ML20129E343
| ML20129E343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1985 |
| From: | Ingram F NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA) |
| To: | Meyer P AUDUBON SOCIETY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20117P504 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8506060444 | |
| Download: ML20129E343 (22) | |
Text
I nog #g UNITED STATES 8 i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
g 8 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 L
.s 4
April 30, 1985 Mr. Peter Meyer Environmental Science Department Massachusetts Audubon Society Lincoln, Massachuseets. 01773
Dear Mr. Meyer:
' 'Ihis replies to your April 24 postcard. Mr. and Mrs. Aamodt have provided this agency with a copy of their report; however, there are not extra copies available for distribution to members of the public. I suggest you contact the Aamodes directly to obtain a copy. Their mailing address 1s 200 North Church Street, Parkesburg, Pennsylvania 19365.
Sincerely,
- 1
' ' Ms. %>%
Frank Ingram Assistant to the Director Office of Public Affairs i
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i M A RC.H ~3.'1, \S P 5 1 people who was in.our survey area who lost her husband could
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2 tell you what this meant to her, and her own experience.
3 MR. BLASS: So we are going to Steve now?
4 MRS. AAMODT: Steve Forry.
5 MR. BLASS: If he could trade places with you, 6 please.
7 Would you remain standing and raise your right 8 hand.
9 (Whereupon, Mr. Steve Forry was sworn by Mr.
10 Blass.)
11 Please be seated and state your name and address 12 and occupation, and begin your statement.
- 13 MR. FORRY: My name is Steven Forry. I am a full
(. 14 time staff paramedic at York Hospital in York. I am also 15 the Deputy Emergency Management Director for Newbury 16 Township in York County, Pennsylvania, which is directly 17 across from Three Mile Island.
18 First of all, I would like to thank you gentlemen 19 that invited us up here today to share our concerns with 20 you all.
21 To give you a little personal background -- I am 22 going to make this as brief as I possibly can. When the 23 Three Mile Island nuclear power station was going around 24 and having the interviews, and just letting you know what p 25 they were planning on doing, I wasn't the Icast bit concerned
I . ..
. , 79 I about nuclear power. It was a new technology. The 2 Government had assured us that it was safe. There were so 3 'many safeguards built into these plants that they would be 4 able to detect an accident before any harm could come, and 5 the bottom line was that it was most economical. That 6 our electric bills.would be cut in half.
7 And unfortunately -- Murphy's Law says anything 8 that can happen will, and it did. We have seen double 9 in our electric bills back home, and we have seen an 10 accident at Three Mile Island that nobody has ever seen 11 before.
12 At that particular point in time I had ten years
- 13 involvement in the Newbury Town fire company as many 14 different officers, and when the accident occurred we 15 discovered that we did not have a workable plan for 16 evacuation at the time of the accident.
17 There was a quick couple of meetings put together 18 where some ideas were put down on paper so that when they 19 did call for a general emergency that we could be able to 20 evacuate, and I quote, as many people as quickly as possible.
21 So, once the plan was as best formulated as could 22 be, the next couple of days were pretty hectic. A lot of i
23 things were going on that we were scared about. We had a 24 mass exodus out of our community of about at that time ten 25 I
I
, , - ---, - - - . - - - - - - + - - - ~ ,
, 80 1 to eleven thousand people. We had people that lef t their
( 2 homes and took as many of their belongings with them as they 3 could. Actually lef t their homes unlocked, and it was up 4
to the people that were' lef t behind to patrol these areas 5 and see if there is anything possible we can do to at least 6 keep down on the looting. There were some national guard 7
called out to close some of the roads down. We don't have 8 to worry about that.
9 And we learned from that experience very greatly 10 that we were not prepared at all, in any way, shape, or 11 form to evacuate any of the people except those who werc 12 able to get in their automobiles and get out of there before the mad rush.
13 14 As Margie touched on the health study, what got 15 me involved in this even more deeper than the emergency 16 planning is the fact that within a mile radius of my home 17 we had thirteen to fif teen people die of cancer within a 18 two to two and a half -- two to three ye ar period after the 19 TMI incident, and only because I have run ambulance for the 20 last ten years, and now for the last fifteen, I took notice 21 of the enormous amount of people that we were transporting 22 t
for different treatment for their cancer.
