine 101 ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 SPARES Same as Engine 101

.. A R

GROUP CHAIRPLRSON W

PROGRAM MANAGER 1 \\d h w

('

/

)

c DG6 Het List

Appendix C Page C1 of 1

(

EDG COMPONENT TRACKING SHOREHAM SITE, NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE t

COMPONENT NO.

03-340-8 Effective Printout Date 4/20/84 COMPONENT TYPE:

Connecting Rod Bearing Shell REFERENCE SHOREHAM EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS SHOREHAM Reverse bearing shells.

RRR 1037 Normal maintenance Perform NDE Exam procedure. Does not Engine 101.

impact design.

NON-NUCLEAR Connecting rod bear-Letters from X-ray examination of ing shells unfit for.

M. Zbinden Shoreham bearing further use.

Delaval 11/6/80,3/19/79 shells excludes advised possibility of 2/2/79.

possible bad alloy.

bad alloy from vendor.

Incorporate into de-M/V " Columbia" sign review.

DSRV-16-4.

Cracked bearing shells Letter from M.

Not applicable, found in conjunction Zbinden 2/5/80.

DSR-48 h'as no rod with damaged rod box box bolts.

bolts and/or threads.

M/V " Columbia" DSRV-16-4.

NUCLEAR Diesel trip on oil and LER Hatch-2 Not applicable.

caused coolant-366-82079,820727 Fairbanks-Morse temperature, caused by engine does not use initial rod bearing ~ failure cast aluminum beer-in Fairbanks-Morse engine.

ings.

i i

TDI4-231

Page 1 of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 Rocker Shaft Assemblies:

Intake / Intermediate COMPONENT & Exhaust UTILITY Georgia Power Company l

GROUP PARTS LIST NO.

02-390A&B TASK DESCRIPTION NO. DR-11-02-390A&B-2 l

l SNPS GPL NO.

03-390A&B CLASSIFICATION TYPE B

TASK OESCRIPTIONS Design review for this component is not required based on the following:

A review of the Comanche Peak and Shoreham DR/QR reports, which establish the acceptability of the rocker shaft assemblies for their intended purpose.

A review of applicable industry experience listed in the EDG Component Tracking System indicated there had been no design related failures associated with this component.

There is no Vogtle site experience listed for this component.

There are no maintenance or modification recommendations for this component.

Quality inspections conducted on both engines at Vogtle were reviewed for acceptability.

Visual inspection of all intake, intermediate, and exhaust I

rocker arms were satisfactory and material comparator test on all intake and exhaust rocker arm shafts verified proper material.

Hardness tests were also performed on all the rocker shaf ts, though not an Owners Group requirement.

The results were acceptable and are reported on TER 11-074 and 11-032.

PRIMARY FUNCTION Not required ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED Not required V03271/1

COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 DR-11-02-390A&B-2 SPECIFIED STANDARDS Not required REFERENCES Not required DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Not required GROUPCHAIRPERSON/ 7-IlM1d PROGRAM MANAGER,)C. %.wv..w -> m u

at

,y V03271/2

Page 1 of 3 11-02-390A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST 4

Rocker Arms & Pushrods -

Georgia Power Company Intake and Intermediate Vogtle Electric Generating COMPONENT Rocker Shaft Assembly UTILITY Plant - Unit 1 GPL NO.

02-390A REV. NO.

1 SNPS GPL NO.

03-390A TASK OESCRIPTIONS Engine 1 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications and chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

3.

Determine the material of one intake and intermediate rocker arm shaft.

Engine 2 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications, and chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED Engine 1 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Surface integrity of the rocker arm assembly 3.

Material of rocker arm shafts Engine 2 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Surface integrity of the rocker arm assembly V02797/1

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 2 of 3 11-02-390A ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Enaine 1 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups 3.

Material to be AISI-4142 Engine 2 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

REFERENCES Engine 1 1.

QCI No. 52 2-3.

Approved Site NDE Procedures Engine 2 1.

QCI No. 52 2.

Approved Site NDE-Procedures DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED Engine 1 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-3.

Inspection Report Engine 2 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2.

Inspection Report d

PROGRAM MANAGER GROUP CHAIRPERSON k77t.

/

U '& "

V02797/2

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 3 of.?

11-02-390A COMPONENT REVIEW Engine 1 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed on all intake and intermediate rocker are assemblies with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 11-074.

3.

Material Comparator and hardness tests were performed on all intake rocker arm shafts.

Results were reported by TER# 11-074.

Engine 2 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence 2.

A visual inspection was performed on all intake and intermediate rocker' arm assemblies with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER#s11-032 and 11-074.

Note:

Material Comparator and hardness tests were performed on all intake rocker arm shafts.

