ML20133B090
| ML20133B090 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1985 |
| From: | Johnson T, Teper D CAMPAIGN FOR PROSPEROUS GEORGIA (EDUCATIONAL), GEORGIANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133B094 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#385-083, CON-#385-83 OL, NUDOCS 8508060063 | |
| Download: ML20133B090 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 00LKETED In the Matter of
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GEORGIA POWER CO., et al.
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Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 '
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85 AUG -5 A10 :55 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units I and 2) c7pigg g: 3gegg7,y, 00CdETihG & SEPvlu.
ERANCH RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF INTERVENORS' CONTENTION 8 Joint Intervenors Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia and Georgians Against Nuclear Energy hereby respond to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Intervenors' Contention 8 (Quality Assurance).
Background
As separate intervenors, Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia and Georgians Against Nuclear Energy filed proposed contentions concerning quality assurance.
Applicants strongly objected to the proposed contentions. As requested by the i
Board, Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia and Georgians Against Nuclear Energy joined their interventions and attempted to reach agreement with the Applicants on new j
language for a quality assurance contention.
After failing to reach agreement, Intervenors proposed a quality assurance contention to the Board while Applicants attempted to eliminate most of the contention as proposed by the Intervenors.
Based on the information submitted by Intervenors and the responses of Applicants, the i
l Board, by order dated November 5,1984 adopted a quality assurance contention reading as follows:
Applicants have not and will not implement a Quality Assurance program for Plant Vogtle for welding, for properly documenting the placement of concrete, for adequately testing concrete, for the preparation of correct concrete quality test records, for procuring material and equipment that meet applicable standards, for protecting equipment and for taking corrective action as required, so as to adequately provide for the safe functioning of diverse i
structures, systems and components, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 1
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such that reasonable assurance exists that the operation of the facility will not endanger the public health and safety.
By motion dated June 25, 1985, Applicants requested that the Board summarily dismiss the contention without hearings or further investigation.
(Atthe initiation of the Commission staff, the Applicants and the Intervenors agreed to extend the deadline to August 1 for responding to the Applicants' motion.) The Applicants' motion fails both legally and substantively.
The Applicants attempt to dismi:3 the already accepted contention by misrepresenting Intervenors' case, by misrepresenting (or misunderstanding) the state of the record, by improperly attempting to shift the burden of proof at this point and by attempting to present their affirmative case while providing no opportunity for cross-examination or-for presentation of Intervenors' expert witness testimony or rebuttal.
In short, Applicants' filing is no more than a thinly veiled attempt to eliminate consideration of a contention which has already been accepted by the Board, after the Applicants failed to convince the Board not to consider the contention when first proposed by Intervenors.
The Law Under the concept of summary disposition, the motion is granted only where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is and where there is no genuine issue of material fact that remains for trial.
Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, units 1, 2 & 3),
LBP-73-29, 6 AEC 602, 688 (1973).
As Intervenors herein demonstrate, Applicants meet none of these standards in their motion for summary disposition.
A contention will not be summarily dismissed where the Licensing Board determines that there still exist controverted issues of material fact. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1), LBP-81-34, 14 NRC 637, 640-41 (1981).
As Intervenors clearly demonstrate herein, there exist issues of material fact in this proceeding.
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'By and large, the rules and standards established by the courts for granting or denying a motion for summary judgement under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
. Procedure will be applied by Licensing Boards in their consideration of motions for summary disposition under 10 CFR 2.749. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217 (1974)
Based on judicial interpretations of Rule 56, the burden of proof with respect to summary disposition is upon the movant who must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
J. Moore, Federal Practice, Vol. 6, Ch. 56, para.
56.15(3) (2nd ed. 1966).
To meet this burden, the movant must eliminate any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Poller v Columbia Broadcasting Co., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,
321 U.S. 620, 627 (1954); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-81-48,14 NRC 877, 883 (1981).
The record and affidavits supporting and opposing the motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
See Public Service Co.
of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877 (1974) and j
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cases cited therin 9 pp. 878-879.
The opposing party need not show that he would prevail on the issues but only that there are genuine issues to be tried.
American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
American Broadcasting Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F. 2d 272, 280 (2d cir.1967).
