ML20126B865

Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Filed by Other Parties Re Emergency Planning & Tdi Diesel Generators.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20126B865
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/10/1985
From:	Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
References
CON-#285-413 OL, NUDOCS 8506140231
Download: ML20126B865 (64)

Text

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June 10, 1985 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing _. Board 90(METED USHRC In the Matter of THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440CL ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50 W A 0FSEcit.N <

) h004Umri 4 SEPn I.

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) DANCh Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' REPLY TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FILED BY THE .

OTHER PARTIES (EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TDI DIESEL CENERATORS)

Jay E. Silberg, P.C.

Michael A. Swiger j Rose Ann C. Sullivan SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Counsel for Applicants 0

, 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

SUMMARY

................................................ 3

!!. ISSUE NO. 1: Emergency Planning........................ 4 A. Tontimony of Dr. Sternglaan....................... 4 B. Contention As Stato and Local Comments on ETE Study............................. 6 C. Contention J: Incompleto EALa..................... 8 D. Contention M: Indopondent Radiation Monitoring Syntomo................................ 10 E. Contention P: Hospitain.......................... 14 F. Contention Q: Lettern of Agrooment for School Bunen.................................. 17

0. Contention Un llandling Contaminated Property at Reception Contorn..................... 18

11. Contention 2: Bus Driver Protection............. 21

!. Contention BB: FEMA Interim Report............... 23 J. Contention CC: SER Ronolution Itoma............. 24

!!!. ISSUE NO. 16: TDI Dional Conoratora................... 24 A. Applicablo Standarda.............................. 25 B. The TDI Dional Conorator Owners Group Program.... 27

1. The Ownern 0roup............................ 27

2. Elements of the Ownern Group Program........ 32

n. Phano !................................ 32

b. Phano !!............................... 32

c. Engino Tonting and Inspection.......... 34 I. J 4 .e5 Page

d. Engine Maintenance and Surveillance..... 35

3. NRC Staff Review of the Owners Group Program at PNPP...................................... 38 se 4. The Adequacy of the Owners Group Program..... 43 C. The Sixteen Phase I Components.................... 44

1. Components Not Contested by OCRE............. 44

2. Components Contested by OCRE................. 47 D. Phase II Components............................... 60 s

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, um June 10, 1985 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

?!HE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' REPLY TO PROPOSED IINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FILED BY THE OTHER PARTIES (EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TDI DIESEL GENERATORS)

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.754(a)(3), Applicants reply herein to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law of the other parties.1/

Applicants do not attempt in this reply to respond to each proposed finding and conclusion of intervenors with which F

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1/ The NRC Staff's (" Staff's") proposed findings and conclu-sions are in most material respects consistent with Applicants' proposed findings and conclusions. Accordingly, Applicants have directed this reply primarily to the findings and conclu-sions submitted by Sunflower Alliance Inc., et al. ("Sunflow-er") and Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy (WOCRE"), with which we have substantial disagreements as detailed in our reply.

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i im Applicants disagree. Nor is the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (the " Board") required to address expressly each and every individual finding proposed by every party. See Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 N.R.C. 33, 41 (1977), and cases cited therein.

Where disagreements are plain, and the positions are accompanied by accurate citations to the record, for example, we have not repeated our positions, but rely on Applicants' previously submitted proposed findings and conclusions.

Citations to Applicants' numbered proposed findings and to the numbered proposed findings of the other parties are in the format " App. PF_ ," " Sunflower PF_ ," "OCRE PF_ ," or " Staff PF__," with the appropriate paragraph number (s) supplied. In citations to pre-filed direct testimony, Applicants employ the abbreviations established in our previously submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Par-tial Initial Decision (Emergency Planning and TDI Diesel Gener-ators) (Appendix A of which identifies the location in the transcript of each witness' direct testimony).

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I.

SUMMARY

The Board has given careful consideration to the preposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the parties.2/

As is reflected in our discussion and resolution of the materi-al issues of fact and law relating to Issues No. 1 and No. 16, set forth herein, the Board has decided to follow in this par-tial initial decision the findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by Applicants. The Staff's proposed findings and conclusions are consistent in most material respects with those of Applicants; however, Applicants' submission was the more de-tailed and complete and we have adopted it as the basis for our decision.

2/ See Applicants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision (Emergency Planning and TDI Diesel Generators), dated May 13, 1985 (as amended on May 20, 1985) (" App. PFC"); Applicants' Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Filed by the Other Parties (Emergency Planning and TDI Diesel Generators),

dated June 10, 1985; Intervenor Sunflower Alliance's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision (Emergency Planning), dated May 23, 1985 (" Sunflower PFC"); OCRE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision (Issue #16, TDI Die-sel Generators), dated May 23, 1985 ("OCRE PFC"); and NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Issues 1 and 16, dated June 3, 1985 (" Staff PFC").

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II. ISSUE NO. 1: Emergency Planning A. Testimony of Dr. Sternglass Sunflower presents two arguments in attempting to refute the considerable evidence calling into question the credibility of Dr. Sternglass. First, Sunflower claims that the " exhibits adduced by Applicants to attempt impeachment of Dr. Sternglass ,

are almost all over a dozen years old, and the Three Mile Is-land accident and its aftermath have lent new credence to Dr.

Sternglass' theories." Sunflower PFC at 1. In fact, only three of Applicants' ten exhibits are over a dozen years old, and a number of the exhibits post-date the Three Mile Island accident. Moreover, Sunflower does not even suggest that Dr. Sternglass has changed his methodology within the last dozen years.3/ Sunflower fails to address the recent critical discussions of Dr. Sternglass in Carolina Power & Light Co.

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-15, 19 N.R.C. 837, 838-39, 843-44 (1984); LBP-84-7, 19 N.R.C. 432, 438 (1984), or the criticisms by the United States Court of Ap-peals for the Third Circuit in its 1980 decision in Punnett v.

Carter, 621 F. 2d 578 (3d Cir. 1980). Indeed, Sunflower fails 3/ Indeed, Dr. Sternglass' most recent chart (Sunflower Ex. 8) indicates that he is continuing to use the same tech-niques he was using in 1969. Tr. 2741 (Sternglass).

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7 to cite any analyses of Dr. Sternglass' work, or other studies, which would lend credibility to Dr. Sternglass' methodology or conclusions. Particularly in light of the Commission's recent statement that the available evidence indicates that radiation 4

exposures produced by the Three Mile Island accident did not and will not result in significant adverse health effects, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-85-08, 21 N.R.C. (May 16, 1985), the Board fails to see how TMI can be said to vindicate Dr. Sternglass' theories.

Second, Sunflower maintains that Dr. Sternglass' belief in the existence of a " coverup" or " conspiracy" by governmental agencies and scientific groups to suppress information sup-porting his views is both " credible and documented." Sunflower PFC at 1. However, the principal " evidence" submitted by Sun-flower in support of Dr. Sternglass' conspiracy theory consists of selected quotations from newspaper articles contained in a book by Dr. Sternglass. See Tr. 2716-25, 2732-34 (Sternglass).

The Board agrees with Applicants that the vast conspiracy sug-gested by Dr. Sternglass simply is not credible. See App. PFC at 15.

In sum, there is nothing in Sunflower's proposed findings which would lead the Board to question its conclusion that y

Dr. Sternglass' credibility has been seriously impeached, and that his testimony should be accorded no weight in this pro-ceeding.

