ML20133B128
| ML20133B128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1985 |
| From: | Mizuno G NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Bloch P, Grossman H, Jordan W, Jordon W Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#485-656 OL, NUDOCS 8510030034 | |
| Download: ML20133B128 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1985003
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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September 26, 1985
[CI -? f.,11 :58
Peter B. Bloch, Esq., Chairman
Dr. Kenneth A'. McCollom
Administrative Judge
Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Dean, Division of Engineering,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
Architecture and Technology
Washington, DC 20555
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, OK 74078
Herbert Grossman,Miternate Chairman
Elizabeth B. Johnson
Administrative Judge
Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Oak Ridge National Laboratcry
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
P.O. Box X, Building 3500
, Washington, DC '20555
Oak Ridge. TN 37830
Dr. Walter H. Jordan
Administrative Judge
881 W. Outer Drive
Oak Ridge, TN 37830
In the flatter of
Texas Utilities Generating Electric, et al.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units' T and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 m /
Dear Administrative Judges:
The NRC Staff has recently issued NRC Inspection Report 85-03/85-02
(September 17,1985). Copies of this inspection report are enclosed for
the information of the Board.
Sincerely,
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. Mizuno
ounsel for NRC Staff
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl.:
Service List
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In Reply Refer To:
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Docket: 50-445/85-03
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50-446/85-02
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Texas Utilities Electric Company
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ATTN: Mr. W. G. Council
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Executive Vice President
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400 North Olive Street, L. B. 81
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Dallas, Texas
75201
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Gentlemen:
This refers to the inspection conducted under the Resident Inspection Program
'by Mr. J. E. Cummins and others of this. office during the period December 19,
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1984, through March 31, 1985, of activities authorized by NRC Construction
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Permits CPPR-125 and CPPR-126 for the Comanche Peak facility, Units 1 and 2,
and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. J. T. Merritt of your staff at
the conclusion of the inspection.
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Areas examined during the inspection included plant status, action on previous
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findings, action on applicant identified design / construction deficiencies
(10 CFR Part 50.55(e) reports), review of purchase order and related
documentation for fuel building liner plates, followup on 10 CFR Part 21
report, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin followup, action on Special Review
Team (SRT) identified deficiencies, special plant tours, followup on alleged
' improper construction practices involving CPSES main condensers, review of
concrete placement procedures, and observations and reviews of reinforcing
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steel splices. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective
examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with
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personnel, and observations by the inspectors. These findings are documented
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in the enclosed inspection report.
Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were
identified.
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Texas Utilities Electric Company
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should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to
discuss them with you.
Sincerely.
Or;dnat signed By:
Ricturd P. Denise
R. P. Denise. Director
Division of Reactor Safety
and Projects
Enclosures:
Appendix - NRC Inspection Report
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50-445/85-03
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50-445/85-02
cc w/ enclosures:
Texas Utilities Electric Company
ATTN:
J. W. Beck. Manager,
Licensing
Skyway Tower
400 North Olive Street
' Lock Box 81
Dallas, Texas
75201
Texas Radiation Control Program Director
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APPENDIX
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/85-03
Permit: CPPR-126
50-446/85-02
CPPR-127
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Docket: 50-445; 50-446
Category: A2:
Appplicant: Texas Utilities Electric Company (TUEC)
Skyway Tower
400 North Olive Street
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Lock Box 81
Dallas, Texas
75201
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Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Glen Rose, Texas
Inspection Conducted: December 19, 1984 through March 31, 1985
Inspe: tors:
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J. E. Cummins, Senior Resident Reactor
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Inspector
(paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, and 13)
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H.~S. Phil' lips, Senior Resident Reactor
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Inspector
(paragraphs 11 and 13)
LOM G
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J. I. Tapia, React 6r Inspector, Project
Date
Section B
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(par & graph 8)
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D. N. Hunnicutt, Chief,
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Reactor Project Section B
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(paragraphs 6, 9, and 12)
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Approved:
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D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief,
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Reactor Project Section B
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted: December 29, 1984 through March 31, 1985
(Report 50-445/85-03)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of plant status, action on
previous findings, action on applicant identified design / construction
deficiencies (10 CFR 50.55(e) reports), review of Afco Steel purchase order
(PO) for fuel building liner plates - followup of a 10 CFR Part 21 report,
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) followup, action on previous NRC
inspection findings, NRC Region IV followup on Special Review Team (SRT)
identified deficiencies, special plant tours, alleged improper construction
practices involving CPSES main condensers, and plant tours.
