ML20128J095
| ML20128J095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1990 |
| From: | Shaw P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128H951 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-330 NUDOCS 9302170321 | |
| Download: ML20128J095 (2) | |
Text
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. March 21, 1990 1 Georgia Power Com>any ATTN: Mr. W. G. Kairston, !!! i Senior Vice President l Nuclear Operations I P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 l Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NRC PERSONNEL ACCESS (DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425) This letter is to provide information concerning access of NRC employees to your facility for the pu pose of conducting an AIT Inspection. The onsite phase of the inspection at Vogtle is scheduled for Herth 22-30, 1990, o
- The Enclosure lists those NRC employees who will be visiting your facility.
For those individuals who have a clearance, we request unescorted access to your vital and protected areas. For those who have no clearance, we reouest escorted access. This does not preclude the granting of a higher level of access, consistent with your approved Security Plan, if you so choose.
'(
- t This letter does not supersede- our previous correspondence dated January 2,1990,
,( regarding NRC personnel access; however, as indicated on the Enclosure, it provides identification of additional individuals who should only be permitted access for the dates specified in the above paragraph.
Should you have any questions concerning this ttatter, we will be happy to discuss them with you. FOR HE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR i. r 9302170321 901020 # PDR FOIA
- LAMBERS */2-330 PDR Peg . how
- Security Officer
Enclosure:
j Access ist ! cc w/ enc 1: R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice l President; Nuclear Operations l C. K. McCoy, Vice President, i Vogtie Project
.G. Fredrick, Site QA Hanager L!
o G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, l(' Vogtle Nuclear Operations J.-P. Kana, Manager, Licensing / Engineering C. Kitchens, Manager, Nuclear Security l
- 0. A. Gelderman, Nuclear Per:onnel Background Investigator
P'6 '* k ' . c 'd sristoseinf i i. March 21, 1990
; ENCLOSURE V0GTLE I This certifies that the persons listed below are employees of the U. S. Nuclear j Regulatory Commission. To the extent of our knowledge, they do not possess !
adverse character traits or indications of aberrant behavior. These employees i have been screened to the national level (insluding a criminal records check); ;
~
no disqualifying offenses were noted. Trustworthiness has been determined ! by a review of his employment records. ! U;, , i Individuals identified by an asterisk have successfully completed the compre- ! hensive training course in radiation protection, emergency response, and [ ' physical security referenced in our letter of January 2,1990, and we request I that you limit further training of those personnel to site specific aspects of *- these areas. Home Clearance NRC Badge No. i f Q ( (ISf*WilliamR.Joneq (' ick Kendall L 55#1 l L QS#:* Warren C. Lvon l ugens A. Tracer, r. L SS#:
*0armon West, Jr- L
_f(SS# A "Q" access authorization is based on a full-field investigation conducted by t l v. the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
-i (FBI) or another U. S. Government agency which conducts personnel security investigations. The other, an "L" access authorization, is based on a Hattonal Agency Check (NAC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.
A "L" access authorization, is based on a National Agency Check (NAC) conducted by the Office of Personnel Hanagement. The above individuals have observed exercises or conducted appraisals at NRC licensed commercial nuclear power plants. I They have demonstrated themselves to be dedicated professionals with no adverse > I' character traits or indications of emotional instability which would impact on their ability to parform their duties in a responsible manner. l
._ . - ~ . - - . -. .. -
V0GTLE ELECTRIC CENERATINO-PLANT STATUS _ CORRECTIVE; ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERQENCY l4~ lcompletedi ;The truck; driver was disciplined for lack' of attention and alertness in: backing the truck when visibility _was
' impaired.
i Hon schedule Although _the Vogtle site safety manual' required the use of flagmen for backing large trucks, --this- requirement had not 3 been-incorporated into site procedures. Airemo has Deen- ' issued to site personnel to ensure understanding -of this = policy and site procedures have beentrevised to-incorporate th':1 requirement. The use of flagmen will be-addedito the; next cycle of General Employee Training.' Security officer training will be revised to emphasize that officers have authority and responsibility to assist vehicle operators-to assure-safe vehicle operation. Specifically, security-escorts vill ensure that ground _ guides (flagmen)-are used-when large vehicles are maneuvered inside the protected area. This security training will-be completed by 6-1-90. Completed Outage Area Coordinators have been instructed to . stage welding machines and other materials on the east and west ends of the Turbine Building, whenever.possible, to avoid - unnecessary equipment and vehicle traffic in the low voltage. switchyard. Completed Maintenance procedures will be revised to restrict staging of equipment in the low voltage switchyard. The procedures will be revised by 6-15-90. Completed Barriers were installed with signs which require 1 authorization from the Unit Shif t _ Supervisor for vehicle access to the low voltage switchyard.' completed Sensitive plant areas have been identified ~and plant procedures have been' revised to-control vehicle access, hazardous materials and transient combustibleA in these areas. Completed The suspected _ switches were' replaced and extensive diesel-generator testing was performed- to ensure operability prior to return to service. Completed Investigation of the suspect. temperature switchesfhas been performed- by an independent- testing laboratory and -a formal-report is expected by 5-18-90. The-investigation revealed that the temperature switches are sensitive to calibration-techniques and foreign material within the switches. Completed Maintenance procedures for temperature' switches.will be revised by 5-15-90 to include lessons learned from < 1aboratory-testing. All-jacket. water high-temperature switches will be cleaned and calibrated using the revised procedure by 5-31-90. Other'non-essential trip temperature switches will be cleaned;and calibrated by the end of the next refueling outage for the associated unit. 1 l J u i
V0OTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIAN'l 1 91hDQ CDEFIC112E hCT19HD. X9R.2113 hB%2L.RKERGZK91 (
- Conpleted Maintenance procedures for temperature switches will be revised by 5-15-90 to include lessons learned from laboratory testing. All jacket water high temperature switches will be cleaned and calibrated using the revised procedure by $~~1-90.
s Other non-essential trip temperature
^~ switches will be c1 caned and calibrated by the end of the next_ refueling outage for_the associated unit.
Completed Vendor failure analysis of a low lube oil pressure switch is expected to be completed by 6-30-90 and results of this analysis will be used to determine if procedure changes c1 caning or re-calibration is necessary for various pres,sure
\ trip switches on the DG.
N___.----.--' _ _ _ . j or schedule The Corporate Haintenance Support Department will review the diesel generator instrumentation. This review will include determining the feasibility of upgrading the existing pneumatic sensors to those of a different manufacturer or replacing portions or all of the entire system with either an electrical or electronic system. Corrective actions or improvements will be made if appropriate. This review, along with an impicmentation schedule, if required, will be completed by 9-1-90. On schedule The Under Voltage (UV) diesel start was changed in both Units 1 and 2 to be similar to a Safety Injection emergency start. This provides a higher dr.Jree of reliability for UV bus conditions. A broader review of diesel start and trip logic, to be completed by 7-31-90, will determine the need for any further changes. On schedule Instructions on the emergency start and restart features of the DG have been provided to operators at shif t briefings and have been incorporated into operating procedures. Additional training will be provided in the normal operator roqualification program by 9-15-90. Completed A policy detailing guidelines for logging pertinent alarms and indications to assist in evsluation of equipment or system malfunctions has been developed and applicable procedures have been revised. 1 on schedule Adeer engine overhauls, functional diesel engine testing u Al be enhanced to include bubble testing to ensure any air logic system leakage is acceptable. Conpleted Trend program data is being reviewed to ensure DG component f ailures are adequately included. The data review will be completed by 6-5-90. Completed The State of Georgia and Burke County have been added to the backup ENN circuit. i L
VSGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT EIAIyj QORRECTIVE ACTIONS FoR sI7E AREA EMEEEENCY , Completed The General Manager has issued memos to the plant staf f to ensure proper understanding of:
- 1. Assembly and Accountability procedures
- 2. ENN Communications procedures on schedule Battery backup power will 6: orovided to the primary ENN in the control room by 9-1-90.
Completed An evaluation will be performed to review and recommend further improvements in notification systems. This evaluation will be completed by 6-1-90 on schedule A memo to all Emergency Directors (EDs) has been issued explaining the communications duties and responsibilities of EDs. The Manager Operations and the Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness will conduct further training for all EDs to review the role and responsibilities of the ED including lessons learned from this event by 8-1-90. On schedule Control room communicators and EDs have been informed by memorandum that there are alternative means of making notifications in the event of a failure of the primary ENN circuit. These alternative means are the backup ERN circuit, now extended to include all agencies, or the ENN in the TSC which has a different power supply. Control room communicators and EDs will receive additional training in the operation of and power supplies for emergency communication equipment by 8-1-90. Completed The Emergency Preparedness group will establish a monthly test program to validate Emergency Response Facility (ERF) computer data by 6-15-90. On schedule The Corporate ERO will be added to the ENN by 7-15-90 to provide another means of ensuring the transmittal of accurate information to the Corporate Office during emergancies. Completed The Corporate ERO will be re-trained in the use of available communication systems to talk with the site by 6-15-90. Completed A full-scale assembly and accountability drill will be performed by 6-15-90. Completed A full-scale assembly and accountability drill will be included as a periodic caergency plan objective. Procedure 91602 C, " Emergency Drills and Exercises", will be changed by 8-1-90 to reflect this commitment. On schedule Changes to Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the Emergency Plan will be requested f rom the NRC based on NUMARC's EAL report presently under review by the NRC.
. VoGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT , gg3prCTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY on schedule The Abnormal operating Procedure covering loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) will be revised by 7-1-90 to include various Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and containment conditions present during either an outage or a boss of of f site Power (LOSP) event.
- 1. A loss of power condition will be specifically addressed in the procedure.
- 2. The time-to-boil curves will be adjueted to address a i 100 degree F starting point for accidents.
Completed An evaluation will be performed for systenLlineups_and power sources during planning'for Unit outages. In addition, we will continue to monitor the industry issue of loss of AC power during shutdown modes and will take appropriate actions in response to regulatory initiatives arising from this issue. On schedule A study of alternate means of feeding ESF busses has been performed and is being reviewed by management. Initial review of this study indicates:that a viable alternate power source is available by backfeeding using the main power transformer and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. This review will be completed by 6-15-90. :As appropriate, procedures will be revised by 8-31-90. A copy.of this' report will be available at the site for NRC review, on schedule A study of alternate sources of cooling water to mitigate a loss of RHR during reduced RCS: inventory operation had been performed and included in site procedures prior to this refueling outage. An additional _ study' of alternate sources of cooling water during a loss- of all AC power event while-at reduced RCS inventory' vill inn performed by 8-1-90. Any ,_ appropriate procedure changes will be implemented; prior to l- the next refueling outage.- Completed A means of closing the equipment hatch without electrical-power will~be evaluated by the next refueling outage. , on schedule Senior Reactor Operators will receive training on reduced L inventory boiling and cooling mechanisms'during the requalification cycle which will be completed by 9-15-90. i t L i
VOOTLE ELECTRIC OENERATING PLANT gIATyg CORRECTIVE _ AQIJpNS FOR SITI_AREh_EMIEQENs1 , completed vendor f ailure analysis of a low lube oil pressure switch is expected to be completed by 6-30-90 and results of this analysis will be used to determine if procedure changes, cleaning or re-calibration is necessary for various pressure trip switches on the DG. On schedule The Corporate Maintenance Support Department will review the diesel generator instrumentation. This review will include determining the feasibility of upgrading the existing pneumatic sensors to those of a different manufacturer or replacing portions or all of the entire aya. tem with either an electrical or electronic system. Corrective actions or improvements will be made if appropriate. This review, along with an implementation schedule, if required, will to completed by 9-1-90. on schedule The Under Voltage (UV) diesel start was changed in both Units 1 and 2 to be similar to a safety Injection emergency start. This provides a higher degree of reliability for UV bus conditions. A broader review of diesel start and trip logic, to be completed by 7-31-90, will deternine the need for any further changes. On schedule Instructions on the emergency start and restart features of the DG have been provided to operators at shift briefings and have been incorporated into operating procedures. Additional training will be provided in the normal operator requalification program by 9-15-90. Completed A policy detailing guidelines for logging pertinent alarms and indications to assist in evaluation of equipment or system malfunctions has been developed and applicabic procedures have been revised. On schedule After engine overhauls, functional diesel engine testing will be enhanced to include bubble testing to ensure any air logic system Icakage is acceptable. Completed Trend program data is being reviewed to ensure DG component failures are adequate 2y included. The data review will be completed by 6-5-90. Completed The State of Georgia and Burke County have been added to the backup ENN circuit. Completed The General Manager has issued menos to the plant staf f to ensure proper understanding of:
- 1. Assembly and Accountability procedures
- 2. ENN Communications procedures On schedule Battery backup power will be provided to the primary ENN in the control room by 9-1-90.
.. 4 v;3*; E 5:1E AGEA E f'E P 3 E N C 'y RE3!ON 11 Da5E T E A C Ot': C C ! T ION RACE TEAM MANA3En: 5. Et4E*'En ENS COMMUN!C ATCD M. GH v N CO E' E R3ENCy r.ESPCNSE MANAGER: A. DDL A',D
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NCTE: ALL ?!!'E5 ARE PRESENTE D IN E AS T ERN ST ANDARD TIME - l v ?.? ! E HDDD Notified - SAE Vegtle U-1. Less of Off G1tr P ~ert U-2 Bot h Tr ains Supplied: One Diesel Operable on -! 1015 Downgraded to an ALERT F T 10M States of GA and 50 notifie: 104G U 0 R. C oci a- t Pumps 1 e 3 tbr a:ng: I 5 4 L os,s 4 1040 FEb% Notif 2ed 1045 EPA Notit led j l 1255 : Rossdents a- c Pr o,'e: t En gin e e r (a t Ha tc h) dispatched , to the sitet Her b Whatener as c pr en tly on site. t
;04b 00 Notif tec JC tJ. F oll ow - u p with rEMA ;
J MSC Breaker es!! net c los e en Rei,er,e B T r a n s f or rwr i - ! Efierts c on t rnue to restore e f t - t-it e - pcwo r v:a 5 , Tr an 51 or mer. i1CC HDI and RHR COnl ang . Av ailatale, i
.10 5 ---- NRC Region 11 enters Stohobs acce. ,
- 100 GEMA Nottfied - F o!!ca-up -
s 11C - 1st wave of c ite te a.* or gani;c c - L. Reye s, C. T es t a, , - R. Alello. L. T rocane, L B-ock ian. M. ' Clark. l - D. Star & ev + l 411E . Follow-up . with FEMA t 114 Follow-up wit h DOE
;11e - F oll ow - u p .- w a t h EPA
-111 6 - .1EC evaluating . actio to rector e power. +
3 12C- HDJ. GLO not active
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Note:, Urc i man, a-d irsta departe: f?Il 'cr s, it e 4GDA and Deccoman't PO4: - Ap p r o < im a t el ,' 180 c :les Site S cr c u r a b a d v ise d re g ar d:r g ces;o,mert and EA of
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[ V0GTLE CRITIQUE ITEMS FAVORABLE ASPECTS OF RESPONSE I Excellent ef fort by all personnel responding. Good communications were exhibited by Team members. OP.MA/ travel support was comendable. Team was dispatched quickly with orders, money, etc... Other resources were also on stand-by. ! Performance of Status Board plotter was excellent considering not a planned l response. 1 ITEMS FOR IMPROVEMENT Coment Resolution Declaration of Response modes should ERC will announce over IRC paging be better comunicated to staf f system, members. Should announce Fireside imediately Any individual receiving an upon receipt of notification. Alert or above notification should call Fireside. Regional management will evaluate appropriate response after going to IRC. Did not have message centers for Ordered - Received /sent back phones. for different model. Headquarters had problems with followup with a HQ bridges. (includingLicensee) Memo stating observed problems. Reduce noise in BTH room and other Address in training. Consider support rooms. cone of silence for conrunicators. Will address in reconfiguration of center. New headset for FNS Comunicator. Have ordered two-ear noise reduction set 3/22/90, with mute capability. Mute attachments also ordered for HPN, PMCL and RSCL Comunicators. ERC should reduce number people in Agree. Some was done but not center early on, enough. Include in training. Post listing primaries and alternates Primaries should know who they outside IRC so people know whether are, not necessary, they should enter. r
2 Coment Resolution , IR vehicle not in ready condittor. DRMA to track and maintain. (gas, cleanliness, operability) Consider keeping in building cage or removing lights and putting in garage. Prior to departure of Site Team Add to Resource Manager must have all vehicle information briefing for Team prior to for access. dispatch, coordinate with SGM. Regional staff and Resident offices Not a priority. Will post not involved in the event should be status sumaries outside IRC, updated periodically. but Residents will have to wait. If Residents to be informed, projects can do. Step-by-step instructions for phone Simplified Merlin instructions usage. are easy and better than-any secondary written instructions. Add soluble markers to location of Being done with Velcro plastic boards, bags. Need turnover briefing for replacement Agree. Address in training, personnel. Need better availability of licensee Agree. Should be incorporated telephone numbers directly to TSC, EOF, in IRC Supplement. Do not take etc... numbers cut of site books. Post in IRC and incorporate into Plan. More telephone training (Established Will conduct hands-on training HPN and RSCL on wrong lines). (notlecture)overthenextfew weeks. Communicator training in progress. PMM phone should have ENS. Remove ENS from SGM and give to PMM (limited as to the number of phones it can be on). Have A/C in IRC evaluated for Agree, adequacy. Make sure times used are consistent ERC announce over PA; Address EST or CST. in training. Use licensee time. IRC " busy" calls and console problems. Rollovers were incorrect. Resolved 3/23 with phone company - Fixed; Not actually all busy. l t
4 C 3 Coment Resolution Brief onsite inspectors on role during Emphasize in Rad Con Training, emergency. Why was licensee Emergency Director OK by Vogtle procedures, can be in CR? either place. Additional space / organization Agree. Working on during review needed for PMT/ bulletin boards of IRC configuration. Need copies of data sheets for PMT Will do, out of PM Manual. Typing support for Public Affairs See later coment on IRC support. Periodically verify status of IRC We do; however had not yet computers, relocated floppy PC and replaced with Compaq - completed 3/21/90 A small inventory of toiletry Agree. Will order, items should be added to Site Team kits. Fireside announcement not audible DRMA having all PA boxes checked, throughout office. In progress, fed / State telephone listing should Just updated 11/89-be updated. (EPA, GEMA numbers will do promptly, incorrect) , Georgia did not receive initial llT concern, notification from licensee in timely manner. 2 Fax machines (one incomirg and one Will order, outgoing) ENS infonnation was not current. Conduct meeting with licensee's Most current data was obtained to discuss NRC requirements through licensee management. for response (resources, data, personnel, space) Need Reactor Safety "Think Tank" to Will implement. -To be located address long-tenn and what-if outside the IRC with speaker-detenninations, phone. Reactor Safety Team should be better Will do. Requires update organized to include a Team leader of emergency roster, supported by technical specialists.
< 4 Comment Resolution 0 Keep Reactor-Safety Status Board fill out boards completely. Will up-to-date. Data related to power incorporate into training. was current by other system status was notposted(ECCS) Add a permanent position of status Will be added, board plotter. Declaration of Standby delayed Regional Management decision-based upon briefing by licensee. (transformeroperability) Methodology for assessing consequences Write Headquarters for support, fromaccidentsatshutdown(open) units Methods for assessing consequences Write Headquarters for support, beyond 24-hours-source term. Reactor Safety Team did not use Increase training. communications fonns for questions to be addressed on the ENS, Need full time operator for telephone. Yes. Will incorporate. Need increased training on E-mail use. Monthly training recently initiated. If-needed, more will be provided. Needs management support to ensure attendance. Need more incident Response Support Consider adding two more personnel (typing, support to EPAs and another ERC. technicalteams, telephones,etc...).
LltilHLDLIMillCATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE THO-IIT-90-02 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notification of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received wist.out verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the incident investigation team on this date. FACILITY; Georgia Power Company Licensee Emergency Classification: Vogtle Unit i Hotification of Unusual Event. Docket No. 50-424 Alert Waynesboro, GA Site Area Emergency General Emergency _.XX.Not Applicable SUIk1ECT: INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVES AT V0GTLE SITE An Incident Investigation Team (llT) is at the Vogtle si.e to investigate the event of March 20, 1990, which resulted in a Site Area: Emergency when Unit 1 lost offsite and onsite AC power to both vital busses. An Augmented Inslection Team (AIT) has teen at the site since March 22, 1990. However, due to the numter of past incidents which have occurred at plants while in shutdown conditions and the rotential for regulatory concerns, the agency has decided this most recent event, at Vogtle, warrants the more formal and detailed review of an 11T.
' team is compceed of members from AEOD, NRR, Region I, and Region V. Under provisions of a Memorandum of Agreement with the Inst.itute of Nuclear Power vperations (INPO), there is also industry participation on the team.
