ML20129C615
| ML20129C615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1996 |
| From: | James Fisicaro ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| W3F1-96-0188, W3F1-96-188, NUDOCS 9610240070 | |
| Download: ML20129C615 (30) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:h e h. y Ent^tgy operations, Inc. Killona. LA 70066 Tel 504 739 6242 mes J. Fisicarc "2*2*?' W3F1-96-0188 A4.05 PR October 21,1996 ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES " Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 : Tornado Missile Protection for the Ultimate Heat Sink Gentlemen: On October 15,1996 Entergy, Waterford 3, personnel held a conference call with certain Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff members to discuss specific issues related to tornado missiles and the ultimate heat sink which came up during , the NRC Enginaering and Technical Support inspection which had recently taken place at Waterford 3. As a result of this conference call, an agreement was reached that Entergy, Waterford 3, would provide a letter to the NRC documenting some of the information discussed during the conference call. Also, on October 16,1996, a second conference call was held with the NRC wherein Waterford 3 agreed to provide certain information regarding the history of events on this matter. Therefore, one purpose of this letter is to provide this information to the NRC. The issues and questions that have arisen on the matter of tornado missile protection for the ultimate heat sink are related and central to a number of complex technicalissues and principles and concepts related to the design and licensing basis of Waterford 3. Therefore, a second purpose of this letter is to discuss these j issues, provide the basis for the evaluations we have performed, describe the l corrective actions we have taken and will take, and to discuss the management I
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i o , i Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 ; Page 2 i October 21,1996 perspectives that provided the basis for these actions. The format for this letter is: i 1.0 history and definition of issues,2.0 perspectives about design and licensing basis 1 for tomado missiles, 3.0 evaluation of existing condition. 4.0 operations ! compensatory measures,5.0 status of plant fixes,6,0 reevaluation of probability calculation and operations compensatory actions,7.0 summary, and 8.0 concluding remarks.
. 1.0 History and Definition Of IssuRE The design and licensing basis of the ultimate heat sink for tornado missile protection had an extensive and long evolution as part of the regulatory review and approval !
process, see Appendix A. These reviews and evaluations have entailed specific evaluations of the ultimate heat sink, and in particular of the location of the dry and wet cooling tower components, the protection provided by structures and walls, and the adequacy of a design which does not provide missile protection grating for , certain dry cooling tower fans. These focused evaluations also included ' consideretion of the probability exposure of certain equipment, the acceptance of probability arguments with respect to missile exposure based on regulatory probability criteria, and in some cases, the exclusion of the need to consider a missile strike for exposed equipment, such as main feedwater piping and emergency feedwater piping, (reference FSAR Table 3.5-3). Furthermore, extensive walkdowns were performed by the NRC and Waterford 3 personnel as part of accepting the original des,ign and construction of the plant. The existing condition, the routing of conduits above the RAB walls, has existed since construction of the plant and is part of the original design. There has been no change to the existing condition since the original design and construction of the plant as a result of a plant modification, temporary change, or maintenance activity. Therefore, it is of some value in considering the information presented in this letter to recognize the extensive and specific evaluations and inspections that were part of the originallicensing and design basis review and the acceptance of tornado missile protection for the ultimate heat sink. One relative recent issue regarding tornado missiles was identified and documented by Waterford 3 in Condition Report (CR) CR 95-1345 on December 12,1995. This ! issue was identified as part of a self assessment by the Entergy multi-disciplined i Service Water Review Team. The issue dealt with the concern that documentation could not be found to demonstrate that the southern most cell under missile protective grating on each dry cooling tower was protected from missiles hazards J l
Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 3 October 21,1996 coming from the south or that may be deflected off the adjacent cell to the north. As part of the CR evaluation, a walk down of the ultimate heat sink area was performed, a review was made of the design and licensing basis, and a probability calculation was performed. The conservative evaluation concluded that there was an acceptable low probability of damage to the equipment in question. During the NRC Engineering and Technical Support inspection there were a number of questions and issues raised and activities that took place rather quickly over the course of the inspection dealing with the tornado missile matter. On October 3, 1996, Waterford 3 personnel were conducting an evaluation and walkdown of air accumulator tank for valve CC-134B. The concern was rust accumulation on the supports of the air accumulator tank. During this walkdown, Waterford 3 personnel raised the issue of tornado missile protection for this and other near by components. One path of the questioning lead Waterford 3 personnel to evaluate the design and licensing basis. Waterford 3 personnel concluded that there was a lack of documentation in the FSAR to explain the basis for not having any grating above valves ACC 138 A and B, CC 134 B, and CC 135 B. On October 3,1996, Waterford 3 personnel documented this concern in CR 96-1563. The evaluation considered the evaluation that had previously been completed as part of CR 95-1345. From an operability standpoint, the evaluation for CR 96-1563 concluded the equipment in question was operable because this condition was similar to the condition which had been evaluated as part of CR 95-1345, and the probability of damage to equipment was acceptably low, in the order of 10# per year. Nonetheless, from a broader perspective, Waterford 3 personnel and management had extensively discussed this issue, and a recognition was established among management that there was a need, as a long term action, to comprehensively evaluate the design and licensing basis for - tornado missile protection. One of the long term actions that resulted from this consensus was that management requested a position paper addressing the Waterford 3 licensing and design basis for tornado missile protection. On October 9,1996, as part of the NRC Engineering and Technical Support inspection, NRC personnel raised a question as to why there was no grating for missile protection for a four inch conduit which supplies control power to the wet and dry cooling tower fan motors. Waterford 3 personnel responded to this question by explaining that the conduit was below the + 30 ft MSL elevation and therefore protected by RAB walls, which extended to the + 30 ft MSL elevation. Further, Waterford 3 personnel explained that the conduit was not within a 38 missile
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k i . 3 . ] . Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink : r W3F1-96-0188 { ~ Page 4 October 21,1996 : trajectory space,38* being a reference basis, not licensing basis, and the angle of ' ' the tornado missile that was used in the response to NRC question 313.29 during the review of the FSAR by the NRC. Waterford 3 personnel believed i't was prudent to i conduct a further walkdown of the ultimate heat sink area to ensure there were no l other conduits or other equipment vulnerable to strikes by tornado missiles. On i October 9,1996, a walkdown of the ultimate heat sink was performed. As part of this j walkdown, Waterford 3 personnel identified various conduits that were routed above i the RAB walls on the east and west sides above elevation + 30 ft MSL, and therefore potentially subject to strikes by tornado missiles. During October 9 and 10, various
- walkdowns were performed, and an intensive evaluation was started and was in
- progress to identify the cables in the conduits and the affected equipment and to l make a determination whether any safety-related equipment was affected. On j October 10,1996, Waterford 3 personnel made a determination that the conduits
! contained control cables for valves CC134 A&B and CC135 A&B. These valves are l used to isolate the dry cooling towers in the event a postulated missile damages a l dry cooling tower coil. The NRC was informed of this condition on October 10,1996, i and the condition was documented in CR 96-1591 on October 10,1996. Waterford i 3 personnel at this time made a decision to enter Site Directive W4.101 to confirm ! the operability of equipment affected by this condition. Formal walkdown and i evaluation teams were mobilized at this time by management, and during this time, a l determination was made on October 10,1996, that the conduits also contained j cables for the controls to the dry cooling tower fans. Members of the W'aterford 3 l investigative team met with the shift superintendent the morning October 11,1996, to i , ensure the plant was in a safe condition and to develop and implement immediate ;
- and conservative compensatory operations measures. i i~
i The afternoon of October 11,1996, Waterford 3 personnel held a conference call j with the NRC to inform the NRC of the condition and corrective measures in place !- and in progress. Acer the NRC conference call of October 11,1996, the operability . evaluation was completed, and it was reviewed and endorsed by the Plant i Operational and Review Committee (PORC) on October 11,1996. During October ! 11 through 14, further team walkdowns were performed of the ultimate heat sink area. These team inspections were performed by civil, mechanical, electrical, and j piping engineering disciplines, and other inspections were also performed by j systems engineering personnel, operations personnel, and Waterford 3 senior i management. Further, the investigative teams placed strong emphasis on ensuring i all essential equipment vulnerable to a tornado strike was identified. On October 15 j 1996, Waterford 3 personnel had a second conference call with the NRC to brief the i-4
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l i !- Tomado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink , i W3F1-96-0188 t Page 5 l October 21,1996 i , 3 i NRC on this matter, and during this call, an agreement was reached to send a letter l to the NRC on this matter. On October 16,1996, Waterford 3 personnel had a third
- j. conference call with the NRC wherein Waterford 3 personnel agreed to provide some information regarding the history of events on this matter. On October 18,1996, the
- Waterford 3 Licensing Manager called the NRC to provide the NRC an update on i . changes to the evaluation for the existing condition and on the progress and schedule for the corrective actions.