23 I started to see husband and wives dying of cancer 24 in the same household, all within this same two to three year 2 period.
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31 t And that is why I started being really involved
(. 2 in better planning for our township.
3 In September of 1980, 1 took the position of L
4 Emergency Management Director with Fred Sanders as my
-5 deputy, and we changed places every once in a while because
'of time'and our college that we are both working on.
6 At 7 tdie.present time I am the Deputy, and Fred is'the Director.
8 May I say to you gentlemen that I was appalled 9 on the way up here. yesterday, being from a little community g ICL that I am from, of the traffic which-you folks have to bear
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11 every day, and my heart goes out to you.
' - 12 I got to the hotel and the first thing I ~said to
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13 the person was: Is there a convention someplace up yonder C-14 here? And she said: No. I said: Where are all these is people going? And she said: Oh, this is just normal 16 traffic. Don' t go out there in about two hours, you won' t 17 go anywhere.
18 And when I looked out my window I just could not 19 believe it. I am not used to it, so this of course is like 20 a mountain to me.
21 And I thought of the fact of having to evacuate, 22 and it just scared the pants right off of me. I am serious.
23 I knew what it was back in the little metropolis of Newbury 24 Town, and we are talking thirteen thousand people where I i
2 live now, with all the people.that we have to have from
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t ' Gol*ds bo ro , from -- that have to come into our township to
.( 2 hit the main arteries to get out, and I think of now'three 3 million some odd people coming down 495. It just really 4 scares me to think 'think if there would have to be a mass 5 exodus of the problems that you folks are all entailed to 6 accomplish that goal.
7 The naivety of me believing in our Government -- and 8 I still do -- there are problems, of course, in any part 9 of Government, any part of personal life, but I found that maybe I was a little too naive, in that I started looking
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to 11 at a plan that we had a little more prospectively. And I
. 12 found that our plan calls for eleven school buses to be
. 13 used to transport the people that don't have' transportation.
14 These might be bedridden people, these might be people that 15 cannot walk, people that just don't hace any friends, or 16 people to take them.
i 17 So,'it is all in our plan that we had eleven buses IS guaranteed, set aside for use during an evacuation of 19 Three Mile. Island. -
20 And I asked a very simple question one day at 21 a meeting, and the question was this: In addition to the 22 buses, do we have any drivers for those buses?
23 And the answer was, no.
l 24 We have two hospitals in the 20 mile radius of l
25 Three Mile Island in our area that we would be responsible
83 1 for, and it has on there that we have an additional 25
( 2 ambulances coming in to transport people, 3 I asked again: Do we have drivers for these 4 vehicles?
5 And the-answer again was, no.
6 And I want to ask you gentlemen,as prudent human 7 beings, if you got a call from anybody, me, and said look, 8 we have a mass problem here. We are evacuating our area 9 due to an immediate danger at Three Mile Island. All of to our people are leaving. Would you drive some buses up into 11 our area and pick up some of our people?
. 12 That is what it boils down to. I testified before
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. 13 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about two or three years 14 ago, and the gentlemen started off by asking one question.
L 15 Ile said: Mr. Forry, in the case of an all out evacuation, 18 what would be your . first . priority?
17 And as I stated in the beginning, this is a 18 volunteer position i.. our township, and it is no excuse for 19 not doing your job right. I am just saying that if that 20 should happen, my first priority in my life is my wife and 21 my two children and my family. And that would be my first 22 priority, to get them out of that area, immediate danger, .
23 and then if there be anything possible to do, that I would i
24 try to do that.
25 But seeing as though Route 83, the main artery that
. 84 I we are to take is only two lanes south and two lanes north, all the traffic flows are supposed to be diverted south.
( 2 3 Okay, both north and southbound lanes.
4 The potassium iodide that we are supposed to get 5 for protection has to come up that route, with all the 6 people heading towards them. It would not be able to get 7 to us unless they flew it in.