Indeed, even if the party opposing summary disposition failed to submit evidence controverting the disposition, it does not mean that the motion must be granted.
4 The proponent of the motion must still meet his burden of proof to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
et al (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-754 (1977);
Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., et al. (Susawehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-8,13 NRC 335, 337 (1981).
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In an operating licinse proceeding, where significant health and safety or environmental issues are involved, a Licensing Board should grant a motion for summary disposition only if it is convinced from the material filed that the public health and safety or the environment will be satisfactorily protected. Cincinnatti Gas & Electric, et al. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-81-2,13 NRC 36, 40-41(1981), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741 (1977); 10 CFR 2.760a.
In an operating license proceeding, summary disposition on safety issues should not be considered or granted until after the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards letter have been issues.
Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-20, 5 NRC 680, 681 (1977).
The ACRS has not yet issued a letter on Plant Vogtle, making the Applicants' motion premature.
Under Commission practices, Applicants for an operating license always carry the ultimate burden of proof.
The degree to which they must persuade the Board (the burden of persuasion) should depend upon the gravity of the matters in controversy. Virginia Electric & Power Company (North Anna Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4), ALAB-256,1 NRC 10,17 9 n.18 (1975).
[I]t is clear that the Commission's rules do not preclude an intervenor from building its case defensively, on the basis of cross-examination.
Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units IA, 2A,1B & 28), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 389 (1974), Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2),
ALAB-137, 6 AEC 491, 504-505 (1973).
The ultimate burden to show no genuine issue of fact exists is upon movant, Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-81-48, 14NRC877,883(1981).
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Applicants' attempt to have the contention summarily dismissed is premature ct best, since Intervenors have not yet identified their witnesses and are still in the process of investigation of the quality assurance breakdowns at Plant Vogtle.
Further, Applicants misrepresent Intervenors' case and misrepresent the state of the record.
In various filings--the contention as proposed, responses to written and oral discovery questions from the Applicants and responses to written and oral discovery questions from the Commission staff--Intervenors have pointed to numerous examples of breakdowns in quality assurance at Plant Vogtle.
Intervenors were always very clear that these breakdowns were not so much a concern individually (important to the protection of the public health and safety though many of them are) but are of utmost concern because of the patterns of evidence they present of repeated breakdowns at Plant Vogtle. The Board accepted this argument in its order of November 5, but now the Applicants attempt to retry their original arguments against the Board's acceptance by merely addressing the individual incidents, not the pattern.
As it now stands, Applicants have presented new information (contained in the affidavits) without giving Intervenors an opportunity to cross-examine, impeach and rebut the claims therein.
This is a violation of the rules of the Commission and is alone sufficient for denial of Applicants' motion for summary disposition.
Intervenors have not yet selected their witnesses for the QA contention and are continuing to investigate the issues surrounding it.
Intervenors are in touch with i
current and former workers at the plant, some of whom are willing to testify on QA concerns. At Intervenors' request, the Government Accountability Project has agreed to assist in this ongoing investigation.
[The Government Accountability Project is i
a nonprofit law firm which protects workers rights.
It has made substantial contributions in various licensing proceedings around the nation.]
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Applicar.ts' attempt to s:bstitute readiness revi;u f;r the 10 CFR Appendix B requirements is an improper attempt to circumvent the requirements of 10 CFR 2.758 requirements.
Applicants attempt to claim that their failure to comply with the requirements of Appendix B is permissible because the Readiness Review Program will cover for the breakdowns is not only an unacceptable technical argument but also flies in the face of Commission regulations.
If the Applicants want to claim that they have grounds for waiver of the 10 CFR Appendix B requirements, then they must apply for a waiver of those requirements under 10 CFR 2.758, which allows (under certain circumstances) for a waiver of the Commission's rules, provided a prima facie case is made for the waiver.
Instead, Applicants simply present the readiness review program in their Motion to Dismiss Intervenors' Contention 8.
Intervenors pointed out the pattern of failure to comply with Appendix B; Applicants' citing of its Readiness Review Program strengthens the Intervenors' case, since Applicants have not received a waiver of the Appendix B requirements. After all, the QA breakdowns discovered in the Readiness Review Program were not discovered by the QA program and therefore represent a breakdown of the QA program. [For examples of some of the QA breakdowns uncovered by the Readiness Review Program, see the not-yet-published transcripts of Applicants' meeting with a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee en Reactor Safeguards, Augusta, Georgia, July 18 & 19, and the Applicants' meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 26; we assume that the Board will be provided with these transcripts when they are completed.]