~ 2.0 Persoectives About Desian and Licensina Basis For Tomado Missiles The plant design and licensing basis was predicated in part on two important concepts, the concept of a low probability of offsite hazards incorporated in SRP 2.2.3 and the concept of low probability of damage by virtue of design features. The missile spectrum and the identification of missiles generated by tornadoes was reviewed and approved at the CP stage before the issuance of SRP 3.5.1.4,
" Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena." This conclusion is explicitly stated in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Waterford 3, section 3.5.1.4. Waterford 3 was evaluated for offsite hazards, which included tor. nado missiles from natural phenomena, on the basis of a generally accepted probability criterion incorporated in SRP 2.2.3. This SRP probability criterion as incorporated in SRP 2.2.3 specifically states that, "... the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of approximately 104 per year is acceptable if when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower." SRP 3.5.1.4 also reinforced this criterion by stating that, " ... The methodology ofidentification of appropriate design basis missiles generated by j 4
natural phenomena shall be consistent with the acceptance criteria [10 per year) l defined for the evaluation of potential accidents from external sources in SRP 2.2.3." l The NRC in the SER section 3.5.1.4 concluded that the missile spectrum and the identification of missiles generated from natural phenomena was acceptable and met , the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.76. Regulatory Guide 1.117 was later i promulgated by the NRC, and this regulato7 guide defined a credible tornado strike as having a probability of occurrence of 10 per year. However, Waterford 3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.117 in the FSAR. Although a reference to Regulatory Guide 1.117 is made in the NRC SER in section 3.5.2, there is no 4 mention made to the 10 per year probability criterion, nor does the SER reference cite any acceptance criteria in referencing Regulatory Guide 1.117.
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) Page 6 < j . October 21,1996 ! ) 1 The design basis for the ultimate heat sink is predicated on various design principles. '
- - FSAR section 9.2.5.3.3 states that the wet and dry cooling towers are designed to 1
ensure low probability of damage by tornado missiles. There is no known specific probability calculation that was performed as part of the licensing review process that
- calculated the probability that a given missile would strike and damage particular components of the ultimate heat sink. Rather, as stated in FSAR section 9.2.5.3.3, a i
low probability of damage was ensured by the combination of various design l features. These design features included the following. The cooling towers and equipment are protected on all sides by the plant outside walls up to elevation + 30 ft ! MSL. The cooling towers are designed with multiple cells, five cells for each dry j cooling tower and two cells for each wet cooling tower, and multiple fans,15 fans for each dry and 8 fans for each wet cooling tower. Sixty percent of the dry cooling tower coils have been protected by grating located above them. Sixty percent of the dry cooling towers will provide sufficient heat dissipation to the i etmosphere and will ensure safe shutdown of Waterford 3 after a design basis tornado assuming the worst case single failure, the loss of one emergency diesel generator, coincident with the loss of offsite power. These design features in totality i provided a basis to conclude, based on qualitative perspectives, that the wet and dry cooling towers are designed to ensure low probability of damage by tornado missiles. ; The NRC in SER section 3.5.2 supports t" oncept of low probability of damage by l virtue of design features. In carticular, ti. 'C in SER section 3.5.2 concludes ! safety-related systems and components are located within tornado missile protected structures or are providt i with tornado missile barriers. SER section 9.2.5 also states the ultimate heat sink is protected against tornado missiles by the reactor auxiliary building walls and missile grating.- And FSAR section 9.2.5.2 states that the dry cooling tower fans and motors are located below grade, and are protected from tornado missiles by building walls and access platforms. Thus, in summary, the SRP 2.2.3 offsite hazards probability criterion and a design which ensured a low probability of damage by virtue of design features were important constituents in the review and approval of the Waterford 3 licensing and design basis.
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j i 4 Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink ' [ W3F1-96-0188 . Page 7 j October 21,1996 i 4 3.0 Evaluation Of Existina Condition . Once the routing of conduits above the RAB walls was identified, Waterford 3 personnel recognized, as the result of the ongoing efforts to review the design and l licensing basis and the ongoing efforts to develop a position paper, that there was i not a specific probability calculation or licensing basis to specifically and definitively ! support the resolution of this condition. Therefore, from an evaluation standpoint, ! Waterford 3 personnel purposely took a ccnservative approach for the evaluation upon which the corrective measures would be based. An important objective in the f evaluation was to ensure that the evaluation was consistent with the principles and {. concepts upon which the design and licensing basis for tornado protection was i based. In particular, is was deemed important to demonstrate there was a low l probability of damage by virtue of preserving the design features of the ultimate heat i sink and a low probability of a missile strike consistent with SRP 2.2.3. The < operability evaluation concluded there was no actual or present danger to the l } ultimate heat sink, and therefore the design features of the ultimate heat sink were :
- preserved. A probability calculation was performed as part of the operability '
- ' ' evaluation, and the probability of a missile strike damaging the conduits in question 4
l_ was determined to be about 2x10 per year, a number consistent with the guidance of SRP 2.2.3. J In performing the prouability calculation, Waterford 3 personnel had to make some decisions about the assumptions, parameters, and techniques used to perform the~ probability calculation. One of the parameters required was the choice for the angle of the incoming tornado missile. As part of the FSAR licensing review process,
.Waterford 3 had answered Question 313.29 to say that safety-related structures and the missile protection grating were designed to withstand a missile incoming at an approach angle of 38 . It is important to note that this particular response was applicable to safety-related structures and the missile protection grating and not to equipment for the ultimate heat sink. Nonetheless, since there was no specific probabilistic calculation incorporated as part of the licensing basis to evaluate specific components of the ultimate heat sink for incoming missiles, the 38 angle was used as a conservative choice for the angle of the incoming missile. The 38' angle was determined in the following manner. The response to Question 313.29 stated that the missile was traveling in the horizontal direction at 40 % of the total tornado velocity (360 mph) or (H = 144 mph,40% of 360) and with a vertical velocity equal to 80 % of the horizontal velocity or (V = 115.2 mph,80% of 144). The angle
Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 8 October 21,1996 i formed by a vector with horizontal component 144 and vertical component 115.2 is an angle of about 38.6 degrees. This angle in conjunction with the configuration of the structures and walls at the site was used to determine the conduit which was within the trajectory of the postulated tornado missile. There were other conservative assumptions employed in the probability calculation. l , The probability calculation employed the same techniques and the same assumptions where applicable that were used in the FSAR for other probability , calculations. In summary, the probability of a missile striking the conduits in question was calculated based on the following formula which is incorporated in SRP 3.1.5.5. ) P7= Ps . Pua . Psc . Pp . N Where Ps = Probability of tornado strike per year = 4.6072 x 104 s l
= Probability of tornado missiles reaching the plant, Pua assumed unity Pp = Probability of missiles exceeding the energies required to penetrate the vital area, that is, damage the conduit Psc = Probability of tornado missiles striking the critical area of the plant N = Number of missiles generated by the design basis event Two important points about the evaluation are noted. First, the effective period of the evaluation was 17 days. This effective period was determined by the duration required to keep the probability at 10~7 per year, [(1E-7/2.05E-6)(365.25)]. Second, the evaluation included the conduits above the east and west cooling towers that carries control cable for valves CC-134 A&B and CC-135 A&B and the dry cooling tower fan motors.