The inspection
involved 162 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the ten areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
Inspection Conducted: December 19, 1984 through March 31, 1985
(Report 50-446/85-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of plant status, action on
applicant identified design / construction deficiencies (10 CFR 50.55(e)
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reports). IEB followup, concrete placement procedure review, reinforcing steel
splices review and observations, review of Afco Steel P0 for fuel building
liner plates and plant tours. The inspection involved 26 inspector-hours
onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
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. DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Applicant Personnel
- J. T. Merritt, Assistant Project General Manager, Texas Utilities
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Generating Company (TUGCO)
C. H. Welch, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor
T. Jackson, QA Staff Member. TUGC0
D. Eddie QA Staff Member. TUGC0
G. Sigler QA Staff Member, TUGC0
P. Mills, QA Staff Member, TUGC0
8. Cromeans. TUGC0 Lab and Civil Supervisor TUGC0
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel'during this
inspection period.
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Plant Status
At the end of this inspection period, the construction of Unit I was
99 percent complete and Unit 2 was 72 percent complete.
3.
' Action on Previous NRC Inspection Findings' (Un_it 1)
a.
(Closed)
Severity Level V Violation 445/8440-01: Unique Identifier
Assigned to two Different 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Items
The NRC inspector reviewed-the applicants
10 CFR Part 50.55(e) tracking log and this appeared to be
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an isolated incident. Procedure CP-QP-16.1 has been
revised to specifically state that numbers assigned to
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voided significant deficiency) analysis reports
(10 CFR Part 50.55(e) reports shall not be reused. This
item is closed.
b.
(0 pen)
Severity Level IV Violation 445/8408-02: Unit 1 Main
Coolant System Crossover Leg Restraints
The applicant initially responded to this violation in a
letter (TXX-4271) dated August 23, 1984, and submitted a
supplemental response in a letter (TXX-4294) dated
September 7, 1984. Based on information furnished in these
two letters, Region IV requested additional information in
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a letter dated November 2, 1984. The applicant responded
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in a letter (TXX-4370) dated November 28, 1984 to the
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request for additional information and delineated the
corrective action that had been taken. The applicant
reinspected the crossover leg restraint installation for
elevation, . location, levelness, anchor bolt tightness and
correct material. This reinspection of the crossover leg
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restraints was documented in NCR M84-100281 and
Construction Operation travelers CE-84-131-8902,
CE-84-132-8902, CE-84-133-8902 and CE-84-134-8902. The NRC
inspector's review of this documentation determined that
the corrective action and reinspection resolved this
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specific issue. However, the review of the generic
implications regarding inspector certification requires
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further evaluation. This item remains open.
c.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 445/8410-01: Sealing of Penetrations in
the Cable Spread Room
The NRC inspector verified that the penetrations-in the
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cable spread room wall and~ fire door E-29 frame had been
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sealed. .The NRC inspector also reviewed documentation that
identified the location and type of f.eal used for each
Documents were made available to the NRC
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inspector that verified that each type seal used had been
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certified by testing.to meet the fire barrier requirements.
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This item ,is closed.
d.
(Closed)
Severity Level V Violation 445/8422-01:
Fa'ilure to
Maintain a Positive Pressure on Electrical Penetrations
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Applicant personnel took immediate action to repressurize
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the' electrical penetrar. ions. The NRC inspector verified
that the pressure gauge readings were as specified in the
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procedure. The nitrogen pressure on the electrical
penetrations is now checked each shift as required by
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procedure 0WI-104, Revision 2, " Operations Department
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Logkeeping and Equipment Inspections," dated November 15,
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1984. The shift supervisors were instructed by the
operations supervisor to be aware ~of all plant alarm
conditions. This item is closed.
e.
(0 pen)
Severi.y Level IV Violation 445/8434-01:
Su> port
Installation Nonconform.inces Not Identified >y Inspection
The incorrectly installed support and the snubber were
reworked and reinspected.
Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28A,
" Installation Inspections of ASME Class 1, 2, and 3
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Snubber", was deleted and the snubber inspections
incorporated into Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 " Fabrication
and Installation Inspection of ASME Component Supports,
Class 1, 2, and 3."
Revision 24 to QI-QAP-11.1-28 was
issued to clarify the requirements for snubber and sway
strut installations and appropriate inspection personnel
were retrained in the correct configuration for snubber and
sway strut installations. The generic implications of this
issue require further review. This matter remains.open.
4.
Action on Applicant Identified Design / Construction Deficiencies (10 CFR
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Part 50.55(e) Reports) (Units 1 and 2)
The 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) reports discussed below were reviewed by the NRC
inspector and closed. The reports were reviewed for content, compliance
with NRC requirements for reporting, appropriate applicant evaluation, and
adequacy and implementation of corrective action. Each report is
identified and tracked by the unique, applicant assigned number.
a.
CP84-02
Applicant's letter (TXX-4108) dated- February 8,1984,
reported to the NRC that linear indications had been.found
on the emergency diesel generator engine push rods. The
applicant has replaced the push rods in both of the
Unit I diesel generators and will replace them in the
Unit 2 diesel generators prior to operation of Unit 2.
NRC inspector observations during the teardown, inspection
and reassembly of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators
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was reported in NRC Inspection Reports 50-445/84-17 and
50-445/84-20.
b.
CP84-04
The applicant reported by letter (TXX-4109) dated
February 13, 1984, that three of the four Unit 1
safety-related inverter ferroresonant output transformers
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had failed. This 10 CFR 50.55(e) report to the NRC was
discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-445/84-22;
50-446/84-07. The transformers have been modified by the
vendor to correct the defect.
c.
CP84-33
The 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) report was initiated by the
applicant based on a 10 CFR Part 21 report made by Brown
Boveri. The 10 CFR Part 21 reported that voltage balance
relays (Model ITE-60) were found that operated outside
specified operating times. Brown Boveri notified-the
applicant by letter dated November 13, 1984, that the
problem did not exist for the Brown Boveri (ITE)
switch-gear furnished to the applicant. The applicant also
performed a review and determined that the questionable
relays were not used at CPSES.
The applicant reported by
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letter (TXX-4376) dated December 10, 1984, that this item
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.was not reportable.
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Inspection and-Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) Followup (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors reviewed the applicant's file for the IES discussed
below and performed inspections as necessary to verify that the applicant
had conducted an adequate review to determine if the IEB was appitcable to~
the CPSES facility, and to verify that the applicant had taken the action
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required by the IEB.
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IEB 84-03: Refueling Cavity Water Seals
This bulletin identified a potential loss of water from the
refueling cavity and spent fuel pool due to the failure of the
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refueling cavity seal during refueling operations. The bulletin
was issued because an incident of this type occurred at the
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Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant. As directed by the bulletin, the
applicant evaluated the potential for and consequences of a
refueling cavity water seal failure at the CPSES site. The
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applicant's response letter (TXX-4373) dated December 4, 1984,
reported that the refueling cavity water seal at CPSES is a
different design from the seals used at Haddam Neck. The
refueling cavity water seal at CPSES is a stainless steel ring
that is permanently welded in place and does not require the use
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of any pneumatic. type device. .The CPSES refueling cavity water
seal design is less likely to experience a gross failure than
seal designs utilizing pneumatic seals or gaskets. The
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applicant determined from the evaluation that level alanns
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located in the containment building sump and the spent fuel pool
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would detect leakage from the refueling cavity or spent fuel
pool and that makeup water sources would be available in the
event that there was a leak. Prior to the first refueling, the
applicant will revise applicable' procedures to check the
refueling cavity for-leakage and to explicitly address a leak in
the refueling cavity seal. The NRC review of the. refueling
cavity leakage check and~ refueling cavity seal leak procedures-
during a subsequent inspection is an unresolved item (445/8503-01;
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446/8502-01).
6.
Review of Afco Steel Purchase Order Package for Fuel Building Liner Plates
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(Unit I and 2)
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In response to an allegation, the NRC inspector reviewed the Afco Steel
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package for PO No. 35-1195-14911 (Job No. and Account
35-1195-1-0-1312-193703-002)~ from Brown & Root Inc. (B&R) to Afco Steel.