In short, if the Applicants want to substitute the Readiness Review Program for the requirements of Appendix B, they have an obligation under 10 CFR 2.758 to move to substitute the Readiness Review Program for the Appendix B requirements.
If the Applicants wish to do so, and if they can convince the Board that they have met the requirements for waiver, then the appropriate hearings before the Board would examine whether the Readiness Review Program is a sufficient assurance of quality to protect the public health and safety; if the Applicants do not wish to apply for an 6
exemption from the Appendix B requirements, or if they fail to receive such an exemption, then the Readiness Review Program's discovery of QA breakdowns strengthens the Intervenors' already strong case for hearings on the QA program itself.
Intervenors would like to state that, while they are disappointed in the Applicants' efforts to avoid QA regulatory compliance, they believe that there is a place for a readiness review and zero defects program.
The RR program provides a window to the success (or, in this case, failure) of the Applicants' implementation of its FSAR commitments on QA.
In this context, the RR/zero defects program is to be praised.
It is unfortunate that Applicants are casting a shadow of suspicion on a program with potential benefits at Plant Vogtle by attempting to use that program to circumvent regulatory requirements. Of course, Applicants cannot get around the regulatory requirements in this way, no matter how they might wish it.
Intervenors have carried their burden of proof that the contention should be heard, as amended by the Licensing Board; Applicants are attempting to switch the burden of proof back onto Intervenors rather than carrying the burden of proving that the case should not be heard.
As described above, Intervenors have reached their burden of proof in convincing the Board that reasonable cause exists to further examine Applicants' quality assurance program.
The burden then shifted to the Applicants, but in the above-cited motion, the Applicants improperly attempt to shift the burden back onto the Intervenors. Under the rules of the Commission, if the Applicants wish to submit the affidavits included with this motion as their affirmative case, Intervenors will rebut or impeach this case at the appropriate time:
in prefiled testimony and/or in cross-examination during hearings on Contention 8.
Applicants' claim that Intervenors have been " vague and unresponsive" has absolutely no basis in fact.
The following are some examples of instances of QA breakdown cited by Intervenors:
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From Intervenors' "Supplccent to Petition for Leave to Intervens and Request for a Hearing" (April 11,1984):
Repeated violations of NRC regulations by Applicants in the construction methods applied to pipe-fitting and welds must be interpreted as undermining confidence in the capability of coolant and containment systems to perform their essential tasks.
... deficiencies involving welds in containment liner penetrations had been raised as an issue... April 29, 1981... problems involving the appropriate inspection of welds have occurred at least as recently as September 1983...As indicated in IR 50-424/83-15 Appednix A, Applicants' construction sheet for examination of reactor coolant pressure boundary welds did not specify the penetrant examination test required by NRC. Such a failure, not simply in the execution of a prescribed test, but the omission of the test from the required procedure, certainly reduces the confidence in the correct functioning of a vital reactor safety system.
[In another violation.] grit-blasting of the closure head weld cladding of 1
Plant Vogtle Unit 1 (IE X7B610) was performed after liquid penetrant examination of the component.
This represented not only a departure from the standard procedure of performing the examination on the component in its finished condition but an unintended method of degrading a critical steam system component after its final installation and inspection.
This is much more than a flaw in an isolated procedure; it is a basic failure in established quality assurance methodology.
Any adequate quality assurance program must take into account a broad range of
" planned and systematic actions necessary" to establish confidence in the system in question. Any quality assurance program predicated exclusively on the implementation of dictated procedures without regard to the exercise of critical judgment and standards of professional practice must be considered woefully inadequate.
In an examination of welding activities involving steel structures and supports in both Units 1 and 2 of Plant Vogtle, the Applicants were cited for failure to include the heat-affected zone (HAZ) of the weld in acceptance radiographs...In response to the notice of violation, the Applicants defended their practice by replying that the Code "gives no requirement for including the heat-affected zone in the area of interest" (X7B610).