Currently, Unit 2 is operating at full power; Unit 1 is in Mode 5. This information is current as of 8:00 a.m., March 26, 1990. CONTACT: A. Chaffee - 404/554-9901 & W. Lazarus - 404-554-9902 DISTRIBUTION: One White M' land Nat'l Flint North Rank Bldg Regiona MAIL 'ID: .DCS (Original IE34) Chairman Carr IRM Region I D0ff (Trans. Only) Comm. Roberts OlG Region 11 Comm. Rogere AEOD Region III FA1.10: INPO Comm. Curtie NRC Ops Ctr Region IV LICENSEE (Corp) Comm. Remick Region V Ril Resident 000 OCA Nicholson IAne Phillips Blds GPA/SLIIP/PA RES ACRS EDO NRR TS L_itreet EW qus!OW% Ql u
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l V0 GILE AIT Charter Item 7 "Lvaluate the performance of the control room operators and other ley plant perhonnel who responded to the event, to include at least RCS heatup and a potential containment challenges. Conduct interviews as necessary to ascertain l both firenoths and wealnesses, on personnel training adecuacy of procedures, s.anagement cc,ntrol and c.on,munications during th& event.* Progress: 3-02-90 Made arrangeeents to interview the operations personnel that were involved in the event. These included the control room operators and shift supervisor present in the control room, the unit supervisors and shift superintendent, and other shift supervisors who were present because of the ongoing outage worl. and that tool. part in the event. We stated our need to speal; with licensee personnel (1) who were responsible for maintenance work prior to and during the event and (2) who were responsible for training, particularly in loss of power and loss of RHR e, vents. Inspected the switchyard location where the iuol truc6 collided with the power line support. Intpected the unit 1 " A diesel generator room. 3-00 Insrected the control room and anttronentetter, used during the event. Conducted interviews of the followina Itcensee personnel D.F;. Vineyard - S5 t'utagt' t.u t po r t P.A.-Humphrey - 140F con trol room operator L.P. Hannier - Reactor operator R.D. Snider - Unit shift supervisor L.A. Johns - Extra CR0 (CR">0 communications) 0.k. Acree - Sh2ft supe inr toutace support) . L.h. Popt - " " " " L. beloach - Plant equipment operator (daesel generator)
- 5. Whitman - " " " " "
J.P. Cash - Operations superintendent /TSC W.L. Burmeister - * * " J.D. Hopkins - Senior SRO (shift superintendent) Inspected the unit 1 " A" diesel generator room with the two PE0's that t.a< been interviewed. i f - i
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i 4.2.5 Clean, che,'r. and lubticit' '" *'r" M % belt !
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. CAUTIOS , ,
T he r.h f ar / r,ut de i ubt ? Si " d 'N P t h e :;;e.hi n e d g s. e k e t *.euling , r,i;r f ace s and the r uawable .mva- , any dur.gn the gaAett. , 4.3.1 Carefulle 1cu r t h e e
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n h e r.r / gt.1 c e lups are rm vided !n A %iJt i n al s p.n ent at:d finul poti t i c.nins 4.3.2 $ 4! 16 ',. t f e t. r II, C '/
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i 4.3.3 Tighten the r.otc <.r. the i : .;t 'e rw:! *.1 vo"il Sw gasker p). *'* sealing t,urfr: :. .i ti.e .m : v ;. ; I 4 t "J.: c t :tr ty the g a F h t/ t . 4.3.4 Sk'iitt, ths Tet...ltn g Eye M % i ut J4 thClr ?+r.,v;t.ive DC11 chairf., *M. I s'* AbrC thJ S pl.iM ' dI We , ' 1* v
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in$erted DUlWF t.'n t h6 T.C t .lud the D *T l t; s ! a '.* 1 ' 4.3.5 Run all nu:c dov1 ifant . ieht. + CAUT?ON Over f:gh wnin.7, nur:. : ore than T eQU 1' e d f o r Ord i!181 */ f u !.U d *. w r e nch ; n y, :..e t h A r ruiy w.w; - da:ng e. . 4.3.6 Tighten all nut, on tquente ch:. n t r4:em 1) . hepeat sequence until hatch ce aling surf ace w.h e t. rats.1 to tnetal contact vith the barrel flange. 1 4.3.7 Verify double .wal :.a pri. start tocred. i
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i 4.3.8 Notify Shift Super /iser 1.ha; x;uired ts.fr.tr.rance is
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' sActfCLRttio. W4 CN sgt e 3 cf 8 VIGP 27505 C 2 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITrilA f 5.1 Maintenance pe:1er:ned uttrg this procedure !s acceptable when: f l 5.1.1 The " Con.pletion" Sheet is preperly filled cut.
i j! 5.1.2 Deviations fiu h the Procedure data and racoteer.ded . l settin30 have'been reviewed en a case-by-rar.e basis j. '. e with the Mainton.ince Foretnan. ; i S.I.3 Daviations have been identified in the "Cccewnts" .'! section of the "Cer.ipletion" Sheet . . 5.1.4 Tha " completion" Sheet 1.an been apprc.ved. ]
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5.1.5 Maintenance Ucrk Ordesc have been written ard v.ubmitted for conditionn evaluated as needf."g attenti ,
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 AX2AG07-38 " Ab selute l'ressure Te r.: Frc.cedure Leuble Seal Interepacew" 6.2 AX2A007-210 "Equipennt llatch Opercitien and ,
!!aintenance Mnnuut". e, 6.3 PROCEDURES ,j l
4 6.3.1 25250-C, " General T iggir.1; Ard Lif ting" 6.3.2 20427-C, " Maintenance Cleanliness And timehcoping Control" li EMD OF FROCEDUP.E TEXT l ( m i i i i s c . .
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/ C0!!PI.C~ ION SHELT
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[l54ffICE~fe [] Hon.su ty Relat ed
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u PROCEDURE 14AiliT. HDID QC STEP pr.5CRIPTIGN ltnT/DATh G;C i L I_!4T INIT/DATP, es/l'o) ~ dl5 { , f s 4.1.1 Verify all prerequisitos e,et __/ _ , _ _ _ _ .
/ __ y iI g 4.1.2 tiotify Shift Supervisvr __ . _ l_ _ _. !_ .,
4.2.1 Check sealing surfaces / _. __ / _ j 4.2.2 Check thriads of nuts and bo1Lu _/ . . . . . _. _. 1._ ,! 4.2.3 Check tuting surfaceo / / ;' 4.2.4 Check gaskets / / 4.2.5 Check bolts _ _ _
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4.3.3 Tightening St.'yence / _ _._
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4.3.7 Proseure Test _ _/ . . _ _ _ _ _ . l _, 4.3.8 Notify Shift Supervisor / __. / ! ? l l i h
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9 i y e WOht.ShEE T FOR T ECHht]L AL WLCIFIC ATIONS AND 011IER REGUL AIOkY REQUlhtif1CN1 S (C on t e nt s 4.0. IO.f4. 600. Hd (9.11 Whi.le T5n f or power operations at nuclear power plant s have been suonort ed by ext encive rvaf ety ennly ses,1 Ss f or nonpower operation wor e prinvil; based on enganosering Judaemont, but on 12;htte d n e toty anelvso% Df primary concern are operations involving reduced RCS mvontory. Specif ic all y, thoro ero etsent2 ally no safety analyses to support equipment con f Aourat ions (e.o.. r r dotud RCS Anventory, open FD, sy stems newcod to l supply mal e-up woter) encountered when operating wit h reduced coolant l Anventory. I ( 4.1 ) Lc+1 of FHk5 events have occurred that were there severe than the Meren . 0.1- 90 o vent + t Vootle. Several of them anvolved the bodmo cf FC6 coolent. wsth the pinntv beving e limited c Acabillty tor oltrarnnto tore ccolino and havino on open RD. Such events may requve a quick reconnue
? o a mad or a.it sac t u tevere cont-Onuences. Situs t 2nns encountered during r
erhic< un nr
- or s enoratten arra not Lounded by postulat ed ovonts during pr we ry a .c M on bocau t r t Se cond2 t2onr. re t reducedinventnry, particul Art s WRh tr.o wa mr low 1 at mie-leop. are unique and involve both thenomerm and pl . a c' n1Jourationc that er e not encounter ed during power opor et son.
P.1 t F i r n *. pernt nnul mus t perterm oetennive 2nnpections. an. Wol! .20 ' mmtr t r n anc o rc sult int? t r Om t he inspec*:lons, during ou t>ges t o compl" wa t h T E sur , eW snce repuaroment s Mt 9t.tno these TS roquirementis recuirea thc4 %us.vunt be out of ser ate dur2ng an outege and of ten est enon the c u t.a us . E uch + 6 req > ttrement s a t Vogtle anclude inservico. SG and EDO 1.f Q P r 3 it .n r., f 4 !! It appeor . tist t he conoral desion craterie, pert icular b iho Dinnlta
+ 3ikirv critorion. have not been- generally appl 19d to operation . in cold chutdown and ref ueling modes. '
(9.2. 0 Vontle TM require tnat the RCS coolant level must be abom fuel and control rods that are being moved. T hu only TS restrjction on RCS wat er level is based on fuel movoment. (9.2.2) In Modes 1,2. 3, and 4, TSn require two ocurces of water (bor:c scad storage t +nt and RWST) be operi ble in Modes 5 and 6, only ono is roquared. a In addition, the allowable levels in these tanks ar e subt tient ially lower an Modes 5 and 6 than in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. (9.2.2) At Vogtle, it is possible to add water to the RCS usino gravity fill
- r. fer.m the RWST if it contains a suf ficient volume. Gravity fill is not possible using the boric acid storage tant because it is at a lower elevation. This j crrpsbility may be needed if additional w:.ter as required and electrjcol power l
1s lost. -The Vootle TSs do not distino. ulsh between these water sources l (9.2.2) Only one train of charging is requ2 red in Modes S and 6. while both traans are require-j in Moden 1. 2. 3. and 4. (- L , r l
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3 e e I (9.2.2) In Modas 4. % eno 6 with the head on the Ev. all the 51 pumes e.*e 1 required to have their pump motor circuit breM ers ra ci ed out to protect egeinst overpressurirang the RV while the RCS is at low temperaturtes. However, doing no partially eliniinetos one additional s ource of RR9 wat or. 1 If the rest of the 91 system is operable, which TSs do not rtrovire. the systom , l could be returned to survice within 5 to 10 minutes,- a period probably adequote to compensate f or e lot:S of t hn RHRSn. l (9.2.2) The capabilit~ to edd water from the sources and paths required ' in Modeo 5 and 6 is ler,n t hon the t r equjred an Modes 1,2,1, and 4. In addition. TSn do not rocognize tne unique conditions that emnt during reduced ir.vontory operations. The T S requirements f or coolait makeup sourct-n c'o not dif f erentietc between Mode 5 and 6 with the RCS fillod, and Mode S
+nd 6 wit h reduced inventory.
F'.2.3J Tho T S prohibition eo nnut moving f uel f or.100 hou-s af ter shutdown p lo c or ric r e v e;.ct lon e n re auc ano t hn RCS wa t nr inventor y imme d16tel y rf ter r,hutdnwn. Vogtle ho c no T5 rostrictiorn, r ecording pormissible activitio s W o, . r < 'ucnq RCS inmntord bac ed on tho omount of cort
- decay hest.
N2A r The T5s for RCS coolina c2f ter between Modes S end 6 ond within Moden S and e. The dit f orence as ba cod on the RCS water level. For Mode S conditions mt h U c RCE loopt f1jled f et Vogtle this meAns wat er fillino the SG tubes). one RHR5 is required to 60 operable toaother With either the other RHRS or too necendsrv cide cf t wo Sh% which must be at least 17 percent full. r
-.s c easured on wide-r+nGo indicat ton. Vogtle has no TS require nont to -
have water on the seconcery su19 c1 CF-c C*ing recuted 2nventory operation. When the RC5 loops cre not fillert noth RHkSs $re requ2 red to be oporeblo and one: n rendred to be in of er ation. No minimum SHRS flow ratu C6pabilit y H speified f or Mode 5. W. .J A ) In Moda 6, with the water 1cvel at 2". f eet ebove the vessel flanoc. cinv one RHRS is required to be operable with e minimum flow rate of 3000 apm. When the RCS wstor ievelis lower than 23100 t above the ves sel flongo, both RtIR55 must be operable end one must be 2n operation with a minimum flow ret e of 0000 gom. Th2s flow rate is not always required to maintain RCS temperature. The potont tal 1 or RHR pump air binding and the subnequent
- Joss of RHRS capabilst y is 2ncreased by operations at higher then required RHRS flow rates. The action utatements f or loss of RHRS cepat<ility require closure of the RD_ within.4 hout 5. . Vogtle determined that RL closure was necessary-in about I hr for the worst case scenario.
- (9.2.4) The TS requirement to have n 3000-gpm flow rate for RCS cooling-may contribute to RHR pump tavitat ton. A comprehensive evaluetion should ~
be prerf ormed to determine if the bene fit of the 3OOO Opm m2Mmum RHRS flow rate to preclude boron dilution is reasonable'in light of the additionel risA c1 cavitationof RHRpumps and theconsequentlosn of shutdowncooling. There oppear e to be lit.tle basiu f or a tiow rate prescribed for Modo 6 when one is not prescribed ih Mode S. P.2.4) TSs for theRHRSs are the only enos oppliceble t anonpower operation where a distinction is mode within a mode (e.g., RCS level above or below 23 f eet above t' vessel flengeb
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14.2.9 Tb3 do not require HB intearity m Modes 5 and 6 unless coro alt crations or f uel mcvement it in procress . The Tbs do not reouirn Rif tntegrit y durarg reduced swuntory or re1ocod electricel source situations. W.2.N 1 hu M af ety .enalv sis f or e f uel movement incident assunies a vtwitm tm relearo of the f ool-pin cap act ivity f rom two f uel assornblics. Thu conzncuencet et a f uel tundling incident are significantly less than thoten t heat could occur if shutdown coelina worn lost and not recovered. The 15s f or f uel movement are inconnistrint with those f or reduced inventory-- ope rot tora. P.T .61 T5s of fectivelv rwJulre ono-half of the electrical sources and trains of einctrital equipment t a be in service durino Modes S and 6 compared with ; those rece ared durino Moder 1. 2.1 a-d 4. In 1oct, were it not f or TS ~;.9.8.?. wh?.ch reautres that bo+h RHRB2 be operable in Mode 6 when water Invol 19 les s Nn 2'; teet above the vessel flance. Saf ety bus li also could have toenremo ed f rott,9ervico telong with tho D EDG). T5 olectrical distribution re quire.n mt : co not dif fr=rc-nttaf 0 between the various configurations within 9 t mmc e " and 6 %% RCE 1rnel or RD integrity). N.,,:.u &ie 1 % circumr t ance af f ectino the situation at Vogtlo on March 20 ;
;m m merits special riote. UniJe the ID RAT could have been returned to s er cico r.arlser t han was the car,e. 2t was not returned to servien because nv a. c *. tor w:uld hr.ve recu3 red tM ira the B sa f ety bus out of twrvico ;
whde the b R..T wat r eturned t o ser vice. T his switch would have requar od ,
- s. < l ut:t e , e ne r' int o o 15 ac tion statement batause one RHRS would havo-bm c.ut of u rvice wh00 the bus wss doenergtred. Vogt le s evaluation 'l u* Pho a tt uelion re sultud in the der.1.lonto not return the D RAT to nervice.
Thu was becautm the plant etat f bulleved that the confiourationwith both ' M OS ; poweroo from the A RAT was incre prudent thsh the &ction of tning Ono train out of 3grvice end returnino the D RM to service. Thu% an existing
- 15 contributed to inh.ibitmq a potential prudent action.
}
W.T.6) Wit h the 03ngle evec ptien of the requirement t hat two kHNSn be operable m Mode 6 when the water level is less than M feet above the vessel flance, the Vogtle TSs do not consider special= situations (e,0.. reduced
- RCS wat er invento"y. the PCB tr.tcarity, or the Rit being open). In oddatlon, the interrelationships of s afotr *yston.s (electrical distribution. RD, and -
hHk9n t ovther with RCS Inventory and decay host level, are not considered in TSs. Additionolly, within the Vogtle TSn. Anconsistencies apparently nunt. (C.2.6) At Vogtle, the plant outage planning staf f relied upon a combination of the TSs and their orpurience and .)udomont to' designato the equipment .
- that should be available du-ing' the outage. However, during reduced
-Inventerv operations, absent other restrictions. TSs f or nonpower operations would not onsure prudent equipment availability. In addition, the Vogtle:
staf f places.e bioh reliance on its TSs by commonly referencing TSs in both , procedures and trainino. (9.2.6) T5s for nonpower operations and. in particular. for reduced wnter inv en tory opera tion. ha ve been dev elopedwith littlo consider a tion ot their analy t ical or saf ety banis.. TS requirement s for Modes 5 and 6 may be ' adequate for many nonpower: situations. However. there are special'
, nituetions, such et operation at redubed invente.Py. where greater protection - j
- nn be worranted.
T * **JP*TT 'M*T'*r t+eAyq pew a wqy y ryg,FTe-9$ W ^9'-L9'T#"' gP F =*'F4r se' e U eP'T T -P9 er9"DrWet-**TF-*as'9- tp'uf e er wm v*1rPsw1'- - P m"1T"#"*""FM"'N-'"T'E '""
s (9.16) The imposition of ad:fitional TE requiremontu is not necesserily tho appropraete method for dec r ee s ing vulnerobilities ' during nonpowrer cpurations The diverso situations encountered during such operations would be dit ficult to fully control solely using TSO Flonibility is needed dwing en outage because of the required surveillanco end maintenance activitie s on various systems and componento During en outege. vulnerability end risk should be managed by considering coro decey heet le vel.RC S inv ent or y.fiCS tot egrit y, elec tric el dis t ribu t inn (including E DGsi. and RB integrity. (9.3) The ' Black out Rulei 10 CFR SO.63. is intended to achieve en eccepteblo level of plent susceptibility to blackout. The blect out rule does not consider shutcown conditionL Thu Vogtle event and other similar ovents would not heve been effected by implementaten ectivities associated with the blockout ; rule. Thu% the blec6 out rule should not be easumed to preclude the Vogtle-event or similar eventr occurring during nonpower opera tion. T ho rale oces + not addreFr the matter et how mony sourenn con bo removied f rom no vice. l f or ett her e t -poo r or shutdown operations. It would appear that T Bs would be a logical Imi between the process req tired by 10 CFR SO.65 to achieve ; therequiredlevelot duscept ibility endthe ellowableconfigurat2ons auring ; shutdown. (IO.8.1) TSs whichcontr olnenpower epera tion % e specially reduced mvtmtor y = cceNtzn. have been developed with 11ttic onalysis or safety consideration. l Situations encountered d;rina power operation do nnt bound situatanns that cculd occur dur2ng reduced inv enterv operation. Generelly. - noo19-f allure criteria have not been app 12ed to shutdown and Opere tiono (10.8. 2) In general, t he 2nterruletionbhips of 2mportant systems are not [ cons tdorod in T5m With t he occEntton of the RHRS% TS ellowAble ccnditiona ; f or bystemu (elect r2tal cources und dis tribut jon. the bD) do not recognue -. p vulnerabilities allowed by the status of other systurn. Or those created by RCS integrity, RCS water inventory, or decay heat generation rete. conditions TS limiting conditions f or operetion do not preclude incrosses l In vulnerebility during certain pheuen of nonpower operetiono .. l (10.8.3) TSs do not require RB 2nteurity during cold shutdown end refueling '! operationk unless core alt eretionn ere in progreus. They do not requaru ' RD integrity during raduced inventory or with reduced electrical sourcem , I l- - (10.8.4) T5s of fectively require only one-helf of the electricel sources ' ' and trains of electrical eQumment to be,in service during Modes S end 6! j compared with those required during Modes 1. h 3, and 4. They tio not require : Odditional electrical sources during reduced 2nventory operetion. . " w . . f (10.8.5) The eyebility to add water to the RCS is reduced in Modes 5'and 6 relative to Modes 1. L 3i; and 4 TSs do not recogni:'e increased h vulnerebilities end the possible increesedneed to add water duringreduced ' inventory opd *ation.