B. Contention A: State and Local Comments on ETE Study Sunflower's proposed findings on Contention A are defi-cient in two fundamental respects.4/ First, Sunflower mis-states the record evidence on this contention. Sunflower claims that Applicants failed to follow the regulatory guidance of NUREG-0654 by seeking " concurrence rather than, and in lieu of, written comments, from local officials." Sunflower PFC at 2 (emphasis in original). See Sunflower PF 3-4. The testi-mony presented by the witnesses for Applicants, FEMA and the Staff clearly established that written comments were obtained from county (and State) officials, and that those comments, which were reflected in the February 1985 revision to the ETE, were submitted to the NRC along with the revised ETE. App.

PF 6; Staff PF 4, 11-13.5/

4/ Sunflower PF 1 quotes Contention A as originally admitted by the Board without acknowledging the summary disposition on all issues except the issue of obtaining published comments i from State and local officials on evacuation time estimates.

l See App. PF 1.

5/ Sunflower's only citation to the record in support of its claim that written comments on the ETE were not solicited is the testimony of Applicants' witness McCandless at Tr. 2797.

! (Continued Next Page) 1

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.e W Second,' Sunflower misunderstands the regulatory guidance of NUREG-0654 applicable to evacuation time estimate studies.

For instance, Sunflower attempts to make much of the fact that HMM met for the first time with the county engineers for Lake, Ashtabula and Geauga Counties approximately three weeks before

, the evidentiary. hearing, and then only as a result of Sunflow-er's "litigative insistences." Sunflower PFC at 2. However, all witnesses agreed that participation by county engineers is not necessary to meet the guidelines of NUREG-0654. Perrotti at 3; Tr. 2799-2804, 2811-16, 2830 (McCandless); 3122, 3127 (Shapiro); 3141-43 (Perrotti). See Staff PF 14. The Board, too, agrees that there is no requirement or recommendation for county engineers to review and comment on the ETE. At any rate, in this case HMM did meet with the county engineers, who concurred with the most recent version of the ETE. Tr. 2795-97 (McCandless).

Sunflower also points out that, at the time of the hear-ing, written concurrences on the revised ETE had not been received from the Geauga County engineer, the Geauga County (Continued)

See Sunflower PF 3. That testimony, however, was part of a discussion specifically addressing review of the ETE by the county engineers. The role of county engineers is discussed infra.

.y Disaster Services Agency Director, or the Ohio Disaster Ser-vices Agency. Sunflower PFC at 2, Sunflower PF 6-8. The Board finds this argument completely irrelevant. The contention deals with obtaining comments on the ETE from State and local officials. In any case, NUREG-0654 says nothing about ob-taining concurrences, let alone written concurrences, from State and local officials with respect to changes made as a re-sult of those officials' comments on the draft ETE. See Tr. 3146 (Shapiro, Perrotti). Applicants have in fact obtained verbal concurrence from State and local officials, including all three county engineers. App. PF 7. That is more than Applicants are required to do. Sunflower's criticisms concern-ing the ETE are without basis.

C. Contention J: Incomplete EALs Sunflower filed no proposed findings addressing the merits of this contention. Claiming that it did not cross-examine on the contention, and that it had reserved the right to " raise this as a substantive late-filed contention" (Sunflower PF 9),

Sunflower proposes that the Board should not rule on the con-tention at this time. Sunflower PFC at 2.

Sunflower did cross-examine both Applicants' and the Staff's witnesses on Contention J. See Tr. 2966-76 (Hulbert);

3139-41 (Perrotti). Whether or not Sunflower chose to submit a L_

V late-filed contention concerning Applicants' EALs (or any other matter), the Board can discern no justification for Sunflower's failure to file proposed findings, and sees no reason to defer its ruling on Contention J.

The Board made the filing of proposed findings mandatory for Applicants, Staff, and the lead intervenor for each conten-tion.Q/ Sunflower is lead intervenor on Issue No. 1.7/ Sun-flower's failure to submit proposed findings on Contention J therefore constitutes a default on this contention.

10 C.F.R. $ 2.754(b). Consequently, the contention is treated as uncontested and is dismissed. Kansas Gas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26, 20 N.R.C.

53, 61 n. 3 (1984); Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Sta-tion, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-24, 19 N.R.C. 1418, 1423 n. 1 (1984); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-48, 15 N.R.C. 1549, 1568 (1982); Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1426 (1981).

See also Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 N.R.C. 17, 23 (1983), and cases cited therein.

4/ Memorandum and Order (Proposed Findings and Conclusions)

(April 18, 1985), at 1, 3.

7/ Memorandum and Order (Concerning Redesignation of Lead In-tervenor (October 13, 1981).

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D. Contention M: Independent Radiation Monitoring Systems Sunflower's proposed findings on Contention M question both the effectiveness and the cost-benefit of the mobile moni-toring teams on which the State of Ohio, the three counties and Applicants rely, versus the fixed monitoring systems which Sun-flower would prefer. Because Sunflower consistently misstates the record, ignores record evidence which does not support its views, and makes irrelevant arguments, the Board finds Sunflow-er's arguments unpersuasive.

For example, Sunflower argues that CEI monitoring teams would not be deployed until 1.5 to 2.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> after commencement of an accident, although a major release of radioactivity could occur within 45 minutes. Sunflower PFC at 3. However, the record cited by Sunflower for this proposition discusses the response time of the Lake County monitoring teams, not the CEI teams. Compare Tr. 2935 with Sunflower PF 15.g/ CEI can have two monitoring teams in place within 30 minutes after declara-tion of an Alert, and a third team within 45 minutes, at any time of the day or night. App. PF 36; Staff PF 34; Tr. 2936-37 (Bowers).

g/ The Lake County teams are dispatched and in place within 1.0 to 2.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> after declaration of an Alert. App. PF 33; Staff PF 35; Tr. 2933-35 (Bowers).

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Sunflower also claims that cross-examination of Appli-cants' witness Cole revealed, contrary to Applicants' direct testimony, that the State monitoring teams would not be gather-ing data.for use during an accident at PNPP, but would be lim-ited to gathering data for use after the emergency. Sunflower PFC at 3, Sunflower PF 19. Sunflower here confuses the two distinct data gathering roles of the State field monitoring teams. The State teams take soil and vegetative samples which play a major role in recovery and reentry following the emer-gency, but are not used for making protective action recommen-dations during an emergency. See Tr. 2899, 2902 (Cole). The State teams also obtain gross gamma readings which provide the data needed by the State's Dose Assessment Group to plot the l radioactive plume and identify plume parameters during an emer-gency. App. PF 29; Staff PF 23. This information is used to I make protective action recommendations. Tr. 2891 (Cole).

Thus, Sunflower is incorrect in suggesting that the State teams do not provide an independent source of radiation monitoring l data during an emergency at PNPP.9/

! . Sunflower also argues that "the team approach does not

! provide for monitoring in Lake Erie," and that " monitoring

, 9/ Sunflower also completely ignores the independent moni-4 toring provided during an emergency by the Department of Ener-gy, U.S. EPA, NRC and Lake County mobile teams. App. PF 32-34.

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teams would be largely confined to sampling along road rights-of-way." Sunflower PFC at 3. However, the record shows that there is an excellent network of roads in the vicinity of PNPP which allows effective tracking of the plume by mobile teams in land-based vehicles. App. PF 37. Releases over Lake Erie which returned to land would be tracked by Applicants' computerized dose projection system, and could be detected by mobile teams along the shore. App. PF 38. In addition, DOE helicopters are capable of conducting offshore monitoring.

App. PF 38; Staff PF 29.

Sunflower further argues that the monitoring teams "never 1 have been tested in worse conditions than darkness and rain."

