ML20132F200
| ML20132F200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132F170 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-96-23, NUDOCS 9612240152 | |
| Download: ML20132F200 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1996023
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket No.:
50-482
License No.:
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Report No.:
50-482/96-23
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Fav'ity:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
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Location:
1550 Oxen Lane, NE
Burlington, Kansas
Dates:
October 20 through November 30,1996
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inspectors:
J. F. Ringwald, Senior Resident inspector
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M. S. Freeman, Reactor Engineer
Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch B
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Attachment:
Supplemental information
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9612240152 961213
ADOCK 05000482
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Wolf Creek Generating Station
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NRC Inspection Report 50-482/96-23
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Executive Summary
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Operations:
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The management decision to reduce power to repair damage to main feedwater
pump wiring was appropriate and conservative (Section 01.1).
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The inspector identified two examples where the shift supervisor inadequately
documented the basis for operability determinations (Section 01.2).
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Maintenance:
Operators identified and properly responded to an inadvertent dilution as a result of
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deficiencies in the restoration section of an instrumentation and control calibration
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procedure for the letdown radiation monitor. During the review of this deficiency,
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the licensee identified that the procedure also failed to restore the monitor to
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service. These deficiencies were identified as a noncited violation (Section M3.1).
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A poor maintenance turnover and weak training caused a spill of spent fuel pool
water from an improperly tightened mechanical seal on the spent fuel pool cooling
water pump (Section M4.1).
Enaineerina:
The inspector concluded that the licensee violated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, when an operability determination failed to comply with the licensee's
procedure on operability determinations, by relying on an engineering evaluation
which failed to properly identify the leaking component in the turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump governor oil system. This example and examples from
previous inspection reports indicated a declining trend in the performance of
operability determinations (Section E2.1).
P! ant Support:
The decision to perform corrective maintenance on the diesel fire pump instead of
reducing the acceptance requirements was appropriate and showed conservative
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management decision making (Section F1.1).
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The inspector identified a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.h associated
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with concerns on diesel fire pump testing which suggested a lack of thoroughness
in preparing and implementing the test procedure and lack of adherence to the fire
protection program (Section F1.1).
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Reoort Details
Summarv of Plant Status
The plant operated at 100 percent power until October 25,1996, when operators reduced
power to 60 percent to repair main feedwater pump wiring. Operators returned the plant
to 100 percent power on October 26,1996, where it remained throughout the inspection
period.
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1. Operations
O1
Conduct of Operations
01.1 Downoower for Main Feedwater Pump Reoair
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspector reviewed the downpower evolution to repair main feedwater pump
wiring,
b.
Observations and Findinas
On October 25,1996, following an extensive troubleshooting effort, the licensee
reduced power to approximately 60 percent power to repair wiring for Main
Feedwater Pump A. The troubleshooting identified damaged ve.ndor wiring with
deteriorated insulation. With the pump out of service, the repairs were completed
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without difficulty.
As a result of the downpower evolution, the ensuing xenon transient resulted in a
quadrant power tilt ratio which exceeded 1.02. Operators entered the action
statement for Technical Specification 3.2.4 and reduced power to below 50 percent
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power. After evaluating the condition, consulting with reactor engineering
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personnel, and evaluating the technical specification requirements, operators
concluded that they understood the cause of the condition, and were certain that it
was not the result of misaligned rods or other reactivity anomaly. They then
increased power above 50 percent power. At approximately 90 percent power, the
quadrant power tilt ratio returned to below 1.02. At approximately 96 percent
power, operators performed a calorimetric power measurement, verified that the
quadrant power tilt ratio was below 1.02, and exited ar action statements
associated with Technical Specification 3.2.4.
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c.
Conclusions
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The decision to reduce power to repair the main feedwater pump was a good
conservative management decision. The licensee's actions with regard to quadrant
power tilt utio were appropriate.