8 We are supposed to have X amount of State Police 9 that. takes care of major traffic points. In talking with to the police, and this I did on my own -- I just went to those 11 people that we have on our list that makes this plan look 12 so well -- and I said: I want to ask you. If you are on 13 duty, or not on duty, and you get a call and say they are 14 evacuating the area, there is an immediate danger, would 15 you come?
16 Their answer was, no.
17 And I cannot hate then for being honest with me 18 in saying that if there is an all out danger that you 19 folks have to get out of there, who is going to come and 20 take our places in that danger zone? And it would be just 21 about each for himself, okay?
22 The main thing I want to get across 'oc you is that 23 of your plan. I have not had a chance to look over your 24 plan. I am not saying that I am a professional at it.
2 All I am saying is that in my six years of continuing to
85 I work with this plan, and trying to make it better, we
( 2 realize more and more that there would be lives lost and 3
there would be more chao's'in evacuation itself than we would 4 be able to handle. The little eight people on our committee 5
would not be able to control thirteen thousand people coming 6 at us, and in no way, shape or form be able to direct them 7 in the right area.
8 The main thing is -- I have two children. One 9
goes to middle school up in New Cumberland, which is north.
10 My other child goes to Newbury. We are supposed to head
.11 south. If anybody in their right mind thinks I am going to 12 let my little girl behind, they are-crazy. And that is 13 what everybody -- every adult that I have interviewed in 14 our township states that they have their priorities, and 15 that is to get their family together and get out of there 16 as quickly as possible.
17 So, I am asking you gentlemen, in all of your 18 consideration, in all your honesty as public cit'zens, i as .
19 public protectors, to look.at your plan.
M MR. PROSPECT: We have already concluded that it 21 can't be done.
22 MR. PORRY: That is what I am saying. And that I
23 is what my bLsis is, that it is almost next to impossible 24 to evacuate this many people in such a short time.
25 During the accident at Three Mile Island, I was
86 I appalled to see people fist fighting over gas pumps, 2 because some of the gas stations closed. And there was no J(
3 all-out evacuation.
4 It was folks,.if you would feel more comfortable 5 leaving the area a while, if you have some place to go, 6 throw a couple of belongings in a vehicle and go.
7 And I mean to tell you, it was just utter chaos.
8 We had to pull the ambulance into one place and just break 9
up fights because people were fighting over gas pumps.
10 . To get gas to get out of there. And these are the kind of 11 things that we have to realize. That people and their 12 personal feelings, how they react to situations. It is 13 going to be just barbaric.
14 One other final thing. We have tow trucks and 15 bulldozers in our plan to help disobstruct traffic. I 16 went to the tow truck operators and I asked them the same-17 question. Guess what their tow truck is going to do?
18 Their tow truck is going to be sitting right . ,
19 underneath them, and they are going to be pushing cars out 2 of the way to get out of here.
21 And that is being honest. I am telling you, this 22 stuff all looks nice on paper, but it is really scary to 23 think if they would have to get these people out of here.
24 Thank you for your time and your patience.
25 (Applause . )
I A. ..
87 1 MR. BLASS: Thank you very much. Mrs. Aamodt, l 2- did you want to say something?
3 MRS. AAMODT: Steve stayed. His wife stayed.
4 She fed the emergency workers. IIis wife is not well from 5 having done that. .
6 The people in the area will not take any reassurance s 7
that everything is all right again. They have looked around.
8 They have counted seven, ten, eleven people have died of 8 cancer, from their window. They can see this. And they 10 have come to the conclusion that they are not going to stay 11 again, no matter what the recommendations are. I think that 12 is pretty much -- they don't believe any recommendations.
L- r 13 They will just know there is a problem, and they will go.
14
- MR. BLASS: Thank you. We have time maybe for 15 two more speakers, and then we lose our reservation for 16 this facility, so I will leave it to you -- I know Mary I7 Osborn --
18 MRS. AAMODT: Mary has a very important presentation.
18 Jackie was one of our people in our study. I think if she 20 just took a minute and just stayed directly to that rather 21 than reading fron the staterent that she had. Jackie is 22 right here.
23 MR. BLASS: Ma'am, would you please remain standing 24 and raise your right hand?
25
88 1
(Whereupon, Mrs. Brockman was sworn by Mr.