'3 (10.8.6) T59 do not impose e required shutdown period or other If.mit (decay
- j .-
s heat level) before reduced inventory operations mey be conducted. ; 4 (~ s l (> _m l _.. _
. m. +,. .. .. - _ ._ ... .~ _,___,..a,... .;_.._ _ w a- - i a ._ a
d (10.C 7) Requarements f or RHR5 ope rabilsty end flow rete very based on RCS water level and mode. These are the only nonpower TSs which vary with2n mode. However, they may 2ncrease the potentaal f or RHR pump cavitation by requiring a minimum RHR pump flow rate which may be unnecessarily high. (H1.3) LCO 3.b.~ 2 in Modes 4, 5 and 6 with the head on requires that all SI pumps be inoperable. T he requirement to rack out the pump motor circuit breal ers would delay use of there pumps f or water eddition to the RCS for 5 to 10 minutes. (H2) LCO 3.9.3 requires that fuel not be moved until the reactor has been subcritical1or 100 hours. It does not specif y a time limit bef ore operation at reduced inventory. (H2) LCO .4.1.4.2 2n Mode 5 with t he RCS loops not filled requires that two RHRSs be operable and that one RHR$ be in operation. This TS does not 2mpose e lower limit on RHRS flow as does the TS for Mode 6. (H2) LCO ..Q.0.12n Mode 6 with water level 23 f t or more above the vessel flange requves that one RHRS must be operable and in operation wit h an EHR flow c f 2000 opm or greater. If not, then RB must be closed within 4 hours. (H2) LCD 3.9.O.2 2n Mcde 6 with the RCS water level less that 23 f t above the vessel flance requires both RHRSs be operable with one providing a flow of g eater than or equal to 7000 gpm. The action statement requires increas2ng water level and (if no RHRSs) closing the RD within 4 hours. (H3) L C Oc 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.5, 3.6.1.7, 3.6.2.1, 7.6.2.3, 3.6.3, 3.6.4.1, and 3.6.4.2 indic a te th a t tho f ollowinq RD-rela ted components are not requ ired in Modes 5 and 6 with a f ew except2ons durina fuel movement or core alterat2ons: primary RD 2ntegrity, upper limit mn RB temperature, operabtlity of the RD purge and exhaust 2 solation valve, RB spray system, RB cooling f ans, RD isola tion valves, PB hy drogen monitors, and bydrcgen re:ombiner uystoms. (H4) LCO 3.8.1.12n Modes 1,2, 3, and 4, requires (1) t wo phy sically independent circuits bet ween the of f site transmiss2cn grid and the onsite safety - electr ical distributaon system end (2) that both EDGs be operable. (H4) LCO 3.8.1.2 2n Modes 5 and 6, requ tres (1) only one circuit between the of f site trantmission orld and t he onsite safety electrical distribution system and (2) only one EDG be operable. The action statement requires suspensionof core alterations,positivereactivity changen, andmovement of wradiated fuel or crane operation over fuel. If operating with loops not filled or with the water level less than 23 f eet above the top of the vessel flange, corrective action to restore electrical sources must be undertaken. Low temperature overpressure protection of TS 3.4.9.3 is provided. (H4) LCO 3.8.3.1 in Modes 1,2,3, and 4. requires that both trains of the 4160-volt safety buses, both trains of the 120-volt instrument buses, and boV trains of dc supplies be operable. j
.. , - . - .- -- -, . . ~ . - . - - - - . . . - - - - - ~ . . . ~ - . -
i a 7 ,
. h (H4) LCD 3.9.3.!' in Mode 3 S And 6. requ2rs s that oniv:one train of each of l the setety electrac31 systems in uCO 3.G.3.1 be operable. The action statement -
requires suspension of core alterations. positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated f uel andinitie t2on of corrective action to restore electrical power. Low tiemperature overpressure protection of TS 3.4.9.3 is required to be provided. , 5 (HO LCO 3.G.O.1 in Modes 1. 2. 3. and 4, requires that four de electrical sources be operable. y (H4) LCO 3.6.2.2 in Modes 5 and 6. requires that only' two of four battsery bonts be operable. The action statement requires suspension of corel alterations positive reottivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel- ; and initiation of correctiva action to restore electrical power. Low-tempereture overprensure protection of TS 3.4.9.3 is required to be provided. g (HS.) LCO 3.1.1.2 requires that the shutdown margan for' Modes 3,4, and S must ce greater than or equal to specific values. (HS) LCO 3.9.1 in Mode 6 requ2res + he t the RCS mu st meet the more rettrictive - of E, ,, of 0.95 or less, or toran concentration of 2000 ppm or greater. (PS) LCO 3.4.2.21n Modes 1. 2. and 3 requires that all pressurarer code saf et y volvss be coerable, m5) L 00 3.4.2.1 m Modes 4 and S requir es that one pressurimer code saf ety - valve be operable, (H5) LCO 3.4,4 2n Modes 4. S. and 6 indicates that'thc pressur2:cr power operatea relief valv,es (PORVs) need not be operable, ,
- (HS) LCC 3.4.9.3.in Modes 4, S. pod 6 with the vessel head on requires that ,
. low t emperature ov erpre s sure protection sy stems be in place. (PDFNs. RHRS suct2on relief valves, or RCS depressurl:ed with vent.)
(HS) LCO 3.4.11 in Modes 5 end 6 indicates that the head vent' system is not required. (HS) LCO 3.3.3.5.1 in Modes 4. S, and 6 does not require that the remote: shutdown system be operable. 7 (H5) LCO 3.9.2 in Mode 6 requ2res that two source range neutron flux monitors be operable.
. (HS) LCO 3.1.3.3 requ2res that one digital rod position system be operable in Modes 3. 4, and S when the reactor trip breaker <a are closed.
(HS) LCD 3.3.1 requires that the f ollowing trip sy stems be in service during nonpower operations whenrods are capable of being withdrawns source range - neutron flux trip, trip breaf ers, 'and bypass trip breakers. l l lb ?. ~
. = -
i
. 2 6.1.1 Activities Involving the EDO PAGE 5-1 What is the-licensee doing to. change the philosophy-to automatically acknowledge: and reset spurious- and nuisance alarms before identifying the cause of the:
alarm? , 5.1.1 Activities Involving the 1DX3 .i PAGE 5-1 The operators have a tendency to clear the. alarm , conditions prior to recording what alarms occurred. What is the licensee doing to change this philosophy? 5.1.2 Design of Annunciator Panel & Controls PAGE 5-5 Several_ factors prevented the operators from-identifying the cause of the EDG trip: Operators reacted to quickly-to the annunciators - resulting in failure to identify what tripped.the EDG Operators were not aware of=the "first out" ,. feature
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6,1,2 Design of Annunciator-Panel-4 Controls-PAGE 5-5
~
Numerous nuisance. alarms: accompanied each trip. Tests concluded that the "first out" feature- did: not work as intended
-* continued *
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- _ n
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- 8.1,3 Design of-Annunciator Panel 1 0entrels PAGE 5 -
The visual design .of the panels .did not helpi . operators to rapidly 11dentify the cause1of'. thel -- trip Other equipment, design-and procedure deficiencies : were identified Investigate licensee corrective actions. 5.1.3 Analysis 5.1.3.2 First Out Feature PAGE 5-6 The 'first out" feature is-intended t'o identifyf thet
- condition that first shut down the; diesel. However, there are problems in the design of the feature including the flash rate and-the low. pressure jacket-
- +
water alarm.
*. continued *-~ ,
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5.1.3.2 First-Out Feature- , PAGE 5-6 All 46 remaining alarms.that are not.part-of the "first out" group of= 12. flashed. at~the same~ fast rate.
- Therefore the first out" alarm can be masked. - !
-Investigate licensee correctiveLactions.
T 4 # ,--- y =:-sh ge uy-. ,mee g p- p*. m- c4i6 + p$ gy I
Y 6.1.3,3 Nulsance Alarms-
- PAGE 5-9 Verify that operators-are being-trained and that lesson plans are-covering "first out" features.
5.1.3.4 Visual' Design Does Not Help to Identify causes of Trips
- PAGE 5-9 All the EDG annunciator alarms ~in the control room, including the trip alarms,- flash white-(exceptsforione: .
that flashes red and another that flashes' amber) rather'- than flashing red. Most local trip alarms flash red.. except one which' flashes white (which was an- as-F.ilt_ error identified by the team).
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5.1.3,4 Visual Design'Does Not Help to Identify causes of Trips A printout.of trip alarms does not exist to-aid the i operatur to, identify trips' either locallyLorcin :the
-control" room.
Investigate licensee corrective action?- , 5.2 RCS and CB Boundary Protection PAGE 5 : Several problems- werez encountered regarding _the
~ handling of incidents occurring: during Eshutdown-operations. _ They include the' transition from a normal l to- an -emergency organizational structure, communications, procedures-and training. .
Investigate licensee-corrective-actions.
. - . = . _. . . - - . - - .
l 5:E:1- EqulP!steHb Ilatell Ol08HF8188988 PAGE 5-13 Although safety power wen lost during the incident, non safety power was availab4e for polar crane operation. Loss of non safety power would have required manual rigging that would have taken several hours to close the equipment hatch. according to an estimate by the Vogtle staff. Doubts were raised about whether Vogtle's Procedure 27505-C, " Opening and Closing Containment Equipment Hatch" would ensure that the specified time would be met for the worst-case conditions.
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- continued
- 5.2.1 Equipment Hatch closure Immune PAGE 5-13 The inspector forwarded to the GM a suggestion (presented from a rigging mechanic) on how to mechanically close the equipment hatch upon less of all AC power.
What are the licensee's intentions? 5.2.3 Analysis PAGE 5-14 . As a result of poor communications, an unintended action, closure of the PZR manway, and several- delays occurred. Furthermore, the ED in the TSC became aware that the PZR manway was shut and subsequently ordered it-open. He later decided-to leave it shut. What is the licensee doing to resolve this confusion?
1 n 6.3.2. Administrative' Control. Prob 1'ess. ;
- PAGE 5-18 The following items were -identified as 'i mportant contributors to the incident:
No special.' qualifications - and training-'were . required or provided for driving the truck on site. , (in' contrast w\;GA State-reqmts for a-. class al -: license) The individual or Vogtle organization responsible- , for'providing.a ground-guide person was undefined ' by Vogtle policy and procedure.
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- 5.3.2 Administrative Control Problems PAGE 5-18
. Any.needed restrictions on access and/or' movement .
of the truck in the switchyard were not- covered -b:r procedure.- The truck had a -blind spot :that extended -tx): 'over l
-200 feet:behind it~.
The security- officer. thad. no- assigned- - responsibility to ensure that1 adequate-; measures were taken to prevent . truck damage tx) .the-plant. Investigate the status of.the-licensee'sl-corrective; actions? 6 i T
- y r--t t- -
--wa -
t *=+e I
5:4:1 @9408H6FF Operatien PAGE 5-19 During the IITe review of sequencer operations, some procedural and training problems were revealed. Included were the availability of procedures, labeling of panels and the understanding of equipment operations. The sequencer procedure was neither available nor used by the operator who reset the sequencer during the incident.
- continued 4
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- 5.4.1 Bequenoor Operation PAGE 5-19 The procedure should be available at the local sequencer panel for all operatora. Furthermore, trips to the control room to obtain procedures may cause unnecessary delaya.
What action is the licensee taking to address these concerns? 5.5.1.2 Procedures for Hid-Loop Operations and Loss of RHR l PAGE 5-20 , t The IIT identified that there were no proceaures.for ! closing the CB equipment hatch under emergency conditions even though the licensee took actions and were successful. ! Determine if procedures have been generated.
b.6,1.0 EM) Op9 rat 41ng Procodurop PAGE 5-21 Determine if procedure 13145 has been revised such that it describes steps to be taken if the EDG trips (including steps to be taken to diagnose the problem), data to be examined and recorded, and conditions for initiating an emergency start or an emergency reset. Furthermore, it did not stress the importance of the "first alert" feature in identifying problems. 5.5.2.1 Training to Restore Power to the Emergoney Buses PAGE 5-21 Determine if training has a program in place to fully prepare personnel to deal with problems such as identification of the causes of EDG trips, operation of the sequencer when lockout occurs, etc. 5.5.2.2 Training for Coping with Loss of the RHRS PAGE 5-22 In evaluating tha plant staff's ability to cope with a loss of the RHRS and recognizing that analysis in this area is incomplete, the following areas of concern were identified:
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- 5.6.2.2 Training for Ooping with Lepp of the IUm3 PAGE 5-22 Personnel generally understood the need for venting to prevent pressure buildup in the reactor-coolant system und some of the implications of inadequate venting.
However, they frequently did not have an understanding of details, such as possible steam generation rates during boiling and the venting capacities that would be required.
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- 6,b,9,2 Training for 00 ping with Lose of the RMHa PAGE 5-22 Most personnel understood that boiling could affect gravity feed, but they did not have a complete understanding of RCS behavior following initiation of boiling and such concepts as effective use of steam generators in a reflux boiling mode.
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- 5.5.2.2 Training for Coping with Loss of the RHRS PAGE 5-72 Most personnel did not understand the implications of releasing steam trom the RCS and its potential -impact upon personnel inside the containment building.
l l
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6-1 Vogtle could have more thoroughly implemented the guidance provided and have prevented the incident. More focused guidance could have-been provided to the industry, 6-l_ Guidance that focused on controlling activities in the switchyard through the . use of signs restricting access and periodic inspections for hazards was not adequately implemented by Vogtle. f6-2.: The guidance that required both residual heat removal systems to be-maintained operational during mid-loop-operations > discussed support system operability. The evaluation by Vogtle-neglected the electrical support systems for residual heat removal, and the industry guidance did not discuss any of the events _where residual heat removal was lost because some electrical support system had been removed from service, 6-2 During the 7 months after the industry was. informed of Calcon-sensor problems and requested to implement-a surveillance plan to-detect sensor problems,.Vogtle experienced'29 sensor fsilures and took little action to determine the root cause, review past experience, or track additional failures. 6-4_ In evaluating O&MR;272 Vogtle did not . consider installing caution tags in the. vicinity of-the switchyard. L6-4 'In evaluating INPO-SER 17-88, Vogtle.
' personnel focussed on. periodic inspections of employee work areas and didinot consider inspections of_other areas around the plant during outages-L for developing hazards or improper work practices, such as lo'cating outage support equipment in a hazardous area such as the switchyard.
{ .
Page 6-1 Vogtle could have more thoroughly implemented the guidance provided and have prevented the incident. More focused guidance could have been provided to the industry. 6-1 Guidance that focused on controlling activities in the switchyard through the use of sins restricting accesa and periodic inspections for hazards was not adequately implemented by Vcgtle. 6-2 The guidance that required both reeldual heat removal systems to be maintained operational during mid-loop operations discussed support system operability. The evaluation by Vogtle neglected the electrical support systems for residual heat removal, and the industry guidance did not discuss any of the events where residual heat removal was lost because some electrical support system had been removed from service. 8-2 During the 7 months after the industry was informed of Calcon eensor problems and requested to implement a surveillance plan to detect sensor problems, Vogtle experienced 29 sensor failures and took little action to determine the root cause, review past experience, or track additional failures. 6-4 In evaluating O&MR 272 Vogtle did not consider installing caution tags in the vicinity of the switchyard. 6-4 In evaluating INPO SER 17-88, Vogtle personnel focussed on periodic inapections of employee work areas and did not consider inspections of other areas around the plant during outages for developing hazards or improper work practices, such as locating outage support equipment in a hazardous area such as the switchyard. 6-6 Based on similar events at other plants, guidance on the importance of - not simultaneously removing multiple electrical power sources from services during shutdown was not communicated to the industry. 4 6-8 In addition to the evaluation of scheduling and performing . surveillance tests during shutdown and reduced inventory, Vogtle did not address the scheduling and performance of infrequently performed maintenance in their assessment of INPO SER 5-89. 6-8 In retrospect, the guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 80-20 and NRC Bulletin 80-12 could have prevented the Vogtle incident , had Vogtle assessed it differently. May be inadequate. 6-10 Vogtle evaluation of NRC Bulletin 80-12 may have been inadequate. The plant determined no action was necessary. 6-10 Vogtle response to INPO SOER 85-4 may have been inadequate. Their evaluation did not address scheduled maintenance and the removal of the RHR system. Compliance with the TS waa considered to ensure sufficient availability of RHR capability. 4
4 16-6 . Based on'aimilar; events at other plants,
- guidance-on the importance of not simultaneously removing. multiple
' electrical power sources from services during shutdown was not communicated to the industry.
6-8 In addition to the evaluation of scheduling and performing surveillance teste during shutdown and reduced inventory, Vogtle did.not address the scheduling and performance of infrequently performed maintenance in their assessment of INPO SER 5-89. 6 In retrospect, the guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 80-20 and NRC Bulletin 80-12 could have prevented the Vogtle incident ,_had Vogtle assessed it differently. May be inadequate. 6-10 Vogtle evaluation of NRC Bulletin-80-12 may have been inadequate. The plant determined no action was necessary. 6-10 Vogtle response to INPO:SOER 85-4 may have been inadequate. Their evaluation did not address scheduled maintenance and the removal of the RHR system. Compliance with the TS was considered to ensure sufficient availability of RHR-capability.
.6-11' Vogtle response to Generic Letter 88-17~,
" Loss of Decay Heat Removal" was inadequate. Electrical power for RHR was not mentioned 11nithe Vogtle .-
response. J6-13' - Vogtle response-to guidance from-Calcon wasLinadequate. _Vogtle determined that the problem was only related to the reliability of spare parts. The , recommendation to implement a surveillance plan for the sensors was not' evaluated. 4
6-14 Vogtle evaluation-of NRC Bulletin 83-51,
" Diesel Generator Events" was inadequate. Plant personnel took no action because the problems outlined in the bulletin were addressed in an owners group study. The development of a maintenance and inspection program to develop trends for failures was not evaluated.
6-14 INPO O&MR " Diesel Generator Starting Air System Dryers" was not evaluated by plant personnel. 6-15 INPO SOER 83-6 may have not been addressed adequately. Pre-existing alarm conditions on the EDG do not cause an alarm prior to startup 6-17 As a result of implementing NRC and INPO documents Vogtle personnel were prepared to prevent the loss of the RHR system caused by pump cavitation; however, they were not fully prepared to cope with alternate core cooling methods if the RHR system could not be restored. 6-18 Vogtle had not assimilated operating experience documents from the nuclear industry into the operating standards for the plant. 8-1 Evaluate alternate methods of core cooling and how to cope with phenomena which may occur until power can be restored. , 8-5 Plant thermodynamic behavior involving boiling during a shutdown is and not well understood. 8-19 Training is needed on plant thermodynamic behavior involving boiling during a shutdown. 8-8 Alternate method of RCS cooling-Low, Pressure Feed and Bleed Cooling - Allowing water to drain from the RWST into the RCS. (procedure, training?)
'8-9 Low Pressure Feed, High Pressure Bleed Cooling (gravity feed from RWST with pressurizer manway closed) (procedures, training)
-. -. - . . _ - -. . ~~- --
L 6-11 Vogtle response,to Generic Letter 88-17 " Loss of Decay Heat-Removal" a inadequate. Electrical power for RHR was not mentioned-in the Vogtle response. 6-13 Vogtle response to guidance from Calcon was inadequate. Vogtle determined-that the problem was only related to the reliability of spare parts. The recommendation to implement a surveillance plan'for the sensors was not evaluated. 6-14 Vogtle evaluation of NRC Bulletin 83-51, " Diesel Generator Events" was- - inadequate. Plant personnel took no action because the problems outlined in the bulletin were addressed in answers group study. The development of a maintenance and inspection program to develop. trends ; for failures was not evaluated. 6-14 INPO O&MR " Diesel Generator Starting Air System Dryers" was not-evaluated by plant personnel. 6-15 As of implementing NRC and INPO. documents Vogtle personnel were prepared to prevent the loss of the RHR system caused by pump cavitation; however, they were not fully prepared to cope with alternate core cooling methods if the RHR system could not be restored. 18 Vogtle had not assimilated operating experience documents from the nuclear industry into the operating standards for the plant. 8-1 Evaluate alternate methods of core cooling and how to cope with phenomena which may occur until power can be restored. 8-5 Plant. thermodynamic behavior involving boiling during a shutdown is-and not well understood. 8-19 Training is needed on plant thermodynamic behavior involving boiling during a shutdown. 18-8 Alternate method of RCS cooling-Low, Pressure Feed and Bleed Cooling - . Allowing water to drain from the RWST into the RCS. (procedure, training?) 6-9 Low Pressure Feed, High Pressure Bleed Cooling-(gravity feed from RWST with pressurizer manway closed) (procedures, training)- 8-10 Some mid-loop level instrumentation may provide. ambiguous indications and because it will not indicate actual reactor' vessel water level _under. 8-19 many conditions. 8-11 The potential reactor coolant system pressure, temperature _, and level behavior at Vogtle are not fully analyzed nor are they well understood-during a lose of RHR. 8-12 Procedures emphasize RHR system restoration, with some guidance provided and for alternate cooling if electrical power is available. Losses where-
8-10 Some mid-loop level instrumentation may provide ambiguous indications and because it will not indicate actual reactor vessel water level under 8-19 many conditions. 8-11 The potential reactor coolant system pressure, temperature, and level behavior at Vogtle are not fully analyzed nor are they well understood during a lose of RHR. 8-12 Procedures emphasize RHR system restoration, with some guidance provided and for alternate cooling if electrical power is available. Losses where 8-19 the RHR system cannot be recovered by recovered, particularly if there is no electrical power, are incompletely addressed. 8-12 The instruction for aligning the RWST for gravity drain to the RCS was appropriate, although no further guidance was provided except to restore level above "mid-loop". 8-12 The meaning of mid-loop in the Vogtle procedure is not clear. 8-12 Procedures to cope with loss of the RHR system do not adequately deal and with the conditions that may occur. 8-19 8-14 The actual time the PDP can be operated without cooling has not been determined. . 8-16 Failure of the temporary thimble tube seals because of overpressurizetion and could open a break that is effectively in the bottom 8-19 of the reactor vessel. 8-16 Closure of the containment building on loss of RHR before containment building environmental conditions prevent its closure is of significant safety importance. (High temp environment, polar crane high in containment, high velocity steam from pressure manway, dense fog).
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;8-17 Containment building closure criteria
- and time _ requirements may not be fully end evaluated, and procedures to accomplish this in the' required time have 8-19 not been tested.