Results were reported by TER#s11-032 and 11-074.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION Engine 1 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as out-lined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

i i

Engine 2 Same as Engine 1 l

l GROUP CHAIRPERSON EU /h-PROGRAM MANAGER

/

(./ f 'at JCK.

j V02797/3

EXHIBIT 2 VEGP REPORT REFERENCING

^

LEAD EUGINE REPORTS

~

TDI OWNERS GROUP for COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - UNIT 1 INTAKE /IN1ERMEDIATE AND EXHAUST ROCKER SHAFT ASSEMBLIES COMPONENT PART N0s. 02-390A and 02-3908 I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station requires a Design and Quality Revalidation review to determine the adequacy of the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assemblies for their intended use at Comanche Peak.

The pri-mary function of the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assem-blies is to translate the motion of the main pushrods into the reciprocating motion of the intake and exhaust valves and connector pushrod.

The part numbers for the rocker shafts as assigned by the manufacturer, TDI, are 1A-5532 and 1A-5465.

II OBJECTIVE The objective is to evaluate the adequacy of the rocker shafts for their intended use at Comanche Peak.

Specifically, the following tasks were performed:

Review of Comanche Peak site, nuclear and non-nuclear industry.

Evaluation of state of stress in rocker shaft assemblies.

Evaluation of resistance to bending and fatigue.

. Review of pushrod socket installation.

Evaluation of load in rocker arm assembly and pushrod sockets.

Evaluation of rocker shaft supports.

Review of Quality Revalidation Checklist results for acceptability.

~

III METHODOLOGY The Emergency Diesel Generator Component Tracking System. records for Comanche Peak were reviewed to determine the nuclear, non-nuclear, and specific Comanche Peak experience of the rocker shaft assemblies.

The calculations for loads and stresses of rocker arms at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station were used for this analysis.

The rocker arms used at Comanche Peak are nearly identical to those used at Shoreham with any differences being judged inconsequential to the results of these calculatiens (Ref. 1).

TDIO900/1

f

}

Page 2 of 3 i

A theoretical model was developed to compute the dynamic response of the valve systems, and to estimate the pushrod, rocker arm, and shaft forces.

These forces were used to conduct a stress analysis of the rocker shaft assemblies, and to evaluate their resistance to fatigue.

The bearing stresses on the rocker shaft support were calculated in order to verify that resistance to lateral loads on the rocker arms is provided by 1) the friction forces between the rocker support and shaft i

assemblies, and 2) the rocker shaft and support dowel and not by bearing between the rocker shaft bolt and the support.

IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS The maximum pushrod and rocker arm forces were computed (Ref. 2).

These forces were used to compute the peak shear and bending stresses in the rocker shaft assemblies.

The maximum shear stress was found to be 7.9 ksi, and the maximum bending stress was found conservatively to be 24 ksi.

These are both below the endurance limit stresses of 19.2 ksi for shear and 30 ksi for bending (Ref. 2).

I Conservative stress analysis of the intake, intermediate, and exhaust rocker arms indicate a minimum factor of safety against failure of 1.1 (Ref. 2).

The forces acting on the pushrod sockets induce stresses in i

the sockets (59.2 ksi max, Ref. 2) which are below the allowable of 200 ksi.

The capscrew (P/N 02-390-05-AA) connecting the rocker shaft to the rocker support is torqued to 365 ft-lb (Ref. 2), which develops a tensile preload of 21.9 kips (Ref. 2).

This is sufficient to provide frictional resistance to lateral forces on the intake rocker-side of both rocker shaft assemblies.

On the other side (intermediate rocker), the support dowel (P/N 03-362-01-08) is engaged by the rocker shaft end, and transfers the shear from the rocker shaft to the sub-base assembly boss.

The shear resistance supplied by friction at this end is minimal, due to the uplift forces on the rocker shaft by the main exhaust and intermediate pushrods (Ref. 2), and calculations indicate that these shear stresses exceed the endurance limit stress for the dowel at full engine load (Ref.

2).

However, there is no evidence (nuclear or non-nuclear) indicating dowel failures.

Specifically, Shoreham experience indicates that approximately 400 hours0.00463 days 0.111 hours 6.613757e-4 weeks 1.522e-4 months (Ref. 3 and 4) have been logged on these dowels at full ~ engine load.

Recognizing that the pushrod loads and material strengths used in the calculations may be conservative, and that the dowels have been subjected to more than 5 x 10s cycles at full load without failures, it is concluded that the dowels are capable of transferring the shear loads to the sub-base assembly.

The information provided on the following TERs has been reviewed and is consistent with the final conclusions of this report:

10-005,10-006, 10-097.

Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B have

'been reviewed and considered in the performance of this review.

These results are consistent with the final conclusion of this report.

TDIO900/2

Page 3 of 3 Based on the above design

review, it is concluded that the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assemblies are acceptable for their intended design function at Comanche Peak.

V REFERENCES 1.

FaAA Report No. 84-6-2(a).

"TDI Owners Group for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1--Intake / Intermediate and Exhaust Rocker Shaft Assemblies - Components Nos. 03-390A and 03-3908," 06/29/84.