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' Page 9 October 21,1996 4.0 Ooerations Comnensatorv Measures On the morning of October 10,1996, members of the evaluation response team met '
with .the shift superintendent to confirm the plant was in a safe condition and to develop and implement immediate and conservative compensatory operations measures. Members of the evaluation response team that met with the shift superintendent included an operations person, the manager safety analysis, a probabilistic analysis senior engineer, a systems engineering supervisor, the civil l engineering supervisor, a design engineering technical assistant, and a senior staff licensing engineer. A key objective of the team was to develop operations j compensatory measures that were conservative, preserved the' design features of the ultimate heat sink, and which supported a low probability threshold for a missile strike. Under the leadership of the shift superintendent and under the guidance of Waterford 3 senior management, the evaluation response team developed conservative operations compensatory measures. These measures were incorporated in the Site Directive W4.101 confirmatory operability evaluation which was reviewed and endorsed by PORC on October 10,1996. The operations ; compensatory measures included in the confirmatory operability evaluation included i the following. { Immediate Actions Taken
- a. All on-shift operators wJl be briefed on all contingency actions described herein. i
- b. No elective maintenance will be performed on the following safety systems:
- 1. EDG
- 2. EFW AB Pump and the flow paths from CSP to SG 1 and SG 2
- 3. Safety-related loops of CCW and ACCW with the exception of conduit repair
- 4. AB Battery
- 5. Switchgear Ventilation
- 6. Essential Chillers
- c. Contact the National Weather Service once per shift for weather report and record in station log.
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. . l Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 10 October 21,1996 Tornado Watch l
- a. Implement the actions of LCO 3.0.3 upon notification of a
- National Weather Service issued tornado watch covering the Waterford 3 Owner controlled area, or if a tornado is seen in the owner controlled
!. area.
- b. Enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 and immediately l commence a controlled plant shutdown. )
- c. Call in an additional operator, brief this operator on manually isolating the Dry Cooling Tower cells and station to carry out actions
- when required.
4 Tornado Warnino l
- a. Split the CCW header by:
- 1. Verifying AB CCW header aligned to the A side CCW header
- 2. Close CC-MVAAA127-B, CC-MVAAA115-B, CC-MVAAA200-B, and CC-MVAAA563.
- 3. Start both EDGs without paralleling to the grid per NRC Information Notice 84-69 l 5.0 Status Of Plant Fixes In accordance with management direction and guidance, Waterford 3 personnel quickly mobilized on October 10,1996, and as part of the evaluation and response team, and began to work to define and implement a fix to the condition. The solution was determined to be the rerouting of the conduit in question. The conduits in question are located in the east cooling tower area near the + 30 ft MSL elevation west of the wet cooling tower fan exhaust shroud and above the Q deck on the west side cooling tower area. On the west side cooling tower area, a total of approximately 40 feet of conduit is above the RAB walls. On the east side cooling tower area, about six feet of horizontal conduit is located above the RAB walls, see Figure One, Drawing LOU 1564 G-766, and Drawing LOU 1564 G-768. The fix will entail rerouting the west side first because fixing the west will provide the most ,
reduction in the probability of a missile striking the conduit, since there is more conduit exposed and vulnerable on the west side as compared with the east side to ; a postulated missile strike.
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Some teams have been working a rotating 24 hour shift and seven day week I schedule, and other personnel have been working extended hours over a six day work week in order to expeditiously fix the condition. Engineering personnel worked to confirm which cables needed to be rerouted and to establish the details for how to route the cables. Work packages were started in phases to expedite the field work. Construction began doing field walkdowns, making area preparations, and writing . condition identifications. The procurement for cable and conduit and other materials was expeditiously initiated. As of October 18,1996, the following work had been completed. On the west side, the cables that need to be rerouted have been identified; the procurement of materials needed to install the new cables and conduits has been essentially completed and is in receipt; the building of scaffolding is nearing completion; the work packages for the core boring, the cable pulling, and for installing the conduit . have been completed for the west side; the removal of cable tray fire wrap and seals j is in progress for the west side; and the drilling of core holes is in progress for the west side. On the east side, the cables that need to be rerouted have been essentially identified, and the initial routing paths have been identified. Significant work which remains to be started and completed includes: the running of conduit and supports; the pulling of new cables into cable trays and conduits; the grouting of all core holes; the performance of meggering and point to point continuity checks; the determ and reterm of components; the testing of components; the sealing of ! penetrations; the rewrap of cable trays; the verification of train operability; and the
- removal of scaffolding. ,
The teams are meeting frequently under the project direction of the Manager, Design Electrical, to ensure there is a continuing focus on the safety of the activities and the plant, there is good coordination of activities, and that the work proceeds at an expeditious but safe manner. A detailed schedule was developed, based on the confirmatory operability evaluation, and the progress has been carefully monitored by the team and senior management. I 6.0 Reevaluation of Probability Calculation and Ooerations Comnensatorv Measures The probability calculation and the operations compensatory measures were based on the objective of Waterford 3 management and personnel to develop a conservative and expeditious resolution to an existing condition whose resolution
/ Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink l W3F1-96-0188 Page 12 October 21,1996 l could not be specifically and definitively supported by the existing design and ' licensing basis documentation. Subsequently, personnel have had more of an l opportunity to identify and put in perspective the important constituents of the design and licensing basis as discussed in section 2.0 of this letter and to perform further probabilistic analysis. )
- i Specifically regarding the probability calculation, a new calculation has been ,
performed which demonstrates that the risk of a tornado strike to the conduits in ! question is extremely low, about 1.6x10'7 per year, at the probability threshold where a tornado strike is not considered credible pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.117. This calculation was performed using a methodology which has been previously approved by the NRC. The probability was calculated using the following equations.' , i PT= Po X Pg X Po Ps = y X At X Nm, where Pr = probability of a tornado strike Po = frequency of tornado occurrence at a given site per year Pn = conditional probability of tornado missile striking a target, given that the tornado of frequency, Po, has occurred. ; Po = conditional probability of tornado missile damaging a target, given that the I missile has struck the target. I y = tornado missile impact parameter expressed as the frequency of impact per missile per unit target area per tornado strike frequency l At = actual exposed areas of target (s) in sq. feet l Nm= number of potential missiles This methodology was specifically approved by the NRC in an SER dated May 1, 1995, for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant to change the licensing basis of the plant to eliminate the licensing requirement l l l
Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 13 October 21,1996 to have tornado missile barriers for certain components of its emergency diesel
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generators.The probability calculation performed by Waterford 3 employs a number i of conservatisms. Some of these conservatisms are the following.
