ML20128Q537

Insp Rept 50-346/85-16 on 850409-0513.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Prepare CRD Sys Test Deficiency List & Inadequate Verification of RCS Boron Concentration During Monthly Surveillance Procedures

ML20128Q537
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/29/1985
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
References
50-346-85-16, IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, NUDOCS 8506040230
Download: ML20128Q537 (10)

See also: IR 05000346/1985016

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/85016(DRP)

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

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Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue

Toledo, OH 43652

' Facility Name: . Davis-Besse 1

Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Conducted: April 9 through May 13, 1985

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Inspectors:

W. G. Rogers

D. C. Kosloff

B. L. Burgess

' Approved By:

. Jac iw,

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Reactc: Projects Section 2B

Date'

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 9 through'May 13, 1985 (Report No. 50-346/85016(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of

licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee event reports, opera-

tional safety, maintenance, surveillance, IE bulletins, operational events,

meeting with licensee, action-on~ regional requests and training. The inspec-

tion involved 209 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 49

inspector-hours'onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified in nine areas and one item of noncompliance was identified in

. the area of surveillance (failure to properly implement a procedure -

paragraph 6).

8506040230 850529

PDR ' ADOCK 05000346

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

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Toledo Edison Company

R.'Crouse, Vice President Nuclear, SALP Improvement Task Force

Leader-

rFT. Murray,. Nuclear Mission Assistant Vice President, Acting

-Nuclear Mission Head

S. Quennoz, Plant Manager

• W. O' Conner, Operations Superintendent

• D. Lee, Maintenance Superintendent

. C. Daft, QA Director

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+J.

Faris, Administrative Coordinator

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J. Ligenfelter, Technical Superintendent

J. Syrowski,~ Nuclear Training Analysis and Evaluation Supervisor

+R. Peters,; Licensing Manager

• S. Wideman, Senior. Licensing Specialist

J. Wood, Facility Engineering General Supervisor

• B. Geddes, Acting Operationss QA Supervisor

• B.

Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director

b.

'NRC

+W.

Shafer, Branch Chief,.DRP

+J.

Haerison, Branch Chief, DRS

+C. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist

4H4. . Choules ,- Reactor Inspector, ' DRS

+I.~Jackiw..Section Chief, DRP

+*D._Kosloff,' Resident. Inspector

+ Denotes those personnel. attending the May 2, 1985 meeting in the

Region III offices to discuss erroneous information provided by-

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Toledo. Edison Company personnel on April 1, 1985.

• Denotes those personnel attending the' Hay 10,-1985 exit interview.

The inspectors also interviewe.d other licenses employees, including mem-

-bers of_the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health

physics staff.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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(Closed)-Open Item (346/85004-14) Establishment of a Maintenance Training

. Supervisor .' A Maintenance Training Supervisor was appointed on March 1,

1985.

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(Open) Open Item (346/85004-07) Channel separation between Safety Features

Actuation system channels. On March 21, 1985,-NRR requested additional

information to determine the adequacy of the channel interconnections.

This item remains open.

(0 pen) Open Item (346/84004-05) Eddy current inspection of the No.1 steam

generator. The licensee provided the inspector with the results of the

special sample inspection of the #1 steam generator. The report has been

forwarded to the regional office for review and evaluation. Closure of

this item is dependent on that review.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were' identified.

3.

' Licensee Event Reports Followup

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of_ records,.the following event reports were reviewed to determine

that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action

was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been

accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

(Open) LER 85-005, Reactor Trip from 28 Percent Power'.

This LER will

remain open pending review of the licensee's change to the Plant Shutdown

Procedure, PP 1102.10 and the licensee's evaluation of the component fail-

ure that caused the trip.

(0 pen) LER 85-006, Failure of Control Rod Drive E-3 to Meet Trip Time.

This LER will remain open pending review of the corrective action included

in the scheduled revision to the LER.

(Open) LER 85-007, Auxiliary Feed-Pump Turbine Response Time 'roblems.

