ML20129F692

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 109 & 112 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively
ML20129F692
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1985
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20129F669 List:
References
NUDOCS 8507170433
Download: ML20129F692 (4)


Text

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        • SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORT AMENDMENTS NOS.109 AND 112 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-44 AND DPP-56 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS NOS 2 AND 3 00CKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50 278 Introduction By letter dated OctoberJa,1981, the Philadelphia Electric Company (, et al.

(the licensee) proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications TSs) appended to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,' Units 2 and 3.

The proposed amendments involve the revisions evaluated below.

_g Evaluation

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1.

Changes in the " Remarks" Column on Table 3.2.B By letter dated March 28, 1984, the Commission issued Amendments Nos. 96 and 98 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom facility.

By those amendments, the requested changes in the " Remarks" column on Table 3.2.8 were made. However, the attached Safety Evaluation inadvertently failed to address these changes.

These changes provide the same description of interlock functions for both the Residual Heat Removal - Low Pressure Core Injection (RHR-LPCI) Pump Discharge Pressure Interlock and the Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure Interlock, namely, deferring actuation of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) until there is confirmation of low Pressure Core Cooling System operation.

These two interlock systems are designed to defer ADS actuation but the description originally found in the Table 3.2.B did not clearly indicate that this was the function of both interlocks.

Therefore, this chance provides clarification of the functions of both interlocks, and we conclude that this change is acceptable.

2.

Clarification Pertaining to the Suopression Chamber High Level Trip Setting This requested change would permit the Suppression Chamber High Level trip setting (Table 3.2.BI to read "less than or equal to 5 inches above torus midpoint" rather than "less than or equal to 5 inches above normaf water 4

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. level." By letter dated February 4',1085, the licensee provided documentation of its telephone conversation with the NRC staff on December 14, 1.984, which resulted in additional hackground infomation concerning this request.

This change provides for new nomenclature for the setting involving the Suppression Chamber Figh Level trip as a result of modifications performed in accordance with the NRC Mark I Containment Program as described in NilREG-0661 ("Safet Program" - July 1980)y Evaluation Report - Mark I Containment Long-Term The original suppression chamber (torus) " normal water level" was at elevation 110'0" or 15'6" above the botton of the torus.

Elevation 110'0" is also the torus midpoint (FSAR, Figure 5.2.1).

The

" current nomal water levels" resultino from the Mark I Program are based upon the torus inventory limits specified jn Section 3.7.A.1 of the current TSs. The minimum water volume (122,900 ft ) specification yields a lower limit of 14 5 ft for the " normal water level" and the maximum water volume 3

(127,300 ft ) yields an upper limit of 14.9 ft for the "nomal. level." These revisions in the "nomal levels" due to the Mark I Cortainment Program had the effect of inadvertently lowering the Suppression Chamber High Level trip setting which currently references in the TSs " normal water level" rather than a fixed physical point on the torus.

The Suppression Chamber High Level trip initiates transfer of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) suction from the condensate storage tank to the torus (suppression chamber). The purpose is to limit the rise in torus water inventory during a loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) to ensure an adequate gas space above the torus water level. Torus gas space insures proper venting of non-condensible gases through the vacuum breakers to drywell. The design basis of the original trip setting was the original torus (Suppression Chamber) normal water level (elevation 110'0" or 15'6" above the bottom of the torus). As indicated above, the torus midpoint is also at elevation 110'0" (or 15'6" above torus bottom).

The proposed TS change clarifies that the trip setpoint is tied to a physical location on the torus (i.e., torus midpoint which is elevation 110'0") and reconfirms the original design basis of this setpoint. This proposed change does not represent a change in either the nomal torus water level established for the Mark I Program or a change in the original design basis for the trip setpoint.

Since the requested change deals only with the nomenclature for designating the trip setpoint, we find that this change is acceptable without further evaluation.

3.

Revision Concernino the Surveillance Recuirements for the Primary Containment Isolation Sinnal (PCIS) and Low Pressure Coolant In,iection (LFCI) Interlock Switch The surveillance requirements for the reactor pressure instrumentation, which provides interlocks for several safety functions, were revised in Table 4.2.B (Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for CSCS) as part of a requested revision guthorized by Amendments Nos. 68/67.