Sunflower PFC at 3. See Sunflower PF 17. Sunflower's basis for this proposed finding is Mr. Bowers' testimony at Tr. 2944-45, which discusses drills and exercises of the CEI monitoring teams. Since the CEI teams are equipped with four-wheel drive vehicles, snow conditions would not be likely to be a serious problem. Tr. 2945 (Bowers).

i With respect to cost-effectiveness, Sunflower criticizes i

the decision not to use a system of fixed monitors on the I

grounds that Applicants have not comparatively assessed the costs of the methods which will be used with the cost of a fixed system. Sunflower PFC at 3, Sunflower PF 12-13. This l

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argument is irrelevant, since a system of fixed monitors would not replace the mobile teams, the thermoluminescent dosimeters, or the in-plant effluent monitors which will be used at PNPP.

See App. PF 26.10/

Sunflower also claims that Applicants' projected costs for a fixed monitor system "did not even mathematically add up."

Sunflower PFC at 3. See Sunflower PF 11. Applicants' addition was correct. Omitted from Sunflower's listing of costs is

$9000 for each of the 100 Reuter Stokes radiation detectors.

Tr. 2917 (Bowers).11/

Sunflower has failed to support its claim that a system of fixed monitors is either preferable or legally required.

10/ Sunflower misstates the record when it characterizes Mr.

Bowers' testimony as stating that a combination of mobile moni-l toring teams and fixed systems of the type envisioned by Sun-l flower would be less effective than mobile teams alone. Sun-flower PFC at 3, Sunflower PF 14. Mr. Bowers actually testified that such a combined system would not be any more effective than mobile monitoring by itself. Tr. 2928 (Bowers).

11/ The Staff inadvertently describes the annual calibration costs for each pressurized ion chamber as $4000, instead of the

$400 figure provided by Mr. Bowers. Compare Staff PFC at 9; Staff PF 37 with Tr. 2919.

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E. Contention P: Hospitals Sunflower contends that Applicants have failed to detail satisfactory " arrangements" consistent with the GUARD deci-sion12/ for hospital medical services for members of the gener-al public in an emergency at PNPP.13/ According to Sunflower, GUARD mandates that Applicants " detail medical arrangements fully, as to facilities, equipment, personnel, etc., for each facility which would be included in emergency preparations."

Sunflower PFC at 5. Sunflower alleges that Applicants "put forth no substantive evidence of arrangements for provision of medical services to public persons who would be radiological victims beyond a superficial discussion of persons trained at area hospitals." Sunflower PF 45.

12/ GUARD v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

13/ Sunflower also continues to insist that the number of ca-sualties requiring emergency medical care in the event of an accident at PNPP could be extremely high. See Sunflower PFC at 5-6, Sunflower PF 35. The overwhelming record evidence is that even a severe accident at PNPP could be expected to produce few if any contaminated injured or radiation exposed persons requiring emergency medical care. See App. PF 46-48, 52-54; Staff PF 55, 68. These cases could readily be handled by the four local hospitals designated to handle contaminated injured or exposed members of the general public in an emergency at PNPP. See App. PFC at 36-38. The worst case estimates cited by Sunflower are inapplicable to PNPP. App. PFC at 33-35; Staff PFC at 12.

The Board can discern no requirement in GUARD for the level and extent of detail asserted by Sunflower. GUARD states only that 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(12) requires more than "a simple list of treatment facilities already in place . . . ." 753 F.2d at 1146. In any case, the record contains considerable detail concerning arrangements for medical services at the four local hospitals designated to handle contaminated injured or exposed members of the general public requiring medical care in an emergency at PNPP, and the medical resources (including fa-cilities, equipment and trained personnel) which those hospi-tals possess. See App. PF 55-61; Staff PF 51, 54, 58-59, 61-62.14/

In addition, evidence was submitted describing generally the capabilities and resources of 26 backup hospitals ia the counties around the PNPP plume exposure pathway EPZ which could be used if needed. App. PF 62-63; Staff PF 52, 65. The Board

. ' disagrees with Sunflownr's characterization of arrangements l

l 14/ Sunflower in its proposed findings asserts that Applicants l

did not adequately deal with the case of persons who are inter-nally contaminated with radiation. Sunflower PFC at 6, Sun-flower PF 37. However, internal contamination, which is caused by inhalation of radiation, is not the critical factor in radi-ation exposure; thus, the need for treatment of internal con-tamination is unlikely. Staff PF 56; Tr. 2991-93, 2999-3001 (Linnemann). Moreover, radiation exposure as a general matter is unlikely to require hospital emergency room care. Tr.

3031-33 (Linnemann).

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9 9 with these backup hospitals as "ad hoc." Sunflower PF 40. The Board finds that existing written hospital disaster plans which provide for emergency patient overflow at one hospital to be handled by referral hospitals constitute adequate pre-arrange-ments for purposes of GUARD. See App. PF 63; Staff PF 66.

The Board takes note of the fact that the Commission has recently issued interim guidance to licensing boards in autho-rizing full-power operating licenses pending the Commission's response to the Court of Appeals' remand in GUARD. Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12),

50 Fed. Reg. 20892 (May 21, 1985). The Commission's Statement of Policy directs the licensing boards to consider an exception from Section 50.47(b)(12) under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(1) for applicants who meet the pre-GUARD standard for medical services and commit to full compliance with the Commission's forthcoming response to the GUARD remand. 50 Fed. Reg. at 20893. Because we find that Applicants in this case have fully complied with 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(12) as interpreted by GUARD, we do not be-lieve it is necessary to pursue the course of action made available by the Commission.15/

15/ Because Applicants have demonstrated compliance with Sec-tion 50.47(b)(12) as interpreted by GUARD, the Board also finds it unnecessary to condition issuance of an operating license on Applicants' commitment to comply fully with the Commission's (Continued Next Page) m

. o F. Contention Q: Letters of Agreement for School Buses Other than stating the contention (SInflower PF 49)1p/ and noting that Applicants do not anticipate obtaining the letters of agreement for school buses prior to mid-summer, 1985 (Sun-flower PF 50), Sunflower submitted no proposed findings on Con-tention Q.

The Staff, while concluding that there is reasonable as-surance that the letters of agreement will be obtained, would require that they be obtained prior to issuance of an operating license for PNPP. Staff PFC at 15, 59; Staff PF 76.17/

Although Applicants testified that they anticipated obtaining the letters of agreement before fuel load, Applicants did not (Continued) response to the GUARD remand, as suggested by the Staff. See Staff PFC at 14, 60. In any event, such a condition would only be appropriate for a license authorizing operation above five percent power. 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(d).

j 1s/ Sunflower PF 49 quotes Contention Q as originally admitted l

by the Board without acknowledging the summary disposition on j all aspects except the issue of letters of agreement with schools outside the PNPP plume exposure pathway EPZ. See App.

PF 64.

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17/ The Staff also would require letters of agreement for all l school districts supplying buses. The contention is limited to school districts outside the PNPP plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Memorandum and Order (Motions for Summary Disposition of Issues 1, 15 and 16)(April 9, 1985), at 8.

I commit to obtain them before that time. Baer (Contention Q) at 2. In any case, the Board is not authorized to require let-ters of agreement prior to fuel load. Imposing such a require-ment would be inconsistent with the Commission's regulations, which provide that no findings or determinations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness are required prior to operation above five percent of rated power. 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(d). The Board finds that there is reasonable assurance that the letters of agreement with school districts outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ will be obtained prior to operation of PNPP above five percent power. See App. PFC at 39-40, App.

PF 65-66; Staff PF 74-76. Thus, there is no reason to impose a license condition concerning the letters of agreement.