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Little Rock, Arkansas, Change Orders, letters of approval, and related
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correspondence to this PO to determine whether B&R had improperly
cancelled their contract with Afco Steel.
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The P0 was let by B&R to Afco Steel on July 6,1977, for stainless steel
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liners (S/SL) and gates for the two spent fuel pools, the S/SL transfer
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canal, and the S/SL wet cask loading pit. The PO requirements were
specified by Gibbs and Hill (G&H) (Specification 2323-SS-18. Revision 2;
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2323-55-7, Revision 1; 2323-55-20 Revision 4; and drawings M1-0014,
Revision E; M1-0015, Revision E; S-0831. Revision 1; S-0832 Revision 1;
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S-0833. Revision 1: S-0834 Revision 1 and $1-0560. Revision 3). The P0
specified that " Safety Related QA was Required."
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During the course of the contract, B&R processed twelve Change Orders
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between the dates of August 5, 1977, and_ July 31, 1978. These change
orders were. required to incorporate changes in scope of work with
drawings, tolerance requirements, method of transmittal of documents,
material additions required, amendments related to monetary conditions,
and reductions in materials required.
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A B&R letter (BRF-8550), dated July 13, 1978, stated in part ". . . please
find a Change Order request from- Afco Steel on PO 35-1195-14911 in which
they supplied the stainless steel liner for the Fuel Building. . . ."
This letter also stated that BAR felt the listed monetary credits were
reasonable and justified.
The NRC inspector's' review of the documentation revealed no apparent
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discrepancies regarding the contract between B&R and Afco Steel.
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No violations or deviations were identiified.
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7.
Followup of 10 CFR Part 21 Report (Unit 1)
The NRC inspector reviewed documents related to a potential 10 CFR Part 21
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report from RTE Delta. RTE Delta reported via letter dated April 3 1984,
to the Director of NRC Region IV that Texas Utilities Services
Incorporated (TUSI) (the responsible organization name was later changed
to Texas Utilities Generating Company), had possibly violated
10 CFR Part 21 requirements by actions TUSI had taken in replacing-type
CFD differential relays in the diesel generator control panels. The NRC
inspector reviewed the following documents:
a.
RTE Delta letter to the Director, NRC Region IV, dated April 3, 1984.
b.
Transamerica Delaval (TDI) letter to TUSI dated April 12, 1984.
c.
Texas. Utilities letter to TDI dated August 24, 1983.
d.
Comanche Peak Deficiency Review Report (DRR) No. 046.
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Construction Operation Travelers Z-2485 and Z-2486.
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Qualification Report NES 26291-1TR, IEEE Qualification Report for
Generator Control Panel,
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TUGC0 P0 CPF-11509-5
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TUGC0 Receipt Inspection Report (RIR) 24286
The NRC inspector determined from review of these documents and
discussions'with. appropriate applicant personnel that'the CFD relays were
replaced by the applicant with prequalified General Electric type IJD52-A
relays. The applicant also revised Qualification Report NES 262991-1TR,
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IEEE Qualification Report for Generator Control Panel (G&H
Specification 2323-MS-34. Revision 1) to reflect the change in these
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relays. General Electric documentation that verified the relay
qualification was attached to the qualification report for the diesel
generator control panels.