8-17 The plant staff didn't have information concerning vent needs for operating in a once-through cooling mode with either a single phase or with boiling. 8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning flow-rates to prevent boiling or to prevent the core from becoming uncovered. 8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning gravity flow rates possible for the typical flow paths. 1 8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning the potential for bypassing the core by using cold leg drain paths during once-through cooling, and the implications of draining water'from the RCS. 8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning the effective vent size of common RCS penetrations' such as conoseals and reactor head vents, .and the implicationa of whether they are open or closed. 8-17 The plant staff d2d not have information
-concerning the potential impact onLvent capability of plastic covers or plywood :
over:over vent openings. 8-17 The closure of the RCS was not addressed-in Vogtle's procedures, nor has has it been discussed in industry and NRC guidance. 8-19 The most_likely success paths for dealing with this type of incident have not been determined or developed ~. l L i
_8-1& the RHR system cannot be recovered, particularly if there is no electrical power, are incompletely addressed. 8-12 The instruction for aligning the RWST for gravity drain to the RCS was-
. appropriate, although no further guidance was provided except to restore level above "mid-loop".
8-12 The meaning of mid-loop in the Vogtle procedure is not clear. B-12 Procedures to cope with loss of the RHR system do not adequately deal-ond with the conditions that may occur. 8-19 8-14 The actual time the PDP can be operated without cooling has not been determined.
'8-16 Failure of the temporary thimble tube seals because of and overpressurization could open a break that is effectively in the bottom 8-19 of the reactor vessel.
8-16 Closure of the containment building on lose of RHR before containmenti building environmental conditions prevent its closure-is.of significant safety importance. (High temp environment, polar crane? , high in containment, high velocity steam from pressure manway, dense fog). 8-17 Containment building closure criteria and time requirements may.not be. fully and evaluated, and procedures to accomplish this in the required time have not been tested. .
' 8 The plant staff'didn't have information concerning. vent needs'for operating in a once-through cooling mode with either a single phase or with boiling.
8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning flow-rates to prevent boiling or to prevent the core 1from becoming uncovered. .
.8 The plant staff did not have information concerning gravity flow rates possible for the typical flow paths.
8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning the potential;for bypassing the core by using cold leg drain paths-during once-through cooling, and the implications of draining water from_the-RCS. 8-17 The plant staff did not have information concerning the effective vent size of common RCS penetrations, such as conoseals and reactor head-vents, and-the implications of whether they are open or closed. 17 The plant staff did not have information concerning the potential impact-on vent capability of plastic covers or plywood over over vent openings.
l f r
' 8-17. The closure'of the RCS was not addressed in;Vogtle's procedures, nor
. has has it been discussed in industry and NRC-guidance.
19 The most likely success paths for dealing-with'this' type of incident have not been determined or developed.
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. 1 12' Procedates sophastat RHR systes restoratica, with sent quai;4ntt Pevit:1 ilst it' a!'.frnate tatllig 14 tltett!!al redir it tv4:!4t!. Ltisti s'.efe ,
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117 .Es ticsvre of the MS was not addressed in Vogtle's preceduren, no' mas has it been discussed in industry and hPC quicance. 519 The nest likely luttets paths for dealing alth this type of inttient have not been deterstnte or developed. 9 9 h'*
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+ *- What caused the 1st 1A EDG trip?
Presently the cause of the trip is unknown. It is suspected the jacket water pressure switch caused both trips but this he.s not been determined. The investigation is-continuing. A special test is being developed to duplicate the event and identify the cause of the trip. What was the RWST Iv1 at the time of the SAE? Approximately 78% Which Accum iso valves were open/ worked on? At the time of the event only 1HV-8808D was being-worked on. What (related) CVCS check valves were open for maint? 1-1208-U4-038 (Normal charging check valve) was_open
*** 1-1201-U4-007 and 1-1201-US-344 (RTD bypass manifold isolation valves)-were being worked but the valves had not been breached at the time of
( the event *** What man / auto valves must be operated to gravity feed from RWST? There are several gravity feed. paths, but with respect to this eve.;' the valves that would .have to be open to gravity feed through RHR are 1HV-8812A or 1HV-8812B.
- \
y s. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURPENCts
/ JANUARY-MARCH 1990
, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The NRC is reviewing events reported at the nuclear power plants licensed to operate. For this report, the NRC has determined that the following event was an abnormal occurrence:
90-1 Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat up at Vogtle Unit 1 During Refueling The following information pertaining to this event is also being reported concurrentl criterion) yofinthis thereport Federal Register. notes Appendix that a major A (see of degradation theessential second general safety-related equipment can be considered an abnormal occurrence. In addition, there were generic regulatory concerns because of several previous incidents that have occurred at plants while in shutdown conditions. Date and Place - March 20, 1990; Yogtle Unit 1, a P.stinghouse-designed pressurized water reactor, operated by Georgia Power Company and located in Burke County, Georgia. Nature and Probable Consequences - At the time of the event, Unit I had been Th a refuelinDutage for about 25 days with its reactor coolant system (RCS) level reduced to "mid-loop" (below the top of the pressure vessel nozzles) to facilitate maintenance activities. Decay heat in the ccre was being removed by one train of the residual heat removal (RHR) system. Several pieces of equipment were out of service for maintenance, including one of Unit l's two emergency diesel generators (EDGs). As described in more detail below, the event involved a loss of all safety power to Unit 1 and difficulties in starting the one available EDG with a consequent _ loss of shutdown cooling. Non-sa fety power remained available. The significance of the event is that had the licensee been unable to restore power within about 1.5 hours, the plant would have been in an inadequately analyzed condition and personnel would not have had adequate procedures and training to deal with the situation. (Had the incident occurred. two days af ter shutdown, the 1.5 hours would have been reduced to 15 or 20 minutes.) This status of analysis, procedures, and training is believed to be typical of industry preparedness. One alternate source of RCS makeup was available that did not require ac power and would increase the time available for the licensee to restore ac power. This involved gravity feed of borated water from the refueling water storage tank to the RCS. plant equipment conditions at the tire of the event were as follows; o The Unit 18 reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) was tagged out of service for maintenance. o The Unit 1 B EDG was tagged out of service and disassembled for maintenance. o The Unit 1 A RAT was supplying offsite power to the crosstied Unit 1 A and B vital buses. 1
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o The RCS temperature was being maintained at around 90*F via the train A RHR pump; the train B pump was in standby. o The vessel head was in place with the studs not fully tensioned, o The pressurizer manway cover was removed. o The unways for steam generators 2 and 3 were partially bolted in . place and th. manways for steam generators 1 and 4 were in place with' bolts fully sensioned, o The inboard charging line check valve and an accu m lator isolation valve were open for inspection. o The containment equipment hatch and the containment personne* hatch were open. At about 9:20 a.m., EST, on March 20, 1990, a truck carrying gasoline, diesel oil, and lubricants in the plant low voltage r,witchyard backed into a support column for the feeder line supplying power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. The insulator for the C phase of the feeder line fractured and
-initiated a phase-to-ground electrical fault. The fault resalted in a loss of power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. The Unit 2 B EDG started and loaded on to the deenergized Unit 2 B vital bus. However, Unit 2, which was operating at 100% power, experienced a turbine trip and reactor trip because of an improperly connected (wrong tap) differential current transformer (DCT). The DCT initiated the trip when the current surge associated with the phase-to-ground fault was sensed. The Unit 2 trip was relatively uncomplicated.
Because-both of the Unit I vital buses were crosstied and being supplied by the Unit 1 A RAT, the loss of this transformer deenergized both vital buses. Deenergizing these buses resulted in the loss of power to the operating RHR puinp. Since the Unit 1 B EDG was tagged out of service and disassenbled for maintenance, the emergency power supply for the B vital bus was unavailable and the standby B RHR pump could not be started. The available Unit 1 A EDG started on bus undervoltage, but for unknown reasons, it shut down automatically af ter 1 minute and 20 seconds. At 9:40 a.m., plant operators declared a " Site Area Emergency." (A loss of all onsite and offsite ac power at Vogtle for more than 15 minutes is classified as a
" Site Area Emergency." The licensee m6de its declaration because all vital ac power was lost for greater than 15 minutes.) Non-safety power remained avail-able. Approximately 18 minutes after the first start of the A FOG, the operators locally reset the load sequencer which automatically restarted the A EDG on undervoltage. However, after 1 minute and 10 seconds, the diesel again shut.
down automatically. At 9:56 a.m., plant operators performed an " emergency" manual start of the diesel, which bypassed most of the diesel's protective trips. The diesel started and leaded to the bus,According the A RHR pump was restarted, to control room indi-and core cooling was reestablished to Unit 1. - cation, RCS temperature increased from SO' to 136*F during the 41 minutesWith the start required to reenergize the A bus (1.12*F/ minute). the " Site Area Emergency" was downgraded to an ' Alert" at 10:15 a.m. ; 2 l l l l
- ~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The critical path item for containment closure, the containment equipment This was within the timm hatch, was closed by approntmately 10:40 a.m. (There are no recomended by the NPC for the existing conditions of the RCS. l regulatory requirements for a closed containment under these conditions.) f Plant personnel returned the Unit 1 B RAT to service after completing formal flowever, attempts to energite the transformer were tagout removal procedures, delayed for several minutes because of a sticking mechanical interlock in the 4 control circuitry for a motor operated disconnect switch on the high side of the B RAT. Power was restored to the B vital bus via the B PAT at 11:40 a.m. At 12:38 p.m., core cooling was shif ted to the 8 RHR train to facilitate subsequunt electrical alignrent changes. Throughout the event, non vital power was continuously provided Also,_ to Unit 1 from offsite sources via backfeed through the main generator transforser. the Unit 2 electrical distribution system remainedHowever, er.ergized (aside f rom the the Vogtle momentary loss of power before the reactor trip). ' electrical sytten was not designed for interconnection of the Unit 1 vital buses to nonvital power or to the Unit 2 electrical buses. Th vital and ncavital buses or for interconnecting the Unit 1 electrical (Thereareno distribution system with the distribution isystem at Unit 2.to develop interconnection regulatory re procedures.)quirementsthatdirectthelcensee Unit I The licensee restarted Unit 2 and returned it to full power operation. remained shut down to investigate and correct the problems during the event and to complete refueling activities. On March 20,1990, NRC Region 11 sent On a team2!: March to19G the site to reviae this was the event upgraded and the actions taken by the licensee. to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) consisting of Heaoquarters and Region 1 personnel. However, due to the number of past incidents that have occurred at various plants while in shutdown cM ditions and the potentia concerns,ledreviewofanIncidentInvestigationTeam(!!T). and detai The !!T consisted a Region !-and Region V) and industry swnbers of NRC menbers (Headquarters, Nuclear Power Operations, and two contultants . member from the Institute of The licensee agreed that Unit I would not L restarted 13, 1990.until approved Criticality was by hkC canagement. This approval was granted on Apriland the plant was connected to attained on April 16, 1990, on April 21,1990. 1990. The team returned to The 11T remained at the Vogtle site until April 2, land to continue evaluation the NRC incident Response Center in Bethesda, Mary of the event, formulate findings, and to prepare a formal NUREG report. Cause or Causes - The di ect cause of the loss of offsite Class IE ac power-was a personnel error by the driver backing the truck into the pole supporting a 230 kV line for the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RATS site safety rules, which require a flagman for backing vehicles when viewing is impaired, were-violated. The direct cause of the loss of onsite ClassThe 1E ac power was the licensee concluded failure to make the only available EDG operational. that the EDG trips were most likely due to faulty jacket water high temperature switches. 3
~ - . .- _
T - Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Licensee - The licensee established a management policy on control and operation of vehicles. The defective EDG temperature switches were replaced and a test program was various switch under plannedconditions. to investigate Thethe lossreliability of offsiteofpower this ty(pe of temperatureLOSP)dieselstart and trip logic was modified for both Unit I and Unit 2 so that an automatic start will occur upon LOSP; therefore, non essential diesel engine
'energency' trips are b locked upon LOSP. The Unit 1 A EDG test frequency was increased until seven consecutive valid tests ware completed with no more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tests.
NRC - The NRC !!T is completing its investigation and will issue a formal report. On April 16,1990, the NRC issued Information Nottct No. 90-25, ' Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolan'. System Heat-up," that described the Vogtle event. The Notice advised licensees that the Vogtle event reemphasized the need for careful planning of equipment outages during shutdown, future reports will be made as appropriate.
. 4 1
March 20,1990 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE P i
,,blic interest significance.la preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice o cation date. or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Re FACILITY: Geor la Power Company Yogt e Unit 1 Licensec Emergency Classification:
Docket No. 50-424, 60 425 Notification of Unusual Event Wayresboro,GA *T' Alert Site Arsa Emergency General Ener ency
~~~NotApplicab$e
SUBJECT:
SITE AREA EMERGENCY AT V0GTLE UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER At 9:58capability. generator a.m., EST the licensee notified the NRC they wer Unit I was in cold shutdown at the time of the incident for refueling.Th The Itcensee has downtemperature peaked at 136'T and stabilized at 100'F after AC of onsite diesel power. graded to an Alert et 10:15 a.m. EST based on restoration Unit loss of 2 offsite was atproblem 100 percent power at the time, tripped normally, and was unaffecte of Uritt 1. ( lon !! has dispatched a team to the site headed by L. Reyes The State of Georgia has been notified. 5 This infomation is current as of 11:20 a.m. on 3/20/90 CONTACT: S. Ebneter - 841 5089 DISTRIBUTION: One White M' land Nat'l Flint North Bank Bido R tons ChairmanTarr IRM MAIL T0: DCS Original IE 34 I DOT Transportation)Qnly) Comm. Roberts O!G Re ion !! Comm. Rogers AE00 Comm. Curtiss Re ion !!! FAX T0: INPD NRC Ops Ctr Re ion IV
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PRESENTATION TO REGION 11 U)Ah S' % "A -- ~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION GEAlE2/C ON LEMBL E V001LE SITE AREA EK RGENCY / MARCH 20, 1990 ( k _,
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AGEMA e OPENING REMARKS C. K. McC0Y , o EVENT REVIEW TEAM CRITIQUE G. B0cKHOLD e IRUCK/ SWITCHYARD e OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS ( e PERSONNEL Acc0UNTABILITY e COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATE / SITE e MID-LOOP OPERATIONS e DIESEL TESTING /0PERABILITY_ G. BOCKHOLD e QUARANTINE COMPONENTS G. B0cKHOLD 1 e UNIT 2 G. BOCKHOLD ? L
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l-l INITIATING EVENT FUELING TRUCK STRUCK INSULATOR SUPPORT INSIDE THE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD CAUSING A FAULT TO THE 1A RESERVE AUxlLIARY TRANSFORMER. e DIRECT CAUSE IRUCK DRIVER AND ESCORT WERE INATTENTIVE p "' TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE TRUCK. 9-ip/' y,rd e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
, llc*
95 CONTROL OF VEHICLES NEAR VULNERABLE AND q,o l SENSITIVE AREAS NOT ESTABLISHED. ,lV MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT STAGED INAPPROPRIATELY. THE USE OF GROUND-GUIDES INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA WAS NOT CLEAR. 4 ( 6E y A _ .A (M-a %~z? i 6 m+'~ q - w .a k: % ~L~k A ' '~']
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Interoffice Correspondence GeorglaPoiver d DATE: March 27. 1990 , i RE: Vehicles In Perimeter Area , FROM: G. Bockhold. Jr. TO: Site Personnel Due to the recent plant event of March 20, 1990, the following shall be-implemented innediately: All vehicles within the Perimeter Area (PA) in dich the driver-that are larger .than a , does not have rearview visibility pickup truck, are required to have a (ORTagman at all times. een the vehicle is backing up. t Additional policies / procedures on this issue will be forthcoming. S 9 k
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4 4 EMERGENCY PLAN IXPl.f5 HTATION DURING THE EMERGENCY, OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS WE R t; LATE AND/0R DELAY'.D BEYOND THE 15 MINUTE TIME LIMIT. , Cc - e DIRECT CAUSES te p/3pl" J; r POWER TO THE PRIMARY ENN (IE EMERGENCY p POWER) WAS LOST. / D
#g ALL EMERGENCY AGENCIES WERE NOT INCLUDED ON THE BACKUP ENN. (BURKE COUNTY AND GEMA ADDED 4/6/90) e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATORS AND SUPERVISORS WERE tiOT FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CAPABILITIES. (PRIMARY ENN IN TSC HAD POWER FROM THE SECURITY SYSTEM DIESEL.) ,[
THE SERIES METHOD OF NOTIFICATION CONTAINED L , U: UNSATISFACTORY DELAYS. n# .
- EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DID NOT ENSURE PROMPT ' " g #
NOTIFICATION OF OFF-SITE AGENCIES. AMPLIFYING INFORMATION WAS NOT PROVIDED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. , QM 4 g,,loSA' u
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Intorolfles Correspondence Georgia Power b
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DATE: Aprt) 4.-1990 RE: Emergency Notification Network ([XN) Communication FROM: George Bockhold, Jr. TO: Emergency Directors (ED) and Comunicators To ensure that ENN communication is timely. Emergency Directors will ensure that the following improvements are implemented:
- 1. Imediately upon the declaration of an emergency, the comunicator (Shift Clerk) will perform a ro11 call to detemine the operability of the ENN while the message p
is being prepared by the ED. L jdC
- 2. Burke County and GEMA is in the process of being added W D 6(,'
to the backup ENN and this will be installed and tested within the next few days. L.,g'e.,T c
- 3. The ED will personally ensuie notifications are timely '.j / L . 4 "c f and problems are resolved. The ED will assign extra a
cf # ts t personnel problems as necessary.or use TSC facilities to solve com
- 4. The TSC uses different power supplies than the Control Room and TSC comunication systems may be operable-when Control Room systems are not.
Since Burke County must respond quickest to most emergencies. ED's will ensure that Burke County receives the highest priority for ENN nottffcations. We are investigating improved comunication hardware and techniques. . In the meantime. pur personai .ttention to ENN comunications must ensure that we de not have the problems that we experienced on 3/20/90. L ut .. GB/gww s
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}lNJ,5fjCY PLAN IMPLEENTATION DURING THE EMERGENCYs SITE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY . NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. . .;
1 e DIRECT CAUSE . ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE i FOR THE SITUATION-OF NOT EVACUATING THE l SITE. (GENERAL MANAGER'S MEMO OF 4/6/90). l e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES r THE INITIAL PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DELAYED ' APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES. ' I - PERSONNEL WERE ALLOWED TO RE-ENTER THE .i
+
PROTECTED. AREA.
-r
-- PAGE ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE DIFFICULT To-HEAR IN SOME PLANT AREAS.- ;
THE' COMPUTER' GENERATED PRINTOUT DID NOT i,e $. : ALLOW-QUICK IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL.- , y# . IHE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR FAILED.TO PROVIDE jg p / *Y / GUIDANCE AFTER DECIDING NOT TO EVACUATE g*p g.J Ld - ' ' PERSONNEL g M Ana dct.4 bdo 4. -(yl
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inferoffico Correspondence Georgialbur d DATE: April 6,1990 RE: Accountability During Emergencies 1.cg: N0Y-00426 FROM: G. Bockhold, Jr. , T0: All Emergency Directors and Site Personnel In the event of site emergency conditions',' we will implement the following revised procedures. These changes will enhance personnel accountability and safety and ensure better information flow for employees. They will also provide flexibility to the plant when responding to energency situations. When the Energency Director (ED) makes an emergency classification, he will make the appropriate tone and page announcement on the plant PA system. He will direct site personnel to the appropriate.tocations. If you can not hear the page, report to your supervisor. He or she taill direct you appropriately. Normally non essential personnel will report to the Admin. Building auditorium or parking lot. David Phillips, the Financial Services Supervisor, has authority to coordinate
'th the ED and control the disposition of non essential personnel.
i his absence, the senior person present will contact the Security Captain for additional assistance. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel should report imediately to the appropriate facility. Other shift personnel, supervisors, and manage.rs on-site should report initially to thJ OSC. Overflow personnel will assemble in the maintenance machine shop area. When directed by the ED, the security department will initiate accountability. The security department cannot account for personnel ' who fail to log into the appropriate EltF (e.g. control room. TSC. or OSC) so it is essential we comply with the ED's instructions as soon as possible. : Your assistance implementing these instructions will ensure. we manage emergencies better and provide plant personnel with sufficient ** information to keep them informed of abnormal plant activities. L Thank you for your assistance. l , d B/ erd 7 xc: Department Heads NORMS l^ ,
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.i EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEENTATION l COMMUN! CATION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND ISC NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED, e DIRECT CAUSES ) - CD g.d'o
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THE STATUS LOOP TELEPHONE BRIDGE WAS NOT OPERABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EMERGENCY-
-f bi BECAUSE OF THE LOSS 0F POWER. g 6N !
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MID-LOOP OPERATIONS ACTIONS TO RESPOND TO LOSS OF CORE COOLING AT MID-LOOP SHOULD BE IMPROVED. e DIRECT CAUSE THE " LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL" PROCEDURE SHOULD PROVIDE IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR A LOSP CONDITION. e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES IHE " LOSS OF RHR" PROCEDURES ARE TOO NARROWLY
! FOCUSED FOR MODE 5 & 6 CONDITIONS.