G. Contention U: Handling Contaminated Property at Reception Centers Sunflower contends that Applicants have not demonstrated the ability to handle contaminated property at reception cen-ters. First, Sunflower states that emergency kits, including l decontamination equipment, were not present at reception cen-ters at the time of the hearing. Sunflower PFC at 7, Sunflower PF 52, 56. There is no regulatory requirement that such kits (or, indeed, any offsite emergency equipment) be in place at l

the time of the hearing. Wolf Creek, supra, 20 N.R.C. at 61-62 I

and n. 4. Some emergency kits already were in place at the j i l

time of the hearing, and kits are scheduled to be in place for all reception centers prior to fuel load. App. PF 73; Staff PF 79.1g/ Sunflower offers no evidence to suggest that this schedule will not be met.

Second, Sunflower claims, based on a provision in ODSA's Radiological Training Manual (see Sunflower Ex. 12), that pri-vate individuals will be personally responsible for decontaminating their own vehicles and equipment. Sunflower PFC at 7, Sunflower PF 55. This is incorrect. The provision of the ODSA Manual cited by Sunflower does not apply to nuclear power plant accidents. Staff PF 81; Tr. 3201-03 (Wills). De-contamination of privately owned vehicles at reception centers will be handled by fire department personnel. See App.

PF 68-75.

Third, Sunflower complains that vehicle decontamination procedures do not provide for trapping of radioactive water runoff. Rather, the areas where decontamination takes place are quarantined. Sunflower PFC at 7, Sunflower PF 57. The ig/ Both Sunflower and the Staff incorrectly assume that the emergency kits will be stored at the reception centers them-selves. Sunflower PFC at 7, Sunflower PF 52, 56; Staff PFC at 15, 60, Staff PF 79. The equipment will not be kept at recep-tion centers, but will be kept at the fire departments respon-sible for monitoring and decontamination activities at recep-tion centers so that the equipment can be periodically checked and maintained. Tr. 3060 (Baer).

Board finds that the quarantine procedure is a commonly accept-ed method that would pose no threat to the public health or safety, and that there is no need to conduct special studies or l analyses of possible leaching effects. Tr. 3068 (Baer).

I Finally, Sunflower alleges that although the Ohio EPA is designated to dispose of contaminated personal property col-lected at reception centers, Ohio law does not give that agency authority to handle nuclear waste. Sunflower PFC at 7, Sun-flower PF 53-54. The State of Ohio's radiological emergency response plan provides for the OEPA to arrange for disposal of contaminated personal property with a licensed commercial ra-dioactive waste disposal firm. App. PF 71. The Board declines to consider whether the State Plan is in conflict with State law on this point. An NRC licensing proceeding is not the appropriate forum for resolving such alleged conflicts. Memo-randum and Order (Admissibility of Contentions on Emergency Plans and Motion to Dismiss) (January 10, 1985), at 8 (denying admission of Sunflower proposed Contention E).19/

19/ In any event, Sunflower fails to establish the existence of a conflict. Sunflower cites Sections 3734.01 et seg. of the Ohio Revised Code. Chapter 3734 of the Ohio Revised Code is the Ohio Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal Law. Although 5 3734.Ol(J)(2) provides that the State of Ohio does not have regulatory authority over substances subject to the Atomic En-ergy Act, nothing in the statute prohibits the OEPA from making the arrangements specified in the State Plan. Since the OEPA in arranging for disposal of the contaminated material with a licensed firm is not exercising regulatory authority, the Board sees no conflict.

In conclusion, Sunflower has uncovered no reason to ques-tion the adequacy of the arrangements for handling contaminated property at reception centers in the event of an accident at PNPP.

The Staff agrees that the provisions for equipping and training fire department personnel to handle contaminated prop-erty at reception centers are adequate, but states that these provisions should be completed prior to issuance of an operat-ing license. Staff PFC at 15, 60, Staff PF 82. Again, such a condition would run contrary to the Commission's regulations.

See supra p. 18. At any rate, the Board finds that there is reasonable assurance that the necessary equipment will be in place and the necessary personnel will be trained prior to operation of PNPP above five percent power. See App. PFC at 42, App. PF 72-73; Staff PF 79, 82. Thus, there is no need to impose such a license condition. See Wolf Creek, supra, 20 N.R.C. at 61-62 and n. 4.

H. Contention Z: Bus Driver Protection Once again, Sunflower's proposed findings either miscon-ctrue or ignore the record evidence. Sunflower argues that the testimony of Applicants' witness Baer was inconsistent because he stated that there is no regulatory requirement or guidance calling for bus drivers to be supplied with respirators, yet

acknowledged on cross-examination that an EPA Manual recommends respiratory protection for emergency workers. Sunflower PFC at 8, Sunflower PF 59-60. Sunflower's argument simply does not follow, since Mr. Baer went on to testify that the circumstanc-es under which the EPA Manual recommends respirators for emer-gency workers do not apply to bus drivers. Tr. 3071-74, 3076 (Baer). See Staff PF 88. For instance, bus drivers will not be required to remain in evacuation areas to perform life-saving activities or time-consuming loading of elderly or handicapped persons into special vehicles. Tr. 3073-74, 3084-86 (Baer). See App. PF 85.

Sunflower claims that Applicants have failed to consider the possibility of prolonged exposure to bus drivers as a re-

. sult of repeated trips into the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Sunflower PFC at 8, Sunflower FF 61. There is no record sup-port for this claim.20/ Applicants have determined that there are sufficient buses in the three counties to evacuate everyone needing transportation in a single trip. App. PF 86. In any event, bus drivers would not be subject to radiation exposures beyond the protect,ive action guides established for the general population. Tr. 3074 (Baer). See App. PF 84-85; Staff PF 87-88, 90.

20/ Tr. 3074, cited by Sunflower, contains no discussion of repeated trips into the EPZ for bus drivers. App. PF 81.

Sunflower also states that the dosimetry equipment supplied to bus drivers is not capable of recording cumulative radiation exposures. Sunflower PFC at 8, Sunflower PF 63.

This statement directly contradicts the record, which estab-lishes that each bus driver will be provided with a thermoluminescent dosimeter, which is a permanent record de-vice, in addition to self-reading dosimeters. Tr. 3076 (Baer).

See App. PF 80.

Finally, Sunflower argues that "[a]s of the time of hear-ing, training to bus drivers on the use of dosimeters had been given to only one-half of their number." Sunflower PFC at 8.

There is no regulatory requirement that training of personnel must be complete at the time of the hearing. Wolf Creek, supra, 20 N.R.C. at 61-62 and n. 4, 85. Sunflower provides no

~

reason to believe that the training of bus dr1 vers will not proceed in a timely fashion.

Thus, all of Sunflower's criticisms of the protective mea-sures taken for bus drivers in the event of an emergency at l PNPP are without merit.

I. Contention BB: FEMA Interim Report Sunflower alleges that 58 of the 145 planning deficiencies set forth in the FEMA Interim Report were "still open and not corrected" as of the time of the hearing. Sunflower PFC at 9.

l i

In fact, the 58 deficiencies cited by Sunflower were those deficiencies originally identified by FEMA in the Interim Re-port itself as being uncorrected. See App. PF 91; Tr 3097 (Baer). Most of these deficiencies subsequently were corrected by revisions to the county plans. See App. PF 92-93; Tr. 3097 (Baer). The record evidence is that the county plans are ade-quate in spite of the few remaining uncorrected deficiencies.

See App. PF 90; Staff PF 92. There is no reason to believe that the few items still being addressed will not be resolved in a timely manner. See App. PF 93-94; Staff PF 93-94.

J. Contention CC: SER Resolution Items Sunflower declined to submit proposed findings on this contention. Accordingly, the contention is treated as uncontested and is dismissed. See supra p. 9.

