ML20128D444
| ML20128D444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/05/1992 |
| From: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Foley T, Quayle J HOUSE OF REP., SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9212070280 | |
| Download: ML20128D444 (7) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
g/
p h
l[Q k}j*%
UNITED STATES
,l'
., l,
NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
{,
i WAMHNG TON. D. C. W.>%
4 S., ' A
/
Noumt,er 5.1992
- e.,*
CHAlHMAN The lionorable J. Danforth Quayle Prealdent of the United States Senate Wachington, D.C.
20510
Dear Mr. President:
I am pleased to submit the fluclear Regulatory Ccmmincion't report on the nondisclosure of Safeguardo Inf ornation f or the quarter ending September 30, 1992, au required by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, an amended.
The report doncriboo two occasione during this period when the liRC withheld irom public disclosure information concerning intrunion-detection devices and alarm annoucment equipment, n i ;' e and armament of on-nite reserve forces, and portionc of a safeguards inopection report that disclose uncorrected weaknessen in the security system.
Sincerely, c6
~
a Ivan Selin I:nclosure:
As ctated i
l l
[
1 i
is t
9212070200 921105 PDR COMMS NRCC COR,RESYONJ)ENcc PpH
7 p@ ** %,
UNITED ST ATES
,[,
6,< y,j-
+
NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,t W ASHINGT ON, D, C. 70%5 s
November 5, 1992 I
CH AlFtMAN The lionorable Thomas S.
Foley Speaker of the United States llouse of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515 Dear Mr. Speakert I am pleased to submit the 11uclear Regulatory Commincion's report on the nondisclosure of Safeguards Information for the quarter ending September 30, 1992, as required by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The report describes tW: occasions during this period when the 11RC withheld fram public disclosure information concerning intrusion-detection devices and alarm assessment equipment, size and armament of on-site reserve forces, and portions 01 a safeguards inspection report that disclose uncorrected weaknesses in the security syntem.
Sincerely,
><h$
Ivan Selin
Enclosure:
As stated w
y
-w v p
. ~ _. - - - -
-. -. - ~.
r r
HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
QUARTERLY REPORT ON NONDISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amonded, prohibits the unauthorized disclosuro of specific typos of Safoguards Information.
This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to proscribe such regulations as necessary-to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards 1
Information.
NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 woro i
published in the Federal Regiaist on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718).
y Section 147 also requiros that the NRC report on a quarterly
+
basis the Commission's application during that period'of overy regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section.
As required.by-Section 147, the items noted below indicate the i
Safeguards Information withhold from public disclosure under the
[
provisions of-the-implementing regulations during the period July 1,
1992, through September 30, 1992.
?
During the reporting period, the following information was withhold from disclosure under two Freedom of Information Act requests:
1.
Typo of Information Withhold on_ono occasion,-the NRC withhold from public disclosure the locations of-intrusion-detection devices and alarm
-assessment equipment, and_thefsizo__and armament of on-site-reserve _ forces at annuclear power plant.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverne Impact 1
The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the plant, and the information could be of considerablo value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
' Assurance That Only the Minimum' Amount of Information Was Withhold The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information doos not deny-the public basic.information concerning'the leve]
j of protection afforded material at facilities.
A line-by-lino review of the documents was conducted to ensure that L
.only the minimum amount of information was withheld.
f k
m
- en-J ya-'
"'F*-W4**T
'P=ttsNr**Br
'*-T9"*'*D'T4 W'
T 7m W t F'4 W-MW's W Gi' 1'Pdq'r"-f N'T's
(-
T+-
4*m W l a FM pC W
T ' 9g vfF'ary-Tur g'* %'d y wydevrwei" F u-It+
y 7
7'r$--
"'vfy
--wgt 'F V
4 2-2.
On one occasion, the NRC withhold from public'disclosuro portions of a safoguards inspection report that dicciosos uncorrected weaknessos in the security system at a nuclear power plant.
Unauthorized Dicciosure could llavo Adverse Imqatt The public dicciosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the plant, and the information could be of considerable value to a potential sabotour in considering or planning-a sabotage attempt.
I I
Assuranco That.palydhn_ Minimum Amount of _ Information Was Withhold The withholding of this type of Safoguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the lovel of protection afforded material at facilities.