I DIRECTIONS FROM THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR , WERE NOT ALWAYS EXPLICIT. 9 (C'"' y ct G,
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MULTIPLE STARTS (5) DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL l UV RUN IEST 6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE V DIESEL OPERABLE HI' JACKET WATER RUNS (3) h DCP UV RUN IEST M . 9 18 SUCCESSFUL STARTS 19 SUCCESSFl#. STARTS W'- o W -10 s p, ) - . na M m-17c7.x c-
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QUARANTINE- COPP0NENTS 4'Sej p P MLa b"i TEMPERATURE-SWITCHES e 1A PROBABLE TRIP CAUSE JACKET WATER IEMPERATURE (2/3 LOGlc) 1 INTERMITTENT- . !' 1 POST CAllBRATION LOW (186*F-8 VENTING) e 1A OTHER IEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 1 LUBE-0!L TEMPERATURE (SLUGGISH) ! e IB TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 4 JACKET WATER IEMP (VENTING) l 2 LUBE 0!L TEMP (VENTING & CAllB.) PRESSURE SWITCHES e 1A , 1 LUBE OIL PRESSURE (TRIPPED) 2 LUBE 0!L PRESSURE-(CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED) h '.
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SITE AREA- EMERGENCY 3-20-90 j EST TIMELINE 0900 Fuel truck entered protected area , 3 0920 Lost of IA & 2B RAT due to switchyard accident because fuel truck backed into insulator support , s 0920 Unit 2 Trip - unit stable , Unit 1 DG-1A started, tripped 1 minute-20 seconds after breaker closure. PE0 dispatched to , investigate DG trip, SRO dispatched tc. investigate ' + sequenceg. I t i 0921 Security Diesel started and loaded properly (SkC) p% 0940 Site Area Emergencyndeclared g Loss of power 0941 A train sequencer reset & D/G 1A Auto started and tripped 1 minute.10 seconds after breaker closure. 0957 Start, i EMEW, initial notification of SAE using SC Backup
- LM ..,.
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. n-0956 Local start of DG-1A - power to 1E Bus, NSCW and CCW pumps on A Train (onsite power restored) l l
0958 NRC operations center notified of SAE L p.g 1
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,m7 f s> , o p 1500,- 3/33 iVR-2< t , EST TIMELINE 1000 Started A Train RHR pump and-placed it ir.-the shutdowa cooling _ mode. At this time-the maximum core exit T/C-tamperature was 118' T., RHR.-inlet: was 136'.F. . 1001 Page-ennouncement to site (Site Ares Emergency-Announcement) 1002 Security commenced accountability 1002 Security (PESB) notified by ED via communicator ' 1005 General Office Operations Center- (Birmingham) i activated , 1009 -Visitors Center initial notification--(Public Informati n ' 1011 GPC Public Informationlin Atlanta notified by Ray Harris-- , 1013 Completed initial notifications- to Aike~n, Allendale,' iarnwell, SRS , - S.C. -(GEMA:_and BCEMA- not
'dotified) ~
~ + .;; a . ,.
1013 TSC ENN' communicator conducts roll call to test;. , _. TSC equipment 4
?
Page 2
,w -. , ,w w - .-- , , - +
. 1500, 3/23 VR-2 s EST TIMELINE 1015 Called GEMA on commercial phone numbers, did not t.ransmit message _s to confusion by communicators 1015 George Bockhold relieves John Hopkins as Emergency Director. #2 Emergency Notiff. cation form spproved by ED. 1015 Site Area Emergency downgraded to Alert. Diesel Generator maintaining load. 1016 Initial notification made to Burke County EMA on commercial telephone ,
*' 217 Alert Plant Page announcement made.
1020 OSC Activitated 1022 EOF ENN communicator test ENN equipment from EOF i 1026 TSC Activated 1030 ersonnal' dispatched to Het Tower to relay data r~yc,l
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1034 Steam generator Primary manways secured 1035 EOF Standby Status 1035 Message #3 started by communicator in Control Room (using BUENN)
- Times are not confirmed
4
,' 1500, 3/23 VR t- -EST TIMELINE 1035 GEMA received notification message i 1 from South Carolina EPD via FAX 1038 Hessage 12 complete to all South Carolina Agencies 1040 Initial Notification completed to GEMA- ;
1042 Containment Equipment hatch bolted 1046 Met Data from HET Tower building 10 meter height, 8-9 mph 340*: Delta T = -3,0 i r t 1050 Radiation monitors information received from- j PERMS: all normal 1050 Message #2 completed to Georgia 1050 Message #3 completed to All South Carolina agencies. 1050 Corporate Office Birmingham contacts Public nformation - Atlanta with initial information
?L.
1055 ljg e+ parts Control Room
. ;9 ? ., . ,-r E
1056 Mas' sage #2 & f 3 completed to Burke County. 10) at TSC and assumes duties and responsibilities. Page 4
I ?!500, 3/23 VR-3'
-EST. TIMELINE y
1059 Message.13 completed to Georgia t 1100 .BriefingLin TSC concerning accountability, PA announcement made for non-essential personnel to leave protecced area and report to admin'b1dg parking lot 1101 Containment personnel hatch interlocks set 1105 Message i 4 initiated by ENN communicator in TSC using Primary ENN for both Georgia and South Carolina 1112 Unit 2 in Mode-3
.o 1-1116 Message f 4 completed to All agencies ~by TSC ENN i
communicator 1130 Unit IB RAT has offsite power to'hi-side 1135 Message #5 initiated by ENN communicator in TSC 1140 IBA03 energized from RAT IB p, 4$ - 1140
,;.Ibsaurizermanwayinstalled--
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1141 ~' Mes. sage #5 completed by TSC -communicator 4 Page 5- ,
-___.______________m_ -
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'500, 3/23 VR-2 EST TIMELINE 1143 All buses off of IBA03 energized 1159 Train B NSCW started 1203 Train B CCW pumps started 1205 Message f 6 initiated by TSC ENN communicator 1212 Hessage 1 6 completed by TSC ENN communicator 1222 TSC Briefing 2 i
1225 Public information manager leaves EOF and returns to Visitor Center 1229 TSC receives Status of personnel accountability 1231 Train B RHR pump started 1 1235 Message f 7 initiated by TSC ENN communicator
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1238 ain B place in shutdown cooling mode
. ain A placed in recire 1241 Message 1 7 completed to All agencies TSC ENN communicator Page 6
7 1500, 3/23 VR-2 EST- TIMELINE 1257 1AA0Z alternate incoming breaker closed to supply power form RAT IB/paralled with D/G 1A 1305 Message 18 initiated by TSC ENN communicator 1310 ED conference call to local agencies to discuss termination of emergency 1313 Message # 8 completed to All agencies by TSC ENN communicator 1313 Offsite power restored - plant in normal refueling configuration E 1326 104 people unaccounted for by security N 1347 Emergency Terminated 1350 Message / 9 (Termination) initiated by TSC ENN communicator 1356 Message i 9 completed to all agencies by-TSC ENN communicator -
.. + s
^
1400 -
~
f bleaseconcerningterminationofemergency
?> .
D, ; sq ; 1430 .
.s p ,,ess.? conference in Atlanta 1545 Joint News Release to Media 1630 Press Conference at Vogtle Page 7
March 21, 1990 l
=
' PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION Or EVENT OR UNUSUA1, OCCURRENCE PHO-II-9016A 1 preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSS h Region !! staff on this puolic interest significance.
. cation or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by t e date.
Licensee Emergency Classification: FACILITY: Georgia Power Company Hotification of Unusual Event Vogtle Unit 1 x ' Alert Docket No. 50 424 Z !ite Area Emergency Waynesboro, GA General Emergency
~ Not Applicable
SUBJECT:
SITE AREA EMERGENCY AT YOGTLE UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER At 12:47 . d$T, the licensee secured from the Emergency classification afte onsite the event. and. offsite power was restored. Region !! Regional and Resident Inspectors a ActivitiesinUnitlareconcentratedinfillingthereactorcoolantsystem. A preliminary sequence of events has been prepared by the NRC. NOTE: All times are presented in Central Standard Time (CST). Initial Conditions:
- 2 was at full power with no significant equipment inoperabilities.
Fuel had been reloaded with approximately Unit I was shut down for refueling, in Mode 6. 1/3 of the core being new, unirradiated fuel, The reactor had been shut down for The reactor head was in approximately 30 days; therefore, decay heat was not significant. Reactor Coolant Inventory place and torquing was in process.The "B" Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) was inoperable Shutdown Cooling was in effect. Diesel Generator was also inoperable due to due to maintenance (oil change). The "B" regularly scheduled maintenance. TlHE ACTIVITY _ 0820 Lubricant truck in"A"the Unit 1 switchyard hits supporting tower for the 230 feeder to the Unit 1 RAT. This established a fault to ground. Alreaker "A" Phase connection was broken.in the 230 KV switchyard opened, effectively isolatin RAT and the Unit 2 "B" RAT. Turnine trip - Reactor trip on Unit 2 due to a protective relay actuating as a result of the switchyard transient. Unit 1 Diesel Generator "A" starts and then trips for unknown reason,and 0821 manually started. Main Steam Line Isolation manually initiated - Unit 2. ( 0856 10 Site Area Emergency declared - Unit 1. Headquarters Duty Officer notified of the event. Region tied into the notification, 0 g nd-ujo % y .
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t at ( , 09159 $ .gg, Class.;ification downgradedi to: an Alert due? to. the : recovery- of P 1 ) RATE"1B" returned to service. . Emergency conditions- terminated.-- T, . ,2 Thz 5 tate of Georgia-has been notified; This.-information is current; as of -10:00=a.m. on 3/21/90',
~
LCONTACT: S.-Ebneter.-- 841-5089
!DISTRIBUT10N: .
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-F SE0VENCE LOF EVENI5 -
LOSS OF A,'C POWER - UNIT 1 20 MARCH 1996 - NOTE: ALL TIMES ARL ' PRESENTED IN CENlRAL ST ANDAhD 11ME ~(CST) INITITAl CONblT10NS: Unit,2 was at full power with no significant equipment inoperabilitics. , Unit 1.was shut down for refueling. in Mode 6. Fuel had been reloaded with approximately 1/3 of the core being new, unirradiated fuel. . The reector had been shutdown for approximately 30 days: therefore, decay heat was not sionificent. The reactor head was in place but had not been fully-torqued.
' Reactor Coolan t Inventory _was at Mid-Loop conditions._ Shutdown Cooling was_in
.effect. 1he "b' RAT was inoperable due to a.alntenance (oil change). -The "B" ,
Diesel Generator was also inoperable due to regularly scheduled maintenance.- IIME ACTIVITY 0820 Lubricent Truel: in the Unit 1 Switchyard hitt supporting tower for the 230 KV feeder.ta the Unit 1 "A" Reserve Auxilliary Transformer (RAT). The insulator fell off o1 the tower ano the "B"~ Phase connection was- brol en. This established a f aul t to ground. -Two. breaters-in.the 230 VV Switchyard opened, effectively; isolating power to the Uni t 1 " A" RAT and the Unit 2 *B" RAT. Tur bine Trip - Reactor - Trip on-- Unit _2. 0921 Unit 1 Diesel Generator " A" starts and then trips on " Low Jaclet Water Presure" (a non-essential trip). Main Steam Line Isolation manually'initiatea Unit 2.- B840 Site Area. Emergency declared - Unit 1. 0956 Headquerters Duty Of ficer! Not tified of the event. Region tied into the-notification. 0915 _Elassification downgraded to an Alert due to the recovery of Diesel-
? Generator "1A".
1247- RAT "1B" returned to service. Emergancy conditions-terminated. Y I
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c ., SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3-20-90 EST TIMELINE ,
'0920 Lost of 1A & 2B RAT due to switchyard accident.
0920 Unit 2 Trip - unit stable - DG-1A started,- tripped because of low jacket water pressure.
*0921 Security Diesel started and loaded properly 0940 Site Area Emergency declared - Loss of power-
, 0941 DG-1A tied to IE Bus and tripped 1
0956 Local start of DG-1A - power to IE Bus, NSCR pumps i on-(onsite power restored) 0959 Start notification of SAE using SC Backup ENN l 1001 Page announcement to site (Site Area Emergency Announcement) 1002- Security.(PESB) notified by ED 1003 Emergency Message 12 started- , i-Page 1
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4 EST ~IMELINE i 1005 Accountability commenced by Security 1005- General Office Operations-Center-(Birmingham) activated 1013 Completed initial notifications to Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell, SRS , S .C. (GEMA and BCEMA not notified)
'1014 Called GEMA on primary and Back-up commercial phone numbers, no answer.
1015 George Bockhold relieves John Hopkins as Emergency Director. 12 Emergency Notification form approved-by ED. 1015 Site Area Emergency downgraded to Alert. Diesel Generator maintaining load. 1016 Initial notification made to Burke County EMA on commercial telephone 1022- Message f 2' completed to 'Barnwell- County 1026 TSC Activated
.1029 Messate 12 completed to Allendale and SRS Page 2
(
- Times are not confirmed
4 EST TIMELINE 1 ,
.( 1034 Message #2 completed to South Carolina l
1035 Message f 3 started by communicator in Control Room (using BUENN) 1038 Message #2 complete to Aiken County 1040 Initial Notification made to GEMA
*1040 OSC Activated
*1040 EOF in Standby s 1044 Message 13 completed to Barnwell County 1045 Message #3 completed to Allendale Co.
10'6 Message (3 completed to Aiken Co. 1048 Message #3 completed to SRS 1050 Message /2 completed to Georgia k Page 3
- Times are not confirmed
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4
~:MELINE- ^
EST 3 I 1050 Message #3 completed-to South Carolina. 1050 Corporate Office Biruingham contacts Public Information -- Atlanta with initial information which is released to the Media, i 1055 ED departs Control Room to TSC. 1056 Message 12 completed :o Burke County. ED at TSC and assumes duties and responsibilities. 1059 Message 13 completed to Georgia 1100 Briefing in TSC PA announcement - accountability announcement
. (.. .
7 INITIAL PRESS RELEASE y 1112 Unit 2 in Mode 3 1130 Second Press Release 1130 Unit 1 RAT has offsite power to hi-side 1140 IBA03 energized from offsite power. 1143 All buses off of-1BAC3 energized 1222 TSC Briefing 1229 TSC. Status of personr.el accountability 1302 Loads of 1AA02 transferred to offsite power 1310 ED conference call to local agencies-to discuss termination of emergency 1313 Offsite power restored (-- 1347 Emergency Terminated 1400 News Release concerning termination of emergency Page 4
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- March 22.-1990
; 3 'PRFilMINARY N011FICATION OF EVENTz0R UN'JSUAL-0CCURRENCE PNO-l!-90-16Bi 5 1.
preliminary notificationi constitutes EARLY noticelof 7 events of-.POS$1BLE safety or.
- public -interest; significance. The- information is as ; initially- received without'verifi-
-cation or evaluation', Land is basically all that is known:by the Region _ IIJstaff on this
- date.: =
-FACILITY: Georgia Power Company Licensee Emergency Classification -
Vogtle Unit-1 Notification o_f_ Unusual Event! Docket No. 50-424 Alert-_ l Waynesboro, GA Site Area Emergency- _ General Emergency T Not Applicable *
SUBJECT:
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM 15 DISPATCHED TO V0GTLE' UNIT 1 An Augmented Inspection-Team is at the Vogtle site to review the event.of March 20,L1990,. which- resulted in a Site Area Emergency when Unit I lost:its--offsite and:onsite AC_ power.: , The team is' composed of members representing AEOD, NRR, and-Region 11. Extensive media - coverage continues. Unit 2 is operating at 25 percent power after recovering f"om-a reactor trip on March 20 . 1990. The State of Georgia'has been notified. information is current as of 10:00 a.m. on 3/22/90. + ( COhTACT: -S. Ebneter - 841-5089 . e DISTRIBUTION:
.0'ne White- M' land Nat'l .
Flint North Bank Blda Regions . MAIL T0: DCS (Original ?!E-34) Chainnan Carr IRM Region !- : DOT >(Transportation Only)- , Comm.' Roberts- O!G Region.Il
- Com. Rogers AE00 . Region Ill FAX TO:. INPO=
Com. Curtiss ' NRC Ops Ctr - Region IV. LICENSEE (Corporate) Comm.-Remick - Region V - RII Resident . OGC. 10CA 'Nicholson Lane Phillips Bldg'
;GPA/SLITP/PA RES ACR5-EDO:
NRR- L. Street EWW NMS$ PDR K5EAP OE
;5520: 03/22/90-9 12:30 P.M. TO REGIONS AND HQ -
.******************************************************************+**********************-
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k BIBLIOGRAPHY
. Memorandum from J. Taylor to the Commission dated 3/23/90:
Subject:
Investigation of March 20. 1990 Event at Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant involving loss of of f site Power on Demand at l' nit 1
- 2. Documents Collected and Provided bv Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) 2-1 Instruction Manual for S & C Ciscuit Switches (Outdoor 230kv) 2-2 Instruction Manual For Westinghouse Tvpe Co overcurrent Relays 2-3 Instruction Manual for ASEA Type RADSE Transformer Differential Protective Relavs 2-4 Instruction Manual For Brown Boveri Type A0T. AOK & AOS High Voltage Current Transformer 2-5 Instruction Manual For General Electric Type PVD Differential Voltage Relav 2-6 Nuclear Plant Maintenance Work Order No. 28900466 2-7 Bechtel Drawings IX3D-AA-A01A (Main One Line - Unit 1) 2-8 Bechtel Drawings 2X3D-AA-A01A (Main One Line - Unit 2) 2-9 Bechtel Drawings AX3D-AA-A01A (Main One Line - Common Units 1 &
- 2)
- 2-10 Bechtel Drawings AX3DLO60 (Switchyard Ceneral Arrangement) 2-11 Bechtel Drawings IX3DH7Al (Low Voltage Switchvard Plan) 2-12 Bechtel Drawings IX3DH7A3 (Low Voltase !.witchyard Deattis -
Sheet 2) 2-13 Bechtel Drawings 2X3D-BB-B01L (Elementary Diagram - Electircal System Generator Tripping) 2-14 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L57D (500kv PCB No,' 1615 20 Close & Trip No. 1) 2-15 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX9D-AA-L50T (500kV PCBs No. 161520/161620/161660 Single Line) 2-16 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L55A (230kV Offsite Source No. 1 C.T. & P.T. Connecting - Sheet 1) 2-17 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L55B (230kv Offsite Source No. 1 C.T. & .T. Connecting - Sheet 1) 2-18 Southern Company Services / orc Drawing AX3D-BA-L55C (230 offsite Source No.1 Dif f & Backup Relaying) 2-19 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-AA-L50B (230kv Single Line For PCBs 161760/161860/161960) 2-20 Bechtel Drawings 2X3D-AA-B04A (Three Line Diagram - Unit 2 AC Generator) f kf
.' 2-21 Bechtel Draw (egs 2X3D-AA-B02A (One Line - Relays & Meters For a RA15) 2-22 Bechtel Drawings 2X3D-AA-B01A (Relavs & Meters - Generator. Main. & l'AT) 2-23 Bechtel Drawings IX3D-BA-B55B (Res. Aux XrMR INXRB CRT , Switcher) 2-24 Southern Company Senciesel CPC Drawing AN3D-AA1.50A (500kv & 230kv Sunstation Single Line index DrawinF) 2-25 Nuclear Plant Maintenance Work Order No. 18906364 2-26 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52R 2-27 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-HA-L52N Elementary 2-28 Southetn Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52P Diagrams for 230kv PCB 2-29 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52Q No. 161860 2-30 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52S 2-31 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52H ; 2-32 Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-CA-L72K 2-33 Bechtel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D03B (4160 V Switchgear 1BA03) 2-34 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-AA-D03A (4160 V Switchgear i 2-35 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-AA-D02B (4100 Y Switchgear 1 AA02) 2-36 Bechtel Drawina 1X3D-AA-D02A (4160 V Switchgear 1BA03) 2-37 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-AA-D01A (4140 V Switchgear INA01) 2-38 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-AA-D04A (4100 V Switchgear 1NA04) , 2-39 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-AA-D02A (41f.0 V Switchgear ANA02) 2-40 Bechtel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D03A (4160 V Switchstar ANA03) 2-41 Bechtel Drawing AX3D-BA-D02C (4160 V Breaker ANA0203) 2-42 Bechtel Drawing AX3D-BA-D03C (4160 V Breaker ANA0303) 2-43 Bechtel Drawing At3D-BA-D03B (4160 V Breaker ANA0301) 2-46 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-D0lJ (4160 V Breaker INA0111) 2-45 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-D04D (4160 V Breaker INA0412) 2-46 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-002c (4160 V Swgr 1 AA02 INCM Brkr INXRB) 2-47 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-D02B (4160 V $wgr I AA02 INLt Brkr INXRA) ( 2-48 2-49 Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-D02D (4160 INCM Brkr 152-1AA0219 EDG) Bechtel Drawing IX3D-BA-D01C (4160 Swgr INA01 INCM Brkr INXRA) 2-50 GPC Procedure No. 13145-1 " Diesel Generators"- 2-51 GPC Procedure No. 24614-1 " Train B Sequencer ACOT & CAL" 2-52 GPC Procedure No. 27563-C " Generator And Engine Control Panel Functional Test" 2-53 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 1 2-54 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 sh 2 ' 2-55 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 3 Diesel Generator 2-56 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 4 Engine Control 2-57 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 5 Panel Schematics 2-58 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 6 2-59 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 7 2-60 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 8 2-61 Delavel Drawing 09-695-72021 " Engine Pneumatic Schematic" 2-62 Prints IX3D-AA-A01A. Rev. 16
, 1X3D+AA-f27A. Rev. 13 4 1X3D AA-F28A. Rev. 14 -; IX3 DG-020. Rev. 15
- 2-63 10 Hile EPZ Map
- 2-64 NOUE ED Checklist Of 3/23/90 2-05 [0F Personnel for 1/20/90 2-60 Security Emeryency Response Organteation for 3/20/90 2-t 7 TSC Personnel 3/20/90 ! 2-68 CR Personnel 3/20/90
. 2-69 OSC Personnel 3/20/90 2-70 Trainint Records EOF 2-71 Communicator Package Consisting Oft ;
Course Completion & Attendance Records Training Student Handout Dated 6/27/89 Lab / Performance Exercise Guides Lesson Plan RE LP 07001-02 Tsaining Student Handout Dated 4/13/88 Lesson Plan RE LP 07001-01 ' 2-72 Control Room Layouts Procedure 10003-C 2-73 Previous Inspection Report: +
$0-424.425 89-21 & 89-25 8/25-27/89 Exercise 50-424/425 88-38 & 88-42 8/15-19/89 ERF Appraisal 2-74 QA Open Item OAA-87-292 2-75 Safety Standard Handbook 2-76 Emergency Director tog 2-77 ISC Log 2-78 Emergency Notification Hessages fil 02
#83 n4 05 48 6 47 08
#9 2-79 EDT Manager tog 2-80 Met Info i 2-81 Dictated From GLHA To VECP (FAX 3/22/90) Notification Information 2-82 Assorted News Dispatcher & Newspaper Articles 2-83 Procedures:
91001-C. Rev. 7 ; 91002-C. Rev. 15 91102-C. Rev. 6 91401-C. Rev. $ 91704-C. Rev. 8 2-84 GET Training Student Handout
}
g
+
ye,, a g +- g .,- - .w y %
, 2-85 Handbook for Ganeral implovee Badge Training 2-86 3/2/90 Test " Data Sheet k" Of 91204-C & Data Sheet 7 2-87 3/20/90 hotes "Emervency Response" - From Region 11 2-88 3/21/90 Notes 3 Pys. Notes 2-89 8 Hr Report Dated 3/20-90 2-90 3/22 Results Sheet On Accountability & ISC Procedure Verification 3/22 Restriction On Offsite Interaction - Phone call 3/22 St'ENN Notes 2-91 3/22 Interview - Herb Whitener Ril 2-92 3/23 Notes CR Procedure Verification 2-93 R11 Plant Note On Capt. 1. Nash 2-94 Interview Pauline Jenkins - Communication 2-95 Interview theresa Jones - Communication 2-46 Interview Jimmy Cash - Operations Supt.