2 Blass.)
3 Please be seated, and state your name and your
'4 address and your occupation, and you may begin your 5 statement.
6 MRS..BROCKMAU: My name is Jackie Brockman. I 7 live right outside Newbury Town. And I am a homemaker
-8 and secretary. And I am here not as an expert witness, 9
but just as representative of your average person who went to through this experience and can tell you briefly bow t'at p 11 experience impacted our family.
12 I have it written out, and I have never spoken
- 13 in the public. If you will bear with me for just a few
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14 minutes.
15 We lived in the area at the time of the accident.
16 My fiance lived five miles approximately -- I lived 17 approximately five miles from the towers. My fiance lived 18 within three miles from the towers. .
19 Wednesday we were not aware that anything was 20 going on. Uc did not hear anything about the Island. Any 21 problems on the Island. Thursday, when I went to work, my 22 employer said: I didn't think you would be here.
M And I said why? They said, well thero is a problem l
24 down there. I said well, it must not be big, or they would 2 have told us. Uc lived there. I trusted them to tell us
89 1 if there was a problem.
J 2 So, I went back home and stayed there.
3 Friday morning, when we had the big problem, I 4 got my daughter up. She stood outside waiting for the 5 school bus that morning. She went to cchool. Mid-morning 6 the sirens started. I turned on the radio, they were 7 advising pregnant women and five year old children to leave .
8 'the area.
9 I am supposed to be factual. It is a fact thct to that is a stomach churning, knee-shaking fear that you get 11 in a time'like that. I threw things in the car that I 12 didn't want to leave behind. I tried to use the phone.
13 You can't use your phone at a time like that. The phone
-C-14 doesn't work. The lines are busy. You can't get through 15 at all.
16 I started over to meet my fiance to tell him I 17 was going to get my daughter. Ile was coming over to meet 18 me. So we. met in the road halfway there. IIe went up to .
19 Lemoyne, about nine miles north. I went down, signed a M
release to get my daughter out of school, along with 21 numerous other parents, and we evacuated at that tice. We 22 moved about ten miles north.
23 I stayed there for the whole week following the 24 accident. My daughter stayed there the whole time. She M
did not go back any closer than ten miles.
', . 90 1- My fiance and'I went down every day to check his
[,- 2 business and our homes, and various things like that. We A.
3 were down every day. We spent time outside checking things 4 out.
5 The day, Friday, of the accident, there was a 6 strong metallic taste. It tasted like you would put an 7 old copper penny on your tongue. And subsequent days .
8 when we were outside checking things in the area, we again 9 tasted that metallic taste. We tasted that subsequent 10 times in the next three, four years when we went outside; 11 when they were reporting releases you could taste that, 12 and some days when they were not reporting emissions you
. 13 could taste that.
14 My fiance was in good health until the Summer of 15 1980 when he began tiring early, catching long heavy colds 16 and chest congestion, and having back pains. He went to.
.17 see several practitioners over the summer and fall. They
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18 diagnosed' flu, cold, things like that. The symptoms got .
19 worse. IIe had a subnormal temperature for several months.
M He had severe night sweats. His back pain got worse. lie 21 had cracking and biceding on his fingers and around his 22 mouth. He had small hemorrhages under the skin inside his
- 23 mouth, i
24 As the fall progressed, he was not able to walk 3 without a cane at timen. His back pain was that severe.
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. 91 1
They said he pulled a muscle, but it got gradually
( 2 worse, and none of the treatments did anything. In January, 3 he was rarely out of bed, lie got an attack so severe in 4 January of 1981, that they took him to the hospital in the 5 ambulance. The same weekend, they took two neighbors who 6 live within half a milo or less to the hospital. Their 7 diagnosis was the same as his; cancer.
8 The doctor, the cancer specialist who took care of 9 him diagnosed multiple myeloma, which he explained to me i l
10 as a bone cancer involving the bone marrow which manufactures i 11 blood cells, lie received chemical chemotherapy and radiation 12 which gave him some remission that summer.