. The highest y value from all available references was used.
. The conditional probability of tornado missile damage, Po, was assumed to be unity.
. According to EPRI report No. NP-2005, Waterford 3 site falls in region B tornado classification which has less severe wind speed compared to the USNRC tornado Region I. The y used in this calculation is based on tornado Region I. ,
The most significant conservatism used in the Waterford 3 probability calculation is i the use of a failure probability of unity given a missile impact. This conservatism was also recognized as the most significant conservatism in the NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER. The NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER is most important from a design and licensing basis standpoint in that it confirms the perspectives discussed in section 2.0 of this ; letter regarding the licensing and design basis of Waterford 3. Specifically, in the l NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER it is stated that BG&E was revising the licensing basis to read: " Tornado-generated missile protection is not required for systems designed to meet the performance standards of draft GDC [ General Design Criterion 2] if the resultant aggregate probability of exposure in excess of 10CFR Part 100 guidelines is less than 10 per year." Subsequent to this statement, the NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER states: " The criterion of 104per year is based on the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3 ' Evaluation of Potential Accidents,' and 3.5.1.4 ' Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena.'" And finally, in the NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER, the NRC concludes by stating: " Thus, SRP Section 2.2.3 4 acceptance criterion, that the realistic probability can be shown to be lower than 10 per year, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments are met." Thus, the NRC BG&E Calvert Cliffs SER confirms that the NRC has used the 104per year probability criterion of SRP 2.2.3, as may have been used for Waterford 3, to exclude the need for protection of components and equipment from tornado missiles, wherein the realistic probability can be shown to be less than 104 per year when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments.
l . l Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 l Page 14 October 21,1996
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- Waterford 3 personnel on October 16,1996, performed a reevaluation of the need to ;
keep in place the original operations compensatory measures. Personnel i considered the design and licensing perspectives herein discussed and the very low l probability of a tornado strike on the conduits,1.6x10~7 per year. Under the ; i leadership of a shift superintendent and with input from senior management, a
- consensus was reached that the optimum safety of the plant is achieved without compensatory measures. A critical judgment in this decision was that there may be j more small net detriments involved from implementing compensatory measures, j such as the consumption of diesel fuel or other transients that may challenge safety systems due to a rapid plant shutdown, given the extremely low probability of a ;
- tornado strike on the conduits, and thus the absence of any credible event.
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- A revision to the Site Directive W4.101 confirmatory operability evaluation was made
! to incorporate the new probability calculation and to remove the original operations : I compensatory measures, and the evaluation was reviewed and endorsed by PORC on October 18,1996. l An important point is mentioned about the new evaluation. Unlike the original
- evaluation, this evaluation does not have a time constraint for its effective period,
! since the duration required to keep the probability at 10~7 per year would be 228 ! days, (1E-7/1.6E-7)x(365.25). Tables One and Two, attached, identify the cables and the associated equipment routed in the conduits above the RAB walls. This l information is subject to further review as part of the configuration control process. 7.0 Summarv i l The identification of the conduits being routed above the RAB walls was a situation ' which we could not conclusively and definitively resolve based on the information available to us initially. Immediate management direction was given and team efforts were implemented to define and bound the problem and to implement the appropriate corrective actions. A decision was made to consider this situation a l significant condition, to continue the evaluation, but to pursue a conservative safety j evaluation in the near term for the immediate resolution of the issue. A significant
- focus of the resolution was to develop conservative operations compensatory i measures which were consistent with preserving the design features of the ultimate l heat sink and confirming a low probability threshold of a tornado strike. Teams have j been aggressively working to make a fix to the plant, and significant progress has i been made.
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3 V . n Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 15 October 21,1996 I During this time, we have had the opportunity to further review our licensing and
- design basis and to achieve a better understanding of the licensing and design basis relative to the issues which have been raised. Further, we performed additional
'probabilistic analysis to demonstrate the condition reflected a low probabilistic threshold,10 per year, consistent with the more recent regulatory guidance issued I subsequent to original design, construction, and licensing of the plant. Thus, based l on this information, we carefully evaluated the need to continue the operations '
cornpensatory measure in order to optimize safety, and we revised the probabilistic analysis. The new evaluation was incorporated in a revised Site Directive W4.101 confirmatory operability evaluation, and the evaluation was reviewed and endorsed by PORC October 18,1996. On October 18,1996, the Licensing Manager called the NRC to apprise the NRC of this status. 8.0 Concludina Remarks-1 At the time this condition was identified, there was not sufficient analysis or documentation to definitively and conclusively resolve the issue. There has been extensive information and analysis identified or developed to justify or support actions other than the actions we have taken. Nonetheless, we believe this
.information is only material in establishing perspective, and the important responsibility is the safe and conservative resolution of this matter. Our decision to fix the condition was a deliberate decision to be conservative, to fix rather than rely on justifying analysis, and to be proactive by completing the fix on an expeditious schedule. In this regard, we plan to aggressively pursue the completion of the fix by December 2,1996, except for the power cables to the Fuel Handling Building MCC 314 A&B which will be completed by December 16,1996. There may be specific conditions which arise as we progress with the plant modification that require reevaluation or affect the scope of work or schedule in order to maintain the plant in j the safest condition. We will apprise the NRC should this occur or should the j schedule need to be revised. !
Also, we believe there is a need to further review our design and licensing basis for tornado missile protection. We plan to perform a comprehensive review of our design and licensing basis for tornado missile protection and plan to complete this work by January 31,1997. We will apprise the NRC should this date change. 1
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Tornado Missile Protection for Ultimate Heat Sink W3F1-96-0188 Page 16 October 21,1996 In conclusion, (1) the ultimate heat sink was and is operable; (2) the evaluations are technically sound and consistent with the design basis, licensing basis, and . regulatory criteria; (3) the immediate evaluations done and the compensatory measures taken were conservative; (4) proactive and expeditious actions were taken to bound and fix the problem; and (5) there is a good basis and rationale for the current course of action we are taking. ; We thank the NRC personnel for your time, cooperation, and assistance on this matter. Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (504) 739-6242 or Tim Gaudet at (504) 739-6666. Very truly yours, M6/m J.J. Fisicaro Director Nuclear Safety JJF/RJM/ssf cc: L.J. Callan, NRC Region IV C.P. Patel, NRC-NRR R.B. McGehee N.S. Reynolds NRC Resident Inspectors Office
. _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - _ _ - - _ _ _ ~
l .
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i h Anoendix A i 1 Licensing Basis Chronology 1 ] < 1977 In the PSAR days , prior to the issuance of the Standard Review Plans (SRP) ,
. the NRC required Ebasco (Waterford 3 Architect Engineer) to backfit missile !
i protection or grating on the UHS design. A "line-of-sight" criteria was used l 4 and the external walls were made higher than originally planned and steel-grating was provided atop of 3 of the 5 dry cooling coils. Additional missile i protection or grating was avoided to ensure adequate heat removal capability; l 4 that is, restrictions on air influent or effluent affected UHS performance. ! I i . 12/78 The FSAR was docketed describing the existing missile protection features j installed at the plant
)
i j e FSAR Figure 1.2-24,25 and GA 210 & G211 show missile protection j j features.