2.

" Rocker Shaft Assembly Support Package," SP-84-6-2(a).

3.

" Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft Failure Investigation - Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," FaAA report

83-10-2.1.

4.

" Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," FaAA report #84-3-16.

i p

5 9

TDIO900/3

l Appendix A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST TEXAS UTILITIES Rocker Arms and Pushrods Intake / Intermediate Exhaust COMPONENT Rocker Shaft Assemblies CLASSIFICATION TYPE B COMPONENT PART NUMBER 02-390A&B TASK DESCRIPTION NO:

OR-10-02-390A&B-1 (SNPS PART NUMBER 03-390A&B)

TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

Evaluate rocker shaft assembly stresses.

Review pushrod socket installation.

Review information provided on TERs.

PRIMARY FUNCTION:

Actuate intake valves, exhaust valves, and intermediate pushrods.

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED:

Review loads, rocker arm assembly and pushrod cups SPECIFIED STANDARDS:

None.

REFERENCES:

None.

l l

TDIO189/1

Appendix A Page A2 of 2 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED:

Valve and pushrod loading, installation drawings.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON:

4 /, I.

PROGRAM MANAGER: dbwsm u 6

TDIO189/2

i Appendix B Page B1 of 3 10-02-390A COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Rocker Arms & Pushrods -

Intake and Intermediate Texas Utilities Generating Co.,

COMPONENT Rocker Shaft Assembly UTILITY Comanche Peak Station GPL NO.

02-390A REV. NO.

2 SNPS GPL NO.

03-390A TASK DESCRIPTIONS D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications and chipped pieces in the outer 1,ips of the pushrod cups.

3.

Determine the material of one rocker arm' assembly.

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications, and chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED D.G.5P1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Surface integrity of the rocker arm assembly 3.

Material of rocker arm assembly D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Quality status of Component Document Ptekage 2.

Surface integrity of the rocker arm assembly TDIO308/1

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 3 10-02-390A ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 4

2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups i

3.

Material to be AISI-4142 D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

REFERENCES D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2-3.

Approved Site NDE Procedures 1

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

Approved Site NDE Procedures DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-3.

Inspection Report D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2.

Inspection Report TDIO308/2

=

i COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 3 7

10-02-390A

+

GROUPCHAIRPERSONN/

PROGRAM MANAGER [

vvr =-

COMPONENT REVIEW D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 l

1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed with unsatisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-006.

3.

The material was determined by use of a material comparitor test.

This was reported by TER# 10-005.

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence 2.

A visual inspection was performed with satisfactory results.

This was reported by TER# 10-097.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above, is complete.

The results have been fo Narded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 Same as 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 GROUP CHAIRPERSON <h 4 ded PROGRAM MANAGER

~

V"p xx l

l TDIO308/3

Appendix B Page B1 of 4 10-02-3908 COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Rocker Arms & Pushrods -

Exhaust Rocker -

Texas Utilities Generating Co.,

i COMPONENT Shaft Assembly UTIILITY Comanche Peak Station GPL NO. 02-390B REV. NO.

2 SNPS GPL NO. 03-390B TASK DESCRIPTIONS 0.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications, and chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

3.

Determine the material of one rocker arm assembly.

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Perform a visual inspection of the intake and intermediate rocker arm assembly for signs of distress, linear indications, and chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Surface integrity of the rocker arm assembly 3.

Material of rocker arm assembly TDIO309/1

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 4 10-02-3908 ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED (continued)

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Surface integrity of rocker arm assembly ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

3.

Material to be AISI-4142 D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2.

No linear indications / chipped pieces in the outer lips of the pushrod cups.

REFERENCES D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2-3.

Approved Site NDE Procedures D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

Approved Site NDE Procedures TDIO309/2

COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 4 10-02-3908 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-3.

Inspection Report-D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2.

Inspection Report GROUP CHAIRPERSON Y

PROGRAM MANAGER 1 %

CJ

~

COMPONENT REVIEW D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed with satisfactory results as re-ported by TER# 10-055.

3.

The material was determined by use of a material comparator test.

This was reported by TER# 10-005.

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 1.

No EDGCTS site experience documents are in evidence.

2.

A visual inspection was performed with satisfactory results as re-ported by TER# 10-097.

4 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above, is complete.

The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

1 TDIO309/3

o COMPONENT QUALITY REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page 84 of 4 10-02-390B RESULTS AND CONCLUSION (continued)

D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-02 7

Same as D.G. CP1-MEDGEE-01 GROUP CHAIRPERSON [u/5 A b/t/E PROGRAM MANAGER Z h %

O i

TDIO309/4

,w

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.,-.,.=.nn.--.

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Appendix C Page C1 of 1 EDG COMPONENT TRACKING SYSTEM:

COMANCHE PEAK SITE, NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

COMPONENT NO.: 02-390A and 02-3908 i

Effective Printout Date: 07/02/84 ROCKER ARMS AND PUSHRODS -

INTAKE / INTERMEDIATE ROCKER SHAFT ASSEMBLY COMPONENT NAME.