A lino-by-lino review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only tho minimum amount of information was withhold.
- i P
t i
w w
4----
rt=++m
+pA.,i-F<-mA--
t!we-ei.
,e>
In.e++--r%as (vw+,9 ma v.6--p gr T aim e 3gy
.q g
rf-A.,mM y-y - v wg y-p*-
.vp rair-m g.-rvy-w-tMa-w ?-=T M - efg 7'-
e e 7 --
a7ff+n*=fyF-T-w $
+P r r' m ' rte W
l ATTACit!4EliT IDEllTIFYIllG SPECIFIC TYPES OF I!1FORIGTIO!1 PROTECTED FROli UllAUTilORIZED DISCLOSIJRE 1.
Ehynical l'Epicction at Fixed.Eli.eE Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or 11ational Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that process formula quantities of strategic special nuc1 car material at power reactors.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.
(ii)
Site-specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii)
Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion-detection
- devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.
(iv)
Written physical security orders and procedures f or members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.
(v)
Details of the onsite and offsite communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi)
Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(vii)
Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certai-safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital f or purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant-specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii)
The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
(ix)
Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
j
.i
.2-t (x)
Responso plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of l
responding forces.
l (xi)
Size, armament, and disposition of onsito roserve forces.
(xii)
- Size, identity,
- armament, and arrival times of offsite forces committed to respond to safeguards i
omorgencies, i
2.
E}1yE,1,ga1 Protection in Transit Information not otherwiso classified as Restricted Data or liational Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(1)
The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii)
Schedules and itinerarios for specific shipments.
(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withhold f rom public -disclosure.
Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be -released 10 days af ter the last shjement of a current series.)
l (iii)
Details of vehicle immobilization -
- features, intrusion alarm devices, and _ communication systems._
L (iv)
Arrangements with-and capabilities of_ local police response forces, and locations of safe: havens.
(v)
Details regarding-limitations of radio-telephone communications.
(vi) procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.
o___ ; '
^
L..
__ n. _,_. _. _. _,_,_,, _
?
l
' i 1.
,Intu;tections Audits, and Evaluatio_ng Information not otherwiso classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safoguards-inspection and reports.
l
)
Specifically1 Portions of safoguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that discloso uncorrected. defects, weaknessos, or vulnerabilitics in_the system._ Information regarding defects, weaknessos, or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have-been mado.
Reports of investigations-may be released after the investigation has boon completed, unless withhold _ pursuant to other authorition; for examplo, the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
l 1
l l
h 5
L w
y
-r*-9y--
--p,sg.,.r. - - - -, w w qvrwrw ir
-.-e---pwgy - y v
,.-w-wc9
-ywm9wyn99p--qm a 3-r4g,we,m y, y--g. ww e m - ir e.a.,,--4rr 6-+P'W ee turSk+*w'-2'+'pmW+NVP&
-?
'8+*w p
ie'*"
I P
"P*'
4
i coNoKESSIONAL cCRAESPCMDENCE SYSTEM DOCUMENT PREPAAATICM eMECKLisT
" tis checklist is
- be submitted with ensk desument (or group of Qs/As) seat for e
'ing into the ccs.
r 1.
antar DEscartTrow cP coccuzmT(s) du a n (r d
f Ghot 2.
TTrz or- -
correspondenem te (Osvaeb 3.
Doccutur comTaos sensitive (Wac caly)
Wea-sensitive 4.
coNonassromaL coxx1TTrz and suscoxxz?Tras (if appliemale) congreesienal committse 1
.u...m.ittse 5.
sussEct conza (al J
i (b)
(e) s.
sounct or nocentwTs (a) 553s (document name
/
(b) f seaa..
(e)
AtT,ashmeate (4)
Rakey (e)
Other 7.
8YsTzM IAS S&TES
/f42/ [2-Date ocE eeat document to 005 (a)
(b)
Date ocs.reesiveesdocument 1
(e)
Data returned to och for meditional infessation
~
(d)
Date reenheitted by-och'to cc8 (e)
Data entered late cc8 by (f)
Date oCA notified that document is in CCS bbOOLa L.