TUSI'provided TDI with specifics of the replacement relay type IJD 52-A by
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letter dated August 24, 1983. When notified by letter dated April 12,
1984, from TDI of the possible 10 CFR Part 21 violation reported by RTE
Delta, the applicant initiated a review (documented on DRR No. 046) to
evaluate the situation. The conclusion of the TUSI evaluation was that
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TUSI was responsible for onsite revisions or modifications and that the
activities related to the relay change had been adequately documented.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Concrete Placement (Unit 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed quality related procedures relative to the
proposed placement of the Unit 2 containment building construction opening
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structural concrete. The review was conducted to ascertain whether these
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procedures reflected proposed work accomplishment consistent with NRC
requirements and Safety Analysis Report comitments. The following
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procedures for the proposed concrete placement in the Unit 2 containment
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wall were reviewed:
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B&R Procedures
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No. 35-1195-CCP-12 Rev. 4. " Concrete Patching, Finishing and Preparation
of Construction Joints"
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No. 35-1195-CEI-24. Rev. 0,."Rebar Prepour Inspection for Containment #2
Exterior Only"
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No. 35-1195-CCP-14, Rev. 4, " Concrete Prepour Inspection and Pour Card
Sign Off"
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No. 35-1195-CCP-10 Rev. 5. " Concrete Batch Plant Operations"
No. 35-1195-CCP-11, Rev. O. " Concrete Placement"
No. 35-1195-CCP-13 Rev. 3. " Concrete Curing"
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TUGC0 Procedures
No. CP-QP-11.0, Rev. 4. " Civil. Inspection Activities"
No. QI-QP-11.0-3, Rev. 5 " Concrete or Mortar Placement Inspection"
No. QI-QP-11.0-2, Rev. 4 " Reinforcing Steel, Miscellaneous Steel and
Embedded Item Placement Inspection"
No. QI-QP-11.0-1, Rev. 5, "Cadweld Inspection Activities"
No. QI-QP-11.0-8, Rev. 2, " Concrete Production Inspection"
No. QI-QP-11.0-4, Rev. 4. " Summer Concrete or Mortar Curing Inspection"
The procedures were found to comply with NRC requirements and Safety
Analysis Report connitments. Specifically, the applicable portions of the
following documents were found to have been incorporated in the review
procedures:
American Concrete Institute Documents
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No. 318-71, " Building Requirements for Reinforced Concrete"
No. 301-72, " Specification for Structural Concrete for Buildings"
No. 614-59. "Recomended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, Transporting, and
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Placing Concrete"
No. 308-71, " Recommended Practice for Curing Concrete"
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Although a specific concrete placement plan had not been developed for the
construction opening, discussions were held.with the engineers responsible
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for its generation. Since the actual plan was not expected for another
six weeks, a similar placement plan previously used in the auxiliary .
building was presented to show those attributes to be considered. The
proposed placement plan contents were also found to consider those
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admonitions from the American Concrete Institute which, when employed,
will yield satisfactory concrete placements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Reinforcing Steel Splices (Unit 2)~
a.
Records Review of Crew Qualifications
The NRC inspector reviewed the qualifications records of 16 cadweld
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personnel. Applicable experience and education for each person was
included in the qualification records. The records indicated that
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each person had prepared two qualification splices for each of the
three cadweld splice positions (horizontal, vertical, and dia
The cadweld splices were made using No.18 reinforcing bars (gonal).
rebar).
Each cadweld splice met the requirements specified in Regulatory
Guide 1.10. " Mechanical (cadweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of
Category I Concrete Structures" and G&H Specification No. 2323-55-11,
Revision 2.
Each cadweld crew member had been instructed by a representative of
the manufacturer in the preparation of cadweld splices for each of
the three splice positions. Each cadwelder had been assigned a
unique identification ' number (symbol) consisting of two letters.
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b.
Observations of Cadwelding of Rebar
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The NRC inspector-observed five preparations for cadwelding rebar
splices on five different days and observed the following:
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(1) the ends of th' e rebar were cut reasonably square, were clean and
free from slag or adhered weld splatter or rust scale, and a
reference line had been marked on each rebar;
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(2) the rebar ends and the cadweld splice sleeve were checked for
location (centering);
(3) the fiberglass rope was properly inserted into the spaces
between the splice sleeve and the rebar;
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(4) the cadweld carbon receptacle which acts as a receiver for the
cadweld powder and a carbon funnel to channel the molten metal
into the sleeve volume to fonn a splice between the two rebar
ends and the splice sleeve was properly and securely attached
prior to loading the cadweld powder;
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(5) after each cadweld splice had been completed and permitted to
cool, the weld surface area was cleaned and inspected;
(6) the acceptance standards for visually inspected cadweld splices
were in accordance with American Weld Society (AWS) D1.1-72,
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Section 8.15. Regulatory Guide 1.1 and G&H Specification
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No. 2323-55-11. Revision 2; and
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(7) rejected (unacceptable) cadweld splices were removed in
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accordance with AWS DI.1-72. Section 3.7.