EXHAUST ROCKER SHAFT ASSEMBLY REFERENCE COMANCHE PEAK EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS COMANCHE PEAK None NUCLEAR i

Intake rocker arm broke Zion 1, Different manufacturer due to binding between it LER 295-81036 (Cooper Bessemer).

There and rocker stand.

295-810106 is no history of clearance Binding was due to in-problems with TDI engines, adequate end clearance.

NON-NUCLEAR Action taken since Hunton & Williams Inspections performed at vessel delivery -

(12/29/83)

Comanche Peak on the plug welded rocker to C. Seaman, rocker arms indicate that arm assembly drilled Letter to TDI the plugs are tight.

oil passages (D. Martini) to reduce oil (03/22/80) from M.

flooding of rocker Zbinden (State of boxes (M/V Columbia).

Alaska).

Intake rocker arm Engine Incidence One incident caused by broke on #3 left Report (City of improperly tightened bank and #6 right Homestead, Florida) tolts.

Other incident intermediate rocker dated 09/30/78 due to flaw in metal.

arm broke.

(File No. T-10)

No design problems.

(V-20)

Replaced partially Customer service Found on new engine.

broken oil supply report by C. McCluney Not a design problem, 3/8 tubing to #8 (TDI) dated 02/02/84 Both Shoreham and cylinder rocker shafts.

(File No. T-38)

Comanche Peak have run successfully without this problem.

TDIO900/1

TDI OWNERS GROUP for SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 INTAKE / INTERMEDIATE AND EXHAUST ROCKER SHAFT ASSEMBLIES COMPONENT PART NO.

03-390-A and B I

INTRODUCTION The TDI Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group Program for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station requires Design and Quality Revalidation reviews to determine the adequacy of the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assemblies for their intended use at Shoreham.

The primary function of the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assembly is to translate i

the motion of the main pushrods into the reciprocating motion of the intake valves and connector pushrod.

The part numbers for both rocker shaft assemblies as assigned by the manufacturer, TDI, are 1A-5446 and 1A-5465.

II OBJECTIVE The objective of this review is to evaluate the adequacy of the rocker shaft assemblies for their intended use at Shoreham.

Specifically, the following tasks were performed:

o Review of nuclear, non-nuclear, and Shoreham site experience.

o Evaluation of state of stress in rocker shaft assemblies.

o Evaluation of resistance to bending and fatigue.

o Review of pushrod socket installation.

o Evaluation of load in rocker arm assembly and pushrod sockets.

o Evaluation of rocker shaft supports, o

Evaluation of the Quality Revalidation Checklist results for accept-ability.

t SM0664/1 REV. 1

Page 2 of 3 III METHODOLOGY

~

The Emergency Diesel Generator Component Tracking System records for Shoreham were reviewed to determine the nuclear, non-nuclear, and specific Shoreham experience of the rocker shaft assemblies.

A theoretical model was developed to compute the dynamic response of the valve systems, and to estimate the pushrod rocker arm, and shaft forces.

These forces were used to conduct a stress analysis of the rocker shaft assemblies and to evaluate the resistance to fatigue.

The bearing stresses on the rocker shaft support were calculated in order to verify that resistance to lateral loads on the rocker arms is provided by 1) the friction forces between the rocker support and shaft assembly, and 2) the rocker shaft and support dowel and not by bearing between the rocker shaft bolt and the support.

IV RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS The maximum pushrod and rocker arm forces were computed (Ref.1).

These forces were used to compute the peak shear and bending stresses in the rocker shaft assemblies.

The maximum shear stress was found to be 7.9 ksi, and the maximum bending stress was found conservatively to be 24 ksi.

1 These are both below the endurance limit stresses of 19.2 ksi for shear and 30 ksi for bending (Ref. 1).

Conservative stress analysis of the intake, intermediate, and exhaust rocker arms indicate a minimum factor of safety against ' failure of 1.1 (Ref. 1).

The forces acting on the pushrod sockets induce stresses in the sockets (59.2 ksi max, Ref.1) which are below the allowable of 200 ksi.

l1 The capscrew (P/N 02-390-01-0J) connecting the rocker shaft to the rocker support is torqued to 365 ft-lb (Ref. 1), which develops a tensile preload of 21.9 kips (Ref.1).

This is sufficient to provide frictional resist-ance to lateral forces on the intake rocker-side of both rocker shaft assemblies.

On the other side (intermediate rocker), the support dowel j

(P/N 03-362-02-08) is engaged by the rocker shaft end, and transfers the j

shear from the rocker shaft to the sub-base assembly boss.

The shear resistance supplied by friction at this end is minimal, due to the uplift i

forces on the rocker shaft by the main exhaust and intermediate pushrods I

(Ref.1), and calculations indicate that these shear stresses exceed the endurance limit stress for the dowel (Ref. 1).