On November 18, 1982, welding on sections of the containment dome of Unit 2 was conducted during a "very light misty rain." The welding and site QA supervisors felt that the conditions were sutable for welding since the surfaces of the pieces were not completely covered with moisture (425/82 02).
The Applicants' responsibility for quality control extends beyond collection of individual defect notification and corresponding remedial action.
By failino to make a general assessment of the suitability of the [Transamerica Delaval:
diesel generator system for such an extremely important emergency function, the Applicants have brought their own quality control capabilities into question, undermining confidence in the safe functioning of its operating plant in direct contradiction to NRC QA requirements.
The number of past and continuing failures of the Georgia Power /Bechtel QA/QC program represents a pattern which indicates an undue risk to the health and Violations involving (activities at times resulted from safety of the public.
For example, Report No. 50-424, 50-failure to provide documented procedures.
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425/83-04 regarding concrete QC problems)
The severity of Quality Assurance performance at Plant Vogtle forced a meeting conducted 22 August 1983 at Georgia Power headquarters on the subject of Subcontractor Quality Assurance Performance Allegation by Pullman Power Products quality control personnel about pipe spuport installation and piping installation as well as job intimidation of quality control workers.
Allegations had been made by a Walsh Company boilermaker that improper welding and work practice had occurred. Twenty-three concerns which dealt with twelve separate items were discussed. Defects were found during the reinspection of Pullman Power Products manufactured piping spool pieces. (Letter from James P.
O'Reilly [ sic] to Georgia Power, 28 September 1983...)
Procurement failures continue after numerous I & E Bulletins from past QA/QC inaction.
[ Eleven specific examples are then cited in Intervenors' filing.]
Repeated questions have been raised about changes in the Vogtle QAP...[three examples are then cited]
Other allegations from a former employee pertain to improper QA testing of backfill materials and falsification of backfill QC test results.
Four allegations made by a former employee pertain to inadequate concrete QC testing and falsification of concrete QC test records. Two allegations were subsequently partially substantiated.
Four violations were also described in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Board Assessment July 1, 1981 through October 31, 1983.
Valve mispositioning has resulted in a $40,000 civil penalty.
Testing procedures have identified discrepancies involving cadwell operators.
Protection of equipment procedures have been neglected.
Failure to establish adequate radiography procedures and welding procedures places the integrity of the entire plant in doubt.
From CPG /GANE's Response to NRC Staff's Second Set of Interrogatories,19 December 1984:
Work was begun although schedules were not prepared for final release of construction and field procedures to assure that their development occurred prior to the construction activity involved.
In 1974, the Georgia Power QA manual did not adequately describe the QA program for design and procurement.
The Georgia Power QA audit planning did not include adequate visibility in that the application of all applicable QA criteria was not clear for design and procurement.
The Southern Services, Inc. QA manual did not reflect the requirements of the then current PSAR Section 17.
The QAE Office Procedures Manual's Procedure QA-04-03 did not include appropriate specification evaluation checklists. At the same time, the QA manual description of organization was inconsistent with functional organization on site.
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Whin, according to the Applicants, in-place compacticn tests conduct 2d on-site could not meet the 97% compaction criteria established in the PSAR, the definition of compaction was changed; two versions of the new definition exist.
During concrete placement A-110-003 consisting of a total of 216 yards of concrete at the Unit 2 control building tendon gallery access shaft, it was noted on two different occasions th3t the concrete was allowed to accumulate at the end of the conveying pipe to a height of approximately 2 feet above the finish elevation. Vibrators were then used to uove the pile of concrete to the required elevation.
GPC Construction Procedure CD-T-02, Concrete Quality Control, Section 6.1.9 paragraph 3 states " Vibrators shall not be used for transporting or moving concrete inside the form."
The QC inspector at the batch plant documents his surveillance in a daily log which is stored in the vault under daily inspection files. Any problems encountered at the batch plant during the day of a placement are to be entered in the daily log while the other records for the placement are filed by pour cards number.
The pour card record file and the daily inspection log files must be reviewed in order to review a completed placement record. Consolidaitn of concrete placement files is necessary.
Slump tests, air tests and temperature measurements were being taken at the concrete lab located beside the batch plant. After testing, the concrete was transported approximately one fourth mile to the pumping equipment. There is no further testing of the concrete.