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01.2 Inadeauatelv Supported Operability Determinations
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
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The inspector reviewed every operability determination documented in the shift
supervisor's log during the inspection period.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On two occasions, the shift supervisor did not adequately document the basis for
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the operability determinations performed. In each of these cases, the operability
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determination themselves appeared to appropriate.
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On November 14,1996, a security guard noted a halon system pipe hanger
contacting an electrical junction box labeled as containing Train A safety-related
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cabling. Operations and engineering personnelidentified that the pipe support
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contacted a junction box containing cabling for GT RT-32, containment atmosphere
process radiation monitor. The log entry stated that this condition did not affect
operability, noted that the junction box had no damage or sign of rubbing with the
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hanger barely touching it, and that the operability of the halon system was not
affected. While this log entry did provide some basis for the conclusion in the as-
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found static condition, it failed to consider the potential effects of a seismic event
or other condition that could exacerbate the condition.
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On November 15,1996, the turbine building watch identified a grounding cable in
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contact with a safety-related cable. The ground cable stuffing tube insulation was
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loose, and there appeared to be excessive slack in the ground cable. The log entry
described the condition and stated that this was not an operability concern. No
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basis for the operability concern was documented.
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The operations manager, plant manager, and chief operating officer all stated that
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these log entries did not meet management expectations. The operations manager
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indicated that they are considering changing their method for documenting
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c.
Conclusions
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On two occasions shift supervisors failed to meet management expectations by
inadequately documenting the basis for operability determinations.
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11. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M 1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities
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a.
insocction Scope (62707)
The inspector observed all or portions of the following work activities.
105797
Task 1
Brickwork on normal charging pump
room wall
110097
Task 1
Mechanical cleaning of Safety
injection Room Cooler Coil Train A
RNM C-0570
Revision 2
Undervoltage relay dropout voltage
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and time response test
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STN FP-450
Revision 4
Fire damper inspection and drop test
STN IC 265A
Revision 9
Calibration of Emergency Fuct Oil
Storage Tank A level loop
b.
Observation and Findinas
Except as noted in Sections M2, M3, and M4, the inspectors found no concerns
with the maintenance observed.
c.
Conclusions
Except as noted in Sections M2, M3, and M4, the inspectors concluded that the
maintenance activities were being performed as required.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities.
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STS AB-201D, Revision 2
Atmospheric relief valve inservice test
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STS BG-210, Revision 10
Chemical and volume control system inservice
check valve test
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found no concerns with the surveillances observed.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the surveillance tests were being performed as
required.
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M 2.1 Breaker Test Device Storace Without Seismic Analysis
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a.
Inspection Scooe (62707)
The inspector reviewed licensee actions in response to the discovery that
electricians stored breaker test devices in spare switchgear cubicles without a
supporting seismic analysis.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On October 18,1996, the inspector questioned the licensee regarding differing
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indications on the spare switchgear cubicles in the safety-related 4160 volt AC
cubicles. During the discussions, the system engineer explained that the indications
were for the 86 lockout relays for the spare cubicles only, and differing indications
had no impact on any safety-related equipment. Subsequent to these discussions,
operators reset the tripped relay to make the indications consistent.
The inspector asked the electrical maintenance superintendent what was located in
the spare cubicles, in answering that the cubicles contained breaker test devices,
the superintendent recognized that these devices may not have had seismic
analyses to support their storage in the safety-related cubicles. After confirming
this concern, the superintendent coordinated with the shift supervisor to have the
devices removed from the cubicles, and directed electricians to initiate Performance
improvement Request (PIR) 96-2662.
Subsequent reviews by engineering personnel concluded that, while no seismic
analysis addressed the storage of these test devices in the cubicle, the analysis for
storing a racked down breaker in a cubicle would bound the storage of a test
device. Engineering personnel completed this engineering disposition based on
PIR 96-2662 on November 27,1996,
c.
Conclusions
While the licensee ultimately demonstrated that it was acceptable to store breaker
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test devices in the spare safety-related cubicles, discussions with the inspectors
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resulted in the licensee identifying that these devices had been stored without an
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evaluation demonstrating the acceptability of this practice.