2-97 Interview Willinm Burmeister - Plant Duty Manager 2-98 Results Of Selected Sampling Of Employee in Security Bldg. 2-99 E Plan Section H-9 " Activities And Staffing Of Emergency Facility" 2-100 Interview John Hopkins - Shift Supt. Unit 1 (Interview Incomplete) 2-101 Interview Capt. William Johnson Accountability & Log Form 2-102 Interview Lt. William Stewart Accountability 2-103 Historical Classification Of Emergency & Phone Communication Notes - Bob Trojanowski - Rll GAO 2-104 E Plan. Section B. "Onsite Emergency Organization" 2-105 Results Of CR Walkdown Of Procedure File As found 2-106 Backup ENN Description 2-107 Met Bldg. Inspection Notes 2-108 Listing of onshift People For Inspection 2-109 Drug And Alcohol Screening Report on Donnie W111hite (Fuel Truck [' Driver)
\ 2-110 Inventory Of fuel Truck 2-111 Procedure 00656-C. Traffic And Parking Control. Rev. 0 2-112 Procedure 90015-C. Vehicle Access. Rev. 8 2-113 Procedure 00653-C. Protected Area Entry / Exit Control. Rev. 8 2-11h Procedure 70030-C. Traf fic And Parking Cont rol. Rev. 2 2-115 Procedure 90015-C. Vehicle Access To The PA. Rev. 5 2-116 Procedure 00260-C. Hazardous Subst ance And Waste Control. Rev 5 2-117 Procedure 00261-C. Fuel Oil Handling And Safety . Rev. 5 2-118 1he Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant: Safety Standards 2-119 Figure 16-1 "Of f site AC" (FSAR) 2-120 GPC - VEGP - Unit 1 Control Log - pp 5283-84 (3/20/90) 2-121 GPC - VEGP - Unit 2 Control Log - pp 2601-03 (3/20/90) 2-122 GPC - VEGP - Unit 1 SS Log - pp 5413-14 (3/20190) 2-123 GPC - VEGP - Unit 2 SS Log - pp 2875-77 (3/20/90) 2-124 VEGP - Unit 2 Trip Report 2-125 Proteous Alarm Printout - Unit 2 (3/20/90) 2-126 Proteous Alarm Printout - Unit 1 (3/20/90) s
2-127 DC 1-90-0097 (IA DIG Sequencer Prob) (3/20/90) 2-128 Control Rooa lavouts 2-129 Procedure 13145-1. Rev. 20 " Diesel Generators" 2-130 Licensed Operator Training Materials For Loss Of E)ectrical ; Power ! I 2-131 Licensed Operator Training Materials for Loss Of Residual Heat Removal 2-132 Licensed Operator Trainina Materials For Emergency Plan Implementing 2-133 Outside Operator Training Haterial For Diesel Cenerator Operation 2-134 Procedure No. 12006-C Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown 3/8/90 2-135 Procedure No. 13005-1 Reactor Coolandt System Draining 2-23-90 2-136 Procedure No. 13011-1 Residual Heat Removal System 3-26-90 2-137 Procedur( No. VEGP 00052-C Procedur'e No. 12007-C Refueling Entry 3-26-90 2-138 Procedure No. 12007-C Refueling Entrv 3/G/90 2-139 Procedure No. 12000-C Refueling Entry 3/8/90 2-140 Procedure No. 18019-C Abnormal Operating Procedure Loss of Residual Heat Removal 3/8/90 2-141 Procedure No. 19100-C Emergency Operating Procedure ECA-0.0 Loss of ALL AC Power 3/16/90 2-142 Procedure No. 23985-1 RCS Temporary Water Level System Emergency Operating Procedure ECA - 0)*0.0 Loss of All AC Power 5/12/89 4 2-143 Procedure No. 54840-1 Installation and removat instructions for the RCS Temp. Level Indication Tygon Tube and the Defeat of the Residual Heat Removal Suction valve auto closure interlock 2-144 0950076021 pp. 9of 9 Delaval Drawing Engine Control Panel ' 2-145 0968876021 pp lof3 Devalve Drawing Engine and Skid Ele. Schem 2-146 IX4DB111 Rev. 17 P&1 Diagram Reactor Coolant System No. 1201 ( 2-147 1X4DB112 Rev. 24 P&l_ Diagram Reactor Coolant System No. 1201 1X4DB114 Rev. 25 P&1 Diagram Reactor Coolant System No. 1208 2-148 2-149 1X4DB115 Rev. 23 P&I Diagram Chemical & Valve No. 1208 2-150 1X4DB116-1 Rev. 23 P&1 Diagram Chemical & Valve No. 1208-2-151 1X4DB116-2 Rev. 16 P&1 Diagram Chemical & Valve No. 1208 2-152 1X4DB117 Rev. 19 P&1 Diagram Chemical & Valve No. 1208 2-153 1X4DB118 Rev. 20 P&1 Diagram Chemical & Valve No. 1208 2-154 1X4DB119 Rev. 21 P&I Diagram Safety Injection System No. 1204
- 2-155 1X4DB120 Rev. 15 P&1 Diagram Safety injection System No. 1204 2-156 IX4DB121 Rev. 25 P&I Diagram Safety injection System No. 1204 2-157 1X4DB122 Rev. 27 P&1 Diagram Residual Heat Removal System No.1205 2-158 NLOD Training Materials 2-159 Loss of All AC/4160 v IE Power-lesson Plan.
2-160 Loss of RHR Haterials 2-161 EPIP Training Haterials that discuss Emerg. Classifications & Notification Reg's. 2-162 DC 1-90-0097
- . . _ . _ m _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ _. . - - . ..- _ _
,e finr Pool du.umen: for IIT teadet 4
- 4. Ev21oatien if Patenti.s1 Explosion in the Vogtle Switchyard
". Enttans. Presentat ion t y Georgia Power company 3/26/90
- 6. PNO-IIT-40-02 3/26/10 Subic.t- I?T arrive it Vogtle Site
- 7. Agreement
- s igt.ed t'v (3 ) industiv tept?scatatives on Waiver of Tumpensation. Conflict of Interest and t elease of 1:.sc$tigation Information foi industry participating in 117 .
- c. Bu*letin Board Notice-o lettet to Do ument contral desk.USNRC f rom W. C. Hairston III. Sr. V.P .
I Noclean at>et a tior.. Geotria Power Co. . dated 11/30/S9 Subject Vogtle (. Electric Cetteratin? Plant Hardwate_Modifi.:atiutis pursuant to generic lettet 88-17.
- 10. Lette: to document conttol desk. 05NLc f rom W. C. Hain ston III. (PC. dated ,
2/2/*o. Subiect: Plant Vogtle - Units 1 and 2. NRC dStket 50-424. 30-425. Opet ating License NPF-68. Canattu'. tion Permit CPPR-109 Response to Gens : f r.- letter 89-17.
-i
- 11. Letter to document control desk. CSNRC W. C. Hairston. III.GPC.
Subject:
= sanne as "10.
!2. Sequence of Events Chronology of site area Emergency 3/20/90 (Received ,
3/2'/40)-from license.
- 13. L-t ter to W. G. Hairston.111. GPC. from A.-R. Herdt. NRC. dated 7/31/89.
Sutt i ect : Not ice of -Violation (Inspect inn Report Nos. . 50-424/84-19 and 50-425/89-23) w/NRC Inspection Manual Tempo:arv . Inst ruction- 2515/101
-,N.- - No- w ,. ,,c .- w ., 4 .. ,w -, ~ , ..'ml<,, y
- 14. lo.11 newn :t et .ovetape - Msti.h 27- IW l' Int er of f ice 'iemr. f im G. Imckhold. J r. . Plat.t M1nac t. to Vortle Site i
P-r-onnel date1 3I2"/90. Subjeit: Vehltles it. Petimete: Atei i
'6. Entrance Meeting with Licenve and P-rmiuw) statements 1/ -l Entrane" Meeting Notes 16-2 J. Hopkins - 55 16-3 R. B. Snyder - 55 16-4 P. V.1:aile r - R0 16-3 F. Jones - CR0
- 17. Order to quarantine
- 18. -Letter to C C. Miller. Mgr. of Engineerine. Vogtle. from W. C. Ramsev.
Jr.. dated 2/16/90.
Subject:
Vortle, l' nits'l & l. Final Response to Request f or Engineering Assistance. At t achment : Loss of Decav Heat removal Analytical Studies for Vogtle 1 & 2. A response to GL 88-17.
- 19. Training Student Handout No. GE-HO-88002-00-001-C Continuing Training--RHR Mid-Loop Oper."
- 20. Training Lesson Plans:
20-A2 Continuing Training--RHR Mid-Loop Oper. No. CE-LP-88002-00-C 20-B Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Fuel Oil System No. NL-LP-11202-01-C 20-C Emergency Diesel Generator General Overview No. NL-LP-il201-00-C - 20-D Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries No. NL-LP-ll2O3-02-C
- 21. EOP No. 19100-C. Revision 4 ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power
- 22. 4160V AC IE Electrical Distribution. Procedure No. 13427-2. Revision 5
- 23. Loss of Class lE Electrical System. A0 Procedure No. 18031-C. Revision 6
- 24. Baron Injection Flow Path Verification - Shutdown. Procedure No. 14406-1.
Revision 3,
- 25. Generator and Engine Control Panel Functional Test Procedure No. 27563-C.
Revision 2
- 26. T-ENG-90-II . Rev.1. "A-TRAIN l'NDERVOLTAGE TEST" Expiration Data: 4/8/90 27 Temporarv Procedure No. T-ENG-90-12. B-Train Undervoltage Test
( l
. 28. Tenporarv ~ Procedute No. T ENG-90-13. Sequencer Operabilltv check d~
' 29. Temporary Procedure No. T-ENG-90-14. Unit one Train B 'DCP 88-VIN 0070 ,
Sequencer functional Test
- 9. T-ENG-90-15. Unit one Train A. DCP 88-51N0070 Sequencer functional Test ;
. .t l . Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 19001576. 3/28/90 (Diesel Generator 1A) ,
d
. 32. Proteus Alasm Printout (l'1)
- 33. Proteus Alarm Printout (U2)
- 34. List of Quarantined Equipment (Revised 3/29/90 Rev. 2) ,
e
- 35. Personnel Interviews ,
35-1 K. Pope - SS ' 35-2 W. Burmeister - L' nit Superintendent 35-3 N. Dewbre.-P. Jenkins. T. Jones - Shift Clerks ' 35-4 P. Thompson - EGS1 R.Moye - ESS 35-5 G. Bockhold - PH 35-6 D. Vineyard - SS 35-7 W. T. Kitchens - Ass't. PM ' 35-8 D. Hines. D. Daughhetee. E. Pickett. J. Stanley 35-9 J. P. Cash - OS 35-10 T. C. Eckert - Oper. Dept.
+
- 36. List of quarantined equipment (Revised 3/29/90 Rev. 3)
- 37. Personnel interviews 37-1 W. Johnsen. W. Stewart -Security 37-2 M. Lackey - Outage Planning Mgr.
37-3 H. Lackey. R. Barlos. J. D'Amico - Scheduling 37-4 J. Roberts - EP 37-5 H. Handfinger - Maintrnance Mgr. 37-6 G. Brenenborg. I. Kochery 38 PNO-IIT-90-02A
- 39. Training Lesson Plan No. NL-11204-000 Emergency-Diesel Generator-Engine Control and Protection 5/11/89
- 40. Procedure No. 13415-1.Rev.6. Reserve Auxiliary Transformers. 6/30/89-
- 41 Training Lesson Plan _No. LO-LP-28201-09-C Sequence Operation. 7/26/89 3
- t
- a .. . a -+ -
-..r,,
42 E0P No. 19101-C. ECA-0,1 Loss of all-
- ACPow2t Recovery without SIRequired
- 43. Training lesson Plan No. NL-11205-010. t Emergency Diese) Generator Control and Protection. 8/29/89
- 4. Training Lesson Plan ho. LO-LP-11102-0$-C :
Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Air Start System. 12/8/89 ,
- 45. Training Lesson Plan No. LO-LP-11001-06-C.
Emergency Diesel Generator Introduction and Overview. 12/11/89
- 46. Personnel Intervews i 46-1 E. Dannemiller. D. Huyck - Security' 46-2 J. D. Jiles - Safety Specialist 46-3 R. Berry - Security ,
46-4 S. Chestnut -Training 46 ' K. Stokes - Sr. Plant Enf.
- 47. ProcedLie No. 13426-C. 4160V AC Common Non IE 'ilectrical Distribution System.1/26/90
- 48. Training Lesson Plan No. LO-LP-11103-06-C Emergency Deisel Generator Auxiliaries:
Combustion air and exhaust, 2/28/90
- 49. Training lesson Plan No. LO-LP-11104-C.
Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries tube 011
. , and Crank Case Ventilation. 12/8/89
- 30. Training 1.esson Plan No. LO-LP-11105-08-C. ;
Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Jacket water cooling system. 12/8/89 ,
- 51. Training Lesson Plan No. LO-LP-11101-07-C Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Fuel Oil System 12/8/89
- 52. Letter to J. P. Kane.GPC. from W.C..Ramsey (unsigned and undated).
Subject:
Response to REA
-VG-9010, Loss of decay heal removal
- 53. Emergency Response Facilities input <
List. revision 07.05, 12/11/86
- 54. Pr<,cedure No. 14406-1. Revision 3.
t
*-'e 9 m +-m.r-w--. ., ,.,. ,
a Boron injection Flow Path Verification-Shutdown. 2/6/89 _ l
- 55. VEGP Standing order No. 1+ 0-05.
Emetrency Boration riow Path. 3/1/90
- 6. Memorandum for A. Chaf f ee f rom S. Ebneter.
undated (received 3/30/90).
Subject:
Desi gnat ed Regional Point of Contact : I
$7. Procedure No. 17038-1. Rev.7. Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 38 on EAB Panel. 3/11/90
$8. Procedure No. 13011-1. Rev. i. Um System 3/11/90 !
- 59. Vehicle Access Request'. 3/2L,90
- 60. (AOP) Procedure No. 18019-C.Rev.7. Loss of RHR.3/16/90
- 61. PRB Comment Review Sheet (PRB-90-44) for Temporary Procedure No. T-ENG-90-14 62 GPC VEGP Handbook for General Employee Badge Training. GE-Il0-00101-001-C.
Rev. 5. 10/23/89 w/ record of training dates for D. W111hite
- 63. Event Report No. 1-90-003. Additional Support Items
- 64. SPDS Checklist
- 65. Items'on fuel Truck 3/2 30/90
'6. Photographs 66-1 Roll 1 - to be listed 66-2 Roll 2 - to be listed 66-3 Roll 3 - to be listed
- 67. Personnel Interview of G. Lee. J. Aufdenkampe. W.-F. Kitchen.
W. Burmeister & D. West
- 68. Diesel Generator failure Analysis
- 69. Personnel Interview 1 D. DeLoach. J. Jackson, and S. Whitman ,
- 70. Photographs 70-1 Roll 4 70-2 Roll 5 b
e e- 4- v.- -w+9- . w 1 yr-
- 71. Meeting Attendance Record 71-1 11T Entrance (3/26/90) i ,
71-2 Diesel Generator (3/28/90) 71-3 Diesel Generator (3/30/90)
- 2. Access Record History. 3/20/90
- 73. 8adre Record - 3/30/90
- 74. Evaluations of Initial Plant Conditions - J. D'Amico
- 75. Procedure No. PTDB-1 Tab 8.0. Rev. 2 - Pictorial Aids: RCS Elevations and Hid Loop Level Instrumentation (3/2/90)
- 76. IB015-C. Rev. 5. Loss of Instrument Air
- 77. Procedure No. 12000-C. Rev. 16. Refueling Recovery 3/8/90
' 78. Procedure No. 12006-C. Rev. 15. Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown 3/8/90
- 79. Procedure No. 12007-C. Rev. 14 Refueling Entry (Mode 5 to Hode 6). 3/8/90 80 Procedure No. 13005-1 Rev.10. Reactor Coolant System Draining. 2/23/90
- 81. Procedure No. 17006-1. key. 11. Annuniciator Response Procedure for ALB 06 on Panel 1A2 on MCB. 3/6/90
- 82. Bechtel Drawings IX3D- AA-002 C. Rev. 6. Vital Inster. Distr. Pnis.
AX3D- AA-A01 A. Rev.13. Main One Line 1 & 2 AX3D- AA-F19A. Rev.10. 480V Mo or Control Center (- IX3D- AA-00$B. Rev.14. 120V AC Non-Class IE key Instr. AX3D- AA-H01 A. Rev. 9. TSC 125V DC/120V AC Non-Class IE Distr. Panels AX31i- AA- A01 A. Rev.16. Main One Line Uni t 1 AX3D-AA-C02B. Rev. Main One Line Non-Class IE 125V DC & 120V Ess. AC System
- 83. MWO 18906587.50#4. Unit 1. 12/23/89
- 84. Procedure No. 25270-C. REv.6. SG Nozzle Dan Checkout. Installation and Removal 12/16/88
- 85. Procedure No. 18004-C. Rev. 6. AOP RCS Leakage. 12/9/90
- 96. (AOP) Procedure No. 18006-C. Rev. 2. Fuel Handling Event. 8/4/88
- 87. ( AOP) Procedure No.18020-C. Rev.3. Loss of Component Cooling Water.
2/14/90
. 88. (AOP) Procedure No. 18021-C.Rev. 4. Loss of Nucicar Service Cooling Water System. 3/16140
- 89. Irocedure No. 18034-1.Rev. 1. Loss of Class 1E 125V DC Poser. 9/12/89
'O. (AOP) Procedure No. 18028-C. Rev. 7. Loss of instrument Air. 3/16/90
- 91. (AOP) Procedure No. 18038-1 Rev. 10. Operation from Remote Shutdown Panels. 8/29/89
- 92. Radiation Monitors Status 93 Relief Request 7 and ll(with accompanying documents) Safety Injection System No. 1204
- 94. Procedure No, 003$0-C. Rev.19. Work Request Program (12/27/89) 95-1. MWO #10807746 3/31/90 95-2. MWO #19001339 3/31/90
- 96. Section 6.0. Adminstrative Controls (Vogtle 1 & 2)
- 97. Information on Critical Safety Function Status Frees on SPDS (on EXT computer)
- 98. Training Records: A. L. Blalock. P. Redivannz. W. Hennessy.