13 We were married in the following spring. Then i C-
) 14 he got worse again. IIe suf fered severe and crippling 15 pain. IIe was not able to work in his business. Ile had 16 to make a heartbreaking decision to close his business which 17 he had built up himself. As the disease progressed, the 18 leukemia grew in severity, as did the pain and crippling, 19 necessitating the use of a T.T:s unit, which is transtaneous 20 electrical nerve stimulation, with strong narcotics for 21 pain. lie also had to go to the hospital for sessions on 22 a machine that cleansed his blood of the abnormalities in 23 the blood, and blood transfusions. !!c progressed from 24 use of a cane to the wheelchair to being bedridden. Ile 25 died one year and ten months after the diagnosis.
. 92 1 He was 51 years of age.
={ 2 During that time, and since then, my daughter who a
was twelve at the time of the accident has suffered severe
-4 sinus attacks, headachea, frequent sore throats, bouts with 5 nausea for days at a tire. She sleeps long hours; twelve 6
to fourteen hours at a time, and she is always tire'd.
^ ba.d t 4 7
She has condyl'e malesia, which is a painful ,
8 softening of the kneecaps and joints. She has several 9
friends in our church and in her school who suffer from to this same thing. And sclorosis. Both are bone problems.
11 And she had none of these problems, or any sign of them 12 previous to the accident. She has been tested three times
- 13 in the last year for mononucleosis, with negative results.
14 And the doctors have not been able to find a cause or a 15 diagnosis for these symptoms.
16 However, they -- especially the joint problems --
17 limit her range of activity and her future range of job 18 possibilities, since she cannot work or stand for long .
18 periods due to joint pain.
20 I must conclude this by stating that the impact 21 of Three Mile Island and the accident there on the lives 22 of my family and myself, has been overwhelming. Medical 23 oxpenses that are high, loss of the business, loss of 24
(
something more precious, our health, and the most precious
" gift of all, a beloved human life.
93 1 That is all I have to say.
2 (Applause.)
3 MRS. AAMODT: That is the story of the people.
4 That summarizes it. So many -- the business of the knee -
5 caps of the children, I didn't even know that until now.
l 6 It is reminiscent of what happened to the animals. They 7 couldn't stand up. They staggered and fell down. And I
8 b
thts was right after the accident. And that was dismissed l 9 as a selenium deficiency.
l 10 MR. BLASS: Thank you very much. We'have time 11 for one more speaker. Whom would you suggest?
12 MRS. AAMODT: I believe Mary has prepared some 13 work on the flora abnormalities that you might be interested j 14 in hearing.
l 15 MR. BLASS: We would like to wind up by maybe
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16 two o' clock or shortly thereafter.
17 So, if you will remain standing and raise your 1
18 right hand, please?
19 (Whereupon, Mary Osborn was sworn by Mr.
20 Blass.)
I 21 Please be seated. State your name, address, and U
occupation for the record, and begin your statement.
22 MS. oSBORM: 1,ery eseern, Sweeare Township.
l 24 1 em a housewife.
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Statement of Carl J. Johnson, M.D.,M.P.M.
(as a supplement to the statement of the Aamodts to the to the Muclear Regulatory commission on May 22, 1985)
There are oversights and miscongeptions in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Memorandum and Order, FLI-85-08 of May 16, 1985, responding to motions made by the Aamodts, l l
Area household surveys of cancer incidence and mortality )
_ are a more valid approach than the state's use of concentric i
circles, when those areas lie in the usual direction of exhaust l
plumes from an industrial point source like TMI-l and TMI-2.
f.
t What the NRC characterizes as " anecdotal information" is the same information that physicians value as medical history, or that the Bureau of the census considers to be vital census data. The information necessary for a valid cohort study must be obtained 'from area household surveys, it cannot be obtained from state cancer registries.
1 The radiation exposures to the communities around Three Mile Island began in 1974 with the start-up of TMI-1. This plant also.had serious problems, had a chronically-leaking PORV, or pressure relief valve, and nearly had the same sort of meltdown in 1977 that later occurred at "4I-2 in 1979.