However, there is no 4

l evidence (nuclear or non-nuclear) indicating dowel failures.

Specific-ally, Shoreham experience indicates that approximntely 400 hours0.00463 days 0.111 hours 6.613757e-4 weeks 1.522e-4 months (Ref. 2 and 3) have been logged on these dowels at full engine load.

Recognizing that the pushrod loads and material strengths used in the calculations i

may be conservative, and that the dowels have been subjected to more than 5 x 108 cycles at full load without failures, it is concluded that the dowels are capable of transferring the shear loads to the sub-base assembly.

SM0664/2 REV. 1

. 1

Page 3 of 3 Quality Revalidation Inspection results identified in Appendix B have been reviewed and considered in the performance of this design review and the results are consistent with the final conclusions of this report.

Based on the above review, it is concluded that the intake / intermediate and exhaust rocker shaft assemblies are acceptable for their intended i

function at Shoreham.

V REFERENCES 1.

" Rocker Shaft Assembly Support Package," SP-84-6-2(a).

2.

" Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft Failure Investigation Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," FaAA Report #83-10-2.1.

3.

" Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," FaAA Report #84-3-16.

l REV. I SM0664/3

Appendix A Page Al of 2 COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEW CHECKLIST Rocker Arms and Pushrods Intake / Intermediate Exhaust COMPONENT Rocker Shaft Assemblies CLASSIFICATION TYPE B

PART NUMBER 03-390-A and 03-390-B TASK DESCRIPTION:

Evaluate rocker shaft assembly stresses.

Review pushrod socket installation.

Review information provided on TERs:

Q-43, 0-44, Q-70, Q-79, Q-126, Q-127, Q-131, Q-132, Q-133, Q-147, Q-148, Q-151, 0-175, Q-197, Q-199, Q-200, Q-201, Q-270, Q-278, Q-279, Q-280, Q-281, Q-295, Q-296, Q-297, Q-319, Q-346, Q-444, Q-481, Q-515, Q-516, DR-1, DR-24, DR-88, DR-170, DR-176, DR-195, DR-196, DR-197, DR-198, DR-215. DR-224.

PRIMARY FUNCTION:

Actuate intake valves, exhaust valves, and intermediate pushrods ATTRIBUTE TO BE VERIFIED:

Review loads rocker arm assembly and pushrod sockets.

SPECIFIED STANDARDS:

None

REFERENCES:

" Seismic Qualification Review, TDI Emergency Diesel Generators at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,"

Stone

& Webster Engineering Corp., Shcreham Project Job Book No. 244.7.

DR13-214-014

)

j Appendix A Page A2 of 2 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED:

Valve and pushrod loading, installation drawings.

/.i GROUP CHAIRPERSON:

e PROGRAM MANAGER

/ a-e MfWab J V Ar:. rdx COMPONENT REVIEW:

Review of nuclear, non-nuclear and Shoreham site experience.

Evaluation of state of stress in rocker shaft assemblies.

Evaluation of resistance to bending and fatigue.

Review of pushrod socket installation.

Evaluation of load in rocker arm assembly and pushrod sockets.

Evaluation of rocker shaft supports.

Evaluation of the Quality Revalidation Checklist results for acceptability.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

The intake / intermediate / exhaust rocker shaft assemblies are acceptable for their intended design function at Shoreham.

Seismic qualification for the intake / intermediate / exhaust is addressed in " Seismic Qualification Review, TDI Emergency Diesel Generators at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,"

Stone Webster Engineering Corp., Shoreham Project Job Book No. 244.7.

A r /

s.

GROUP CHAIRPERSON PROGRAtt tiANAGER

=

/+3My O '> m DR13-214-014

Appendix B Page 31 of 5 COMPONENT REVAI.IDATION CHECKLIST Rocker Arms & Pushrods - Intake &

Intermediate Rocker Shaft COMPONENT Assembly including Capscrews DOCIP.2NT NO. QR-03-390A QR-1, Rev. 1; PART NO. 03-390A INCORPORATES DOC. NOS. QR-2, Rev. 1 TASK DESCRIPTIONS ENGINE 101 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Review the pushrod cup installation documentation and ensure the overhang is properly ground flush (TDI P/N 08-390-01-07) for cylinders 5, 7 and 8.

3.

Perform visual inspections of cylinders 5, 7 and 8 intake and intermediate rockor arm assemblies for signs of debris, chipping, loose metal and damaged parts prior to subcover removal. Document with photographs.

4.

Determine the material and the hardness of both the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A) and the capscrews (TDI P/N 02-390-01-0J) for cylinders 5, 7, and 8.

5.

Perform visual inspections of intake and intermediate rocker arm assemblies for signs of wear & distress, cylinders 5, 7, 8.

6.

Perform a dimensional inspection of the rocker arm bushing bore, cylinders 5, 7 8.

