ML20129E474
| ML20129E474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1985 |
| From: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, NUDOCS 8506060509 | |
| Download: ML20129E474 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1984012
Text
4.
W 2 41985
In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-285/84-12
Omaha Public Power District
ATTN:
R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-
Nuclear Production
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Gentlemen:
This refers to your April 9, 1985, response (LIC-85-138) in reply to the
Notice of Violation sent to you with our letter dated March 8, 1985. Our
letter and Notice described a violation which occurred at the Fort Calhoun
Station which was identified during an NRC inspection and investigation
conducted in May, June, and July respectively.
The violation was discussed
with you during an Enforcement Conference held with Mr. P. S. Check, Deputy
Regional Administrator, Region IV on December 20, 1984.
Your response has been carefully considered. The response does not contradict
the fact that the violation occurred, and false, inaccurate and incomplete
information was provided to the NRC for review. The information requested,
under oath, by the NRC through the issuance of an IE Bulletin, is considered
material since it was needed to assess the significance of an identified
problem, the potential degradation of threaded fasteners. The key question is
whether the information furnished had a natural tendency or capability to
influence, not whether the information was in fact relied on.
In our
opinion, it did have a natural tendency or capability to influence.
See
VirginiaElectricPowerCo.(NorthAnna1and2),4NRC480(1976), affirmed
VEPC0 v. NRC, 571 F 2d 1289 (4th. Cir. 1978.). The violation identified by the
NRC regardTng your August 2,1982 reply to IE Bulletin 82-02 demonstrated the
~
need for more effective control of your responses to the NRC. As discussed in
our Notice of Violation, in recognition of prior good performance and prompt and
extensive corrective action, the civil penalty was fully mitigated.
However,
since the false statement is considered to be material and is considered to be
more than an inadvertent clerical error as there was a specific lack of emphasis
and attention by several levels of management and supervision within the OPPD
organization, the classification of the violation as a Severity Level III is
appropriate.
I
I
,
'
0506060509 050524
ADOCK 05000295
G
..
..~
- .
=
-lw ,
- i
'
+
.
~
,.
>
,
..
Omaha Public Power District-
-2--
'
.We find your reply responsive to the-concerns raised in our Notice of
l
Violation.- We will review your. corrective action during a. future. inspection
to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.-
Sincerely,
.
!
Original signed by
'
'
Robert D.' Martin
' Robert D. Martin
-
!
. Regional Administrator.
cc:
W. G. Gates, Manager
Fort Calhoun Station
P..O. Box 399
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023
Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
,
,.
'
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
f1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
20036
Kansas Radiation Control Program Director
Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director
[.bec'lioDMB(IE01).
-bec distrib. by RIV:
'
- RPB2
- Resident Inspector
R..D. Martin, RA
. EP&RPB
- SectionChief(RPB2/A)
- MIS System
- RIV File
R. Denise, DRSP.
- RSTS Operator
.T. Westerman
(
...
E0f
l
RIV:RP,B
'
DRS&P
i-
RHuntWr:gb
RPDenise
TWesterman
RDP
in
5/Jy/85
5/g%BS
SM/85
5/ i/85
'
l
l
l
I
l>
-
- - -
I
.
'
6
, M [*39 *ylg.),g y 1.;fii Q ( % ,y(;#fk? % R Q Q,Cf f
Q{
.
,
Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102
402/536 4000
April 9, 1985
LIC-85-138
APRII1985
f4r. James M. Taylcr, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
(1)
Docket No. 50-285
(2)
Letter from OPPD (W. C. Jones) to NRC (J. T. Collins)
dated August 2, 1982 (LIC-82-269)
(3)
Letter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (J. T. Collins)
dated July 2, 1984 (LIC-84-209)
(4)
Letter from 0 PPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (R. D. Martin)
dated December 27, 1984 (LIC-84-434)
(5)
Letter from NRC (R. D. Martin) to OPPD (R. L. Andrews)
dated March 8,1985 (EA-84-63)
Dear fir. Taylor:
IE Inspection Report 84-12
'
The Omaha Public Power District received IE Inspection Report 84-12 and Reference
(5) both dated March 8, 1985.