The responsibility for the excess cancer deaths in the l
communities near Three Mile Island must be shared by both plants. The same management responsible for the lying, the cheating, the misrepresentation of the radiation releases j of TMI-2 also operated TMI-l since 1974, and I believe that f TMI-l also teleased large amounts of radioactive gasses and
) /
particulates. This belief is supported by reports of a chronically-leaking PORV and an aborted meltdown in 1977.
6 -
i .
An undorlying problem with the nuclearestcblishment is the reliance on doctrine, which is treated as a matter of religious belief. The doctrinal approach to science was supposed to have'Seen displaced centuries ago by the empirical approach. In this case, if an unusually high incidence or death rate from cancer is observed near two failed nuclear plants, sources of extremely potent carcinogens, we had better believe it, and not strive tortuously to find some spurious but.plaasible explanation.
If you choose to believe that the time since the "MI-2 accident is not compatible with some of the cancer deaths, simply consider TMI-1, which has also been a very dirty operation, releasing plumes of radioactive gases and_particulates since 1974.
The importance of the seven cases of neonatal hypothyroidism in 1979, when only 0.6 cases were expected, has been confirmed by the rates for this condition since, falling sharply in 1980 and 1981, and now down to 1 or 2 cases yearly. The opinions of the State Health Department here is asinine and inexcusible.
The tone of the NRC comments lead me to ask the Commission if their policy on radiation effects research has changed from that outlined in a 1962 Atomic Energy Commission memo addressed to the Commission. "The basic approach to the report would be to start with a simple, straight-forward statement of conclusions.
We would thus identify the. major questions that could be expected to be asked in connection with these conclusions.
It would then be a straightforward matter to select the key
3 -
3-scientific con;ultanta whosa opiniona should 53 scught in ordar to substantiate the validity of the conclusions, or recommend appropriate modifications."
Reference attached documents:
An Internal Memorandum of the Atomic Fnergy Commission, September 25, 1962 Remarks, May 21, 1985, Transuranics and the Imoact on Health, Carl J. Johnson, M.D., M.P.!! t Carl J. Johnson, M.D., M.P.R.
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! that the Seeretariat~et the Cous11 wouM how te seeste its gnertere sa me amasutive ottise amiMing, hr Osteher 1, ens asse to ass genroers et 718 Jankeen F1ase. I inspeetet the proposes i est gassers, alsag wie es other members er the Verhing ereup.
l It is sur umanismus eenslasses that these particular quarters i ass totally landequate to serve as a base ter the Feteral Radiatima Cees 11, partasularly La view et the propeeni to develop a permaant i 3retessimal statt. I, -
"y, an of the opiasen that amt j- gaasters shou 14 he oeucht as seen as possinaa. Yes mar vaak to Aanida ela proklam, alms with these er organisatim nas gan11.*1
< estions et pernammel, la the Suhemnittee tant is developing this,
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3 The Verking Group AaatAad that the sely effielest ammaar laidtiek .
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to 3seteet en plans tw the preparatian of the report en the health
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, ont the applienbility et aantarmeasures, would he to assist a
! spee121e samber et tas Verkias Gree to est as the proJest Imeder.
' I was ashot to asseyt Mia assagummet ama agreet te de se, eQBject to the semeurranse of Dr. Westara, Mr. I. Prise ama yee. ,
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! : she verttag erow opset aus meettag eensiderlag alternative kaads Atmie Bediation CaummLttee of the Estimal Amedag et Sciences.
- er =p==d ==*4 - feast ami enstant ter the proposed report,2 Me greklam is this ease would be to investigets tbs Latiusmes et them iedertook to write a 3eeJost eutlies, sukultting alteramtive re41stian tumatitativear as a anunative agent at all levels and
, - tmpo to aggreneh the report, noch ta teras et eastemt an4 in the rates et exposure la relattaa to other agents. The fundammatal
< ergamiastian ama essoutism et the steer. De draft ses revisees 3hileesshr to whaak this study veu14 be directet is that resistiaa at the last soottag of the Working Group, ears it ses osmalades protest 1m umasures egn*ast a sewee over wktak ene has ao central
- est the 3 reject really had te be sividas into tes yhnees, sammet be inthammed br a "heastit.riak* eensept er a esmesyt sunk as "no radiatica shc014 he secepted unless then is goet reassa ter
' 1. Ik was agreed that current 1svela of resistian from in11aut detag es." hder thsee een11 time, the selsvust eensept would he wuse see 1st to assess a .
