ML20128B605

Intervenor Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in Form of Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning Contention

ML20128B605
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	05/24/1985
From:	Lodge T LODGE, T.J., SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE
To:
References
CON-#285-132 OL, NUDOCS 8505240600
Download: ML20128B605 (21)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 24 # 0:22 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board < - --

• 4 In the Matter of )

) Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-4410L.

Tile CLEVELAND ELECTRIC 11LUMINATING )

COMPANY, et. al. )

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

-Units 1 and 2) )

)

INTERVENOR SUNFLOWER ALI.IANCE'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND COPCLUSIONS OF LAW IN TiiE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (Emergency Planning)

Terry Jonathan Lodge, Esq.

618 N. Michigan St., Suite 105 Toledo, Ohio 43624 (419) 255-7552 Counsel for Intervenor Sunilower Alllance, Inc.

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1 OPINION History of the Case Sunflower Alliance, intervenor herein, has indicated to thih Board that it will stipulate to the " History of the Case" appearing at pp. 2-7 of " Applicant's-Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision (Emergency Planning and TDI Diesel Generators)" dated May 13, 1985.

Therefore, the Board adopts Applicant's history statement as its findings in that respect.

EMERGENCY PLANNIhG CONTENTION

1. Background and Introduction Sunflower Alliance has further indicated that it accepts the " Background and Introduction" appearing at page 7 through the end of the partial paragraph appearing at page 12 of " Applicants' Proposed Findings," and the Board adopts that material as its finding.

However, the Board does not agree with Applicants' proposed finding that Dr. Sternglass' testimony must be given no weight in this proceeding. The exhibits adduced by' Applicants to attempt impeachment of Dr. Sternglass are almost all over a dozen years old, and the Three Mile Island accident and its aftermath have lent new credence to_Dr. Sternglass' theories. Tr. 2706, 2708-9 (Sternglass). The incidents cited by Dr. Sternglass in support of his belief that there has been a

" continued effort by the Government and agencies. . .[who are all] stonewalling the idea that fallout at levels of background radiation could have produced any health effects" are credible and documented. See Tr. 2613-15; 2634-5, 2654, 2717-25.

2. Contention A: State and Local Comments on ETE Study An as yet unresolved aspect of Contention A deals with the obtaining of comwents from state and Jocal officials concerning Applicants' proposed evacuation time estimates. (ETE).

i While there is no regulatory requirement strictly mandating independent monitoring systems, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requires an applicant to dem-onstrate " adequate" methods, systems, and equipment for assessing actual or potential radiological emergency conditions. Finding 22.

This Board is not convinced of the adequacy of the combined utility and state monitoring efforts. CEI would deploy teams to assessment sites within li to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the commencement of an accident, even though witness Bowers acknowledged that a major release could occur within 45 minutes of the beginning.

Finding 15. Bowers surrealistically argues that a mixture ,of " Cadillac" fixed-site monitors and mobile monitoring teams would not be as effective as the exclusive use of monitoring teams. Finding l'.. This .as his conclusion even though the team approach does not provide for monitoring in Lake Erie, ofiahore from PNPP, a substantial expanse of the EPZ, and despite the fact that monitaring teams would be largely confined to sampling along road rights-of-way. Findings 14, 21.

The veracity of Bowers' position was also undercut by his highly suspect

-comparative cost-benefit rendition of fixed monitors versus monitoring teams.

His projected costs of independent systems did not even mathmatically add up.

Moreover, he repeatedly admitted that he had not comparatively assessed the economic expense of emplacing and maintaining teams and their equipment, nor had he calculated the expense of existing effluent monitors at PNPP or installation and maintenance of the 77 htermuminescent dosimeters in the EPZ around Perry.

Findings 11, 12, 13. Bowers' preparations never have been tested in worse conditions than darkness and rain. Finding 17.

Kenneth Cole was, by contrast, a credible witness. he projected that his three teams would be taking samples near PMPP 3! to i nomr8 folio.!ng the begin-ning of radiation leakage. Findings 18, 20. His teams' san.ples of soil and vegetative matter would optimally be delivered to an Ohio Department of Health laboratory in Columbus within 5 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from dispatch. Finding IS.