These documents idertified a potential material
false statement and violation of NRC requirements relative to the District's re-
sponse to NRC IE Bulletin 82-02.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, please find attached
the District's response to these allegations.
Sincerely,
Th/sC
/
/
R. L. Andrews
Division Manager
Nuclear Production
)
1
RLA/CWN/dao
V
"
4
&c
4
-
.,
s
N g
(
4
~-ggnoo,m.,,
...s,.
..
_
-
-
- ..
..
,
LIC-85-138'
s
-:Page' 2
,
p
.cc:
LeBoeuf, Lamb,~Leiby & MacRae
.1333 New Hampshire Avenue,.N.W.
p.;
,.
Washington, DC 20036
Mr. James R. Miller, Chief ~
.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Division of Licensing'
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
Washington, DC 20555
<
Mr. Robert D. Martin
Regional Administrator-
.
r
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
,
Arlington, TX 76011-
Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager
l
.Mr. L. A..Yandell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
!
,-
L
l
l
I
L-
r
.
-
,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
In the Matter of
-
Omaha Public Power District
)
Docket flo. 50-285
(Fort Calhoun Station,
)
Unit No. 1)
)
'
'
R. L. Andrews, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Division
Manager - Nuclear Production of the Omaha Public Power District; that he is
duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the
attached response to the flotice of Violation identified in the Commission's
letter dated March 8, 1985 (EA-84-63); that he is familiar with the content
thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief.
' b'.?ftie'L
,.
R. L. Andrews
Division llanager
fluclear Production
STATE OF NEBRASKA)
)
ss
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notcry Public in and for the State of
Nebraska on this
9
day of April, 1985.
.
-r
enum neuer-se e m e.
0amyl.(liAzp>
Er
k
Y
fj
ilotjry Public
I-
k.
}
l
r
.
.,
. . ,
,
ATTACHMENT
0 PPD Response Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201
In accordance with Reference 5 and as required therein, the District is
responding to the subject Notice of Violation associated with OPPD's
initial. response to IE Bulletin 82-02 (Reference 2).
VIOLATION
The NOTICE OF VIOLATION attached to Reference 5 states:
The following is a material false statement within the meaning
of Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
In the August 2,1982, response to NRC IE Bulletin No. 82-02,
'" Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundaries in PWR Plants," the licensee stated, in part, that
"The Fort Calhoun Station approved maintenance procedures cal!
'for the use of NEVERSIEZE (sic) (Pure Nickel #65) on all
threaded fasteners."
Contrary to the above statement:
Special Maintenance Procedure SP-RC-11, Revision 1,
" Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly," (effective between
May 24, 1980, and March 1,1983) designated no specific
lubricant on the reactor coolant pump (RCP) studs.
Discussions revealed that it had been common practice to
use molybdenum disulfide lubricant on both.the RCP and
reactor vessel studs.
Revision 6 of Special Maintenance
'
Procedure SP-RC-11, dated March 16, 1984, specifically
required the use of " Super-Moly" (molybdenum disulfide)
on RCP Studs.
Maintenance Procedure RC-2-1-B, Revision 12, "S/G Primary
Manway Replacement," (effective between June 9,1981, and
January 20, 1983) designated a mixture of 50% oil and 50%
graphite to be used on manway studs.
The August 2,1982, statement was false in that contrary to the
statement, a number of different types of lubricants were
utilized at Fort Calhoun Station, including " Super-Moly"
(molybdenum disulfide).
The false statement was material in
that one of the purposes of IE Bulletin No. 82-02 was to find
'
out which licensees used " Super-Moly" (molybdenum disulfide) as
a fastener lubricant and what plant experience the licensee had
with stress-corrosion cracking of fasteners using molybdenum
disulfide lubricants.
At the time IE Bulletin 82-02 was
,
l
issued, the NRC thought that molybdenum disulfide might have
,
Io
n
'
.
-
.
VIOLATION'(Continued)
a pronounced tendency to decompose in the presence of high
temperature and moisture conditions to release sulfide, a
known promoter of stress-corrosing cracking. Although the
NRC subsequently found molybdenum disulfide lubricant to be
acceptable, this fact was not known when the licensee sub-
mitted its response.
This. is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement VII).