r'-' proklas is publie hamle, est 3roteetian aseseos Deeme Justified een the risk at 9,*%==== sparr t It was sugestet that the 7411e Esalth Seevise some is wie fres rettatie een be espeetat to start having a prestiaal its visse as to est anvuls would earrespond to ensu$ et a en a persen's futwo life expostaaey. Where and her gametis esmnM.
heele risk to Justair diverste et resources la ester to erstions should enter sunk esameyts is met at all slaar. $1::11arly, Broride preteetten. It euy ressemsham agresumas a this' the 3k11sesphy of as appropriate eutert point naae4 as direct sematie suNest eam he romahat emmag the esameias, the tesie essrunch eftests, under asa.emerguadr omgitions, la 41st eteews. Better to tha ; he te maart wie a ade=. ===.===umummu interustian relevant to 12rse Maamata mde to be sys' *11y
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Justify emaida stima et the esend. Aar thoughts which you tar have, mich would be et assistanee to se la this project, would be
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-*-1 Paul C. Tampkins, Deputy Direetar
. Warutas esse, that the Come11 eensider settlag up a kidt Divisies et Indiaties preteetten standare
-Insel eter yee to enumsas mis suhJoet,esa present sa advisesy report to to cens11. est chairman Seekers
% weil the presamt time, there has Desa as sertans e-mamant- pomissimar paltver et eat gunment amasammi yh11eesphy regarding radiatim es-eswo t'= 'a=4 - Samar amatare vanM to meet appropriate, es a uneis et pelier for the Commissimar vilmes 7tsemur.1 essesumast. This is a rather deep ouhjeet that would Federal Radiaties Comail Vesting Groui A. 2. Ze w ecks, Genera 1 Nmanger seguar u highly sophiatsentes examaasttaa nas eeu14 Justify shout 3. A. Zak, Assistaat Gemaral Maanger B tWD' pear eIIItr 1r a highly caugotant group. Dap== dine en the V. 3. Mecool, seeretarr (a) destat sua dotati sa esak the gesettoms were to be seasidered, skie c. 1. Dunhas, Direeter, stalagr & Medinias eludr senad rangs emputere sram three anaths to eso years. me N. E. Veetrutt, Direeter, cymrstiemal Safety ihmee.ammtk stuer emad deal may with trend appreenhos and ariteria, -
het eeu14 3rehehar go as rether. Se langer study would De espeete4 to to emothtag alaset as eengrahamstve as the recently puk11ahed
- 34 pert W to 9tites Beties, but with an ertestettaa sempletely
- 144ESuseet een either the Seited Estians report er the eerresponding
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Mny 21, 1995 '
TRANSURANICS AND THE IMPACT ON HEALTH Carl J. Johnson, MD, MPH
- l A typical nuclear reactor like TMI-2 has about 97 tons of uranium 238 2 -
cnd 3 tons of U-235. Although some reactors are also fueled with plutonium, all operating reactors make large amounts of plutonium.
A typical reactor in a year will produce 100,000 to 600,000 curies of alpha-radiation emitting plutonium, 7,000 to 110,000 curies of cmericium, and 400,000 to over one million curies of curium.
Each curie will exceed the Department of Energy's (DOE) maximum permissible body burden for 24 million nuclear workers, or 2.4 billion people. This DOE exposure standard does not protect workers, however. At Rocky Fl'ats ,
nuclear workers with less plutonium in their bodies than permitted by DOE had sharply increased rates of chromosome damage, even at only 1%
to 10% of the permitted dosage of plutonium.
Put another way, a teaspoon of plutonium 238 would exceed the DOE exposure limit for 40 billion nuclear workers, or 4 trillion people, and even a cm211 fraction of this maximum permissible dosage will cause severe chromosome damage.