III. ISSUE NO. 16: TDI Diesel Generators The Board's discussion of OCRE's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on Issue 16 follows the subject headings used by OCRE in the Opinion section of its submittal.

i I

4 A. Applicable Standards OCRE asserts, in its proposed findings, that the Board should find that the performance specification for the PNPP diesel generators and its attachment provide the standard for determining whether or not the diesels meet General Design Criteria ("GDC") 1 and 17. OCRE PFC at 11-12. However, the Board finds that the evidence clearly established that the per-formance specification and attachment were not written for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of PNPP's FSAR. See Tr.

2187 (Christiansen). Thus, they provide an inappropriate stan-dard for judging whether GDC 1 and 17 have been met. The Board relies on the record as a whole in determining Applice.nts' com-pliance with GDC 1 and 17.21/

OCRE maintains that OCRE Ex. 1 (documenting one of the pe-riodic manufacturing audits of TDI conducted for PNPP) is evi-dence that GDC 1 has been violated. OCRE PFC at 12. The audit referenced in OCRE Ex. 1 was conducted after the manufacture of i

21/ The Board finds OCRE's citation to decisions concerning 4

the adequacy of the TDI diesel generators at Shoreham irrele-vant to this proceeding. See OCRE PFC at 12. The fact that l another facility may or may not be in compliance with GDC 17 is j not probative of the situation at PNPP. Additionally, while i the TDI diesels have experienced numerous problems with engine i components, the Board finds OCRE's assertions of " numerous failures" and a " demonstrated . . . lack of reliability" to be unsupported by the record. See id., OCRE PF 12 (emphasis added).

l

the PNPP diesel generators, which were fabricated between 1977 and 1978. Tr. 2235-36 (Christiansen). The audit was performed in 1982 to inspect TDI's manufacturing program for spare parts.

See App. PF 183. The follow-up evaluation conducted as a re-sult of this particular audit determined that the hardware, as manufactured, was acceptable and that the TDI quality assurance program was adequate. Id. PNPP responded to the recommenda-tions generated as a result of this audit, aa well as to con-cerns identified by both the Owners Group and Staff, by as-signing a quality assurance repre9entative full-time to TDI to witness factory inspections and holdpoints, perform visual and dimensional checks, etc., for each safety-related engine compo-nent ordered to support its engine revalidation effort. Tr.

2267 (Christiansen); Christiansen at 16.

While the Board notes Applicants' response to this audit with approval, it does not find it necessary to dwell upon the alleged deficiencies in TDI's quality assurance program in light of the independent revalidation of the PNPP diesels con-ducted as part of the TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group Pro-gram. Deficiencies in TDI's quality assurance program (includ-ing those alluded to by OCRE in Staff Ex. 1 at 1 and Tr.

2313-14 (Berlinger)), were one of the reasons for the formation of the TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group Program and PNPP's participation therein. See App. PF 182. Because tho Owners o o Group Program, as implemented at PNPP, revalidated the diesel generators onsite, without reliance on TDI's quality assurance 9

program, any findings documented by the 1982 audit are of no 6 . relevance to the Board's decision regarding the reliability of the diesel generators.

B. The TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group Program

1. The Owners Group.

OCRE cites to the three documents comprising its Ex. 2 as evidence that the Owners Group was more of a " lobbying force" than a " disinterested technical organization." OCRE PFC at 13-14. The Board does not see how the owners Group's concern with licensing schedules, id.; OCRE Ex. 2 (January 10, 1985 Memo to File), is evidence of anything more than its desire to keep the review process moving along expeditiously. Similarly, the Board finds no cause to question the Owners Group's motives in OCRE Ex. 2 (Proposal for Closure of TDI owners Group). In this exhibit, OCRE draws our attention to the Owners Group's desire to " minimize the risk of unnecessarily raising any addi-tional concerns" and "the visibility of the Owners Group ,

[which] sets the TDI diesel generators apart from other make diesel generators . . . as needing special consideration."

OCRE Ex. 2 (Proposal for Closure of TDI Owners Group at 2).

See OCRE PFC at 14. This document was written at the close of

~27-i

the generic Owners Group program. See Tr. 2250-51 (Kammeyer).

The TDI diesels no longer needed special consideration; the

. program had been completed with favorable results. Id. It was, therefore, time to deal with this equipment through the normal reporting and review process again. Id. Similarly, the fact that meetings and discussions occurred between the Owners Group and the NRC Staff does not aid OCRE. OCRE PFC at 14. At most, it demonstrates that the Owners Group kept the Staff ap-

prised of'its progress, sought feedback, and responded to re-quests for additional information. See, e.g., Tr. 2247-55

,- (Christiansen, Kammeyer). l OCRE's statement that the Owners Group " lobbied" for "re-laxing licensing standards and restrictions, such as the 185

_ BMEP limit and maintenance and surveillance requirements", OCRE PFC at 14, illustrates its continuing misconception with regard I

[ to the 185 BMEP restriction.22/ This limitation was estab-lished by the Staff as an interim licensing restriction for plants seeking a license prior to implementation of their re-spective DR/QR programs. Staff Ex. 1 at 13-19; Tr. 2248-49 (Christiansen).23/ PNPP remains restricted to the 185 BMEP l

l j 22/ The Owners Group and Staff interaction with regard to L maintenance and surveillance requirements is discussed supra.

t 23/ PNPP was granted a limited waiver of the 185 BMEP require-ment for-the purpose of conducting torsiograph testing and pre-operational testing of its engines to their rated load of 7,000 1

kw (224 BMEP). Tr. 2254 (Christiansen); OCRE Ex. 3.

1 -

J

-- . .=

l limit pending confirmation of its torsiograph testing results by the Staff. Tr. 2266 (Christiansen), 2307 (Berlinger). This l is the only open issue at PNPP limiting engine operation to 185 BMEP, Tr. 2322-23 (Persinko), as PNPP's DR/QR program is com- i plete. Tr. 2248-49 (Kammeyer). There was, therefore, never )

any need for a " lobbying" effort on the part of the Owners )

Group to lift this restriction. From the beginning, the Staff intended this to be a temporary condition. The Board agrees with the Staff that, given favorable torsiograph test results, PNPP engine operation to 224 psig BMEP is acceptable. See App.

PF 174.

OCRE cites to its Ex. 5 as further indication that the Owners Group was really "a lobbying force". OCRE PFC at 14.

The Board finds no support for this allegation in OCRE Ex. 5, in which the Owners Group requested its members to furnish re-alistic loading information to present to the Staff. The Bo'ard sees nothing inappropriate with the Owners Group desire to use realistic, site-specific engine loading requirements.

The Board also finds no basis to question the motives of the Owners Group in the fact that the DR/QR program did not ex-plore the alternative of replacing the TDI diesels. See OCRE PFC at 14. The DR/QR program was a TDI engine revalidation ef-fort, Tr. 2409 (Berlinger), not a vendor survey. Similarly,

the Board sees nothing inappropriate in the fact that the con-clusion as to a particular diesel engine's reliability was left to the individual owner, or that the Owners Group did not es-tablish a benchmark for number or type of failure or quality deficiency beyond which they would consider the diesels unacceptable. OCRE PFC at 14. OCRE has offered nothing to suggest why these procedures were improper.