(No Civil Penalty)
DISTRICT'S RESPONSE
1.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation
The District admits that its August 2,1982 response was incomplete,
but den.ies that the alleged violation is a material false statement.
Supplement VII to 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C provides that:
A false statement caused by an inadvertent clerical or
similar error involving information which, had it been
available to NRC and accurate at the time the information
should have been submitted, would probably not have
resulted in regulatory action or NRC seeking additional
information
is a " Severity IV violation."
The complete text of that portion of the District's August 2,1982
response that led to the Notice of Violation is as follows:
Request
Identify those closures and connections, if any, where
fastener lubricants and injection sealant materials have
been or are being used and report on plant experience
with their application particularly any instances of SCC
of fasteners.
Include types and composition of materials
used.
,
!
l
District's Response
Maintenance records indicate that injection sealant
canpounds have never been used on any of the RCPB
enclosures within the scope of IE Bulletin 82-02 at
the Fort Calhoun Station.
The Fort Calhoun Station approved maintenance proce-
dures call for use of NEVERSIEZE Pure Nickel #65 on
all threaded fasteners.
To date, the District has ex-
perienced no problems related to use of the NEVERSIEZE
lubricant.
-2-
.- --
-
_ -
-_ .
. - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _
-
-. - - _ - _ _ _
_
,
,
.
'
1.
LAdmission or Denial of the Alleged Violation (Continued)
In essence,.the District furdshed three categories of information
to the NRC:
'
(1)
Injection . sealant compounds used,
-
(2)
Lubricants used on-threaded fasteners, and
(3).
Plant' experience with sealants and lubricants, particularly
_
instances-of stress corrosion cracking of threaded fasteners.
Infomation furnished under Category 1 was accurate; infomation
under Category 2 was incomplete and therefore inaccurate; and
infomation under Category 3 was accurate. The District believes
that its answer in Category 3 must be considered to determine
whether there was any material false statement.
The District
accurately reported that it had experienced no problems. That
infomation~was correct with respect to all lubricants used, even
though the lubricants themselves were not al1~1isted.
Had the-
other lubricants been identified, no different conclusion con-
cerning their effect would have been presented. Therefore, con-
trary to the Notice of Violation, the statement was not material .
If complete and accurate information had been included in the
District's 1982 response of IE Bulletin 82-02, .it "would probably -
not have resulted in regulatory action or NRC seeking additional
infomation."
Since the NRC acknowledges that the District's incomplete response
was not intentional and was not intended to conceal or mislead, we
also believe it is appropriate to classify it as " inadvertent."
In
addition, the Commission has determined that " materiality" should be
contingent upon the safety significance of the. infomation (47 Fed.
Reg. 8584 (1984)). Based upon the above discussion, the District
has-concluded that the inco'nplete response has no safety signifi-
cance.- For all of these reasons, the District submits that its 1982
response was not a material false statement and that classification
as a Severity Level III is not warranted.
2.
Reasons for the Violation
Reference 3 described the steps taken to correct the District's
response to Item 5 of IE Bulletin 82-02.
Reference 3 also identi-
fied the procedures which were in effect in 1982 when the initial
response was prepared.
Further, the inspection conducted by the
NRC's Office of Investigations during June and July of 1984 defines
the causes for the occurrence. The results of the NRC's inspection
are summarized in the third paragraph of Reference 5.
The submis-
sion of the statement occurred due to failures on the part of the
District including inadequate review of documentation, failure to
adequately coordinate and discuss the matter with knowledgeable
personnel in the specific area of concern, failure of management
to assign the response to an experienced employee, and failure of
-3
e==w-s-
-
.
,
.
.
-
2.
Reason for the Violation (Continued)
management to identify the incomplete statement during the required
procedural review of all the responses to the NRC.
The circum-
stances associated with the preparation of the response to the NRC
indicated a specific lack of emphasis and attention to detail by a
number of levels of management and supervision within the District.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
As described in the District's presentations to Mr. P. S. Check and
other members of the NRC Region IV staff during the December 20,
1984 Enforcement Conference, corrective measures have been taken in
three-areas:
(1)
Review of the qualifications of those responsible for
preparing NRC response for the years 1983 and 1984.
(2)
Re' vision of the trainirg program for new technical
employees.