This LER will remain open pending review of the corrective action included

in the scheduled revision to the LER.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months

of April and May. The inspector verified the operability of selected

emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to

servic9 of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine

buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including

potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to

verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need

of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview

verified that tha physical security plan was being implemented in

accordance with the station security plan.

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The inspector observed plant housekeepiag/ cleanliness conditions and

verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the

months of April and May, the inspector walked down the accessible portions

of the station battery and DC electrical distribution systems to verify

operability.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

' technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

While reviewing the Unit Log on Apr31 3, 1985 the inspector noted that

the security and fire protection computer had been shut down for main-

tenance at 0915 and that the required fire watch patrols had not been

established until 1120. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for

Operation 3.3.3.8 requires specific fire detection instrumentation be

operable. Shutdown of the security and fire protection computer renders

'that instrumentation inoperable. -Technical Specification Action Statement

3.3.3.8 a. requires that fire watch patrols be established within one hour

to inspect the zones with inoperable instruments. The time limit estab-

lished by the action statement was exceeded by one hour and five minutes.

A discussion of the occurrence with the Shift Supervisor revealed that

although he had been informed that the security and fire protection com-

puter was to bc shutdown for maintenance that morning he was not notified

at the time the computer was actually shut down. He established the fire

watch patrols in accordance with existing plant procedures after his

independent discovery that the computer had been shut down. This item is

unresolved (346/85016-01) pending further review.

While touring the Startup Feedwater Pump / Auxiliary Feeduater Pump (SUFP/

AFWP) area on April 24, 1985 at approximately 1210 the inspector observed

that the only other person in the room was a sleeping unlicensed operator.

At this time the plant was in Mode 3 and the SUFP was in operation.

Paragraph 2.C.(3)(t) of Facility Operating License Number NPF-3 requires

that Toledo Edison station an operator in the SUFP/AFk'P area during opera-

tion of the SUFP to monitor SUFP and Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW)

piping status in the AFWP Rooms.

In the event of SUFP/TPCW pipe leakage,

- the c perator is required to trip the SUFP locally or notify the Control

Room to trip the SUFP, and isolate the SUFP/TPCW piping. Another Toledo

Edison employee entered the area and the operator was awakened in the

presence of the inspector at approximately 1212. The inspector notified

the appropriate Toledo Edison supervisory personnel of the occurrence.

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The operator was relieved and disciplinary action was taken. This item

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is unresolved (346/85016-02) pending further review.

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

5.

Monthly Maintenance Observation

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Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components

listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry

codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed'from_ service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating'the'

~ work; activities were. accomplished using approved procedures and.were

inspected as' applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

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performed prior.to returning components or systems to service; quality

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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified

personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological

controis were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were' implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and

to' assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment mainte-

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nance which may affect _ system performance.

~The~following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

~ Installation of a_ fire wall.and fire doors in the auxiliary building

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Emergency diesel generator preventive maintenance

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Following-completion of maintenance on the-emergency diesel generator, the

inspector verified.that the system had been returned to service properly.

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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Monthly. Surveillance Observation

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LThe inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance

testing _on the Control-Rod Drive System, ST.5013.02, Control Rod Assembly

Insertion Time Test, and verified that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that

limiting conditions for operation were met,-that removal and restoration

of the- affected components were accomplished, -that test results conformed

~ with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed

.by personnel'other than the individua1Ldirecting_the test, and that any

deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

resolved by appropriate management personnel. While reviewing the test

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results the inspector noted minor errors in the' calculation of rod inser-

tion time. The inspector then reviewed the same calculations in the

record of the previous test.

Similar errors were noted. The inspector-

discussed these errors with the licensee and verified that.the errors did

not affect the results of the test'.

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

ST 5013.03

Control Rod Program Verification

ST 5030.02

Reactor Protection System Functional Test

ST 5081.01

Diesel Generator Monthly Test

ST 5031.14

Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System

Monthly Test-

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While reviewing the results of the control rod program verification, the

inspector noted that there was no Test Deficiency List attached. Admin-

istrative Procedure AD 1838.02, Performance of Surveillance and Periodic

Tests, requires that a brief summary of any malfunctions be noted on a

Test Deficiency List and that the list be attached to the completed test.