J. D, Williams. W. P. Stephens. W. M. Watkins. D. Haile. J. W. Covington. R. LeGrand. G. J. Durrence
- 99. Information on Maintenance Personnel Training on Mid-Loop Ops
.00. Procedure No. 00400-C. Rev. 11. Plant Design control. 2/24/90 101. Request for Engineering Review (Procedure No. 00400-C) of System 500 kv 102. Relaying Data Sheet - Gen. No. 2 Main Bk. Primary 103. Sequence of Events w/ source of information 104. 2.0 Hardware Configuration 105. Vendor Document Status Sheet-Manual Change No. 76021-9. 9/9/86 106. Security Department Report No. 3941-90 107 Joint News Release - 3/20/90 108. MWO (continued) No. 19001576 l
l
. 109 T-ENG-90-11. Rev. 1. A-Train undervotlage test w/related MWO's 110. lA Diesel Generatot Reference Material 111. 3/20/90 Lors: Unit 1 & 2 Shift Supervisor 1 & 2 Control
- 12. Memo to G. Bockhold f rom G. R. I drick. itated 9/27/89. Subicet VEGP-1 and 2 QA Audit finding Report 35' 113. Pelease 91 and n 2 3/20/90 114. OSC LoF 115. MWO 18906328. 3/27/90 116. Attendance Roster - Diesel Generator Mtg. (3/31/90) 117. Personnel Interviewst 117-1 K. Ex1y 117-2 P. Ilumphrey 117-3 J. Williams. D. Gustaf son. G. ficCarlev 118. Operational Journals. 3/20. w/ Situation Chart 119. MWO No. 19001684 (3/31/90) Diesel Generator - To Verify Timing of Two Trips During LOSP 120 Personnel Interviewst 120-1 C. Schnieder (EP) and S. Threatt (BRH-EPC) 120-2 R. Dorman - Training
( 120-3 M. Cagle - Maintenance
- 5. Driver - Training 120-4 120-5 D. Willhite Truck Driver 120-6 E. J. Kozinsky - SS 120-7 S. Young - PFS 121. Design Change Request No. 88-VIN 0070 wlDesign Change Package Closure -
Train A & B Sequencer Panels 122. Operation and Maintenance Instruction (SFSS) w/ drawings 123. Vogtle Operating Records - VPO40lGP 124. MWO 19001684 - 3/31/90 MWO 19001576 - 3/31/90 Mwo 28900466 - 3/31/90 k
, 125. PROPRIETARY DOClHENTS: W FIELD SERVICE PROCEDL'RES, 125-1 MRS 2.2.2 CPC-1. Post Activity Sign-Off for Area Cleanliness 125-2 MRS 2.2.2 CPC-21 Rev. O. Nozzle Dam Hydrotest 2 125-3 MRS 2.2.2 CPC-22 Rev. O. Nozzle Dam l 125 4 MRS 2.2.2 CPC-23 Rev. O. Nozzle Dam Manual 125-5 MRS 2.2.2 CPC-24 Rev. O. Nozzle Dame. Leak Detection Manual 126. Procedure No. 29536-C. Outage Management Program (3/4/88) 127. Procedure No. 27505-C. Rev. 2. Opening and Closing Containment Equipment Hatch (7/18/88) 128. Procedure No. 10013-C. Rev. 6. Writing E0Ps from the Westinghouse Emergency Response cuidelines (9/22/88) 129. Procedure No. 29537-C. Rev. 1. Outage Scheduling (4/11/89) 130. Procedure No. 01000-C. Rev. 1. Management of Outages (6/9/89) 131. Procedure No. 10011-C. Rev. 13. Operations Procedure Preparation and Review Cuidelines (7/5/89( 132. Procedure No. 10018-C. Rev. 11. Annunciator Control (9/26/89) 133. Procedure No. 10000-C. Rev. 16. Conduct of Operations (3/23/90) 134. Procedure No. 11011-1. Rev. 7. RHR Removal System Alignment (4/18/89) 135. Temporary Change to Procedure Form (TCP) No. 13001-1-12-90-1. RCS rilling and Venting (Expiration Date: 4/6/90) (436.ProcedureNo. s 14230-1. Rev. 4. AC Source Verification (7/27/88) 137. Procedure No. 91403-C. Rev. 4. Site Evacuation (12/6/88) 138. (EOP) Procedure No. 19101-C. Rev. 8. ECA-0.1 Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without 51 Required (7/26/89) 139. Procedure No. 19111-C. Rev. 8. ECA-1.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (7/26/89) 140. Procedure No. 13001-1. Rev. 12. Reactor Coolant System Filling and Venting (10/10/89)
-141. System Block Diagrams - SFSS 142. Bechtel Drawings k.-
_ =
-e --n + * *
. , - . - . - - . . . - - - . - _ _ .. . . _ - . ~
l i
-11. Rev. 1. A-Train undervotlage Test s/related NWO's !
1 G2nerator Reference Material Logs: Unit 1 & 2 Shif t Supervisors 1 & 2 Control VEOP-1 O. Bockhold from G. R. Fredrick, dated 9/27/89. Subs,e : 4 i Audit finding Report 350
#1 and # 2 3/20/90 2 -)6328. 3/27/90 ' nce Roster - Diesel Generator Mt g. (3/31/90) el Interviews:
K. Ex1y P. Humphrey
.J. Williams. D. Gustafson. G. McCarley onal Journals. 3/20, w/ Situation Chart 19001684. (3/31190) Diesel Generator - To Verify Timing Trips During LOSP i
n1 Interviews: G. Schnieder (EP) and S. Threatt (BPR-EPC)
-R. Dorman - Training M. Cagle - Maintenance S. Driver - Training D. W111hite - Truck Driver ?
-E. J. Kozinsky - SS 5.. Young - PPS Chsnge Request No. 88-VIN 0070 w/ Design- Change Package Closure -
A & B Sequencer Panels 8 Lion and Maintenance instructions (SFSS) w/ drawings-
? Optrcting Records - VPO401CP L1001684 - 3/31/90 3001576 - 3/31/90 1 3900466 - 3/31/90 1
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DRP MORNING REhnd - REGION 11 DATE: April 13, 1990 Licensee / Facility: Notification: Region 11 Georgia Power Company
Subject:
Vogtle Unit 1 Restart Vogtle Unit 1 Docket Hos.: 50-424 Facility Type: W - PWR , Repot: table Event Number: N/A Discussion: NRC management has approved the restart of Vogtle Unit 1. The unit was the subject of a Confirmation of Action Letter as a result of the dispatching of an Incident Investigation Team on March 23, 1990. Criticality is scheduled to be achieved on April 15, 1990. Unit 2 continues to operate at f00% power. (' Regional Action,: The Resident inspectors will be observing the restart. { >
Contact:
K. Brockman FTS: 841-6299 (
pnREGv r 4 h 0 4a to w o b l o FrerM vnoTt.E
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- PAGES
2 ' cf SEit!-oserz/5'. 114;27190n DGHsn wow 3~ s DG 18 TROUBLESHOOTING PLAN Vent JW temperature switches prior to each start. Monitor P 3 operation for each start. . Snoop each JW temperature switch during start. Monitor JW temperature during each run and record. Any problems stop and have meeting.-
- 1. Perform 3 local emergency starts with'"old" switches installed l -
?- C:librete-re. P-3 te I;.;r setyvini (bri 4-0 % vp) -
M
- 3. Perform 1 (en more) normal starts with existing P-3
._L__' r ^ - " = " 0 .;i t h l e e. m eu . n v Er-- P:rf:-- ? nc rm:1 3t..te .... os. T 6. Perform Operations surveillance
;A C7.5rCOT C 2+ ye 4
4
C 'd Lttel 06/r2/SO .L 'I d - 3"lH 0n Det4Sn 408 3
. Y 3An F7~
TIME LINE GEQUENCE OF KVENTS TIME EVENT 12-18 hours I&C used new calibration procedure to before calibrate temperature switches for the cooling installation water jacket high temp alarm. This was the first engine tested under this cal procedure. 5-23-90 - 1202 CDT I&C installed the 3 switches, the little air switch was cleaned and the engine was put in
" remote".
1226 First start, normal start 1228 Engine tripped after 60-90 seconds run. Alarms: 1) Lo Turbo 011 Pressure
- 2) Hi Jacket Water Temp
- 3) Lo Jacket Water pressuro NOTE: First alarm not clear due to error by operator.
Reset " Test button" accidently instead of
" Silence Alarm button
Engine declared (HOP action statements & LCO's initiated 1310 All parameters reset for second restart (Normal restart) Engino Restarted 1312 Engine tripped after 80-90 seconds run. Alarus a) Lo pressure turbo lube oil b) Lo jacket water pressure NOTE: I&C Personnel at each switch with leak detection (snoor) soap to check for venting - Ho switcbes venting. 14'12 All parameters reset for third restart (Emergency Start) engine restarted NOTE: No trips or malfunction annunicators lit 1425 Engine stopped efter 13 minute run. 1445 All parameters reset for Fourth restart (Normal Start) Engine restarted (NOTE: No abnormal indicators) 1449 Engine stopped after 4 minute run. i
r 'd LCirl 06er2/50 17d 371900 Det45n WOdd i ii UNIT ONE "B" DIESRL GENERATOR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1925 Trouble shooting urgent HWO 19002711 for 1-2403 04-002 approved for work by UGS Steve Chestnut Pre fabricated pressure gauges and fittings in I&C shop. Also blew linos to try to assure no noisture or trash gets into lines when these 4 gauges are installed. 2-60 pour.d & 2 100 pound gauges - all MATE calibrated VP numbers are on HWO, I&C - Bob Neal, Wayne Belwig. Bill Whaley, Mark Briney 1958 Ops personnel Sam Hart, Greg Horley, Mark Jackson and Bill Dunn preparing D/G for start per procodure 13145-1 2012 I&C installed 1/4" fittings on gauges and blew out 1/4" tygon tubing. 2035 I&C began running tubing and hooking up all 4 gaugen. NOTE: When first air line to first temp switch (A) was disconnected a puff of air was detected. The second air line (B) disconnr.cted with a definite puff of air. The third line (C) disconnected with a definite puff of air. Also all fittings were swagelok and no goop was.uned on those fittLngs. 2105 I&C assured gauges a: e zeroed with no pressure and completed connectionn 2108 I&C informed Operations ready to run D/G (Mark Briner. Sam Bart) 2110 Control Room and PRO's set up communications. PEO Jackson opened the turbo lube oil bypass valve. , (TLOBV) 2113 Start button pushed (operational) for first trouble shooting test 2114 Jackson went to close TLOBV. 2115 Control Room announcta " Start 1B D/G atand clear
- 2118 D/G ntarted 55 seconds later - tripped 2119 3 alarms - 1. Turbo Lube Oil Lo Pressure
- 2. Di Temp Jacket Water
- 3. Low Pressure Jacket Water P3 gauge read - 43 (NOTE: Should have gone above 52.5) 117 A switch read 1.5 2.0 3.5 119 B switch read 2.4 2.5 3.
11R C ,5 witch rand P./ 3.8 A A
- - ~ ~
g .a actrl OG/ra/Go 1ia 311oon D8Nsn Wosd 1 1 j 2134 Preparation for second test began. Marc Jackson opena TLOBV. 2135 D/G 1B starting announcement from Control Room 2136 D/G IB started. Haro Jackson closed TLOBY. 2137 D/G 1B tripped after 80 second run. Same three alarms. A B C 117 119 118 1.5 2 3.5 2 2.5 5.5 P3 read 41.5 pai 3 temp switch gauges maximum reading at approx. 6.5 Psi 2140 Snooped tygon connections. No leaks detected. 2146 In preparation for third test. Three temp switches connected to air surply with pressure gauges and tygon tubing were removed. 2153 Control Room announced. " Ready to Start D/G"" 2154 Operational button pushed. TLODV opened by Jackson. 2158 D/G started. (Third test) TLOBV closed. P3 gauge read - 47 pst A & C temp switches observed venting at a noticeable rate. B venting also but not nearly as much. 2157 DG tripped after 60 second run. Alarum Lo pressure ' turbo oil and Lo pressure jacket water. 2205 D/G restarted (fourth test) P3 gauge read - 81.S ps1 - running good. 2210 DG manually stopped. 2239 Freparation for fifth test (Emergency atart) bled air off all 3 temp switches. All 3 nwitches had puff of air released when air line was disconnected. Reconnected air lines.
e 1eloi ee s.ir1 05/rD50 l1d 3 ~1100:1 08NEn WOds l i4, 2240 "Roady for Emergency Start" control room announcement. TLOBV opened. 2254 Emergency start'TLOB" closed. P3 gauge went up to 80.5 then dipped to 55 at trip then backup to 01.5. 2256 Tripped Hi temp jachot water alarm NOTE: Actual temp of Jacket water : lb5 F but trip setroint : 200 F 2310 Cracked the 3 temp switches to bleed off air A had puff of air B had no air C had no air 2336 Bixth Test. Kmergency D/G start - 1 minute 10 seconds then tripped. Snoop testing all 3 temp switches to see if venting during run A partial venting, B venting, C venting 2337 Tripped after 1 minute 10 seconda run. Same alarma as fifth trip. b/2' ?O 010 '!? Replacing all three (3) Jacket water switches with original switches renoved earlier with teatLng to resume on day shift. A had puff of air when line was removed. D did not have air pressure when line was removed. C did not have air pressure when line was removed, QC inspector J. C. Sirvey witnessed the removal and reinstalled of switcLen. C200 Switches have been replaced and those removed have been bagged and L. red and placed in cabinet C-8 in I&C Shop Class "B" st orage. -
, , ( , r # C"-~ u A >
[
^ y fd1 k r( ;] g - U c.( L OJL V \J A V0GTLE 11T NUREG-1410 GEliEPAL FIND 1 HGS o Conclusions ano findings can be grouped into seven arens:
- Plant configur6 tion during outages
- Switchyard controls
- Safety but inter-connections
- EDG issues
- Loss o1 M.F guidance
- Emergency clnssitication and respor,se
- Tect.nical specification concerns e
/.l l I
I- . l t' l P. ANT CONiiGliPATION DL'Rit.G OUTAGE 5 j u togtle complied w/TS 1 I o GPC did net consider qu611tative risk it; outage plannir.g 1 o No requirtrer.ts to cor. sider risk I
~
l o Plant configuration untsecesserily compromised plant sefety. l
- Allowed reduced power sourcts during tric-loop operstions
- Coulc have beer, cvoiced o Pist ranagenier,t would address
- Minirnze time ir, inic-loop i
- liaxu.n;:e pathways for water to RCS '
- Kaxir.ize suont t systens
- Minimize tirie to secure ccntainment
- Remove fuel from rter.tcr (officee' to spent fuel pit) l l
~
l l
l r SkiTCHYARD CON 1ROLS 0 No vehicle 6ccess controls prior to event
- Subsequer.tly implemcasted c I;c specific restrit.tions on combustibles
- Ignition cf combustibles coulc have increasto event severity c No currer.t hkC require.ents
i .
.i I
SAFE 1Y BU5 lhTER-CONNEC110NS o Vettle complitc w/TS for electrical sources o Vogtit t,ac no procedure to cross-tie buses c Vogtle " Missing Breaker" design is r.et flexible
- Prevints inaavertent connection of safety buses /seperation IE buses --
- Prever:ts live transf er between reserve aux, transf ormers
- Limits operator flexibility to supply safety related loads
- hequires additional Ebb starts u Alterr.e t ives
- Key lock switttes
- Two circuit breakers in series
- f rovide sarrt protecticr. w/ greater flexibility 4
k 1 \ l ll ,* EDG ISSUES o ECG Trip Senscr Problers
- Foreign material
- Calibtution methec
- Set peint dritt o EDG Trip Design
- Nortel (UV) start all protective trips active
- En.ergency start only essential tiips active (ger., diff., engine overspeed, Jacket w6ter temp., IUbe oil press.
- Vogtle modified EDGs to bypass all non-essential trips for all autu starts
- Vogtle niodifiec EDGs to manuolly bypass incket water temp.
- Cuaplies w/Pesulatory Guide o EDG Panel Design
- First out feature not useful in deterr.ining root cause trip
- !!uisance alarms contribute to operator confusion o Inter 6ction Between Sequencer are EDG
- Ebc locked-out following trips
- Cuuld not bs startec by normal means EDG circuitry / sequence circuitry / auto start signal interact following EDG shutdown Was not well understood by oper6 ting staff
t -- LOS$ OF RHR GUIDM.LE l o Vogtle hat not fully implemented GL 08-17
- Incomplett training anc procedures
- Containment closure took longer than analysis (loss of all power-would have further lengthened closure tin.6) o GL SE-17 dio not fully address severei loss of RHR issues
- Gravity feed
- Reflux bciling
- kecovery of RCPB following loss of RHR (w/ vent)
- Heir.tuining core coolinC w/o AC power o Industry has not explicitly todressed the loss of AC pcwer/ loss of RHR evert >
- 560 rule coes not address e loss.of Tempor0ry Thimble Tube Seals
- Was not e concern for-Vogtle event
- Could lose RCFC integrity followis.g overpressurization
- Break /le6k woulo be bottom of vessel o Industry feedback on related events
- Comprehensive er specific events
- Did net globally view the loss of RHR/ loss of power scenario
".g _ v _ - .,
s a ,
. EMCRGEACY CL AS$1FICAT101.'-Ahi, RESP 0fiSE' x.
o NUREG-0654 dcts not address loss of poweriplus loss of': RHR at -
~
cold shutouwn c NUREG-06L4 is ambiguous for loss ct power events
-- .3 o Incer$1 stent in.plementation at 12 sites sampled -
o Vogtie n.aoe a! correct / conservative t.lassification - Site Area
-lmergency u l.onfusit,n withL site ev6tu6 tion.
d o Corisideration should be given to outage.situatic'ns (large nunbers-of pecple)
- Neec to respond to evant (ex. close containment, regt.ir. RCPB)-
- ieec to evacuate non-esser.t.ial personnel o- Vogtle did not ru t 15 min, notificatior'f,oal- -
- Eht lost due to loss.of 1B' safety bus :
-BackupElifJtoSC(cidnotincluceGeorgi6)-
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.s. . t-TECHNICAL SFLCIFICAT10fi C0hCERNS o Yogtle was in con.pliance w/TS c Lower modes not adequately addressec l<e : Saf ety analyses, equipment availability, worst single failures
- Assumed to be bounded by higher modes
- Assumed to be less severe
- Assumed to have tt:1 to respond and mitigatt c Vulntritilities/]nterrelationships in lower modes not well addressed in TS
- Cuntainn.ent integrity
- Alternate water sources
- Alternate power sources o Additional TS Requirements may not be advisable
- heec to perform maint., inspections, surveillance tests
- Requires open echtainn.ent
- Ecquires equipment out-of-service
- Can reduce vulnerabilities ano einimize risk
- . , .. . - . . . . - - . - . - . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . .
3 Ad > 0;
- Le w V.
.O r
k, COLLECTED MISCELLnHEOUS liF0RMAf f 0N t ... frints
= l t Ji,- A A - A01 A . F. e v . Ic la3D-AA-F274.-Rev. 13 1x315-AA-F28A. Rev. 14
- 1 x3 D0-020. Rev. - 15
- 2. 10 Mile EPZ Map 3.- MRE Et 4?'ktWYe'?s'$heckMst. eniiiYWWit9790
~
Of 3/23/?( L' fiscurity EN/yeniy"Ilesponse Organf ration for 3/28/98
- 4. TSC Personne1'3/28/ft'
- 7. CY Piri sondir 7/29799 9p OSC Persoriser'37N/tti P; TPhtntig p eords K !
197 Chaeunicator Package Consisting Of C'ourse CImplvl}on~'{, TFatAf Itudsat men t' De Gs )4'/77/09dyl d 6Ehrds' Lat,Te(evFaascTEisfcile r Guides towsarffW. - Tfutfitnf ., , ,, .,,hted 4/13/08
- Lessen Sa,g,,,% g.,. -41 1 l'. CWtroF111RWt.ayem s-Procedure 10003-C 1E ' Wees s B _ __ _ , gn
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- 14. Sefety Standard Handboot
(. L 1 o e ILb: matin in t,his record vias deleted in 3:cc:dtxe with the freedom of Information i - - _ _ . ' A:t, czemjtions _ 4 F0:A _I_3 - 7#
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'/1001-C. Rev. 7 91002-C. hev. 15 61102-C, Rev. 6 91431-C. Rev. S 91?M -C, R6v. 8 W OET Training Student Hamdant
- 3. Handbook For General Employee.3adesA**='- _
- 4. 3/7/?F'THf ' Wha Sheet 4' Of 91294-C E Data Sheet 7
, 3/2Wf9FHotes
- Emergency Respanse* - Frocs Region 11 3/2rr?T NrtM TPye.* IWttt"*' ,
- 7. 8 Hr Report Dated 3/29-99
- 14. 3/22"R96wlts Steet On kroentability E 15C Procedure Veriftration 3/2TRettPtetter* OfftttWr TWttractitart- Phone-Call:
3/22 Dupar1#tet 7 3/277WtervtW- Merb Whiteese RIr~ 106 3 h wertttratiese - 1 p' RfTPrdlit ' Not6-tiri W 9f*'TamesP**** 12 Int &rvisNr 'Paufine 'JenkiW6 'tNImmunrAh-13f Interview 'TheresaJJonee 'Communtemetenw id . Interview Jiane Camin + sSpous4tannreipf. 1Ij Intsevietr ei..,7 _LL -
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2 7 Wackup I!im Desee '
- 2. Met- 31dg. In " .