(3)
Establishment of internal procedures for checking sub-
mittals to the NRC and independently reviewing submittals
requiring oath or affimation and as otherwise deemed
appropriate prior to management review.
'
These measures and the results achieved are summarized below.
(1)
. Review of Preparer's Qualifications
An undocumented review and evaluation of correspondence
submitted under oath or affirmation for the last two years
(1983-1984) was conducted to address the following functions:
a.
Were the individuals who prepared responses experienced
in the area of the response?
b.
Is it necessary to perfom a technical review of any
responses submitted during 1983 and 1984?
c.
Is it necessary to conduct a review and evaluation of
correspondence submitted prior to 1983?
The results of that review and evaluation are as follows:
Items submitted under oath or affirmation fit into three
general categories:
Technical Specification Amendment Applications (both
-
initial applications and revisions to previously filed
applications)
,
Proprietary Information Declarations
.
-
IE Bulletin and Generic Letter Responses
-
-4-
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
____-
_
-
.
.
.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
(Continued)
,
Technical Specification Amendment Application
The review and evaluation concluded that since Technical
Specification Amendments were reviewed and approved by the
Plant Review Committee and the Safety Audit and Review
Committee, the detailed reviews and approvals of these two
groups was sufficient to ensure that the information was
correct.
In addition, the Commission approved such appli-
cations in the form of Amendments to the District's Technical
Specifications.
Based on the above, the District believes
that no additional review is necessary for the Technical
Specification Amendments submitted during 1983-1984.
The
review and evaluation also concluded that it is highly un-
likely that a similar situation to the IE Bulletin 82-02
response could occur with Technical Specification Amendment
applications.
It was also detemined that it was not neces-
sary to do additional reviews on the Technical Specification
Amendments submitted prior to 1983 since they were handled
in a similar manner as the 1983-1934 applications.
Proprietary Information Declarations
,
The review and evaluation concluded that Proprietary Infor-
mation Declarations are not nomally of a type where safety
significant information is provided to the Commission.
Therefore, no additional review of Proprietary Infomation
Declarations submitted during 1983-1984 was needed nor was
it necessary to review such submittals prior to 1983. The
review and evaluation also concluded that it is highly un-
likely that a similar situation to the IEB 82-02 response
could occur with Proprietary Information Declarations.
IE Bulletin and Generic Letter Responses
-
The review and evaluation concluded that the personnel who
initially prepared IE Bulletin and Generic Letter responses
submitted under oath or affirmation during 1983-1984 were
sufficiently experienced to prepare such responses.
These
IE Bulletins and Generic Letter responses were processed
through the District's management review cycle. As described
in Item (3) on Page 7 of this response, the District procedure
for processing of f1RC and other regulatory correspondence
(DAS-L-03) was revised in September 1984 to incorporate an
independent review and checking function.
Since that revi-
sion, IE Bulletins and Generic Letters submitted under oath
of affimation have been independently reviewed as required.
For 1983 and 1984 IE Bulletins and Generic Letter responses
that were submitted prior to September 24, 1984, the following
action was taken.
-5-
_ _ _ _
_____-__ __ _ __
.
-
.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
(Continued)
g
a.
Many of the personnel responsible for preparing
i
these responses have been interviewed in order to
4
determine if additional review is required.
During
-
these interviews, personnel were asked to describe
the steps they used in preparing the response with
the intention of determining whether the necessary
steps were taken.
Based on these interviews it was
determined that the necessary steps were taken;
-
consequently, no additional review was required.
b.
Some responses were discussed at several meetings
where sufficient qualified personnel were present
%
and extensively discussed the subject matter. The
- :
responses were then prepared ba;ed on those discus-
_
sions and the documents were subsequently processed
through the District's correspondence review cycle.
c.
Some of the IE Bulletins or Generic Letter re-
Y
sponses have subsequently been reviewed by the
J
Commission and closed.