- e FSAR section 3.5.1 describes the design of missile barriers.
4 e FSAR Section 9.2.5 describes safe shutdown capability following tornado I missile damage. In addition, it provides additional details regarding j missile protection and the arrangement of DCTs and WCTs with respect to tornado missiles. I s ! 3/79 The UHS manufacturer files a 10CFR21 report with the NRC describing j potential design concerns; the concerns addressed, in part, tornado missile protection. l 8/79 The Accident Analysis Branch of NRR requires the tornado missile barriers be
- compared or checked against the impact force of 2 additional missiles, a 1" j steel rod and a telephone pole. (Response to NRC question 313.29).
11/80 The Auxiliary Systems Branch of NRR requires additional information to j confirm safe shutdown capability assuming tornado missile damage to the J UHS. Confirmation of the 30 day water supply requirements contained in the i- Regulatory Guide 1.27 was also required. The Staff's position, as described in this question, was that additional missile protection would be required if safe shutdown capability was not adequately demonstrated. (Response to NRC Question 010.19)
_ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ m _ _ . . _ - - i -
- ~
Anoendix A i ! Licensina Basis Chronoloav . 4
- i. ,
( l 7/81 NUREG-0787, Safety Evaluation Report Related to Operation of
- Waterford 3 concludes
- :
i l
- In Section 2.4.5, ..NRC acceptance is contingent upon confirmatory p preoperational testing of the hydrological and thermal performance of the l wet and dry ecoling towers. . ,
! . In Section 3.5.1.4, ...The tornado missile spectrum was reviewed and !
- approved by the NRC at the CP stage prior to issuance of SRP 3.5.1.4. l l The staff reevaluated this spectrum (reference question 313.29) and ,
- concluded that the W-3 missile spectrum is acceptable and meets the j requirements of GDC 2 and 4 and the guidelines of RG 1.76.
e In Section 3.5.2 and 9.2.5, ..The UHS is protected against tornado ; j missiles by the reactor auxiliary building walls and missile grating with i j the exception of two of the five cooling coils of each dry tower and the ) wet tower fans and fan motors. It was shown by analysis (reference ! question 010.19) that sufficient heat removal capability is provided for 24 l hours with 60% of the dry cooling coils. Thus, the staff stated that the ! requirements of GDC 2 & 4 and the guidelines of RG 1.26 and 1.27 were 1 met regarding UHS design against natural phenomena and associated i- missiles.
- In Section 3.5.3, ..The 2 step methods used to design tornado missile l barriers are adequate and acceptable. In addition, the staff acknowledged j the position that secondary missiles were prevented by fixing the target j thickness of the grating well above that determined for penetration.
- 2/83 Letter transmitting confirmatory information to the NRC staff on the results of
} preoperational testing of the UHS, including performance in the tornado mode l of operation. The letter also addressed the Part 21 concerns with respect to
- adequacy of missile protection and other issues. Regarding missile protection, ,
the letter again documents that grating protection was for only the cooling l coils of three dry cooling tower cells (60% per tower). The letter infers that l . protection of the dry cooling tower fans and motors is unnecessary because j they are located below grade, and are protected from tornado missiles by i building walls or access platforms 2 1 7 i a
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, Tablo 1 W3F1-96-0188 WEST Side Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure NonCR 1 30625M-SB . NC 30625M Containment Air Lock Loss of indication on CP8 of pressure equalizing on escape lock ext. door l
2 30749T SA NC 30604D LCS Control of sol valve CS-ISV-0129A Unable to operate valve & potential failure of indication i See 35068-SA This cable provides power, control and @ LCS of CS-lZS-0125 , valve position indication. l C 30749F CCW Surge tank level switch (CC-ILS. Loss of automatic ability to isolate & bypass DCT I 7011A) A 3 30761 A1-SA NC 30761A WCT "A" Fan 1480 v feed form 3A315 Loss of WCT fan 4 30761 B3-SA NC 30770R Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 1 Loss of heater i NC 30770S Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 2 Loss of heater l NC 30770T Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 3 Loss of heater l NC 30770U Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 4 Loss of heater 5 30762A1-SA NC 30762A WCT "A" Fan 2 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 6 3076281-SA NC No cables 7 30763A1-SA NC 30763A WCT "A" Fan 3 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 8 3076381-SA NC No cables 9 30764A1-SA NC 30764A WCT "A" Fan 4 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 10 3076481-SA NC No cables 11 30765B-SA NC 30770V Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 5 Loss of heater NC 30770W Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 6 Loss of heater NC 30770X Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 7 Loss of heater NC 30770Y Motor Space Heater for WCT fan 8 Loss of heater 12 30819B-SA NC 30819B Sol Valve ACC-ISV-0138A's 120v feed. Unable to open valve for Wet Tower Level Equalizing 13 32349A3-SA NC 32349A 4kv feed to 3A315 Cntical feed to MCC 14 3234983-SA NC 323498 4kV feed to 3A315 Cntical feed to MCC 15 32482A2-SA C 32482A 480v feed to 3A314 Loss of MCC loads 16 32507A-SB C 32507A 480v feed to 3B314B Loss of MCC loads 17 33535-SB C 32513A DC feed to 3B314 Bus isolation Loss of ability for breaker to trip on LOV. breaker 18 34912 SA C 32488A DC feed to 3A314 Bus isolation Loss of ability for breaker to trip on LOV. breaker 19 35066-SA NC 30840C Fuel pool temp control valve (CV ISV Valve not able to close. or a hot short maintains it 0620-1). Valve energizes to close. closed or SIAS energizes to close. NC 31232C FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Fan tnps & no control room indication nor control. 21 Control NC 31232T FHB Mech. Equip Rm Exhaust Fan E- Make-up air damper closes. 21 hydramotor control NC 31234C FHB Ernergency Filtration Unit E-35 Loss of Fan NC 31234T FHB Emergency Filtration Unit E-35 Make-up air damper closes hydramotor controls NC 312358 E-35 Elec heating coil EHC-42 Loss of input from PAC to operate heater. NC 31238B intake damper D-35A (HVF-ISV-0103) Loss of Control Rm. control & Indication Fails close. Bypass Damper D 36A (HVF-ISV-0110) pageI
Tcbb 1 W3F1-96-0188 WEST Side Conduit crit Cable Function Failure NonCR Fails Open NC 31238E Intake damper D-38A (HVF-ISV-0105) Loss of Control Rm. control & Indication Fails close. Discharge Damper D-37A (HVF-ISV-0108) Fails Close C 32488D LOV trip of 3A314 Isol Brk Loss of ability for breaker to trip on LOV NC 32685A 120v power to Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE- Loss of Rad Monitor 0300 2) FHB Airborne Rad monitor NC 32685D Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE-0300 2) FHB Loss of Rad Monitor action Airborne Rad monitor Actuation of other devices upon Hi-Rad NC 326LSE Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE-0300 2) FHB Loss of Rad Monitor action Airbome Rad monitor Actuation of other devices upon Hi-Rad NC 32683A 120v power to Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE- Loss of Rad Monitor 0300 4) FHB Airborne Rad monitor 20 35068-SA NC 30604D LCS Control of sol valve CS-ISV-0129A Unable to operate valve & potential failure of indication ; See 30749T- This cable provides power, control and @ LCS of CS-lZS-0125 ! SA valve position indication. ' NC 30749G DCT A isolation valve.(CC-ISV-0135A) Loss of automatic speed control of DCT fan 1,2, & 3 input for automatic speed control for from PAC panalCP-48 DCT fan 1,2, & 3. C 30749C Control Rm. Indication & control of Loss of automatic and Control Rm. ability to DCT A isolation valve.