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c.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) on Rebar Due to Longitudinal Seams
A No.18 rebar was tagged with an NCR (C-85-200-210) due to
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longitudinal seams identified during visual inspection. A
representative from the rebar fabricating company inspected this
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rebar and other rebar with visually observed seams. The
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representative evaluated the seams and submitted a letter discussing
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rebar seams. The letter, dated March 14, 1985, and supporting test
results indicated that longitudinal tensile tests on reber with seams
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in excess of 3/4" have been performed. The test results indicated
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that no propagations or failures in full section (the cross sectional
area is 4 square inches) testing occurred in tests performed in
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accordance with Specification ASTM A-615 which is designed for
tensile testing in the longitudinal direction.
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d.
Rebar Certifications
Material Specifications
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The NRC inspector reviewed the certifications for No. 18 reb'ar.
Those certifications indicated that the rebar conformed to the
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requirements of ASTM A-615-72. Grade 60. The certified minimum yield
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strength is 60.000 psi. The minimum certified ultimate strength is
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90.000 psi. The minimum certified elongation is 7 percent in
8 inches.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. NRC Region IV Followup on Special Review Team (SRT) Identified
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Deficiencies (Unit 1)
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During the period from April 3. 1984, to April 13. 1984, the NRC SRT
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conducted a review at the CPSES site, of activities related to
construction, inspection and testing. Details of the SRT review were
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documented in a report that was transmitted to the applicant via letter
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dated July 13. 1984.
In Section E.b.(8), page 36, of the report the NRC
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SRT inspectors noted 14 deficiencies in pipe supports that were identified
P.
during a field walkdown in the Unit I containment building. Two of these-
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-deficiencies (Supports CC-1-295-005-C53R and MS-1-151-025-C52K) were
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considered to be a potential enforcement item and the details of the
.
Region IV followup action for these two supports were reported in NRC
Inspection Report No. 50-445/84-34; 50-446/84-13.
The NRC inspector
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verified that the applicant had taken adequate action to correct nine of
the remaining deficiencies by reviewing the applicant's documentation,
discussions with cognizant applicant personnel, and field inspections as
necessary. The nine SRT deficiencies inspected during this report period
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are listed below. The applicant's NCR that documented the corrective
action is also listed. To preclude repetition Quality Instruction
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Q1-QAP-11.1-28A was deleted and revision 24 was issued to address more
clearly sway strut and snubber installation.
Support No.
Status
CC-1-218-012-C53K
Snubber connection cotter keys missing
M-13377
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CT-1-038-436-C62K
Snubber connection cotter keys missing
M-13380
No washers in rear bracket
CT-1-117-405-C62K
Snubber connection cotter key missing
M-13383
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CT-1-117-415-C62K
Snubber safety wire broken
M-13382
CT-1-053-444-C62K
The south snubber was installed
M-13376
improperly
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DD-1-046-020-C65R
Snubber cotter keys missing
M-84-01113
FW-1-096-705-C62K
Snubber safety wire broken
M-13381
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FW-1-102-002-C62K
Snubber cotter key missing; needs
M-13379
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relative adjustment on snubber
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FW-1-102-003-C62R
Snubber cotter keys not bent
M-13378
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Special Plant Tours (Unit 1)
On January 10, 1985, the NRC inspector conducted a tour of selected areas
of Unit I and Unit 2.
The
Technical Review Team (TRT) group consisted of two NRC inspectors, a
representative, two NRC consultants, and two
allegers (who were brought to the site to specifically locate hardware
which had previously been alleged to be deficient). With the allegers'
consent a tape recorder was used to note locations and describe any
alleged deficiencies. The TRT recorded this information and will decide
what action should be taken,
During this plant tour a portable welding rod oven was observed to be
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empty and was without paperwork. The NRC inspector discussed this with a
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B&R supervisor to determine how long the welding rod had been outside the
heated oven. The welding supervisor did not know who had checked out the
oven and welding rod; did not know what procedure controlled welding rods;
did not know the general content of the procedure which controls welding
rod material; and could not find the procedure in his work area. The NRC
inspector further determined that 13 welders worked for this supervisor
and that the welding oven in question belonged to this supervisor. He was
asked how he knew his men were following procedures if he did not know
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the requirements of tue procedure. He replied that he relied on his men
and the training they had received. Although the paperwork was not at
the portable oven, the welder (who was assigned this oven) had the paper-
work with the subject welding rod. The welding rod material had not
exceeded the time that it was allowed to be out of the oven.