Since several malfunctions had occurred during conduct of the test,

preparation and attachment of a Test Deficiency List was required. The

control rod program verification also requires that the reactor coolant

system (RCS) boron concentration be determined at least once per two hours

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during the verification of the rod program by control rod movement. The

test data sheet (enclosure 12 of ST 5013.03) shows that RCS boron concen-

tration was not verified within the time required on two occasions and the

test data sheet does not include any record of RCS boron concentration

verification during other times when the rod program was being verified by

control rod movement. The failure to prepare a Test Deficiency List and

the inadequate verification of RCS boron concentration are' considered

examples of an item of noncompliance for failure to properly implement

procedures (346/85016-03).

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletin listed below, the inspector verified that the written

response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the

written response included the information required to be reported, that

the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based

on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee'.s response, that

licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appro-

priate onsite' management representatives, that information discussed in

the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action

taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

IEB 83-07, Fraudulent Material Supplied by Ray Miller, Inc.

U.S. Steel

stated that no Ray Miller material was supplied from U.S. Steel.to Toledo

Edison.

Reynolds Aluminum stated that they were unable to determine if

any material from Ray Miller was supplied from Reynolds Aluminum to Toledo

Edison. The licensee researched the material supplied from Reynolds

Aluminum to Toledo Edison and determined that none of the material was for

safety-related application. This bulletin is considered closed.

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

8.

Followup on Operational Event-

On April 17 and May 13, 1985, the licensee observed evidence of water

hammer in the auxiliary feedwater steam supply lines. This water hammer

problem is the subject of Inspection Report 85013 and was also addressed

in a Confirmatory Action Letter on April 26, 1985.

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<0n April 30 and May-1, 1985, the licensee experienced Level 1 Safety

Features'Actuations due to spurious trips of the' Channel 4 containment

radiation monitor.

In each case, a single channel containment radiation

monitor trip was sufficient to cause a Level 1 actuation because the

Channel:1 'contsinment radiation monitor had been declared inoperable and

placed in_the tripped condition on April 30, 1985. All. systems responded-

as expected during each actuation except for one Emergency Core Cooling

System-Room Ventilation Damper (RV 5716). After the April 30 actuation,

NV-5716 was manually-closed and power to it was removed. All other-

affected equipment was restored to normal ~following identification of the

cause of each actuation.

On May 5, 1985, the licensee declared an unusual event when the meteoro-

. logical tower lost electrical power. The normal power supply was lost

when-a breaker tripped due to a ground. The meteorological tower auto-

- matic transfer switch did not-automatically transfer to the backup power-

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supply. 1The unusual event was terminated approximately one hour later

-when_the transfer switch was: manually transferred to the alternate power

supply._ The~ ground was eliminated from the normal power supply and the.

normal _ feeder was energized. When the alternate power supp1v was deener-

gized the _ automatic transfer switch performed its function and ttwnsferred

automatically to the normal power supply.

Following the plant trip on April 24, 1985 the inspector ascertained the

~ status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room

indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant

parameters, emergency' system status and reactor coolant chemistry.

The

inspector verified the establishment- of proper communications and reviewed

the corrective actions taken by the licensee.

All systems responded as expected, except for aut unexplained steam genera-

-tor;10w level trip on one channel of-the Steam and Feedwater Rupture

Control System and an unexplained trip of one. Main Feedwater Pump. The

trip was caused by overly conservative flux-to-flow setpoints'in the

flux / delta flux / flow module of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), an -

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overly conservative calibration of the flux inputs to the RPS and fluctua-

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tions in the reactor coolant flow input _to the RPS. The details of this

trip are discussed in Inspection Report 85009. -After determining the

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cause of the trip the plant was returned to operation on April 25.

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licensee.is restricting reactor power to 90% until the optimum setpoints

for the flux / delta. flux / flow trip are determined.