As to OCRE's assertion that "as early as March 8, 1984, long before the completion of the Owners Group Program, Appli-cants voiced the conclusion that the PNPP diesel engines are not unreliable", id. at 14-15, the Board notes that Applicants expressed this opinion in response to an interrogatory posed by OCRE concerning Applicants' reason for not replacing the TDI diesel generators with equipment fabricated by a different man-ufacturer. See OCRE Ex. 4 at 10. Applicants went on to state that their " evaluation of the reliability of the PNPP standby diesel generators [would] be based on all of the available data." Id. at 12. PNPP's successful completion of the Owners Group revalidation effort has obviously confirmed Applicants' initial belief in the reliability of the diesel generators in l place at PNPP. See App. PF 184.

l l

OCRE finds further evidence of the "true nature" of the Owners Group in the fact that it "had no objection to full

O O power operation of a unit which had not demonstrated resolution of the generic Phase I known problems." OCRE PFC at 15. Staff Ex. 1 at 3, cited by OCRE, actually states that the Owners Group recommends resolution of Phase I issues, permitting an exception in those cases where " interim operation prior to problem resolutions may be justified by any owner." (Emphasis added.) The Board finds nothing inappropriate with justified exceptions to such a general policy.

OCRE's proposed finding 17 asserts that the Owners Group

" acted as a ' lobbying' influence on the NRC Staff so as to gain the Staff's concurrence with the Owners Group's predetermined conclusion that the TDI engines are reliable." See also OCRE PFC at 15. The portions of the record cited by OCRE (and the record as a whole)'do not support OCRE's allegations. The Board finds Applicants' testimony that the Owners Group "didn't go in with [its] conclusions already there", to be credible.

Tr. 2247 (Kammeyer). The record supports Applicants' and Staff's characterization of the program as an independent requalification of the TDI engines. This finding is supported by the additional fact that a review conducted by an engineer-ing consulting firm, Southwest Research Institute ("SwRI"), in-dependently confirmed the Owners Group's conclusion as to the reliability of the PNPP engines. See App. PF 105.

4

The Board finds that OCRE has failed to establit*. that the Owners' Group was engaged in a " lobbying" effort. Thus, the Board rejects OCRE's proposed conclusion of law that the Owners Group Program was governed by commercial interests and, there-fore, inadequate. OCRE PFC at 57.

2. Elements of the Owners Group Program.

a. Phase I The Board finds no disagreement with Applicants in OCRE's initial discussion of the Phase I program. See id. at 16.

b. Phase II OCRE states that "the Staff believes that the DR/QR effort need not be completed prior to licensing and the Staff may never review the DR/QR programs at following plants." Id. at

17. PNPP has already completed its DR/QR program. Chris-tiansen at 8-11. The Board agrees with the Staff that a de-tailed review is unnecessary in light of the indepth evaluation being performed for the " lead" engines and one "following" en-gine. See Tr. 2302-04 (Berlinger).

OCRE argues that " Phase II must be fully implemented at PNPP and fully reviewed by the NRC Staff, with a finding that GDC 1 has been met, before [this Board] can approve of licensing for PNPP." OCRE PFC at 17. In this context, OCRE cites Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 A.E.C. 520, 529 (1973), for the proposition that "[f]ull compliance with the Commission's j regulations is mandatory. It cannot be argued that a facility not meeting the regulations is safe anyway and thus should be licensed." OCRE PFC at 17.

In Vermont Yankee, after the licensee began low power operation, the Appeal Board became concerned with an NRC Staff letter erroneously excluded by the licensing board. The letter stated that the applicant's written quality assurance program contained substantial omissions. After the applicant and NRC Staff supplied information demonstrating that corrective action had been taken, the Appeal Board ruled that there was no basis to reopen the record on the quality assurance issue. ALAB-138, 6 A.E.C. at 527. OCRE has not shown that serious deficiencies occurred in the manufacture of the PNPP diesels, let alone that there are deficiencies remaining uncorrected, in light of PNPP's successful completion of the Owners Group Program. The Board finds that the record demonstrates that GDC 1 has been fully complied with at PNPP. We , therefore, reject OCRE's sug-gestion that Vermont Yankee requires us to withhold a license on the record before us.

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. . l

c. Engine Testing and Inspection The Board is obliged to disregard OCRE's statement ques-tioning the veracity of Applicants' testimony concerning the hundreds of hours of successful operation of other TDI DSRV-16-4 engines. See OCRE PFC at 18. OCRE had ample oppor-tunity to cross-examine Applicants on this point, but failed to do so at the hearing. The Board, therefore, accepts Appli-cants' testimony as uncontroverted and probative of the reliability of the DSRV-16-4 engines. See App. PF 178.

OCRE argues that the preoperational testing experience of other DSRV-16-4 engines is irrelevant to PNPP because differ-ences exist among these engines. OCRE PFC at 18. First of all, the Board notes that PNPP is not compelled to rely on the engine testing conducted at other plants; PNPP is performing its own Regulatory Guide 1.108 testing. App. PF 175. Sec-ondly, the Board notes that the majority of the PNPP engine components are identical to those on the other DSRV-16-4 en-gines. See, e.g., Kammeyer at 22. These components would have been subjected to the same inspections performed at PNPP. See, e.g., App. PF 107-08. The Board, therefore, believes that the significant preoperational testing conducted on,these other en-gines is relevant to its decision in this proceeding.24/ In 24/ The Board observes that it was operational experience at another plant which provided one of the bases for admitting this contention in the first place. See App. PFC at 51-52.

any event, it is unnecessary to test the PNPP diesels for 7

10 cycles, as OCRE suggests. See App. PF 179.

On the record before us, the Board finds no basis for questioning Applicants' commitment to perform preoperational testing of its diesel engines. See OCRE PFC at 18. As dis-cussed, supra, the Board finds no basis for OCRE's suggestion that the NRC Staff is willing to arbitrarily rescind any re-quirement at the request of Applicants or the Owners Group.

d. Engine Maintenance and Surveillance PNPP's maintenance and surveillance program goes beyond the recommendations contained in the DR/QR report and "merely complying with 10 C.F.R. Parts 21 and 50.55(e)", as OCRE sug-gests. OCRE PFC at 19, OCRE PF 28. PNPP is implementing all Owners Group recommendations as well as those of Pacific North-west Laboratory ("PNL") and SwRI. App. PF 111. While its sur-veillance program does include monitoring reports under and complying with 10 C.F.R. Part 21 and 6 50.55(e), see Chris-tiansen at 19, it is obviously not limited to this activity.

OCRE's proposed finding 29 which states that "[t]he NRC Staff is willing to defer implementation of maintenance and surveillance requirements until after the first refueling out-age" is without basis in the record. See also OCRE PFC at 19.

r

Apparently, OCRE's confusion stems from the fact that the Staff will reassess the diesels after the first outage, reviewing certain component inspections required to be performed at that time. See Tr. 2305 (Berlinger). Maintenance and surveillance is ongoing at PNPP. See App. PF 111.

The Board rejects OCRE's attempt to characterize the NRC Staff as willing to arbitrarily relax maintenance and surveil-lance requirements at Applicants' request. See OCRE PFC at 14,

19. As noted in the very exhibits to which OCRE cites, the Staff requires that " applications requesting less stringent maintenance and surveillance requirements from those in the DR/QR reports (be] supported [by] additional site experience."

OCRE Ex. 2 (January 10, 1985 Memo to File at 1). See also OCRE Ex. 2 (Executive Summary) (" Owners should utilize the mainte-nance recommendations in the DR/QR reports for a period and re-quest changes based on successful operation of the engines.")

OCRE asserts that "[t]he Owners Group considers the main-tenance and surveillance requirements to be time-consuming and burdensome." OCRE PFC at 19, OCRE PF 30. While it is true that the Owners Group considered the frequency of some of PNL's preliminary recommendations regarding maintenance and surveil-lance to be too stringent, the Owners Group concurred with PNL-as to the need for the maintenance and surveillance requirements as a whole. See Tr. 2299-300 (Berlinger,). The Board notes that, in its final recommendations, PNL reduced the maintenance and surveillance frequency for some components and, in other cases, left them the same. Tr. 2456-59 (Berlinger).