Based on the above information it has been concluded that it
7
is not necessary to conduct further reviews of the IE Bulletin
5
'"
and Generic Letter responses submitted for the 1983-1984
period or made before 1983.
g
_
this review provides confidence that it is unlikely that a
3
similar situation to the IEB 82-02 response could occur with
I
the IE Bulletin and Generic Letter responses submitted before
2
or during the 1983-1984 period.
j
'=
The District cannot positively state that all responses
'
submitted to the Commission are 100'. complete and accurate;
7
however, the District can state there is a high degree of
-
assurance that responses submitted to the Commission are
=
complete and accurate based on past reviews and the results
7
of the review and evaluation which was conducted prior to
i
the December 20, 1984, Enforcement Conference.
(2)
Revision of the Training Program for New Technical Employees
Training of new tehnical employees has been upgraded by the
i
availability of additional courses in reactor and power plant
a
fundamentals.
Further, availability of training materials and
y
resources has been formalized and implemented by the Nuclear
l
Production Division (NPD) as described in the NPD Policy /
i
Procedure No. C-3, R0 2/15/85, " Orientation / Training of Newly
?
Hired Technical Employees Performing Safety-Related Activi-
e
ti es . " Policy / Procedure C-3 training of managers and super-
3
visors in NPD and managers in the Engineering Division was
}
N.
d
-6-
y
i
-
_.
.
..
. . _ . . . - . . . , . . , _ _ . -
. . . . . , . . . . . - ~ _
.
. - , . .
- _ . -
.
,
g
-
.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
1
(Conti nued)
7
.
completed on February 12, 1985. New technical employees in
j
the Nuclear Production Division will be trained under this
a
upgraded training and orientation policy. These improve-
$
ments improve employee awareness of existing documentation,
y
resources, and 'nfonnation prior to preparation of responses.
]
Also, utilization of this policy encourages communication
between the supervisor and new employee to provide the
supervisor with a thorough understanding of the employee's
4
capabilities.
4
-)
The improvement of the training program and formal establish-
4
ment of an NPD training policy for new employees has resulted
-d
in increased managerial and supervisory awareness that indivi-
2
duals preparing responses must be properly qualified prior to
being assigned as a preparer. Similar policies are in effect
g
in the Engineering Division.
I
Al
(3)
Establishment of Internal Procedures for Checking and
--
Independently Reviewing Submittals to the NRC.
-
The District's Nuclear Regulatory & Industry Affairs depart-
7
mental procedure for processing of NRC and other regulatory
m
correspondence (DAS-L-03) was revised in September 1984 to
a
incorporate appropriate Independent Review requirements as
?
well as Checks of responses.
In accordance with the proce-
i
dure as revised, NRC submittals now undergo a Check which is
j
generally an intradepartmental review of the originating NRC
3
document against the submittal to confinn that items are
-
adequately addressed, properly stated and the responses are
_
complete. A Check is normally done by a knowledgeable person
i
or the preparer's supervisor or manager.
Q
Correspondence from the NRC is reviewed upon receipt to deter-
I
mine if a response is required and if that response should be
=
independently reviewed.
Review of such responses are assigned
to an OPPD organization separate from the initial preparer's
-
for an Independent Review, which is generally an interdepart-
s
mental review of the NRC originating document against the
"
submittal to confinn that all items are adequately addressed,
3
properly stated and the responses are complete and technically
4
correct.
The Independent Reviewer confirms that information
5
in the submittal is accurate and correct. Also, the Indepen-
'
dent Reviewer confirms that the supporting data in the sub-
j?
mittal supports the submitted conclusion.
Either a Check or the Independent Review are completed prior
3
to management review of the proposed NRC response.
These
i
Checks assure that the preparer and the preparer's super-
5
visor have reviewed apprcpriate documentation and available
j
resources so that responses are complete and accurate in
,
4
3
-
-7-
J
l
r'
. ,l
'
'
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
(Continued)
detail.
Independent Reviews add these same features plus
the review of a knowledgeable third party.
The District's experience since revision of DAS-L-03 has
indicated that Independent Reviews and Checks are providing
a thorough review of the responses, thereby reducing the
likelihood of further similar violations.
4.
The Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations
Experience'with the process of Independent Reviews and Checks of
responses indicates that additional corrective steps are not neces-
sary; however, the training programs for new and seasoned employees
are anticipated to improve as further training resources become
available and supervisors become better acquainted with application
of these training resources to their employees' training and re-
training needs.
5.
The Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved
The District is currently in full compliance.
-8-