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'No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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-Meeting with Licensee

On May 2, the NRC met with the licensee in the Region III offices to dis-

cuss an. apparent miscommunication between_the NRC and licensee personnel

on April 1, 1985. On April 1, licensee personnel told the NRC that the

Control Rod Drive Mechanism leadscrew nut assembly leaf springs had been

exercised. The inspector later determined that the exercising had 'not

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been done. On May 2 the licensee presented the results of their investi-

gation of the false statement and their corrective actions. The informa-

tion presented showed that the miscommunication was the unintentional

result of the licensee's poor internal communications. The corrective

actions taken'by the licensee appear to be sufficient to prevent future

communications failures. This item is considered closed.

.No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Regions! hequests

Due to problems experienced at other licensed facilities, the region

requested verification that:

a.

Directives or procedures exist that clearly define "at the controls"

for a reactor or senior reactor operator.

b.

Directivesaor procedures exist implementing the requirement for an

operator or senior operator to be present in the control room at

all times.

The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure AD 1839.00, Station

Operations, and determined that sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 along with the

sketch of enclosure II of the procedure provide adequate direction with

regard to a. and b. above.

Due to a problem experienced at the Byron Nuclear Power Station, the

region requested the inspector determine the:

a.

Installed configuration of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV).

b.

MSIVs' manufacturer.

c.

Methodology utilized by the licensee to demonstrate the operability

of the MSIVs.

This information was compiled and provided to regional management on

April 17, 1985. While compiling the information on the MSIVs (MS100 and

MS101), the inspector discovered an apparent deficiency in the integrated

Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Test, ST5031.18. The

test 'only verifies operability of part of the solenoids and associated

air-system for actuation Channel 1 to MS101 and for actuation Channel 2

to MS100. This item will remain unresolved (346/85016-04) pending review

by NRR.

Due to a seismic qualification problem identified by Commonwealth Edison

Company, regional management requested the inspector to inspect all safety-

related batteries and:

a.

Determine whether the licensee received any notification of this prob-

lem from GNB Batteries, Inc. (GNB).

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b.

If the licensee did receive notification, determine what action was

taken to resolve this issue.

c.

Measure and ensure that the end gap on each end of a rack is between

1/8" to 1/4" maximum.

d.

Measure and ensure that the distance between the rack side stringers

and the battery cells is no greater than 1/4".

The inspector determined that the licensee did not receive any notification

of this problem from GNB. However, they were made aware of the problem

during an inspection by the NRC Vendor Programs Branch. At the time the

inspector inspected the batteries, the licensee had modified their battery

racks in acco~ dance with directions they had received after initiating con-

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tact with GNB. The end gaps on each rack are now all less than 1/4" and

the distance between all rack side stringers and the battery cells is no

greater than 1/4".

Regional management requested that the inspector verify that the safety

evaluation for IEB 80-06, Engineered Safety Features Reset Controls, was

consistent with the licensee's submittal on'the bulletin. The inspector

reviewed the safety evaluation and the licensee's responses to the

bulletin and determined that they were consistent.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11.

Training

The inspector conducted a followup inspection of the training department

with respect to the Performance Appraisal Section (PAS) findings and items

previously identified in Inspection Reports 50-346/84019 and 50-346/85004.

The inspection included a review of training department.and administrative

procedures and interviews with members of the training and maintenance

departments. Of the seven items reviewed, two were ready for closure.

One item is documented in paragraph 2 of this report and the other item

was addressed as follows:

Report 50-346/84-19, Non-Operator Training Observation 1.c.(2) (Closed)

Maintenance personnel were trained on material handling and storage

requirements for nuclear safety-related material in accordance with

Administrative Procedure AD 1847.00, Station Materials Control. The

training was conducted in conjunction with other procedures during

February and March of 1985. Also, job task analyses were completed to

-determine specific training requirements for maintenance personnel.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompli-

ance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are

discussed in paragraphs 4 and 6.

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13.

Exit Interview

The inspector: met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May-10,

1985, and summarized ~the scope and-findings of the inspection activities.

The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the

licensee, the inspectors have-determined there is no proprietary data

contained in this inspection report.

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