ENGINE 102 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Review the pushrod cup installation documentation and ensure the overhang is properly ground flush. (TDI P/N 08-390-01-0F) for cylinders 5, 7 and 8.

3.

Determine material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A) for I

cylinder 7.

4.

Perform visual inspections of intake and intermediate rocker arm assemblies for signs of wear & distress, cylinders 5, 7, 8.

5.

Perform dimensional inspection of rocker arm bushing bore, cylinders 5, 7, S.

1 ENGINE in3 Same as Engine 101 SPARES 1.

Perform material analysis of rocker arm shaft ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED EGINE 101 1.

Quality status of Vendor Component Package 2.

All sockets (TDI P/N 08-390-01-OF) grcund in accordance with TDI Letter April 15.

1983. L. McHugh to M. Rudikoff.

3.

Absence of debris, loose metal and damaged parts in the rocker arm assemblies.

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 5 QR-03-390A ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED (continued)

ENGINE 101 (continued) 4.

Proper material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N-03-390-01-0A) and capscrews (TDI P/N 02-390-01-0J).

5.

Visual integrity of the rocker arm assemblies 6.

Dimensions of the rocker arm bushing bores ENGINE 102 1.

Quality status of Vendor Component Package 2.

All sockets (TDI P/N 08-390-01-0F) ground in accordance with TDI Letter April 15, 1983. L. McHugh to N. Rudikoff.

3.

Proper material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A) 4.

Visual integrity of the rocker arm assemblies 5.

Dimensions of the rocker arm bushing bores ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 SPARES 1.

Materials of the rocker arm shaf t ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ENGINE 101 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-6.

Review Inspection Report by Design Group ENGINE 102 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-5.

Review of Inspection Report by Deaign Group ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 SPARES 1.

Review of Inspection Report by Design Group REFERENCES, ENGINE 101 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

TER Q-91, LDRs 1851, 1252 3.

LILCO approved inspection procedures, Q-126, Q-91 4.

TERs Q-91, DR-33, Q-143, Q-16. DR-24

1 r

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 5 QR-03-390A-l REFERENCES (continued) 1t; ENGINE 101 (continued) s 5.

TERs DR-24, Q-91 4

6.

LDRs 1235, 1245 ENGINE 102 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

LDRs 1252 & 1851, QR-1 Rev.1 3.

TERs DR-24, Q-16, DR-33, Q-143 4.

TER DR-24 5.

LDRs 1234, 1245 s

ENGINE 103 g

Same as Engine 101 DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED ENGINE 101 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-6.

Inspection Report ENGINE 102 1.

Document Summary Sheet 2-5.

Inspection Report ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 SPARES

1.-

Inspection Report GROUP CHAIRPERSON

/

PROGRAM MANAGER v

CCMPONEhi REVIEW ENGINE 101 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results.

2.

A visual inspection of the intake rocker arm push rod cups was perfor=ed for cup overhang. The findings were reported.by TER Q-346 and dispositioned by LDR 2279.

The visual inspection of the intermediate rocker ar= pushrod cups was found to be satisfactory.

a

, ~. -.. - - - -,

-,g-

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B4 of 5 QR-03-390A COMPONENT REVIEW (continued)

ENGINE 101 (continued) 3.

A visual examination was performed for debris, chipping, loose metal, and damaged parts. The findings were reported by TER Q-270 and dispositioned by LDR 2241.

4.

Material tests were accomplished with a Bausch & Lomb 3600 Mobile Metal Analyzer on the shaf t and the (2) two capscrews for cylinders 5, 7 & 8.

The results were reported by TER Q-295. Hardness Tests were performed with an Equotip hardness tester. The results of the hardness tests for shafts were reported by TER Q-319 and those for the capscrews were reported by TER Q-297.

5.

A visual inspection was performed with findings reported by TER Q-280 and dispositioned by LDR 2246.

I 6.

A dimensional inspection was performed as reported by TER Q-278.

ENGINE 102 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results.

2.

Positive verification of cups being ground flush was reported by TER DR-170 for cylinder 5 only. Documentation to support inspecticn of 7 & 8 was reported by TER Q-44 and dispositioned by LDR 2070.

3.

Visual inspections of 5, 7 & 8 rocker arm assemblies w2re accomplished. The results were reported by TER Q-44 and dispositioned by LDR 2070.

4.

Materials were determined by Bausch & Lomb 3600 Mobile Metal Analyzer for cylinder 7.

The results were reported by TER DR-197 for the intake and intermediate shafts. Hardness tests were performed on the shafts for cylinder 7 by use of an Equotip hardness tester as reported by TER DR-215.

5.

A dimensional inspection was performed as reported by TER DR-170.

ENGINE 103 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed as were done for Engine 101.

2.

A visual inspection of the pushrod cups for overhang was satisfactory. The results of the inspection of intermediate for cylinders 5, 7 & 8 were reported by TER Q-131.

3.