(CC-ISV-0135A), isolate & bypass DCT A C 30749D Control Rm. Indication & control of Loss of automatic and Control Rm. ability to DCT A By-pass valve.(CC-ISV-0134A). Isolate & bypass DCT A 21 35246A-SA NC 30731C DCT 'A' fan 1 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30732C DCT 'A' fan 2 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30733C DCT 'A' fan 3 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30734C DCT 'A' fan 4 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30735C DCT 'A' fan 5 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30736C DCT 'A' fan 6 control power and Loss of Fan indication C 30737C DCT 'A' fan 7 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication C 30738C DCT 'A' fan 8 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication NC 3076.B Control of WCT A Fan 1 and remote Loss of Fan and Control Room Indication of tans 1 to status indication of fans 1 to 4. 4. NC 30761H Control and ramote status indication of Loss of fan control and status indication for WCT 'A' WCT A Fans 1 to 8. fans 1-8 NC 30762B Control of WCT A Fan 2 Loss of Fan NC 30763B Control of WCT A Fan 3 Loss of Fan NC 307648 Control of WCT A Fan 4 Loss of Fan 22 35247A-SA C 30739C DCT 'A' fan 9 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication C 30740C DCT 'A' fan 10 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication C 30741C DCT 'A' fan 11 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication C 30742C DCT 'A' fan 12 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication C 30743C DCT 'A' fan 13 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shieid indication C 30744C DCT 'A' fan 14 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield page 2
s
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Tcbla 1 W3F1-96-0188 WEST Side Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure NonCR indication C 30745C DCT 'A' fan 15 control power and Loss of Fan under missile shield indication NC 307658 Control of WCT A Fan 5 and remote Loss of Fan and Control Room Indication of fans 5 to status indication of fans 5 to 8. 8. NC 307668 Control of WCT A Fan 6. Loss of Fan NC 30767B Control of WCT A Fan 7 Loss of Fan NC 30768B Control of WCT A Fan 8 Loss of Fan NC 32538A Sequencer loading of LVD-EMT-315A Loss of motor heaters. WCT A Fan 1 to 4 control, sol panel 381SA valve for WCT fill & MCC 315 space heaters 23 36936 SB NC 30841C Fuel pool temp control valve (CV ISV Valve not able to close. SIAS energizes to close. 0620-1) Valve energizes to close. NC 31233C FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Fan tnps & no control room indication nor control. 21 Control ' NC 31233T FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Make-up air damper closes. l 21 hydramotor control l NC 31236C FHB Emergency Filtration Unit E-35 Loss of Fan NC 31236S FHB Emergency Filtration Unit E-35 Make-up air damper closes. l hydramotor controls 1 NC 31237B E-35 Elec heating cost EHC-42 Loss of input from PAC to operate heater. NC 31239B FHB isolation dampers intake damper D- Loss of Control Rm. control & Indication l 35B (HVF-ISV-0104) Fails close.- Bypass Damper D-368 (HVF-ISV-0109) Fails Open NC 31239E Intake damper D-38B (HVF-ISV-0106) Loss of Control Rm. control & Indication; dampers Fails close or open. (solenoids) fail close or open. Discharge Damper D-37B (HVF-ISV-0107) Fails Close or open C 32513D LOV trip of 3B314 Isol Brk Loss of ability for breaker to trip on LOV NC 32687A 120v power to Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE- Lots of Rad Monitor and associated instrumentation 0300 3) FHB Airborne Rad monitor NC 32688A 120v power to Rad Monitor (ARM-IRE- Loss of Rad Monitor and associated instrumentation. 0300.1) FHB Airborne Rad monitor NC 32688D Rad Monitor (ARM-!RE-0300.1) FHB Loss of Rad Monitor action Airborne Rad monitor Actuation of other devices upon Hi-Rad. RM -80 3001
" RAD HI-Hi" to Aux. Pnl. 2 (contact)
NC 32688E Rad Monitor (ARM-lRE-0300 3) FHB Loss of Rad Monitor action Airborne Rad monitor Actuation of other devices upon Hi-Rad; RM -80 300.3 '
" RAD Hi-HI" to Aux. Pnl. 2 (contact)
NC 3H036BA Heat tracing for the FHB WRGM Loss of Heat Trace , (PRMIRE3032). ' 24 37014-SA C 30713N WCT A Level Transmitter for loop Loss of the following: , ACC-IL-7079A (1) indication in the main control room; (2) ' computer display in the main control room; (3) The level instrumentation associated main control room alarm (annunciator) to alert the with each wet cooling tower basin operator of hl/lo basin level; and (4) automatic provides four primary functions. control of the wet cooling tower basin water These are: (1) indication in the main makeup valve from the Condensate Storage control room; (2) computer display in System. the main control room; (3) main control room alarm (annunciator) to alert the operator of hillo basin level; and (4) automatic control of the wet cooling tower basin water makeup valve from the Condensate Storage System. See 30715K NC 30715K WCT A basin RTD - temperature loop Loss of the following ACC-IT-7077A (1) Indication in the main control room. (2) Indication at There is one temperature instrumentation the auxiliary control panel (LCP-43); (3) Computer loop associated with each wet coohng display in the main control room. (4) main control room page 3
^
, Tcblo 1 W3F1-96-0188 WEST Side Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure NonCR tower basin, which provides nine alarm (annunciator) to alert the operator of high basin functions These are: (1) hdication in the temperature; (5) high temperature interlock to start wet main control room; (2) Indication at the cooling tower fans 1 through 4; (6) low-low temperature auxiliary control panel (LCP-43); (3) interlock to stop wet cooling tower fans 1 through 4; (7)
Computer display in the main control high-high temperature interlock to start wet cooling tower room; (4) main control room alarm fans 5 through 8; (8) low temperature interlock to stop (annunciator) to alert the operator of high wet cooling tower fans 5 through 8; and (9) low basin temperature; (5) high temperature temperature signal to automatically readjust the setpoint interlock to start wet cooling tower fans i for CCW heat exchanger temperature control valves through 4; (6) low-low temperature (ACC-126A.B) to 115'F dunng a SlAS if basin water is > interlock to stop wet cooling tower fans 1 74 degf. through 4; (7) high-high temperature interlock to start wet cooling tower fans 5 through 8; (8) low temperature interlock to stop wet cooling tower fans 5 through 8, and (9) low temperature signal to automatically readjust the setpoint for CCW heat exchanger temperature control valves (ACC-126A.B) to 115'F during a SIAS if basin water is > 74 degf. 25 37678-SA NC 31232G FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Loss of PMC inoication Hi temp Annun , and 21 (3A-SA) Thermocouple for Rm. Temp automatic Fan control HVF-lTE-51601 A NC 3123:.H FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Loss of PMC indication, Hi temp Annun., and 21 (3A-SA) Thermocouple for Rm. Temp automatic Fan control HVF-ITE-5160 3A NC 31232P FHB/ Ambient Diff Pressure loop HVF-IP. Loss of the following: 5105A e indication on the Plant Monitonng Computer Point A53600 e Interlock to initiate opening of the Air Handling Unit Make-up Air Damper D-72 (SA)
- Fuel Handling Building Negative Pressure Lost Alarm SA-93 on RTGB (CP-18)
NC 31234L FHB Emergency Unit E-35 (3A-SA)-- Loss of Damper control Damper D-29 (SA) control (reference 5817-1119) NC 31235L E-35 (3A-SA) Filter T rain Diff Pressure Loss of the following: (HVF-IDPT-5108A) ; loop HVF-IP-5108A
- computer points A53602
- differential pressure recorder SBVIDPR5051 A (at RTGB. CP-18) e annunciator alarms SA-63 (Fuel Handling Duilding Emergency Filter Differential Pressure Hl/LO) at RTGB CP-18 e low flow (Iow dP) interlock for heater EHC-42 NC 31235M E-35 Filter Train Temp (HVF-ITE- Loss of the following.