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M3
Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
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M3.1 Inadvertent Dilution Due to an inadeauate Procedure
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a.
inscection Sec,pe (62707)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding an inadvertent dilution
following a radiation monitor surveillance.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 18,1996, after completion of Procedure STN 10-480, " Channel
Calibration CVCS Letdown Radiation Monitor SJ RE01," Revision 5, operators
questioned the reading of Radiation Monitor SJ RE01, letdown radiation monitor,
and initiated a purge. Approximately 20 minutes later, the operators noted that the
purge light was still illuminated, and the volume control tank level had increased
approximately one percent. Reactor power began to increase, and operators took
actions to limit the increase to below the license limit. Operators subsequently
initiated PIR 96-2998.
During troubleshooting, operators determined that Procedure STN IC-480 changed
the purge time from the normal value of 2 minutes, to 60 minutes, and failed to
change it back to 2 minutes. This nominal one gpm flow from the reactor makeup
water tank through the radiation monitor into the volume control tank continued
beyond the normal 2 minutes causing the inadvertent dilution.
The licensee made two significant revisions to Procedure STN IC-480 since the last
performance of the procedure. While Revision 4 incorporated lessons learned from
Revision 3, Revision 5 failed to capture appropriate restoration steps which had
been present in Revision 4. One of these omitted restoration steps was the
resetting of the purge time. On November 20,1996, instrumentation and controls
technicians identified another restoration step that Revision 5 omitted. The
procedure directed operators to shut Valve SJ-V733, letdown radiation monitor
sample isolation valve, but failed to direct them to open it during restoration. After
discovering the procedure omission, the technicians notified the shift suoervisor.
Operators immediately checked and found Valve SJ V733 shut. Consequently,
Radiation Monitor SJ-RE01 was not restored to service on November 18,1996, at
the completion of Procedure STN IC-480, and remained out of service until
November 20,1996. Technicians subsequently initiated PIR 96-3012.
c.
Conclusions
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Operators identified and properly responded to an inadvertent dilution. The f ailure
of Procedure STN IC-480, to properly restore the radiation monitor to service, and
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reset the purge time, was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a in that the
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procedure was not adequate. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is
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being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC
M4
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Spent Fuel Pool Coolina Pumo Seal Leak
a.
Inspection Scone (62707)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to sealleakage from the Train A
spent fuel pool cooling pump.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On October 25,1996, while performing a fill and vent of the Train A spent fuel pool
cooling pump, the nnlear station operator noted excessive water leaking from the
seal of the pump. Arter stopping the fill and vent evolution and obtaining
assistance from radiation protection personnel, the licensee initiated PIR 96-2756 to
document and evaluate this issue. No personnel contaminations occurred, and
radiation protection personnel appropriately posted the newly created contaminated
area.
During the subsequent investigation, the licensee discovered that the mechanic who
replaced the mechanical seal elected to only tighten the seal finger tight and
planned to tighten the seal further after the pump alignment. Due to a poor
turnover, this information was not conveyed to the oncoming crew and the seal
was never completely tightened prior to the fill and vent evolution. Management
disciplined the master mechanic who provided the poor turnover to the oncoming
Crew.
The licensee also identified two approaches for tightening mechanical seals. The
first approach tightened the seal upon installation, the second delayed the tightening
until af ter pump alignment. Management decided upon the standard practice for the
shop to tighten the seal prior to alignment and attempted to convey this during a
recent training class. During the PIR investigation, the licensee determined that this
message was not clearly understood by several individuals who attended this
training. As a result, management directed the training department to enhance
future training on this topic.
c.
Conclusions
A poor maintenance turnover and weak training caused the sealleakage. The
licensee responded very effectively to the event in limiting the spread of
contamination, and in identifying and implementing effective corrective action.