A visual inspection was performed for evidence of damaged parts. The results are reported by TER Q-147 and dispositioned on LDR 2194 4.

Materials were determined by Bausch & Lomb 3600 Bobile Metal Analyzer.

The results of the tests performed the on shaf ts were reported by TER Q-200. The test results for the capscrews were reported by TER Q-199.

An Equotip hardness test was performed on the shafts and the capscrews for cylinders 5, 7 & 8.

The results were reported by TER Q-175.

5.

A visual innpection was performed with findings reported by TER Q-147 and dispositioned by LDR 2194.

6.

A dimensional inspection was performed as reported by TER Q-133.

SPARES 1.

Material analysis was performed on rocker arm shaft as reported by TER Q-505.

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKI.IST Page BS of 5 QR-03-390A RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

_ ENGINE 101 i

The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above, is complete. The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

ENGINE 102 Same as Engine 101 DIGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 SPARES Same as Engine 101 l\\

PROGRAM MANAGER h N C \\M m m u GROUP CHAIRPERSON f

W

}

l l

DG3 Checklist 2

Appendix B Page B1 of 4 COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Rocker Arm & Pushrods COMPONENT Exhaust Rocker Shaft Assembiv DOCUMENT NO. QR-03-3903 PART NO. 03-390B INCORPORATES DOC. NOS. QR-1 TASK DESCRIPTIONS ENGINE 101 1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Review the pushrod cup installation documentation and perform a visual inspection to verify the overhang is properly ground flush (TDI P/N 08-390-01-OF) for cylinders 5, 7, and 8.

3.

Visually inspect the rocker arm shaft assembly for any signs of wear, scoring and pitting on cylinders 5, 7, and 8.

4.

Measure rocker arm bushing bore on cylinders 5, 7, and 8.

5.

Determine the material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A) for cylinders 5, 7, and 8.

I I

ENGINE 102 l

1.

Assemble and review existing documentation.

2.

Review the pushrod cup installation documentation and perform a visual inspection to ensure the overhang is properly ground flush (TDI P/N 08-390-01-OF) for i

cylinders 5, 6, 7, and 8.

3.

Visually inspect the rocker arm shaft assembly for any signs of wear, scoring and

. pitting on cylinders 5, 6, 7, and 8.

4.

Measure rccker arm bushing bora on cylinders 5, 6, 7, and 8.

5.

' Determine the material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A) for cylinder 7.

l ENGINE 103 l

Same as Engine 101 l

ATTRIBUTES TO BE VERIFIED l

l ENGINE 101 l

1.

Quality status of Component Document Package 2.

Pushrod cup overhang properly ground flush 3.

Absence of wear, scorir.g and pitting on the rocker arm shaf t 4.

Proper rocker arm bushing bore dimension 5.

Proper material and hardness of the shaft (TDI P/N 03-390-01-0A)

ENGINE l'02

[

Same as Engine 101 ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101

a COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B2 of 4 QR-03-3903 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

~

ENGINE 101 1.

Satisfactory Document Package 2-5.

Review of Inspection Report by Design Group ENGINE 102 l

Same as Engine 101 ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 REFERENCES ENGINE 101 1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

TERs Q-91, Q-444, Letter from W. Lenny McHugh (TDI) to Neil Rudikoff (LILCO) dated 4/15/83 (LDR 1252) 3.

TERs Q-91, DR-88, DR-481 4.

TERs Q-91, DR-88, DR-481 5.

TERs Q-91, Q-143, Q-16, DR-88 ENGINE 102 l

)

1.

QCI-FSI-F11.1-020 2.

TERs Q-444, Q-481, Letter from W. Lenny McHugh (TDI) to Neil Rudikoff (LILCO) dated 4/15/83 (LDR 1252) 3.

TER DR-88 4.

TERs DR-88, Q-481 5.

TERs DR-88, Q-16, Q-143, Q-481 ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 DOCUMENTATION REOUIRED I

ENGINE 101 1.

Document Sumnary Sheet 2-5.

Inspection Report ENGINE 102 Same as Engine 101

1 COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B3 of 4 QR-03-390B DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED (continued) i ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101

[d,I GROUP CHAIRPERSON PROGRAM MANAGER 2

COMPONENT REVIEW ENGINE 101 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results.

2 2.

A review of pushrod cup installation documentation showed the overhang to be ground flush satisfactorily.

3.

The rocker arm shaft assembly was visually inspected. The results were reported by TER Q-281 and dispositioned by LDR 2247.

4 The rocker arm bushing bore was measured. The results were reported by TER Q-279.

5.

Materials were determined by use of a Bausch & Lomb 3600 Mobile Metal Analyzer.

Results for cylinders 5, 7 and 8 reported by TER Q-296.

Equotip hardness tests were performed on the shaft for cylinders 5, 7, and 8 and reported by TER Q-319.

The report was documented by TER Q-297.

ENGINE 102 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents were assembled and reviewed with satisfactory results.