GPC Construction Procedure CD-T-02 references ACI Standards as applicable.
The ACI Standards reference ASTM C-172 which makes provisions and requirements for taking samples at the point or placement.
This is another example of failure to follow procedures during concrete placement.
There are voids in the auxiliary building concrete. The voids occur in walls which were heavily congested with reinforcing steel, embedment, pipe sleeves and blockouts. Stop work notice number SW-C-13 was issued on 20 Dec.1979 to stop concrete placement.
Fine aggregate test sieves failed to meet requirements of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50...
The Applicants failed to follow Rebar Procedures... Lack of inspection, improper documentation and improper identification of cut rebar appears to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
Embed assemblies in the Auxiliary Building and the Control Building suffered many defects, including: all of the plate nuts were standard hexagon nuts instead of heavy hexagon nuts; some of the bolts for a given embed plate assembly were not fully engaged with the plate nut; some of the bolts were not tack-welded to the plate nut; some of the bolts in a given embed plated assembly did not have washers; some of the bolts having washers did not have washers tack welded to either the bolt or the end nut; some end nuts were not tack welded to the corresponding bolt; some bolts may have been bent in excess of the design drawing specified thirty degrees; and some bolts may be cracked due to excessive bending.
Three hundred spray nozzles for the containment spray systems, 44 Fisher Control valves and 7 elbows for the reactor coolant piping system were 10
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icprop;rly pr:tected. Neith2r ad;quats facilities fer storing the safety-related equipment nor approved procedures had been provided.
The inspector made further investigation and determined that a "QA program is not in operation at Vogtle." [A]n evaluation had not been made to assume that the site was prepared to receive, receipt, inspect ard store safety related equipment. The inspector found that although a procedure "Nonconformance Control," GD-T-01, had been written and approved it has not used in conjunction with the " red hold tags" to prepare a nonconformance report and to provide for QA records and corrective action. In summary, the inspector determined that the QA program is not effective, audits had not been scheduled or performed on procedures and personnel in advance of activity to assure proper receipt, inspection, storage and handling of safety-related equipment.
Based on NRC inspection No. 79-17, damage to Category I backfill and possible undermining of Class I structure foundations as a result of 2 Nov.1979 heavy rains was not reported until 14 Nov.1979 which is an infraction of 10 CFR 50.55 (e)... Backfill around the control building and Units 1 and 2 reactor building foundations will be required.
Moderate to severe erosion and slumping occurred on construction slopes in the br kfill.
Backfill around the control building and Units 1 and 2 containment building had been severely eroded by washes and gullies with partial undercutting of some crud slabs.
Seepage was visible along the south side of the Unit 2 tendon gallery wall, indicating that the foundatino may have been damaged by sub-surface ccosion. The backfill construction slope north of the building was saturate, as a result of seepage i
and showed evidence of partial slumping. Seepage on t?e backfill slope north of the auxiliary building had been ongoing since Sept. 1979.
Stop Work notice SW-C-6 showed backfilling stopped as of 1 Nov.1979 because of seepage. SW-C-7 issued 9 Nov. 1979.
This is compounded by surprise find of limestone area under the plant which was later found to have cavities.
Applicants reported a potential CDR regarding the fabrication and installation of embeds to Region II on 22 Nov.1978. All concrete work involving embeds had been stopped as of 21 Nov. 1978.
However, on 29 Nov.1978... embeds were being installed.
During excavation, "GPC QA or QC personnel had no idea what acceptance criteria wsa necessary for determining the proper bearing strata until they were enlightened by this inspector.
I feel there is a definite deficiency or lack of interest on the part of GPC [ Georgia Power Company] QA-QC personnel toward projecting ahead into the construction schedule and predetermining critical checkoff points in the construction sequence where required acceptance criterion must be met."
In addition, Intervenors filed more than twenty pages of written responses to Applicants second set of interrogatories (relating to QA) (excluding document production which amounted to hundreds or thousands of pages) and more than twenty pages more in response to Applicants' third set of interrogatories (also excluding documentation).
In addition, Applicants deposed Douglas Teper, which deposition ran i
355 pages in transcript.
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Clearly, there are numerous material facts in controversy.