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E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
Erroneous Operability Determination
a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspector reviewed every operability determination requiring engineering support
made during the inspection period,
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 11,1996, the turbine building operator identified an oil leak on the
governor oil system of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The shift
supervisor made an immediate operability determination based on an estimated leak
rate evaluation. Later that day, the system engineer provided an operability
recommendation after evaluating the leak, its impact on the system, and after
discussing the impact of the leak with the call superintendent, a system sngineering
supervisor, the operations superintendent, and other personnel. The next day, the
inspector discussed the leak with the system engineer. When the inspector asked
the system engineer what the leaking component was, the system engineer
incorrectly identified the leaking component. Oil leaked from fittings on the auxiliary
tube oil sump, yet the system engineer referred to the leaking component as the
electronic governor, a governor component that sensed the turbine speed and
provided an oil pressure error signal to the governor valve controller.
Administrative Procedure ADM O2-024, " Technical Specification Operability,"
Revision 3, Step 5.3.2, required the licensee to perform a number of actions
associated with the operability determination to ensure sufficient scope of review.
This step required the licensee to determine what equipment was degraded or
potentially nonconforming, the safety functions performed by the equipment, and
the circumstances of the potential nonconformance including the possible f ailure
mechanism. Without properly identifying the leaking component, the inspector
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concluded that these requirements could not have been met.
The inspector determined that the operability evaluation performed by the licensee
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failed to include all the required actions, in that the licensee did not properly identify
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the affected component and, therefore, did not determine the impact of the leak on
this component. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V
(482/9623-01).
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NRC Inspection Reports 50-482/96-12,-96-11, and -96-09 identified several
previous examples where the NRC inspectors identified weakly supported operabikty
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determinations. The inspector determined that while the previous examples of
weakly supported operability evaluations were not identified as victations of
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requirements, they indicated a declining trend in performance. The violation
identified in this paragraph was determined to be more significant than the previous
examples, in that the licensee performed an operability evaluation without properly
identifying the affected component.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the licensee violated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, when an operability determination f ailed to comply with the licensee's
procedure on operability determinations, in that it failed to properly identify the
affected equipment. This example and previous examples identified by NRC
inspectors indicated a declining trend in the performance of operability
determinations onshift.
E2.2 Review of Uodated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
USAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares
plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the USAR descriptions. While
smorming the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the
applicable portions of the USAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors
verified that the USAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices,
procedures, and/or parameters.
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E8
Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1
(Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-482/9302-06: Pressure Locking and Thermal
Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves. This item involved the
licensee's efforts to complete reviews of its Generic Letter 89-10 motor-operated
valve population for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding and to
take corrective actions, where necessary, to ensure valve operability.
Subsequently, the NRC issued Generic Letter 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal
Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves." The licensee's response to
this generic letter is currently under review by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation. This issue will be fully resolved under Generic Letter 95-07; therefore,
this item has been closed.
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IV. Plant Support
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P1
Conduct of Emergency Planning Activities
P1.1
Emeroency Plannina Drill
a.
Inst,ection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed the unannounced off-hours emergency drill of October 30,
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1996. The drill was unsuccessful due to late staffing of the technical support
center. The licensee issued PIR 96-2258 to address this. This matter will be
reviewed during a future inspection as an inspection followup item (482/9623-02).
The inspector observed the operators in the simulator during the drill and noted they
used the correct emergency procedures for the situation, paid attention to detail,
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and maintained a questioning attitude while recovering from the scenario. The
inspector noted the operators were concerned with the condition of the plant dunng
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the scenario. They were concerned that, because of continued emergency core
cooling system operation and as a result of the procedural requirement for the
269 F subcooling prior to returning to normal charging, that pressurizer level would
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increase until the pressurizer went solid. This would have increased the leak rate
through the tube rupture. As a result of previous concerns, the licensee began
investigating possible changes to Emergency Procedures EMG C-31, "SGTR With
Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired", and EMG C-32, "SGTR
With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Saturated Recovery Desired." The licensee issued
Document Revision Requests 96-2449 and 96-2450 to track these changes. The
inspector concluded this would adequately address the concern described here.
