ML20128G097
| ML20128G097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1993 |
| From: | Link B WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-93-012, CON-NRC-93-12 VPNPD-93-024, VPNPD-93-24, NUDOCS 9302120148 | |
| Download: ML20128G097 (2) | |
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gm ct m VPHPD-93-024 NRC 012 February 3,
1993 Document Control Desk U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
DHCETS 50-266 AFD 50-301 INSPECTION _ REPORTS 50-266/92028iD M )_ rid 50-301/92028(DRSS)
POINT BEACJi NUCLEAILELANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Your letter dated December 30, 1992, transmitted the subject inspection reports related to the security program at our Point Beach Nuclear Plart.
The letter requested that we provado an analysis of our corrective actions taken in response to a violation identified in Inspection Reports 50-266/92017 and 50- 301/92017 to determine if any additional corrective actions are necessary to prevent recurrence.
The Notice of Viola',lon transmitted with Inspection Reports 50-266/92017 and 50-301/92017 concerned the breakdown of our escort controls.
We committed to complete all corrective actions and be in full compliance by October 31, 1992.
We identified two addi-tional violations of escort requirements concerning contractor visitors in mid-October 1992, prior to completing all corrective actions.
Successful corrective action of human-performance issues is contingent upon ensuring that appropriate management attention is focused on the issue.
Management attention is vital in reinforcing awareness of and sensitivity to the issue and in obtaining the cooperation of all personnel in resolving the problem.
Accordingly, the Manager-Regulatory Services discussed the recurrence of escort problems during a meeting of the Manager's Supervisory Staff (our on-site review committee) on November 3, 1992, to ensure heightened managerial awareness of the problem.
Additionally, during an all-plant meeting held on November 4,
- 1992, the Manager-PBNP discussed our recent visitor control problems.
During this discussion, the events which had occurred were presented and acceptable, as well es unacceptable, methods of visitor control were discussed.
To date, we have not experienced any additional loggable events associated with the failure to maintain proper control of visitors.
We are continuing to monitor the effectiveness of our corrective actions and will take additional corrective action, as necessary for aty ec ence.
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' bent control Desk Docu february 3, 1993 Page 2 He would also like to take this opportunity to clarify three additional items documented in Inspection Reports 50-266/92028 and 50-301/92028.
Item 2.d contained follow-up information closing out Inspection Reports 50-266/92017 and 50-301/92017, Inspector Follow-up Item 04.
This item concerned the testing of the security uninterruptable power supply and noted that, based on our evaluation of this item, we had implemented a test on September 15, 1992, to verify operation.
The requirement for this test had been identified and a call-up schedule to perform this test was initiated in 1990.
The call-up was generated for a two-year frequency and came due in September 1992, shortly following Inspections 50-266/92017 and 50-301/92017.
Item 5.a states that we are planning to return to normal posting to respond to target sets.
We presently plan to continue to strive to improve our security program by experimenting with new fixed and mobile post positions for responding to target sets, and the development of new timeliness.
We believe it is vital that we challenge our security personnel by escalating the degree of difficulty in our security drills, rather than performing routine scenarios where we are assured of achieving success.
Because of our continuing efforts to make drills more challenging, we do anticipate that failures will occur.
However, by working to improve the overall effectiveness of our security force response to more difficult and complex scenarios, we believe we ensure a higher probability of success during any scenario which may occur.
Item 5.b states that knowledgeable security personnel were not involved in the engineering aspects of the project.
This statement is related to modifications made to one of our security zones.
Security personnel were involved in the project.
However, even with security participation, problems which should have been avoided were not adequately identified and corrected during the modification process.
If you have any questions related to our response to your request, or our clarification of additional items documented in the subject inspection report, please contact us.
Sincerely, s
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<7 Bob Link Vice President Nuclear Power TGM/jg cc:
NRC Resident Inspector NRC Regional Administrator, Region III