5114A) ; loop HVF-lT-5114A e direct temperature indication on Plant Monitoring Computer Point A53606 for thermocouple HVFITE5114 A e differential temperature signal for annunciator alarms SA-73 (FHB Fan 'A' Locked Filter Temp LO) at RTGB CP-18 e differential temperature signal for interlock with FHB Emergency Ventilation System Fan E-35 (3A-SA) to trip and " lock out" if the low differential temperature exists for more than 400 seconds NC 31235N E-35 Filter Train Temp (HVF-ITE- Loss of the following: 5119A); loop HVF-IT-5119A e direct temperature indication on Plant Monitonng Computer Point A53608 for thermocouple HVFITE5119 A l
- differential temperature signal for annunciator alarm SA-73 (FHB Fan (A) Locked Filter Temp LO) at RTGB CP-18 t
page 4
. Tab:91 W3F1-96-0188 I
WEST Side l 2 Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure NonCR
- differential temperature signal for interlock with FHB Emergency Ventilation System Fan E-35 (3A-SA) to tnp and " lock out" if the low differential temperature exists for more than 400 seconds NC 32596A7 RM.-80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM -11 for Rad Monitors 300.2,300.4,100Y, RM.-11's 5031,100.1,7050A and/or Rad Monitors.
l NC 32596A8 RM -80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM -11 for Rad Monitors 300.2,300 4,100Y, . RM.-11's 5031,100.1. 7050A and/or Rad Monitors. 4 NC 32596G RM -80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM -11 for Rad Monitors 300.2,300.4,100Y, RM.-11's 5031,100.1. 7050A and/or Rad Monitors. f NC 32596J RM -80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM -11 for Rad Monitors 100Y,5031,100.1,
- RM.-11's 7050A NC 32685B Recorder RMS-lUR-0014A (CH. 5); Loss of recorder and/or Rad Monitors.
records FHB radiation levels NC 32685C ARM-IRI-0300.2 (RM.-23), monitors FHB Loss of RM.-23 and/or Rad Monitors. levels NC 32686B Recorder RMS-luR-0014A (CH. 6); Loss of recorder and/or Rad Monitors records FHB radiation levels NC 32686C ARM-IRI-0300.4 (RM.-23); monitors FHB Loss of RM.-23 and/or Rad Monitors. I levels 26 37679-SB NC 31233G FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Loss of PMC indication, He temp Annun., and 21 (3B-SB) Thermocouple for Rm. Temp automatic Fan control HVF-ITE-51601 B NC 31233H FHB Mech. Equip Rm. Exhaust Fan E- Losc of PMC indication, Hi temp Annun., and 21 (3B-SB) Thermocouple for Rm. Temp automatic Fan control HVF-lTE-5160 3B NC 31233P FHB/ Ambient Diff Pressure Temp Loss of the following: Thermocouple loop HVF-IP-5105B
- Indication on the Plant Monitonng Computer Point A53601 e interlock to initiate opening of the Air Handling Unit Make-up Air Damper D-72 (SB) e Fuel Handling Building Negative Pressure Lost Alarm SB-93 on RTGB (CP-18)
NC 31236L FHB Emergency Unit E-35 (38-SB)-- Loss of Damper control and/or loop Damper D-29 (SB) control (reference 5817-1964) NC 31237L E-35 (3B-SB) Filter Train Diff Pressure Loss of the following: (HVF-IDPT-5108B) ; loop HVF IP-5108B
- computer points A53603
- differential pressure recorder SBVIDPR5051 B (at RTGB, CP-18)
- annunciator alarms SB-63 (Fuel Handling Building Emergency Filter Differential Pressure Hl/LO) at RTGB CP-18 e low flow (Iow dP) interlock for heater EHC-42 NC 31237M E-35 Filter Train Temp (HVF-ITE- Loss of the following:
51148) ; loop HVF-IT-5114B e direct temperature indication on Plant Monitoring Computer Point A53607 for themlocouple HVFITE5114 B e differential temperature signal for annunciator alarms SB-73 (FHB Fan 'B' Locked Filter Temp LO) at RTGB CP 18
- differential temperatura signal for interlock with FHB Emergency Ventilation System Fan E-35 (3B-SB) to trip and " lock out" if the low differential temperature exists for more than 400 seconds NC 31237N E-35 Filter Train Temp (HVF-lTE. Loss of the following:
5119B); loop HVF-IT-5119B
- direct temperature indication on Plant Monitoring Computer Point 53609 for thermocouple HVFITE5119 B
- differential temperature signal for annunciator alarms SB-73 (FHB Fan 'B' Locked Filter Temp LO) at page 5
i l
. Tcblo1 W3F1-96-0188 WEST Side j Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure NonCR RTGB CP-18 e differential temperature signal for interlock with FHB Emergency Ventilation System Fan E-35 (3B-SB) to inp and " lock out" if the low differential temperature exists for more than 400 seconds NC 32598A7 RM.-80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM.11 for Rad Monitors 300.1,300.3,5029 RM.-11's 100.2, 7050B, 200.6 NC 32598A8 RM.-80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM.-11 for Rad Monitors 5029,100.2,70508 RM -11's 200 6 NC 32598G RM.-80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM.-11 for Rad Monitors 300.1,300 3,5029, RM -11's 100 2,7050B. 200 6 and/or Rad Monitors NC 32598J RM -80 transmit and receive from the Loss of RM -11 for Rad Monitors 5029,100 2,7050B, RM.-11's 200 6 and/or Rad Monitors.