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The NRC inspector discussed this matter with TUGC0 Assistant Project
General Manager and as a result 73 welding supervisors were retrained and
tested on CPM 6.93 " Weld Filler Material Control." One of 73 failed the
test after receiving training.
In addition, training was administered to
welding supervisors concerning other welding procedures depending on their
scope of responsibility. The following are the results:
Procedures
No. Persons
Test Failures
WES 29 (Welding Structural Steel)
43
3
CP-CPM 9.10 (Welding ASME Hangers)
36
0
CP-CPM 6.90 (Welding Piping and
37
6
Components)
AB&RMemo(28140)datedJanuary 15. 1985, indicated that after additional
training was given all passed the test. This memo indicated that the
reason for the failure was the fact that the individuals only occasionally
used or needed to refer to a specific type item. One failure was
attributed to a supervisor having no welding related responsibilities.
The NRC inspector considers this item unresolved pending further review
(446/8502-01).
On February 5.1985, the NRC inspector conducted a plant tour with the NRC
Contention Panel 5 members. The purpose of the tour was to observe the
quality of construction in Unit 1 and to observe some of the deficiencies
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identified by the NRC to TUEC management in a series of meetings between
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the NRC TRT mcmbers and TUEC management, staff, and consultants.
On February 25, 1985, the NRC inspector conducted a tour for a number of
NRC licensing personnel and NRC consultants to observe mechanical hangers,
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restraints, and snubbers throughout Unit 1.
On March 7,1985, the NRC inspector and a TRT member from NRR conducted an
inspection of selected areas in Unit 1.
The purpose of this inspection
was to allow an alleger to physically identify areas that were alleged to
be deficient. Several NRC consultant personnel, who were members of the
TRT and who had followed up on specific allegations, went along to
,
evaluate specific deficiencies that were to be pointed out. With the
consent of the alleger, a tape recorder was used to note locations'and
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describe the alleger's concerns. This inspection centered on visually
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inspecting the stainless steel liner plate in Units 1 and 2 reactor
refueling cavities and the copper-nickel tubes in the condenser. The TRT
recorded this infomation and will decide what action should be taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Alleged Improper Construction Practices Involving CPSES Main Condensers
(Unit 1)
>
A potential safety concern from an alleger was fomarded to TUEC by an NRC
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letter dated June 19, 1984. The allegation had been expressed during an
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interview conducted on August 24, 1983, by members of the NRC Office of
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Investigation (OI) Field Office. The allegation concerns were assessed by
the TRT and were documented in NUREG-0797 Supplement No. 8, pages K-111
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through K-113.
The NRC inspector reviewed the applicant's July 9,1984, response to the
NRC June 19, 1984, letter. NRC inspectors perfomed inspection activities
during the scheduled Mini-Hot Functional Testing (Mini-HFT) Program during
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late 1984. NRC inspection observations and a review of NCR 84-0229
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detemined that the condenser was of acceptable cleanliness immediately
prior to and during the Mini-HFT test period. NCR 84-0229 and Revision 1
to NCR 84-0229 indicated that following HFT during the period between
January 1983 and May 1983 debris collected in the condensers as a result
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of various work activities performed between mid-1983 and mid-1984;
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however, the debris was removed prior to the start of the Mini-HFT. The
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Unit 1 condenser is clean and closed at the present time. Surveillance of
the condenser cleanliness will be determined by the applicant through
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water sampling and analyses. The water analyses will determine water
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purity (quality) as required by Procedure STA-610. " Secondary Water
Chemistry Control Program," Revision 2.
The water will be analyzed for
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chlorides, dissolved oxygen, silicone, and other chemical compounds to
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determine the purity of the water and assure that deleterious chemicals
do not remain in the water for the secondary side of the steam generators.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Routine Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
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At various times during the inspection period, the NRC inspector conducted
general tours of the reactor building, fuel . building, safeguards building,
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electrical and control building, and the turbine building. During the
tours, the NRC inspector observed housekeeping practices, preventive
maintenance on installed equipment, ongoing construction work, and
discussed various subjects with personnel engaged in work activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Exit Interviews
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The NRC inspetors met with meabers of the TUEC staff (denoted in
paragraph 1) at various times during the course of the inspection. The
scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. The applicant
acknowledged the findings,
.
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