2.

The pushrod cup overhang was inspected.

The results were documented by TER DR-198.

3.

A visual inspection of rocker arm shaft assembly was performed.

The results were reported by TER DR-176.

4.

The rocker arm bushing bores were measured. The results were reported by TER DR-198.

5.

The material of the shaf t was determined by use of the Technicorp Model 850/950 we Alloy Separator. This was reported by TER Q-79 (cylinder 7).

An Equotip hardness test was performed.

The results were reported by TER Q-79 (cylinder 7).

ENGINE 103 1.

All preassembly EDGCTS Shoreham experience documents vere assembled and reviewed i

with satisfactory results.

2.

A visual inspection was performed on cylinders 5, 7 and 8 to ensure that the overhang is properly ground flush. Cylinders 7 and 8 were found satisfactory as reported by TER Q-132. Cylinder 5 was found unsatisfactory. This was reported by TER Q-132 and dispositioned by LDR 2184.

3.

A visual inspection of the rocker arm shaft assembly was accomplished.

Unsatisfactory results for cylinder areas 5, 7 and 8 were reported by TER Q-148 and dispositioned by LDR 2195.

4.

Rocker arm bushing bore dimensior.s were taken and reported by TER Q-151.

5.

Materials were determined by use of a Baush and Lomb 3600 Mobile Metal Analyzer on the shafts for cylinders 5, 7 and 8. The results of this test are reported by TER Q-201.

Equotip hardness tests were perfor=ed on the shafts for cylinders 5, 7 and 8 and reported by TER Q-175.

i

4 l

COMPONENT REVALIDATION CHECKLIST Page B4 of 4 QR-03-390B f

_lSULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ENGINE 101 The Quality Revalidation effort with respect to this component, as outlined above...is complete. The results have been forwarded to the Design Review Group for their evaluation and conclusions in support of the final report.

ENGINE 102 Same as Engine 101 ENGINE 103 Same as Engine 101 3

4 t

GROUP CHAIRPERSON PROGRAMMANAGERO/ dC g

F U'

C l

l' 86dLE%rvJd3at. 2

w i

Appendix C Page C1 of 2 EDG COMPONENT TRACKING:

SHOREHAM SITE, NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERI'ENCE

SUMMARY

COMPONENT NO.

03-390-A and 03-390-B Effective Printout Date 4/20/84 Rocker Arms and Pushrods COMPONENT TYPE:

Intake / Inter' mediate Rocker Shaft Assembly REFERENCE SHOREHAM EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS SHOREHAM Replace pushrod LDR 1235 Damage to pushrod sockets on Engines 1245 sockets frequently 101 and 102.

Repair RRR 885 occurs during instal-pushrod cups on 887 1ation.

All pushrod cylinder no. 7 on sockets at Shoreham Engine 103.

have been inspected and found satis-factory.

Adjust engine lifter RRR 374 Lifter oil hole rocker arms, clean blocked with dirt.

oil passages for These have been Engine 103.

cleaned out. Routine maintenance.

Replace cracked RRR 637 Damage to pushrod engine rocker arm LDR 0991 sockets frequently pushrod socket on 1851 occurs during instal-Engine 103.

lation.

All pushrod i

sockets at Shoreham have been inspected and found satis-factory.

Replace damaged RRR 1329 Capscrews were not subcover and LOR 1954 torqued properly, rocker arm assembly 1955 resulting in damage for cylinder no. 3 1956 to rocker shaft on Engine 101.

assemblies.

Capscrews have been inspected to verify proper instal-lation.

DR13-214-014

?

~

(-

Appendix C Page C2 of 2 COMPONENT NO.

03-390-A and 03-390-B Effective Printout Date 4/20/84 Rocker Arms and Pushrods COMPONENT TYPE:

Intake / Intermediate Rocker Shaft Assembly REFERENCE SHOREHAM EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS STATUS SHOREHAM Machine lip of RRR 1530 Damage to pushrod rocker arm socket sockets frequently on Engine 102.

occurs during instal-lation.

All pushrod so'ckets at Shoreham have been inspected and found satisfactory.

Repair / replace RRR 1517 Repair work completed discrepancies LDR 2070 and satisfactory.

g on rocker arm assembly on Engine 102.

NUCLEAR Intake rocker arm LER 295-81036 Different manufac-broke due to binding 295-810106 turer (Cooper between it and Bessemer).

There rocker stand.

is no history of Binding was due to clearance problems inadequate end with TDI engines.

clearance.

NON-NUCLEAR Action taken Hunton & Williams Rocker arm plug since vessel 12/29/83 size increased delivery - plug to C. Seaman from 1/8" to 1/4" welded rocker arm Letter to TDI for a more secure assembly drilled (D. Martini) fit.

oil passages to dated 03/22/80 reduce oil flooding from M. Zbinden of rocker boxes.

(State of Alaska)

(M/V " Columbia")

I l

ML20133B884

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