l NC 326878 Recorder RMS-lUR-00148 (CH. 6). Loss of recorder and/or Rad Monitors. records FHB radiation levels NC 32687C ARM-IRI-0300 3 (RM -23); monitors FHB Loss of RM.-23 and/or Rad Monitors. levels NC 326888 Recorder RMS-lUR-00148 (CH. 5); Loss of recorder and/or Rad Monitors. records FHB radiation levels NC 32688C ARM-IRI-0300.1 (RM -23); monitors FHB Loss of RM.-23 levels NC 3H036BB Heat tracing for the FHB WRGM Loss of Heat Trace (PRMIRE3032) l NC 3H036BC Heat tracing for the FHB WRGM Loss of Heat Trace (PRMIRE3032). 27 30713R-SA NC 30713R WCT A Level Control Valve control Loss of automatic ability to add water to WCT I Power from PAC - automatic control of i i the wet cooling tower basin water ) i makeup valve from the Condensate Storage System. 28 30713U-SA NC 30713U WCT A Level Control Vaive control Loss of ability to automatic add water to WCT Power for automatic control of the wet cooling tower basin water makeup valve from the Condensate Storage System. 29 30765A1-SA NC 30765A WCT "A" Fan 5 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 30 30766A1-SA NC 30766A WCT "A" Fan 6 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan l l 31 30767A1-SA NC 30767A WCT "A" Fan 7 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 32 30768A1 SA NC 30768A WCT "A" Fan 8 480 v feed Loss of WCT fan 33 30715K-SA NC 30715K WCT A basin RTD indication to CP33 & Loss of indication see 37014 LCP43 , 1 l l l l Conduits on RAB Roof +46' or +69' MSL , 34 32671H SA NC 32671H Plant Stack Airborne Rad Monitor "A" Loss of valve control l (PRM-IRE-01001) control of normal sampling valve 7HV-V260-1 NC 32671L Plant Stack Airborne Rad Monitor "A" Loss of valve control
- (PRM IRE-01001) control of accident sampling valve 7HV-V259-1 page 6
Tcblo1 W3F1-96-0188 l WEST Side Conduit Crit Cane Function Failure NonCR 35 32672J-SB NC 32672E Plant Stack Rad Monitor 'B' (PRM-IFY- Loss of flow indication 0100 2) to Normal (PRM-lFT-0100 22 plant stack flow transmitter. ', NC 32672F Plant Stack Rad Monitor "B" (PRM-IFY- Loss of flow indication 0100.2) to Accident (PRM-IFT-0100.21 plant stack flow transmitter NC 32672J Plant Stack Rad Monitor "B"(PRM-IRE-0100.2) position indication of normal sampling valve 7HV-V260-2 NC 32672K Plant Stack Rad Monitor "B"(PRM-IRE-0100.2) position indication or accident sampling valve 7HV-V259-2 36 32672!l-SB NC 32672H Plant Stack Rad Monitor "B" (PRM-IRE-0100 2) control of normal sampling valve
- 7HV-V260-2 i NC 32672H Plant Stack Rad Monitor "B' (PRM-IRE-0100 2) control of normal sampling valve 7HV-V260-2 37 32671J-SA NC 32671E Plant Stock Rad Monitor "A* (PRM-IFY- Loss of normal flow indication and normal sampling 01001) to Normal (PRM-IFT-0100.12 valve control.
1 plant stack flow transmitter. NC 32671F Plant Stack Rad Monitor "A"(PRM-IFY- Loss of flow indication Loss of accident flow indication i 0100.1) to Accident (PRM-IFT-010011 and occident sampling valve control. plant stack flow transmitter NC 32671J Plant Stack Rad Monitor "A"(PRM-IRE- Loss of valve control 0100.1) position indication of normal sampling valve 7HV V260-1 NC 32671K Plant Stack Rad Monitor 'B"(PRM-IRE- Loss of valve control l 0100.2) position indication of accident
- sampling valve 7HV-V259-1 38 Box NC 31503B SG #1 Feed Water Control Bypass No effect on FW Reg. valves unless MSIS occurs.
B30918-SA Valve (FW-ISV-0166A1) and Control Valve (FW-ISV-0173A1) Power , NC 31519B SG #2 Feed Water Control Bypass No effect on FW Reg. valves unless MSIS occurs. Valve (FW-ISV-0166B1) and Control
, Valve (FW-ISV-0173B1) Power a 39 Box NC 31503D SG #1 Feed Water Control Bypass No effect on FW Reg. valves unless MSIS occurs.
l B30919-SB Valve (FW-ISV-0166A2) and Control i Valve (FW-ISV 0173A2) Power l NC 31519D SG #2 Feed Water Control Bypass No effect on FW Reg valves unless MSIS occurs. Valve (FW-ISV-0166B2) and Control Valve (FW-ISV-017382) Power l l Piping on RAB Roof +46' or +69' MSL 3FW6-228 Emergency Feed Pump B Discharge to See FSAR Table 3.5-3 i isol Valve I l 3MS6-90B Supply to Emer Feed Pump See FSAR Table 3.5-3 l l l 1 page 7 , I
_ . . . =_ .- . .. ._- . . . .- .-. - . 4 . 3
. Tcbla 2 W3F1-96-0188 EAST Side Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure
, NonCR l 35071-SB NC NO CABLES 35248 &A-SB NC 30781C DCT 'B' fan 1 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30782C DCT 'B' fan 2 control power and Loss of Fan indication NC 30783C DCT 'B' fan 3 controi power and Loss of Fan 4 indication i NC 30784C DCT 'B' fan 4 control power and Loss of Fan indication l NC 3v785C DCT 'B' fan 5 control power and Loss of Fan indication i NC 30786C DCT 'B' fan 6 control power and Loss of Fan
- indication C 30787C DCT 'B' fan 7 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield l and indication ;
l C 30788C DCT 'B' fan 8 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield ' j and indicaticn l NC 308118 Control of WCT 'B' fan 1 and Loss of Fan and Control Room Indication of fans 1 to 4. 3 remote status indication of fans 1 to 4. NC 30811H Control and remote status Loss of fan control and status indication for WCT 'B' i indication of WCT B Fans 1 to 8. fans 1-8 NC 308158 l l Control of WCT 'B' fan 1 and Loss of WCT 'B' fan 5 and WCT 'B' fans 5-8 status j 1 remote status indication of fans 5 indication ; to 8. i ] NC 308168 Control of WCT *B' fan 6 Loss of Fan NC 30817B Control of WCT 'B' fan 7 Loss of Fan NC 30818B Control of WCT 'B' fan 8 Loss of Fan NC 32542A 208/120 VAC power panel PDP Loss of power to distnbution transformer to PDP 382-l 382-SB feeder sequence 'S6X' SB. DF 35249 &A-SB C 30789C DCT 'B' fan 9 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30790C DCT *B' fan 10 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30791C DCT 'B' fan 11 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30792C DCT 'B' fan 12 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30793C DCT *B' fan 13 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30794C DCT 'B' fan 14 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication C 30795C DCT 'B' fan 15 control power Loss of Fan under missile shield and indication NC 30812B Control of WCT B fan 2. Loss of Fan NC 30813B Control of WCT B fan 3. Loss of Fan NC 308148 Control of WCT B fan 4. Loss of Fan 39371-SB C 30799C Control Rm. indication & Loss of automatic and Control Rm. ability to isolate control of DCT B ise!ation & bypass DCT B valve.(CC-ISV-01358). C 30799D Control Rm. indication & Loss of automatic and Control Rm, ability to isolate control of DCT B By-pass & bypass DCT B valve.(CC-ISV-01348). C 30799F CCW Surge tank level switch Loss of automatic ability to isolate & bypass DCT B (CC-ILS 70118) 39577-SB NC 30714S WCT B Level Control Valve Loss of automatic ability to add water to WCT control Power from PAC - automatic control of the wet pagei
. . Tcbla 2 W3F1-96-0188 EAST Side Conduit Crit Cable Function Failure
, NonCR cooling tower basin water makeup valve from the Condensate Storage Systerr, J f f d 1 i l l l J l 4 i i i d 1 .i d i i 4 v 'i 'l d 4 4 4 page 2 l
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