These amendments changed the calibraticn frequency from once every 3 months to once every operating cycle. The basis for this change was the installation of new analog transmitters.

The three reactor pressure instrumentation interlock systems are shown in Table 3.2.8 of the TSs (Reactor Low Pressurei.

The new analog transmitters as described in Amendments 68/67 were associated with only two of the thrn interlock systems. The instrumentation for the third reactor L

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, low pressure interlock (PCIS/LPCI interlock) was not modified to employ new analog transmitters and, therefore, the surveillance frequency should remain at once every 3 months. To correct this error, the licensee proposes to add to Table 4.2.R, as a separate entry, the above discussed PCIS/LPCI interlock feature and require a calibration frequency for this interlock of once per 3 months.

This action would reestablish the more stringent surveillance requirement which had been previously required by the Peach Bottom TSs prior to issuance of Amendments 68/67 The surveillance requirements which the NRC staff authorized for the new analog transmitters in Amendments 69/67 are not affected by this change.

We conclude that this change is acceptable because it corrects an error in the TSs and results in reestablishment of surveillance reouirements previously occurring in the Peach Potton TSs.

4.

Correction of an Error in the Calibration Frequency for Reactor level Instrumentation in Table 4.2.F (Minimum Test and Calibration Frecuency for Surveillance Instrumentation)

By Amendments Nos. 68/67, the calibration frequency for the Reactor Level Instrumentation in Table 4.2.F was lengthened from once per 6 mnnths to once per operating cycle (approximately once per 18 months).

The licensee states that the lengthening authorized by the above amendments was inadvertent and the proposed change would correct this error by reestablishing the original TS calibration frequency requirement of once oer 6 months.

Notwithstanding the inadvertent lengthening of the calibration frequency authorized by the above previous amendments, the licensee has stated that the shorter calibration frequency (once per 6 months) has continued to be used. We find that the proposed change is acceptable since it corrects an error and restores in the TSs the original required calibration frequency for Reactor Level Instrumentation.

E.

Revision to Appendix B (Environmental Technical Specifications) Thermal Maoping Reporting Frecuency and Clarification on the Recuired Events Necessary to Initiate Thermal Mapoing The first requested change involves a revision in the reporting frequency for thermal mapping results.

The current Appendix B TSs require that any thermal mappino results be reported to the NDC within 30 days.

The requested channe would still reouire that thermal mapoing results be compiled but that reports to the NPC be submitted at least annually rather than within 3n days.

In assessing this requested change, we have reviewed the requirements and objectives of ETS Section 3.1 (Thermal "apping) and the previous NRC actions involving these requirements, including Amendments 67/66 (April 2a, 1980) and Amendments 9?/94 (February 24, 198ai which were directly related to the Section.

This above change does not alter the procedures or conditions for themal mappino in ETS Section 3.I but rather affects only the

-reporting frequency. We conclude that the proposed nodification does not alter the objective of this ETS reautrement which is to assure that thermal regimes, during cooling tower outages linked with extrene environmental conditions, are not detrimental to aouatic biota.

, In addition, the licensee requested a modification of ETS 3.1 to preclude the collection of thennal mapping data by boat when weather and river conditions are not conducive to safe data collection. We believe that this is a reasonable modification which would enhance the health and safety of the licensee's employees and which would not significantly alter the objectives of the ETS as stated above.

It should also be noted that ETS 3.1 also requires that temperature measurements downstream from the site at the Pennsylvania / Maryland state line "...be transmitted to the PBAPS control room and logged." Thus, there is continuous monitoring and recording of thennal regimes required by ETS 3.1 which remain unchanged by this request.

In addition, the supplemental thermal mapping by boat as specified in ETS 3.1 would only be precluded if weather or river conditions would not allow safe data collection.

Therefore, based upon the above, we conclude that there will be no environmental impact attributable to the proposed action. These changes to the environmental monitoring (surveillance) requirements do not involve any change in station design or operation or involve an increase in effluent types or quantities, or increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The impact of the overall station operation has already been predicted and described in the Connission's FES for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

Our review has not revealed impacts greater than those previously anticipated.

Environmental Consideration These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of a facility comp:nent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements.

These amendments also relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding.

Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and 51.22(c)(10).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

9 Dated:

June 10,1985 Principal Contributor:

G. Gears