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10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12) requires a showing of " arrangements. . .for medical services for contaminated injured individuals." The Commission has previeuwly interpreted this regulation to encompass radiatina exposures as well as cor.ta.aliated injured individuals. Southern California 4dison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Cer.arating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528, 530 (1983). In February of this year, the Distrier of Columbia Federal Court of Appeals ruled that " arrangements" for medical services for contaminated injured and exposed members of the general public require more than a simple listing of treatment facilities already in place; mere ad hoc arrangements are not adequate:

The underlying assumption made by the Commission-that wherever present or future nuclear power plants may be located, adequate facilities will be available in the area to serve victims of radiation exposure in the event of an accident-is hardly within the core of the Commission's expertise. In any case, it is not an assump-tion properly indulged in an emergency prepardness regulation. Section 50.47(b) describes the medical ar-rangement requirement as one of the several " standards" applicants' emergency response plans "must" in fact meet.

GUARD v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 753 F. 2d 1144, (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Board believes that GUARDS converts the inquiry on this issue to one wherein an applicant must detail medical arrangements fully, as to facilities, equipment, personnel, etc., for each facility which would be included in emergency preparations.

Instead of taking this constructive tack, Applicants instead chose to minimize the very possibility of a serious accident. Sandia Laboratory modeling suggests that a worst-case accident hypothesis at Perry could cause 5,500 deaths within the first 60 days, 100,000 injuries, and 14,000 malignancy cases. Finding 35. CEI witnesses considered it unimaginable that severe radiation exposure or contamination victims would occur from any mishaps. Findings 41, 43, 46. Dr. Linneman refused to acknow-ledge the possibility that all or a part of 5,500 severely injured victims might floot E c ._ . . _ _ _ _ . . . ..;_ - . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . . .

In view of the attitudinal posture of Applicants, and because of the substantive deficiencies of the record, this Board cannot find for Applicants on Contention P. -

6. Contention U: Handling Contaminated Property at Reception Cer.ters Sunflower Alliance contends that the designated reception centers cannot adequately handle radiation contamination.

The witnesses on this matter were Applicants'. Richard Baer and John M.

Wills.

LAt the time of hearing, decontamination equipment was not present at reception centers. Findings 52, 56. Existing regulations make it the private person's responsibilityto decontaminate his vehicle, making it quite possible for perhaps many contaminated vehicles to be driven out from the EPZ and never decontaminated.

Finding 55.

Applicants anticipate that the Ohio EPA will dispose of radioactively contami-nated property, yet OEPA does not have legal jurisdiction over such hazardous materials. Findings 53-4. See generally Section 3734.01 et. seq., Ohio Revised Code.

Decontamination of vehicles at reception centers translates into scrubbing them down. There are no precautions for trapping radioactive water runoff, nor to prevent leaching into the soil and perhaps the groundwater, and concomitant need to quarantine these areas many of which are presenly playgrounds or athletic fields. Finding 57. Although Applicants have not researched or assessed this potentila leaching problem, they maintain that no harm to the pubik health and safety would exist. Finding 57.

The problems raised by Sunflower here are solvable, yet Applicants either do not see them as problems, or refuse to devise solutions. If for no other reason than equipment was not in place at the time of hearing (and certainly the record divulgas other reasons), the Board must find against the utilities on this contention.

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And Sunflower was right. Some 58 items were still open and not corrected as of-the time of hearing.- Finding 65. These deficiencies inclu,ded lacking letters of agreement from such entities as Ashtabula's Medical Center and ambulance operators, as well as a failure at hearing time to have forwarded drafts of an Emergency Information llandbook, proposed to be publically avail-able, to FEMA'.s Regional Assistance Committee. Findings 66, 67.

ThisiBoard pondered at hearing why such things as why a relatively simple item such as the handbook remains open. Tr. 3107. A review of the record reveals the answer: the record shows that Applicants have continuously made quality emergency preparedness a low priority.

9. Contention CC: SER Resolution It(ms Sunflower Alliance conducted no cross-examination on this contention; and has indicated that it will defer to this Board to weigh the record and make its own ruling. As we find against Applicants on other contentions, we hereby in-definitely defer ruling on this matter,

10. Summary and Conclusions The record is rife with incomplete preparations, evasive word games, denials of the possibilities of the " unimaginable" happening, and manipulated statistics.