This modification was based on a "[re-evaluation of its] tech-nical position on the basis of better knowledge", id. at 2458, not Owners Group " lobbying" or arbitrariness as OCRE implies.

See OCRE PFC at 19. The Board agrees with Applicants and Staff that additional modification of maintenance and surveillance requirements may be appropriate as additional operational expe-rience is gained on the diesels.25/ See App. PF 185.

We can find no evidence in the record (indaed OCRE has cited to none) for OCRE's statement that there is "no assurance that the maintenance and surveillance program will exist for the life of the plant, or that it will be implemented at all."

OCRE PFC at 19. Testimony presented by Applicants at the hear-ing, as well as its pre-filed testimony, indicates otherwise.

See, e.g., App. PF 111. PNPP's implementation of required maintenance and surveillance will be reviewed by the Staff.

25/ The Board does not find it " unusual that such relaxation of requirements would be discussed now," OCRE PFC at 19, given the successful testing and over 1700 of hours of operation al-ready accumulated on TDI engines at other plants ~which have participated in the Owners Group Program. See, e.g., App. PF 178.

7-----_____

Id. The Board, therefore, rejects OCRE's allegation and finds that GDC 17 will be met throughout the life of the plant. Id.

3. NRC Staff Review of the Owners Group Program at PNPP.

.The Board finds OCRE's discussion of interim licensing ir-relevant to this proceeding. See OCRE PFC at 20-21. Appli-cants are not seeking, and the Staff is not concerned with, in-terim licensing at PNPP.26/ The concept of " interim licensing" of plants was developed in the Staff's generic SER and PNL's accompanying TER addressing the Owners Group Program Plan. See Staff Ex. 1 at 13 (SER), 19 (TER). As previously noted, the concept of interim licensing was developed in response to the fact that certain plants would be candidates for near term operating licenses prior to their completion of the Owners Group Program. See id. at 19 (TER). It was determined that the diesel generators should, therefore, be reassessed after the first refueling outage when plants which had obtained only interim licensing would have comple~ed t their-Phase II DR/QR ef-fort. Tr. 2305-07 (Berlinger). PNPP has already completed its Phase II program. Tr. 2248-49 (Christiansen).

26/ OCRE apparently recognizes this fact because it states that " Applicants have not applied for an interim license; what they seek is a full-power, full-term license." OCRE PFC at 20.

r OCRE states that "this interim licensing concept is the very premise of the Staff's conclusions presented at the hear-ing." OCRE PFC at 20-21. The fact that the diesels will be reassessed by the Staff after the first refueling outage means that in the future the Staff "will be able to judge in part how well the Owners Group did and how well the Staff did with re-gard to the reviews that were conducted." Tr. 2305 (Berlinger). The Staff will use this opportunity to review en-durance inspections to be conducted for certain components.

Id. To infer, from the foregoing, that the Staff's review of the PNPP diesels is truly " preliminary" would be erroneous.

See OCRE PFC at 21. A review of the Staff's testimony at the hearing, pre-filed testimony, and exhibits 27/ dispels any no-tion that the Staff is just beginning to consider the adequacy of the PNPP diesels. The Staff's conclusion as to the reliability of the PNPP diesels is certainly not expressed as an " interim" conclusion. See Staff Ex. 2 at 12.2g/

27/ The Staff's review of the Owners Group Program and the PNPP diesels is not limited to Staff Ex. 1, Ex. 2, and Ex. 5 as OCRE suggests. See OCRE PFC at 20.

2@/ OCRE's erroneous impression that the Staff has given only temporary approval of the diesels may stem from the fact that the Staff relied upon a preliminary PNL report in reaching its conclusion. See Staff Ex. 2 at 4.

. . I I

In any event, the Staff may rely on preliminary reviews and interim findings as long as the record allows the Board to conclude that reasonable assurance exists that the TDI diesel generators at PNPP will reliably perform their safety-related functions.29/ Contrary to OCRE's assertion, the Board does not need to rely solely on " promises and predictions" (OCRE PFC at 22); the Board finds sufficient " reliable, probative and sub-stantial evidence of record" to support each of its essential findings in this proceeding. Id. See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2),

ALAB-254, 8 A.E.C. 1184, 1188 (1975) (quoting Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2),

ALAB-78, 5 A.E.C. 319, 322 (1972)).

OCRE asserts that "the Staff is willing to defer resolu-tion of outstanding items identified in SSER 6 until plant operation above 5 percent power."30/ OCRE PFC at 21. OCRE 29/ In this context, the Board notes that the Commission's regulations do not require that preoperational testing results be in hand. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1449-51 (D.C. Cir.

1984), cert. den., 105 S.Ct. 815 (1985) (recognizing the NRC's practice of conducting and assessing the results of preopera-tional testing after the licensing hearing).

30/ In this context, the Board finds OCRE's discussion of NRC Staff decisions concerning low-power operation of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Plant to be wholly irrelevant to this pro-ceeding. See OCRE PFC at 21-22.

( .

fails to identify the items it is concerned about. While the Board notes that Applicants must formally submit to the NRC Staff the information identified in SER, Supp. No. 6, see App.

PF 187, it recognizes that most, if not all, of the "open items" identified by the Staff were addressed by Applicants at the hearing. See Tr. 2489-2509 '(Christiansen, Kammeyer).

In'its proposed findings, OCRE insinuates that the " lead" engine (Comanche Peak) DR/QR report for the PNPP diesels may be insufficient.31/ OCRE PFC at 22. OCRE goes on to state "that some of the components on the PNPP engines differ from those at Comanche Peak." Id. It is no secret that certain components on the PNPP engines differ from those at Comanche Peak. See Kammeyer at 23. Because of this fact, the Owners Group pre-pared eleven reports (some of which address multiple compo-nents) for the components unique to the FNPP engines. Id.

These unique reports were included in tne final DR/QR report for PNPP. See, e.g., id., Ex. A. Whether or not the Staff 31/ Similarly, OCRE later states that Staff findings at other sites cannot be used as a basis for reaching a conclusion regarding the PNPP diesels because "none of [these Staff con-clusions] were confirmed by a licensing board in a contested proceeding." OCRE PFC at 22. The Staff is free to rely on whatever information it considers relevant to its determination of diesel generator reliability. The fact that'certain bases

for its conclusion may or may not have been the subject of con-troversy in another licensing proceeding is of no consequence.

OCRE was free to challenge any information relied upon by the Staff in this proceeding.

4 l

I .

reviews every PNPP-specific component report is immatprial.

See OCRE PFC at 22. The normal Staff practice is not to in-spect every piece of equipment in a plant prior to licensing.

Rather, the Staff performs audits to ensure that Applicants' quality assurance program is functioning properly. See, e.g.,

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co._ (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-77, 18 N.R.C. 1365, 1379 (1983) (noting that the Staff reviews construction and quality assurance ac-tivities at the site on a sampling basis), aff'd, ALAB-802, 21 N.R.C. (March 26, 1985 at 26) (noting the NRC Staff's

" oversight role").

OCRE asserts that "[b]ecause of the low number of hours the PNPP diesels operated before the teardown and inspection,

[the Board should not afford) the findings resulting there-from . . . much significance."32/ OCRE PFC at 22. The Board disagrees with OCRE and finds this comprehensive effort pro-vided important baseline data on the engines. See, e.g.,

Christiansen at 11-12, 17-18, 32/ The Board notes that OCRE's proposed finding 93 (cited in support s~ this statement) is restricted to PNPP's inspection of the cylinder block which was performed during the revalida-tion effort. The cylinder block will be receiving periodic inspections in the future, in addition to those already per-formed. Tr. 2490-91 (Kammeyer).