F1
Control of Fire Protection Activities
F1.1
Diesel Fire Pump Test
a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspector observed the performance of a sequential flow test and investigated
the licensing basis requirements for operability of the diesel fire pump.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The licensee performed the annual test of the diesel fire pump using Procedure
STN FP-204, " Fire Protection System Flow and Sequential Pump Start", on
October 2,1996. This test required the pump to produce a minimum flow of
3300 gpm with a residual pressure of 80 psig at the underground i.iterface point.
The pump failed the test and was declared inoperable. In deciding how to restore
the pump to operability, the licensee investigated the possibility of changing the
acceptance requirements and did find adequate margin to lower the flow
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requirements. Management decided, however, to let.ve the acceptance
requirements alone and perform corrective maintenance on the pump instead. The
licensee installed a temporary diesel fire pump in accordance with the fire protection
program and reworked the permanent pump to improve its performance. The
postmaintenance test on the permanent diesel fire pump was to perform the annual
flow test again. The inspector observed performance of Procedure STN FP-204,
Revision 10, October 24,1996.
License Condition 2.C.5 required a fire protection program as described in the
USAR. This was described in USAR Section 9.5.1.7 which referred to
Table 9.5.1-3 and the licensee's fire protection program document. USAR
Section 9.5.1 further stated the fire protection program was an administrative
procedure. Procedure AP 10-100, " Fire Protection", Revision 1, described this fire
protection program. Step 6.3.2.2.i required Procedure STN FP-204 to perform a
flow test in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of the National Fire Protection
Assoc.iation (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook,14th edition. In addition, Technical Specification 6.8.1.h required that procedures be established, implemented, and
maintained covering fire protection program implementation. Procedures AP 10-100
and STN FP-204 were required by this Technical Specification.
in comparing the performance of Procedure STN FP-204 against these requirements
the inspector found five concerns:
1)
The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook provided instructions to take pitot tube
readings in the center of the flow stream at a distance equal to one half the
diameter of the nozzle opening, in this case one inch.
Procedure STN FP-204 contained no such instructions which resulted in
different personnel using different methods to take readings during the test.
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Early in the test the inspector observed test personnel taking readings with
the pitot tube instrument directly against the test nozzle. Later, test
personnel took readings with the pitot tube held in the flow stream out away
from the nozzle. The licensec later learned the proper method only after
consulting with fire protection industry experts. The licensee initiated
PIR 96-2809 to evaluate the use of pitot tube readings as a method of
determining flow.
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The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook also provided a caution that pitot tube
readings less than 10 psi or greater than 30 psi at any open hydrant should
be avoided. Procedure STN FP-204 contained no limits on pitot tube
readings and the inspector noted that readings taken on October 24
exceeded 30 psi. The observed readings were not taken on open hydrants,
but on a test header. The limits were provided in the handbook because of
reduced accuracy at higher pressures. With no limits, it would be possible to
have pitot tube pressures high enough to cause data errors such that flow
would be indicated to be acceptable when in fact it was not. The licensee
initiated PIR 96-3065 to investigate these limits.
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3)
The inspector observed that Pump Discharge Valve 1FP0005B was throttled
closed during the test to raise the system pressure. This was allowed by
Procedure STN FP-204, however, it would not accomplish the test objective.
of providing adequate loop pressure and flow. The licensee initiated
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Document Revision Request 96-2418 to request procedure changes to
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remove this practice.
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4)
Upon restoration from the test, the inspector observed that the electric fire
pump, which had been secured during the test, automatically started when
restored to service. This was not prohibited by the test procedure, but it
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was unexpected because test personnel had made extra efforts to increase
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header pressure just Lefore closing the breaker in order to keep the pump
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from starting. Upon investigation, the inspector learned that an automatic
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start signal was sealed-in due to low header pressure after the diesel pump
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was stopped. This seal-in feature was due to a time delay which had not
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elapsed when the electric fire pump breaker was closed. This indicated a
lack of understanding of the electric fire pump start logic. The licensee
initiated Document Revision Request 96-2418 to review this concern.