. Listing Of 3musse&ien )
bw%%, i .- Q%T LOCUMENTS EECETVED g.g. p t -w - ad,w : , I . ....c. , j J. Inventory Of fuel truct.
- 3. Procedure 00656-C. Traffic And Par 6ing Control, hev. 0
- 4. Procedure 900lb-C. Vehicle Access. Rev. 8
- 5. Procedure 00603-C. Protected Area Entry /Esit Control. Rev. B
- 6. Proceduro 70030-C. Traf fic And Far61ng Con trol, Rev. 2
- 7. Procedure 90015-C, Vehicle Access 10 The FA Rev. 5
- 8. Irocedure 00260-C. Harerdous Substence And Waste Control. Rev. S
- 9. Procedure 00061-C. Fuel Oil Handling And Safety , Rev. S
- 10. The Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Flants, Safety Standards FER50HS IHTERVIEWED _
Hame TLug Richard lierry Huclear Security Office David Jiles Health And Safety Advisor Glenn G. McCarley ISEO Supervisor Tod Dannemiller Head Of Security Doug Huyck Huclear Security Operations Superintendent Donnte Willhite Fuel Truel. Driver Slim Whttener Plant Equipment Operator D. baloach Plant Equipment Operator John Hopkins Shift Superintendent ( t 1
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. DOCunEtlis
. F squre 16-1 "Of f 51te AC" (FSAFu i . 6P0 - VEGP - Unat 1 Control Log - pp 5283-84 (3/20/90)
J. 6PC - VEGP - Unit 2 Control Log - pp 2601-u313/20/90)
- 4. OPC - VEGP - Una t 1 SS Log - pp 5413-14 (3/20/90)
- 5. OPC - VEGP - Unit 2 SS Log - pp 28'5-77 (3/20/90)
- 6. VEGP - Unit 2 Trip Feport 7 Protoous Alarm Prtntout - Unit 2 t 3/20/90)
- 8. Proteous Alers Printout - Unit 1 (3/20/90)
- 9. DC 1-90-0097 (1A D/0 Sequencer Frob) (3/20/90)
- 19. Contret ReserEeyewtm
- 11. Frocedure 13145-1 Rev. 20 " Diesel Generators"
!?. ~ L'l'c5 Mise ( % fi k T h jgi g ng M eF= % ,L,osy W H eet M W
- 13. Licensee' yater TraiMny Materials For kose 4f Desidemi<MairY Reesial
- 10. Licens 8ppig%fulAingltatarials EiW
- 15. Outstl{e Operator Training Mhterial' Fbf Mirier%48vnera, elled[ d$273Ohg C
_- __-.._________.-___._____._m.___m._._.__.______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
F All CODUMLHTS kECElVED
'struction Manual For S 5 C Circuit Switches (Outdoor 230)vi structtore Manual For Westinghouse ivpe Co Overcurrent Relayc
.nstruction Nanual For AbEA Type RADSE Iraansformer Dtiferential Protective Peleys inti oction Manuel For brown bovert irpe A01. A0t 4 AOS High voltage Current transformer Instructico Manual For General Electric lvpe PVD D211erential Voltaae Relay Haclear Pl.nt Maintenance Wort Order No. 289004c6 bechtel Drawinot 1x3D-AA-A01A (Main One Line - Unit 1)
Bechtel Drawings 2X3D-AA-A01 A (Main One Line - Una t 2) Bechtel brewings AX3D-AA-A01A (Main One Line - Common Units 1 & 2) Duchtel Drawings AX3DLO60 (Switchyard General Arrangement) Etchtel Drawings 1X30H7Al (Low Voltage Swatchyard Plan) bechtel Drawings 1(30H7A3 (Low Voltage Switchyard Leot11s - Sheet 2) Oc chtel Drawings 2X3D-BB-b0ll (Elementary Diagr am - Clectarcal System Generator
~
Irippinq) Southern Company Servicet/GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L57D (500lv PCB No. 161520 Clote A 1 rip Ho. 1) Southern Conipany Services /GPC Drawing AX9D-AA-LbOT ( 500kv PCBs No. 161500/161620/161o60 Single Line) Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L55A (230lv Offsite Source No. 1 C.T. 4 P.T. Connecting - Sheet 1) Southern Lompany Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L55B (230Lv Of f site Source No. 1 C.T . & F .T. Connecting - Sheet 1) Sou thern Company Services /GPC Drawing Ax3D-BA-L55C (230 Of f site Source No.1 Ditt. 4 Bec6up Relayingi
/
'uthern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-AA-L50b (230lv Single Line For PCBt 1s1'30/161860/161460)
(' .cchtel Drswings 2X3D-AA-B04A (Three Line Diagram - Unit 2 AC Generator) bethtel Drawings 2x3D-AA-B02A (One Line - Relayt 8 Meters For RATS) bechtel Drawings 2x3D-AA-B01A (Relays & Meters - Generator, Mann, 4 UAT) bechtel Drawings 1X3D-BA-bb5b (Res. Auz. XFMR INXRB CRT Switcher) Soutnern Ecmpany Sercisse/ GPC Drawing AX3D-AAL50A (500fv & 230Lv Sunstation Single Line Index Drawing) Muclear Plant Maintenance Work Order No. 18906364 aouthern Compeny Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52R Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52H Elementary Diagrams Southern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52P For 2306v Soutnern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L520 PCB Ho. 161060 Sc-uther, Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52S Southern Eompany Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-BA-L52H Soutrern Company Services /GPC Drawing AX3D-CA-L72K Lec6tel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D03b (4160 V $wichaear 1BA03) bechtel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D03A (4160 V Swichgear ) bt-chtel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D02B (4160 V Swichgear 1AA02) Dechiel Drawing 1X3D-AA-D02A (4160 V Swithoear 1BA03) Bechtel Drawing 1X3D-AA-bO1A (4160 V Swichaear 1HA01) k
- +1 (-3
. B2chtel Drawing IX3D-A4-LO4 A '(4160 _V Swichaear' 1tJA04)-
-- Fechtel Drawing : 1x3D-AA-DB2A'(4160 V- Swi chgear ' AHA02)
%chtel Drawing 1x3D-AA-D03A (4160 V.Swichgear ANA031 ch tel Drawino AX3D-FA-002C (4160 _V Brea> &r AHAe2O3)-
.echtel Drawing . A13D*hA-D03C- (4160 V Breci.er AHA0303)
Bechtel Drawing AX3D-BA-D03B (4160-V Prea6 er ANA0301) bechtel Drawing-1X3D-FA-D01J (4160 V Breafter 1HA01111 Fechtel Drawino~ D 3D'-FA-D64D (4160 V Prealer 1HA0410) Bechtel . Drawing 1X3D-BA-002C (4160 'V Swor 1 AA02 ItEn BrPr 1HARB) Bechtel Drawing 1X3D-FA-D02B (4160'V Swgr 1AA02 ItCM Prir 1HxRA) Bechtel- Drawinq _1 A3D-SA-000D (4160 ItCM Brtr ib2-1AA0219. EbG) Bechtel Drawing 1X3D-BA-D01C (4160 Swgr 1HA01 DCM Brtr'1NARA).
- GPC Procedure tJo. . 13145-1'" Diesel Generators" OPC Procedure No. 24614-1." Train B Sequencer AC01 4' CAL" GPC Procedure No. 27563-C " Generator And Engine Control F'anel. Functional: Test
- Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 1 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 2 .
Delaval_Drawirig 09-500-76021 Sh 3 Diesel Generator-Delaval Drawing 09 'iOO-76021 Sh 4 Engine Control Delavel Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 5 Penel Schematics l'elaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 6 Delaval Drawing 09-500-76021 Sh 7 Delaval Drawina 09-500-76021 Sh 8 Delaval Drawana 09-695-72001 " Engine Pneumatic Schematic" i(;
, 1
1 oi A W% l UNITE 3 STATil - [pa m8 'o NUCLEAR HEGULATC3Y COMMis3 TON O ~,' Rt olON il [~ 101 M ARitTT A ST RE ET. N .yv, i g .j AT L ANT A, ot 0 Mot A 30323
% **"* /
APR 0 31990 i MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Philip Stohr, Director DivisionofRadiationSafetyahSafeguards THRU: p?bDouglasM. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch William H. Rankin, Chief 'Qh Emergency Preparedness Section FROM: Anne T. Boland, Emergency Response Coordinator Emergency Preparedness Section
SUBJECT:
CRITIQUE OF REGION ll'S RESPONSE TO THE V0GTLE INCIDENT On March 28, 1990, I conducted a critique of Region ll's response to the Vogtle emergency of March 20, 1990, and all response personnel were invited to attend. The critique was based on " direct observations" of the participants many of which had been documented and provided to me prior to the meeting. A sumary of the critique items identified and the proposed corrective actions are included in the Enclosure; however, the improvement items can be categorized into several areas: training, communications, assessment tools, procedural adherence, program maintenance, and organizational / operational enhancements. Although numerous items were identified where the Region can improve its emergency operations, the overall response effort was judged successful and the agency's response goals were met as discussed below. The Region mobilized quickly and responded effectively with good comunications exhibited with both the licensee and Headquarters personnel. Related to the overall mission of the NRC/ Region in responding to an emergency we have several primary objectives: (1) monitor the licensee's actions to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the incident consequences; (2) inform other response organizations (State, local, Federal) of HRC response and plant status; (3) keep the media infonned of response activities; (4) advise and support the licensee technically; (5)' ensure appropriate protective actions are recomended to offsite authorities; and (6) direct the licensee's actions as necessary to protect the public's health and safety. Due to the sequence of events at Vogtle many of the above actions were not required (i.e., Offsite Protective Actions, NRC Orders), however, the other objectives were met as described following:
- Good comunications were exhibited between the Region and the licensee over the ENS and HPN. Although some telephone bridge problems were evident, they did not impede the Region's ability to gather infonnation. In addition, when information on the ENS and HPN was untimely or incomplete licensee management was contacted to ,
obtain the information.necessary for NRC assessments. [ g gg-
4 a. J. Philip Stohr 2
- Plant information and NRC response status was also transmitted to the appropriate State and Federal agencies in a timely manner. Initial riotifications were made promptly and comunications were continued throughout the event until termination.
- Press releases were issued by the Region regarding the event and were coordinated with the licensee's releases prior to issuance.
Region 11 Public Affairs participated in the press conferences held by the licensee at both the Corporate Office and the site. Senior Regional management participated in the site press conference the day of the emergency.
- The appropriate technical expertise was.available in the Incident Response Center to assess plant conditions (Reactor Safety and Health Physics). Evaluations of the plant and on-going actions continued throughout the event.
- Due to the initial conditions of the event, imediate preparations were made to dispatch a team to the site. The team was dispatched and enroute to the site within one hour with the appropriate response equipment. The team included: the DRP Division Director, the DRP Section Chief, an HP/EP Inspector, Public Affairs, a Project Engineer, and two Resident inspectors. One Region-based inspector was onsite throughout the event.
Federal agencies and other NRC offices, including Headquarters, were kept informed throughout the event by the Status Sumary. Four Status Sumaries were issued during the three hours the IRC was activated (goal one per hour). To date over 100 acknowledgements have been received, in addition to the overall response, exceptional individual performances were also noted. These included the Status Board Plotter, the admir.istictive staff, - and the resource management / travel staff. A completion schedule for the items identified in the Enclosure will be provided to you for concurrence in the near future. l Anne T. Boland l
Enclosure:
Status Sumary i
Nuc1couro 1 .c W V0GTLE CRITIQUE ITEMS FAVORABLE ASPECTS OF RESPONSE Excellent effort by all personnel responding. Good communications were exhibited by Team members. Team was dispatched quickly with DRMA/ travel support was commendable. money, etc... Other resources were also on stand-by. Performance of Status Board plotter was excellent considering not a planned response. ITEMS FOR IMPROVEMENT Resolution Comment ERC will announce over IRC paging Declaration of Response modes should system. be better communicated to staff cambers. Should announce Fireside immediately Any individual receiving an ; upon receipt of notification. Alert or above notification should call Fireside. Regional management will evaluate appropriate response after going to IRC. Did not have message centers for Ordered - Received /sent back for different model 3/29/90. phones, Followup with a HQ Headquarters had problems with Memo stating observed problems. bridges. (Including Licensee) Address in trsining. Consider Reduce noise in BTM room and other cone of silence for connunicators. support rooms. Will address in reconfiguration of center. Have ordered two-ear noise New headset for ENS Communicator. reduction set, 3/22/90, with mute capability. Mute attachments also ordered for HPN, PMCL and RSCL Communicators. ERC should reduce number people in Agree. Some was done but not enough. Include in training. center early on, Primaries should know who they Post listing primaries and alternates are; however, will put outside IRC so people know whether they should enter. bulletin board outside IRC with this information.
I 2 Coment Resolution IR vehicle not in ready condition DRMA to track and maintain. (gas, cleanliness, operability) Removing lights and park in garage. Prior to departure of Site Team Add to Resource Manager must have all vehicle infortnation briefing for Tean prior to dispatch, coordinate with SGM. for access. Regional staff and Resident offices Will post status summaries outside IRC, on bulletin not involved in the event should be board; but, Residents will updated periodically, have to wait. If Residents to be informed, projects can do. Step-by-step instructions ta,- console Simplified Merlin instructions usage, are easy and better than any secondary written instructions. Add soluble markers to location of Being done with Velcro plastic boards, bags. Need turnover briefing for replacement Agree. Address in training, personnel. Need better availability of licensee Agree. Instruct staff not to telephone numbers directly to TSC, EOF, remove numbers out of site books during response. Post etc... in IRC and incorporate into Plan. Vogtle numbers obtained. More telephone training (Established Will conduct hands-on training HPN and RSCL on wrong lines). (not lecture) over the next few weeks. Comunicator training in progress.
.PMM phone should have ENS.
Phones to remain as they are. Have A/C in IRC evaluated for Agree. DRMA to follow-up on. adequacy. ERM will announce over PA, and Make sure times used are consistent EST or CST, all clocks will be reset to event time including a wall posting. Will use licensee time. In correspondence spell-out time zone the first time. IRC " busy" calls and console problems. Ro11 overs were incorrect resulting in false busy. Resolved 3/23 with phone company - Fixed.
..t }'
T _3 Resolution Coment Emphasize in. Rad-Con Training and Brief onsite _ inspectors on role during - provide ROI on gu1_ dance for emergency. inspectors. Why was licensee Emergency Director OK, by Vogtle procedures, can be either place. .. in CR7 Additional. space / organization Agree. Working on during review of IRC configuration. needed for PMT/ bulletin boards Need copies of data sheets for PMT Will do. 1 out of PM Manual. See later comment on IRC support. Typing support for Public Affairs Periodically verify status of IRC We do; however had not ye;- __ relocated floppy PC and replaced computers, with Compaq - completed-3/21/90. .. A small inventory of toiletry Agree. Will order. , items should be added to Site Team kits. DRMA having all PA boxes checked. Fireside announcement not audible In progress. throughout office. Fed / State telephone listing should Just updated 11/89. Old listings, -- be updated.- (EPA, GEMA numbers Were.available for use. Will-verify numbers are correct. incorrect) Georgia did not receive initial IIT cor.cern. notification from licensee in timr'y-
-manner.
2 Fax machines (one incoming and one Will evaluate. Consider new 1 outgoing) light-weight FAX for; site team , and transfer site' team fax to'IRC. Conduct meeting with licensee's L ENS information was not current. to discuss NRC requirements ? Most current = data was obtained forresponse.(resources, data. l through licensee management,
-persnnnel, space)
Need Reactor Safety "Think Tank" to Will implement. To be located address long-term and what-if outside the-IRC with speaker--
- determinations. phone, i
! Reactor Safety Team should be better Will do. Requires update organized-to include a Team leader of emergency roster in progress. supported by technical specialists. L D _e-_
4 l Resolution I i Coment f Fill out boards completely. Will Keep Reactor Safety Status Board incorporate into training. up-to-date. Data related to power was current by other system status was notposted(ECCS) Add a permanent position of status Will be addeo. board plotter. Regional Management decision Declaration of Standby delayed based upon briefing by licensee. (transfomer operability) Write Headquarter; for support, Methodology for assessing consequences from accidents at shutdown (open) units Write Headquarters for support, Methods for assessing consequences beyond 24-hours-source tem. Increase training, Reactor Safet, Vam did not use comunications terms for questions to be addressed on the ENS. Need full time operator for telephone. Yes. Will incorporate. Need increased training on E-mail use. Monthly initiated.training recently If needed, more will be provided. Needs management support to ensure attendance. Will also provide annual training to status sumary ' writers. Need more Incident Response Support Adding two more EPAs and another ERC. perr.onnel (typing, support to technical teams, telephones, etc...). Need telephone instructions for Agree. Will add these when new
- message centers arrive.
key function (i.e., mute) at each phone station. Will form task group prior to Develop training / working group conduct of training in May 1990, for Reactor Safety Team to ensure team members understand concept of operations. None. Alternate route for access to VEGP. Will implement immediately, Add Duty Roster to equipment for site team.
\
i
\ 4
* /'.a un4.g utilTED STATES l ! '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
~ } wAtaiNoiON, D. C. 20668
! August 8, 1990
;% . . . $ .*/
4 HEMORAN0UM FOR: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Ril rROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
CLOSE0VT OF STAFF ACTION 4.b (2) IN RESPONSE TO YOGTLE !!T FINDINGS (NUREG-1410) An investigation was conducted to determine the cause of the communication problems experienced during the incident at the Vogtle plant on March 20, 1990. The problems identified and the subsequent corrective actions are detailed in the enclosure. A complete system test was conducted on July 26, 1, and the system is operating normally. This completes thu plant specific a in Item 4.b (2). r o Ulrector Offi for Analysis and Evaluation of sperational Data Cnclosure: As stated cc w/ encl: J. Taylor, EDO
- 7. Kellam, IkM R. Freeman. AEGD
<% Brockanan, Kil
.:lisw-$-l00+6w-N-h=
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,* 2 UNITED STATES . IT,e, i NUCLEAR REGULAT07Y COMMISSION WA $HING ton, o. C. 2o555 s., .....f g 11 rs HEHOPMDUM FOR: Eric W. Weiss, Acting Chief incident Response Branch Division of Operational Assessment Office for Analysis and Evaluation
- of Operational Data FROM: Thomas B. Kellam, Chief Telecommunications Branch Division of Computer and Telecommunications Services Office of Information Resources Management
SUBJECT:
TELECOMMUNICAT101.5 PROBLEMS DURING V0GTLE EVENT in reply to your memorandum of July 12. 1990, subject as above, the commercial portion of the problem was due to '5e power source for the telephone system being damaged. The solution for that problem is to have the telephone system placed on an uninterruptable powtr se; ply. It appears that the decision to do that would be operator partly by the utilities, not the NRCs. The CNS portion of the problem was caused error because of the hardware p(roblems that have been identifie Three problems were discovered, (1) The Control Room telephone was disabled each time the Emergency Operating Fecility telephone was placed off-hook. That would account for the numerous occashns of interrupted service. U) had been physic. ally disconnected by the licensee teleccamunications contractor.T (2) A component of the system in Bethesda was intermittent, item (1) was corrected by AT&T replacing a component on the EOF portion of the Main Control Card. Item (2) was corrected by AT&T instal',ing a new cable to the TSC phone, Bethesda. item (3) was corrected during the troubleshootint procedures in . The AT&T technician swapped circuit boards in the Wescom equipment, rewired the Pimension Wescom connections and reseated the circuit boards in 400 switch. the We L These actions cleared the problem. H0 wever, it is unsure L
' @ ich one was actually creating the intermittent outage.
Juy Testing has occurred through dime 26 and the system is operating normally. We have been advised by AT&T that other locations having the Tellabs equipment are subject to the same disconnect. problem as outlined in (1) above. We have issued orders to AT&T to repair all the known Tellabs sites. These sites are fort St. Vrain, besides Vogtle.Diablo Canyon, Sumer, Kewuanee, VNP2, Browr.s ferry, and THI, After the repairs have been effected at each location, we will Mvise you and request that a test be conducted where the EOF goes off hook while the HQOC and Control Room are connected. We have recommended to the Incident Response Bra'ich that this test also be conducted at least once at all other -
- locations to ensure that-all equipment is operating properly. ,
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If you have questions or require additional information, please _ contact Tom l Baldest at ext. 27121. v l f k, l ^ T mas B. Kallas, Chief. : Telecommunications Branch ;
-Olvision of Computer and !
Telecomunications Services ' Office of Information , Resources Management ! cc: Patricia Norry ' Pamela Kruzic t i
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HEMORANDUM FOR: Alfred . ...affee, Team Leader, incident Investigative Team Vocile FROM: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
DESIGNATED REGIONAL POINT OF CONTACT NUREG-1303, " Incident Investigation Manual," paragraph 2.5 provides for the establishment of a single point of contact in the Region, to coordinate the effort between the lli and the Region. The following individual is so designated: Kenneth E. Brockman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Office Phone -
"404/331-6299 Home Phone -
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Beeper - Please make all assistance requests through him, if you have any difficulties beyond Ken's capability to handle, please contact myself, or Jim Milhoan.
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cc: K. Brockman ' Inlormatica in this tecord was ddeld in acco: dance with the Fleedom of Information gg'4 I N _____
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