There are about 40 tansuranics of importance, like plutonium 238, produced in all nuclear reactors. Some are somewhat less toxic, some are more toxic. Plutonium and similar radionuclides occur in all tissues in the body in man, and become a permanent resident in the body. The excretion rate is very slow, about one-half would be excreted every 200 years.
In animals, plutonium causes cancer of the lung, bone, kidney, mammary glend, lymph nodes, nesothelium, and ten types of soft tissue cancer.
In one animal study, plutonium caused a cancer rate of 114% with a mean induction period of about one year. Many animals has two different types of cancer.
Excess cancer incidence has been reported in Rocky Flats workers and in tha population living downwind in Denver. The children and young adults in Arvada and the area near the plant in 1957, when an explosion blew out tho filters at the plant, had a greater than four-fold excess of leukemia in 1969-1971 at the time of the National Cancer Institute's Third National Survey of Cancer Incidence. I estimate that the Rocky Flats cxposures will cause more than 12,000 excess cases of leukemia and cancer in the Denver area between 1960 and 1990, and a somewhat greater number will be affected by~ birth defects and non-specific effects on health.
This was the only Federally-supported study of cancer incidence around c Federal nuclear facility.
An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report states that a nuclear rc2ctor can routinely release over a million curies of fission products in the exhaust each year. These routine releases include 6.8 curies of nsptunium, a transuranic. I asked an EPA regional radiation officer why the release of the other 40 plus transuranics were not reported, and ha said "that would not be self-serving to the industry."
- 42 Hf.llside Drive, Denver, CO 80215 (303) 232-2328
.. . . ,s Nuclent fugl, .urenium andplutonium, ara- contai,ned in 'a reactor in rods.
'Th3 rodo quickly- dsteriorato under tha heavy bombardmant of countloos un;utrons,,and the heat and increasing pressure, as these very heavy metals fission into some 1,800-different. lighter isotopes, many of them gases. The rods quickly develop more and more leaks, which permit fission products and transuranics to escape. An operating reactor like TMI-2 produces as much fallout fission products andtransuranics as the ,-
Hiroshima bomb every 4 yeees. h*vrf- "/
There is evidence that there was a large release of nuclear fuel, of uranium,. plutonium, of the 40+ transuranics, along with the release of huge amounts'of' fission products from the core. At a core temperature of 5,100* F, or 2816* C, all of the nuclear fuel can melt, and many of.the
~
transuranics, like americium, will boil, producing large volumes of I metal fumes. Iodine boils at 184 C, cesium boils at 678 , polonium ;
at 962 , radium at~1,140*, strontium at 1,384 , and americium at 2,607*.
Contrast a teaspoon of plutonium to the 3 to 11 tons of nuclear material missing from the TMI-2 reactor vessel. I am certain that a large amount of plutonium, curium, and other transuranics have been dessiminated offsite.
These releases in the exhaust fumes from TMI would be in the form of matallic fumes and gases, and extremely fime particles of-radionuclides.
Such exhaust plumes have been called " dry fallout" and are much less likely to.be deposited on the ground than " wet fallout" brought down by rain-orJsnow. However, it is very important that a survey of contamination of surface respirable dust be carried out, to a distance of 20 miles at least, around the plant. The survey should look'at all'of the important isotopes of curium, plutonium, americium,. neptunium and uranium.
After~the TMI-2 accident, I asked the NRC and the DOE to do such a survey cround TMI, using a surface respirable dust method I developed in collaboration with the U.S. Geological Survey that was published in Science. The Department of Energy itself has used and recommended a very similar approach around the Savannah River Plant.
However, the DOE refused to do this survey around TMI. They did soil
.tosts to a depth of 15". This approach guarantees negative results. A later study by the EPA to a depth of 1 centimeter is not much better.
A large lawsuit brought by landowners against Dow, Rockwell and DOE for-the contamination of their. land with plutonium by Rocky Flats was recently cattled in favor of the plaintiffs, based in large part on the sort of evidence I present here. I was the health officer for the county involved in this issue. The federal judge in this case ruled that the plant was guilty of conducting an ultrahazardous operation, according to the reports in local. newspapers. Similarly, I believe that both TMI-1 and TMI-2 have been conducting an ultrahazardous operation, and must not be permitted to resume operations.
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