It is the opinion of this panel that it will find against Applicants on all contentions.

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Contention M: Independent Radiation Monitoring System

10. Contention M states:

Independent Dats Monitoring Systems should be  ;

installed within all counties in the emergency '

plaoning zone (EPZ).

January 10, 1985 Memorandum and Order at 6.

11. CEI'S evidence in support of mobile field monitoring teams was bad mathematics. A state-of-the art system of some 100 fixed site monitors would cost

$2.7 million dollars. Each telemetry station would cost $7,800.00; wind speed and director sensors, $700.00 each; air samplers, $1,800.00 each; all for a supposed total of $19,300.00 (totals $10,300.00) Tr. 2917-18 (Bowers). Enclosing units in small buildings could range as high as $3,000.00 per station, at an installation cost of $2,800.00 per station, Tr. 2918A (Bowers), all for an alleged estimated total of $24,350.00 per unit. A central computer would cost $200,000.00. Tr. 2919.

(B owers) .

12. CEI'S witness did not know the coat of existing effluent monitors at l'NPP. guessing "well over half a nillion dollars." Tr. 2921 (Bowers). There was no assessmeat performed by Cl.! of the costs of robile monitoring re.ima. Tr. 2021, 2922 (Bowers). Ilowever , each team's equirnent would coat $15,000.00 ant.all .f Tr. 2922 (Bowers).

13. CEI fails to account in its cost-benefit evidence for the expense of 77 thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLb's) set at varying radii f rom PNPP. Tr. 2923 (Bosers). Without support, Applicant maintains that its proposed system would t

total less than $2.7 million dollars. Tr. 2925 (Bowers).

14. Applicant maintains that a hybrid approach of fixed monitors and mobile teams would be less satisfactory than the use solely of mobile teams. Tr. 2928. (Bowers).

Applicant proferred false interpretation that regulatory requirements favor mobile monitoring over fixed-site monitors. Tr. 2929-30 (Bowers). While admitting that

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21. There are no provisions by Ohio DSA to monitor radiation of f shore from PNPP. Tr. 2882 (Cole); Tr. 2944-5 (Bowers).

22. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requires offsite emergency response plans to contain

[a]dequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radio-logical emergency condition are in use.

(emphasis supplied)

.23. Delays in the arrival of mobile equipment or finding the plume of radiactive gas are critical. Sternglass at 7. At Three Mile Island, helicopter-borne monitors missed radiation releases for days, and missed the plume centers on other occasions.

Sternglass at 7-8.

24. Mobile detectors cannot make measurements over water. Sternglass at 8.

25. Only a ring of many air samples and other fixed electronic detectors can-adequately characterize the nature, intensity and directim of radioactive gas released f rom a nucicar facility in a timely fashion. Sternglass at 8-9.

26. Tlormoluminescent dosimeters cannot given instant aneous readine,s. Sternglacs at 9.

27. A network of some 100 instruments could be installed at one ten-thousandth of the cost of PNPP. Sternglass at 9.

28. Applicant in fact desires that the public, media and local officials not have I

access to information of subaccident, re, tine radiation released from PNPP, as PNPP is effectively licensed to emit some radiation at all times. Sternglass at 9.

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29. Timely response when radiation is airborne, rather than when it has settled on vegetation, is needed to avoid tragedy. Sternglass at 10.

30. Abnormal, unreported releases of radiation from Three Mile Island endangered the health of the public, particularly newborn children, showing up as" spikes" in

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37. Decontamination is easy to accomplish if proper equipment to detect and trap radiation particles, and proper personnel trainit:g, are in place. However, contamination of breathing passages and internal organs, while minimized by Appplicant, is not so easily treated. McTrusty at 3; Tr. 2984, 2985, 2986, 2991-4, 3030 (Linneman). Training of personnel at Ashtabula's Medical Center is neither full nor complete. McTrusty at 3.

38. Ashtabula County's Medical Center does not have a lead-lined room for-treatment of contaminated and injured patients. Tr. 2982 (Linneman). There is no evidence of the ventilation system for this treatment being controlled to suppress airborn radiation spread. See Tr. 2982 (Linneman).

