ML20132E125

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Final Deficiency Rept DER 85-23 Re Diesel Generator Start Failure Due to Mechanical Valve Failure.Initially Reported on 850607.Valves Replaced.Deficiency Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) or Part 21
ML20132E125
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/1985
From: Van Brunt E
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Kirsch D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
ANPP-33411-TDS, DER-85-23, NUDOCS 8509300411
Download: ML20132E125 (6)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:[ T O V Arizona Nuclear Power Project /g P.O. BOX 52034 e PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 g, O NGlg,, September 9, 1985 ANPP-33411-TDS/TPS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety & Projects

Subject:

Final Report - DER 85-23 A 50.55 (e) Evaluation Relating To Diesel Generator Start Failure Due To Mechanical Valve Failure File: 85-019-026; D.4.33.2

Reference:

A) Telephone conversation between Jo Bianchi, Office of D. F. Kirsch, and P. Coffin on June 7, 1985 B) ANPP-32999, dated July 10, 1985 (Interim Report) C) ANPP-33207, dated August 13, 1985 (Time Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached i= our final written report of the deficiency ref- ~ erenced above which has been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55 (e) and 10CFR21. Very truly yours, } . CLL( [%CC E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/'.t PS /nj Attachment cc: See Page Two 8509300411 850909 PDR ADOCK 05000528 S PDR QLJq I

g. Mr. D. F. Kirsch ANPP-33411-TDS/TPS ( ' DER 85-23 I-Page Two' L-L cc: Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 4 J. G. Haynes' D. B. Karner i W. E. Ide I'- D. B. Fasnachts A. C. Rogers. h L.'A. Souza D. E.-Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen D. Canady A. C. Gehr G. A. Hierzer W. G. Bingham R. L..Patterson R. W.~ Welcher H. D. Foster D.'R. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman M. L. Clyde B. T. Parker -T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby Records Center. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

FINAL REPORT - DER 85-23 DEFICIENCY EVAIEATION 50.55(e) ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP) PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 1. Description of Deficiency On March 5,1985, during testing, Unit 1 Diesel Generator "A" failed to attain the required voltage, frequency, and speed within 10 seconds (actual time: 10.51 seconds) per Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 (see Reference 1). On March 8, 1985, during testing, Unit 1 Diesel Generator "B" failed to attain the required voltage, frequency, and stopped within 10 seconds (actual time: 11.6 seconds, 12.55 seconds, and 12.06 seconds, respec-tively) in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 (see Reference 1). Again, on March 29, 1985 during testing, Unit 1 Diesel Generator "B" failed to attain the required frequency within 10 seconds (actual time: 10.64 seconds) per Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4. Evaluation The Diesel Generator (D/G) provides emergency power to equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of loss of preferred power. There are two D/G sets per power plant (Train A and Train B). Each unit is required to start, come up to full rated speed, voltage, and frequency within 10 seconds. Starting air is provided by two independent starting air systas; each consisting of a compressor, an air dryer, and an air receiver. 'Ihe air system also supplies air to the control air syst s in the D/G package. A portion of the control air is routed to the Turbocharger Manifold Terperature Control Valves (valves TV-265, TV-266, TV-267, and TV-268). These valves act as pilot valves to temperature valves TV-271, TV-272, TV-273, and TV-274 which regulate jacket water to the turbocharger intercooler/ heaters. Air to the temperature control valves is taken off the control air syst s header. (See attached sketch, Figure 1.) The valves bleed air, thus reducing air pressure in the control air header. When a diesel start signal (test mode) is initiated, reduced air pressure in the air header is not sufficient to fully actuate the pneumatic valve that vents air frm the fuel cylinder control valve pneumatic actuator and the fuel control cylinder (UV-248 and SV-242, respectively, Figure 1). Air is not vented frm the "0FF" side and admitted to the "0N" side of the fuel control cylinder fast enoup) to enable the diesel generator to start in 10 seconds.

Final Report DER 85-23 Page Two In the emergency mde, Class lE solenoid valves UV-10 and UV-12 provide positive assurance of venting of the fuel control systs in place of pneumatic valve UV-248. Therefore, slow actuation of UV-248 due to low air pressure has no affect on diesel generator operation in the emergency mde. The installed valves are the valve port overlap type which bleed con-tinuously. This was determined by dismantling and inspecting the valve internals. Valve port overlap valves have two grooves in the spool as did the PVNGS valves (Reference 1). The root cause of the failure of the temperature control valves to operate properly is that the valves now installed do not have the correct internals. Per Cooper Energy Services letter, Reference 2, the proper valves for the systs are center dead spot valves which do not bleed air during actuation. These valves perform a non-safety-related function and are designated, and were procured, as a non "Q" cmponent. II. Analysis of Safety Implications Reduction of air pressure in the control air system increases the start time for the diesel generator during the test mode. However, the diesel generator is designed to use solenoid valves to vent air from the pneumatic control valve and fuel control cylinder in the mergency mode, therefore, reduced air pressure has no affect on starting capability. Based cn the above, it is concluded that the diesel generator would have performed its intended safety function if this condition had re-mained uncorrected. This condition is therefore evaluated as not reportable under the conditions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. III. Corrective Action Replace the existing valves TV-265, TV-266, TV-267, and TV-268 with center dead spot valves Amot Corporation mdel number 4021C11C7. The wrk will be performed under Work Request number 108529 for Unit 1, Work Request ntuber 108530 for Unit 2, and a subsequently issued DCP for Unit 3. Work is expected to be completed prior to fuel load for Units 2 and 3 and during the first outage for Unit 1. Cooper will be requested to evaluate other material supplied by Amot Corporation that may be used in a safety-related capacity and verify the adequacy of the material supplied. Discrepancies will be docu-mented by the appropriate deficiency document and this DER will be referenced.

o j- . Final Report DER 85 Page'Ihree IV. References 'l. EER 85-DG-033 .2. Cooper Energy Services Imtter CES No. 493, June 27' 1985' MIC 245674.

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