Moreover.
Applicants have addressed the incorrect contention.
Intervenors cited numerous examples of failures of the Applicants' Quality Assurance (QA) Program not as contentions in themselves, but as evidence of a pattern of failure of Applicants' QA program. The fact that Applicants have failed to address the failure of the QA program to identify deficiencies but rather have limited themselves to attempting to rebut the specific failures one by one, demonstrates both a failure to understand the contention and a lack of understanding of the purpose of a QA program in the first place.
Indeed Applicants' response in itself is one more piece of evidence of Applicants' lack of an adequate QA program for Plant Vogtle.
Again, the overall questions raised by the specific examples Intervenors cited are not addressed by the Applicants. The Applicants must address the pattern of problems, not the specific examples of that pattern. That correction has been or will be performed for the specific examples cited by Intervenors is in no way a response to the contention concerning the pattern. Applicants' responses do not even identify the root causes or generic implications of the problems, let alone the appropriate response to and correction of those root causes and generic implications.
Applicants' Statement of Material Facts similarly addresses the wrong issue.
The question of whether individual problems have been solved avoids the Intervenors' and the Board's concern about root causes and generic implications of the QA breakdowns.
Moreover, the majority of items 1 through 25 discuss written procedures which are supposed to be followed during plant construction. Unfortunately, Applicants have failed to follow the overwhelming majority of these proceedings, as evidenced by scores of documents at the Public Document Room. The simple recitation of procedures (which Applicants have failed to follow) does not relinquish Applicants from explaining the past pattern of violations, a pattern which presents 12
a threat to the public health a:d safety. A QA prograa is more than paper, it is hardware and work. The NRC staff does not and cannot inspect every item of the plant to back up Applicants' program, rendering insufficient Applicants' claim that investigation should be avoided due to the lack of NRC notices of violation in certain areas. The inadequacy of the QA program in all areas admitted by the Board has been sufficiently demonstrated that hearings on the concerns are necessary.
Applicants' motion severely mischaracterizes Intervenors' case.
The personal attack on Douglas Teper was uncalled for and unnecessary. Mr. Teper was frank in his responses to the Applicants' questioning during deposition, a deposition which took a 355 page transcript.
In this 355 pages, Mr. Teper cited numerous examples of AppItcants' violations of NRC regulations, as well as informing the Applicants that he had spoken with a former worker at the plant who might testify as to specific shortcomings in the quality assurance of welding at Plant Vogtle.
Mr. Teper's candor, rather than being praised by the Applicants, was attacked; his confirmation that he is not an engineering expert in quality assurance is cited by the Applicants as grounds for dismissing the contention, a bizarre twisting of the Intervenors' case.
Applicants failed to cite Mr. Teper's repeated citations of Applicants' violations of NRC regulations, and similarly failed to cite Mr. Teper's explanation that he is an expert on the Coorgia Power Company and its management practices.
As the Board knows (and as the Applicants know). diligent citizen intervenors have made substantial contributions in one case after another for the past two decades.
The general attitude of the Appeal Panel is that pubite participation through intervention is a positive factor in the licensing process and that intervenors perform a valuable function and are to be complimented and encouraged.
See, e A Virginia Elecric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2),
ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10,18 at n. 9 (1975); consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2), ALAB-243, 8 AEC 850, 853 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station). ALAB-229, 8 AEC 13
425 (1974); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222 (1974).
The Applicants' attack on Mr. Teper was a cheap shot.
Intervenors have not selected their expert witness or witnesses on QA. As Intervenors explained to Applicants, Douglas Teper is the only individual who has worked on this contention that Intervenors might use; he is not, however, the only person who has worked on this contention (nuclear physicist Marc Merlin, formerly with the Rand Corporation, and Tim Johnson have also, as the Applicants were informed), nor is he likely to be the only witness for the Intervenors in the proceeding. Additionally, Intervenors will use cross-examination to help carry their case at the hearing stage.
Conclusion In conclusion, Applicants' motion for summary disposition of Intervenors' Contention 8 (Quality Assurance) is without merit both legally and technically and should be denied.
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Respectfully submitted this, the 30th day of July, 1985, Tim Johnson Douglas C. Teper Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia Georgians Against Nuclear Energy I
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