39. Applicant's evidence suggests that an exposure of 800,000 milliran is the lowest level of exposure which would cause reddening of the skin. Linneman at 4.

-The victim at this point would be dead. Tr. 2045.

40. Applicant admits that existing PNPP plans to transfer radiological victims who are from the general public to referral hospitals ate cd hoc in nature.

Tr. 2999 (Linneman).

41. Applicant's witness considered it impossible to centract the condition of pulmonary edema from inhaling radiation, but implicitly retracted that conclusion to acknowledge that edema was unimaginable. Tr. 3000-1 (Linneman).

42. Despite the Sandia conclusion that 5,500 deaths would occur within 60 days of a worst-case accident at PNPP, CEl's witness indicated that early treatment of those victims would not be an undue burden on hospitals. Tr. 3004 (Linneman).

43. CEl'S witness could not imagine high level radiation exposure to emergency personnel in a major accident at PNPP. Tr. 3007 (Linneman).

44. Despite a Federal Emergency Management Agency criticism to the contrary, CEI's witness did not believe that a health physicist needs to be present at

Contention U: Handling Contaminated Property at Reception Centers

51. Contention U states:

Reception centers do not have the means or facilities for handling contaminated prop-erty.

January 10, l'J85 Memorandum and Order at 7.

52. Emergency kits referenced in preflied testit:ony by CEI were not deteloped nor in place at reception centers at time of hearing. Tr. 1056 (Buer).

53. Applicant proposes that Ohio Er.vironmental Protection Agency (OPPA) make disposal arrangenents. Tr. 3056 (Baer).

54. OEPA does not have jnrisdiction over disposal of nuclear waste. See general Section 3734.01 et:, seq., Ohio Revised Code.

55. The Radiological Training Manual for Ohio DSA indicates that private individuals will be personally responsible for decontamination of their own vehicles and equipment, making it possible for people driving out of the EPZ to avoid decontamination procedures entirely. Tr. 3059-60, (Baer); Sun. Ex. 12.

56. At the time of hearing, decontamination equipment was not present at propose reception centers. Tr. 3060 (Baer).

57. Vehicle decontamination procedures do not provide for trapping of water runof f for washing of radioactive vehicles, but rather quarantining f or lengthy, indefinite periods of playgrounds or other lands which would became contaminated.

Tr. 3061-3 3068 (Baer). Applicant has not demonstrated ary analysis of passible leaching of radiation at these sites into groundwater or soil. Tr.3068 (Baer).

Applicant believes that contamination of proposed sites will pose no danger or threat to public health or safety. Tr. 3068 (Baer). See also Tr. 3205-6 (Willis).

Contention Z: Bus Driver Protection

58. Contention Z states:

The plans do provide decontamination protection for bus drivers during an tmergency.

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CONCI,USIONS OF l.AW

69. 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) provides:

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No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that the state of onsite and-offsite emer-gency preparedness provides reason-

able assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radio-logical emergency.

70. Based upon reliable, probative and substantial record evidence, the Board'cannot conclude'that Applicant has met its burden of proof and has demon-strated that " reasonable assurance" of adequate protective measures exists.

71. This doubt centers upon the ad hoc, largely rote and mechanical descriptions of medical facilities, clearly not in conformance with current

- federal law. Unsatisfactory explanation of-radiation monitoring arrangements also~ exists, as Applicant failed on economic or implementation grounds conclu-sively to displace the superiority of fixed-site. Independent monfroring.

- Protective measures for bus drivers are not assuredly adequate. Deco itamination neasuret, at reception centers are not evea yt finalized, much less pr ven

- The- same pertains to the state of agreements for the e:1ergency use of school buses. Resolution of' FEMA-identified problems is incomplete. Applicant has not even suf ficiently af forded a realistic spectrum of public of ficials to comment upon its evacuation time estimates.

72. The Board concludes that, as to these inadequately assured matters, that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cannot be authorized at this time to license any aspect of operations at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

ORDER

-WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

All issues of material fact under issue No. 1 (Emergency Planning) in this proceeding are resolved in favor of Sunflower Alliance, and those portions of

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