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5)
Fire Protection Prog am Procedure AP 10-100 required Procedure
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STN FP-204 to perform a flow test in accordance with the NFPA Fire
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Protection Handbook. However, Procedure STN FP-204 indicated the
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requirement came from NFPA Standard 20. This situation gave confusing
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guidance on which requirements were to be implemented by
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Procedure STN FP-204. The licensee initiated Document Revision
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Request 96-2418 to review this concern.
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c.
Conclusions
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The decision to perform corrective maintenance on the diesel fire pump instead of
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reducing the acceptance requirements was appropriate and showed conservative
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management decision making.
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The concerns on diesel fire pump testing suggest a lack of thoroughness in
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preparing and implementing Procedure STN FP-204 and lack of adherence to the fire
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protection program. This failure of the licensee to adequately establish and maintain
Procedure STN FP-204 as required by the fire protection program is a violation of
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Technical Specification 6.8.1.h (482/9623-03).
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F2
Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
F2.1
Reactor Coolant Pumo Oil Collection System
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a.
Inspection Scoce (71750)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to NRC Information Notice 94-58,
" Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Fire."
b.
Observations and Findinas
The licensee initiated industry Technical Information Program Report 02805 in
response to NRC Information Notice 94-58. This report concluded that major leaks
would be collected appropriately and directed to the oil collection system, but that
minor leaks, such as those identified during Refueling Outage Vil from the
resistance temperature detector terminal box, could occur. The evaluation further
concluded that these minor leaks were essentially negligible, and that no additional
actions were necessary. However, the report also recommended that reactor
coolant pumps be inspected each outage, and if leaks continued to occur, it
recommended the addition of drip pans with the leakage conveniently routed to the
oil collection system.
The licensee did not track this recommendation and initiated PIR 96-3133 on
December 2,1996, to address this concern. In addition, engineenng personnel
used PIR 96-3133 to track the initiation of Industry TechnicalInformation Program
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Report 03547 associated with the containment fire at Arkansas Nuclear One as
described in INPO Operating Plant Experiences 8123," Fire in Containment Building
During Heatup Following Refueling Outage," November 18,1996, and Licensee
Event Report 50-313/96-009.
The inspector asked the system engineer how they met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, given the leakage identified during Refueling Outage Vll. The
engineer responded that 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R refers to flanges and fittings,
and any leakage from these are collected and routed to the oil collection system.
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Leakage from the terminal box they viewed as beyond the scope of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector will review this issue during a future inspection after PlR 96-3133 and
Industry Technical Information Program Report 03547 are closed. This will be
tracked as an inspection followup item (482/9623-04).
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
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conclusion of the inspection on December 3,1996. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented. Some licensee staff members expressed disagreement with the
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violation associated with the operability determination for the turbine-driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump discussed in Section E2.1 of this report. The licensee asserted that since
the actual operability determination was correct, and the engineer properly identified that
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the leak was on the governor oil system, it was not necessary to correctly identify the
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actual subcomponent in order to comply with Procedure ADM O2-024. The licensee also
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stated that the small size of the leak made proper identification of the location irrelevant.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
G. D. Boyer, Director of Site Support
N. S. Carns, President and Chief Executive Officer
C. W. Fowler, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling
O. L. Maynard, Chief Administrative Officer
B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering
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W. B. Norton, Manager, Performance improvement and Assessment
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C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
lP 37551
Onsite Engineering
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance Observations
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
9623-01
Erroneous operability determinatic,a (Section E2.1)
9623-02
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Emergency planning exercise (Section P1.1)
9623-03
Diesel fire pump test (Section F1.1)
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9623-04.
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Reactor coolant pump oil collection system (Section F2.1)
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Opened and Closed
50-482/9623-05
Inadvertent dilution due to an inadequate procedure
(Section M3.1)
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Closed
50-482/9302-06
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Pressure locking and thermal binding on safety-related
power-operated gate valves (Section E8.1)