=

4. The Adequacy of the Owners Group Program.

In its proposed findings, OCRE implies that the Owners Group Program must be considered inadequate in its entirety un-less it. guarantees that in the future there will be no problems with any of-the engines' components. See OCRE PFC at 23-24.

The Board rejects such an approach as unreasonable and unre-alistic. The Board finds that the likelihood of random compo-nent failures on the PNPP diesels has been significantly re-duced by PNPP's implementation of the Owners Group Program.

See App. PF 186. This fact alone demonstrates the program's success.33/ The Board, therefore, rejects OCRE's proposed con-clusion of law which would have this Board find the Owners Group Program inadequate due to "its inability to prevent fur-ther failures attributable to TDI's substandard practices."

OCRE PFC at 57.

The Owners Group Program incorporated the essential ele-ments needed to resolve outstanding. concerns related to the-reliability of the TDI diesel generators for nuclear service, and to ensure that the TDI diesel engines complied with GDC 1 and 17. .See App. PF 101. The Board finds proof of PNPP's 33/ The Board notes that the PNPP engines were not even af-facted by the component problem-identified in OCRE Ex. 8 which OCRE relies on for its argument. See App. PF 118.

compliance with GDC 1 and 17 in its successful completion of the Owners Group Program.

C. The Sixteen Phase I Components OCRE does not contest the design adequacy of twelve of the sixteen Phase I components. OCRE PFC at 24-25, 56. OCRE as-serts that Applicants have not met their burden of proof with regard to the design adequacy of the turbocharger, crankshaft, cylinder block and cylinder liner., Id. at 25-31, 57. OCRE also finds the Owners Group maintenance and surveillance pro-gram inadequate because OCRE is not convinced it will be imple-mented for the life of the plant. Id. at 24, 57. The Board does not agree with OCRE; it finds each of the Phase I compo-nents suitable for their intended service and PNPP's main-tenance and surveillance program for these components satisfac-tory.

1. Components Not Contested by OCRE.

OCRE does not contest the design adequacy of the con-necting rod, connecting rod bearing shells, pistons, pushrods, rocker arm capscrews, fuel oil injection tubing, wiring and termination, airstart valve capscrew, cylinder head studs, jacket water pump, or cylinder heads. OCRE PFC at 56. See also OCRE PFC 24-25. OCRE's proposed findings on these

components are in substantial agreement with those of Appli-cants. See OCRE PF 34-64, App. PF 132-62.

While not contesting the design adequacy of the aforemen-tioned components, OCRE highlights maintenance and surveillance requirements for some of these components in its proposed find-ings, thereby implying that specific items will not be per-formed at PNPP. These proposed findings are addressed below.

Because Applicants' commitment to perform appropriate mainte-nance and surveillance for these components is uncontradicted on the record, the Board finds each of these Phase I components suitable for their intended service for the life of the plant.

Connecting Rod. OCRE proposed finding 36 states that maintenance for this component should include bolt torque checks. Applicants have committed to perform preventive main-I tenance for this component, including bolt torque checks. App.

PF 134.

Connecting Rod Bearing Shells. OCRE notes the Staff i testimony that "PNPP verify the adequacy of all installed bearings." OCRE PF 38. See also OCRE PFC at 24-25. The Staff s

believes that bearings which meet the Owners Group acceptance criteria are adequate for their intended servic'. e App. PF 136.

The connecting rod bearing shells in place at PNPP have been i

found to meet the Owners Group criteria for acceptance. Id.

~

-. .. I Pushrods. OCRE notes that the Staff has required Applicants to confirm that the Owners Group requirements regarding random sample testing of the pushrods have been fol-lowed at PNPP. OCRE PF 44. See also OCRE PFC at 24-25. PNPP will confirm this fact. App. PF 142.

? Rocker Arm Capscrews. OCRE's proposed findings state

, that " proper maintenance and surveillance (of the capscrews) is necessary to guard against loss of preload." OCRE PF 46. SwRI recommends periodic retorquing and torque checks to ensure that loss of preload does not occur. Wood at 11. Applicants have committed to perform SwRI's maintenance recommendations.

Christiansen at 13.

Fuel Oil Injection Tubing. OCRE notes that "PNL rec-ommends that compression fittings be periodically checked for leaks." OCRE PF 48. PNPP has agreed to implement the mainte-nance and surveillance recommendations made by PNL. App. PF 111.

Airstart Valve Capscrew. OCRE's proposed finding 53 repeats SwRI's and PNL's recommendation that proper torquing be performed on this component to ensure its continued suitability. The Board notes PNPP's commitment to implement the maintenance and surveillance recommendations made by PNL and SwRI. App. PF 111.

Cylinder Head Studs. OCRE's proposed findiag 56 restates the need for proper maintenance of this component to ensure preload is maintained. Maintenance will assure preload is maintained at PNPP. App. PF 154.

Cylinder Heads. OCRE's proposed finding 62 states that "the Staff found that the thickness patterns appeared in-consistent for several of the heads, a condition which would warrant maintaining spare heads." Only four heads evidenced inconsistent thickness patterns, see Staff at 31, and all of the heads (including these four) meet the minimum thickness requirement. Tr. 2431 (Kirkwood). The Staff's recommendation that standby heads be maintained is not a safety requirement, merely "a suggestion for the operational convenience of the utility." Id. at 2431-32.

OCRE's proposed finding 63 reiterates the need for proper maintenance and surveillance procedures for the cylinder heads, including air-rolling the engines after all operations and be-fore all planned starts. PNPP has committed to perform this operation. App. PF 161.

2. Components Contested by OCRE Engine Base and Bearing Caps. OCRE does not contest the design adequacy of this component, see OCRE PFC at 25, but

believes it is necessary to analyze the material properties of the base to ensure it meets specifications. Id. at 26. It cites problems with impurities in the cylinder block as a rea-son for requiring testing of the base.34/ Id.

The Board finds Applicants' and Staff's response to OCRE's cross-examination on this subject persuasive. See App. PF 164.

Only one failure of a base due to material abnormalities has ever been reported in the hundreds of engines in operation, id., and that failure was confirmed to be an isolated oc-curence. Tr. 2216 (Kammeyer). Further, the failure did not result in an immediate engine shut-down. Id. at 2505. This fact, coupled with the low loading on the base, make a materi- '

als evaluation of each engine unnecessary. App. PF 164. Given the fact that the probability of crack initiation (but not propagation) in the block is quite high, App. PF 129, the Board does not find it unreasonable that the Owners Group would rec-ommend a materials analysis for the block, while not requiring a similar analysis for the base. The Board finds the owners Group recommended inspections and routine maintenance 34/ While this component was included among the Phase I compo-nents due to three types of problems observed in operation (App. PF 163), only one of these problems resulted from materi-al abnormalities. See App. PF 164. The other two problems were addressed and resolved in the Owners Group analysis. See Wood at 16-21.

sufficient to ensure the base is fabricated from acceptable ma-terial. App. PF 164. OCRE's assertion that Applicants "have not demonstrated that the base has the specified mechanical properties," OCRE PFC at 56, is, therefore, rejected.

Turbochargers. OCRE's proposed findings note the problems experienced with nozzle ring vane failures on the turbo-chargers. Id. at 26. The Board finds the increased mainte-nance and surveillance to be implemented at PNPP an acceptable solution to the problem. See App. PF 170. In reaching this conclusion, the Board was influenced by the fact that although vane breakage could severely damage or demolish the rotor, the history of the turbochargers in nuclear service reveals that none has suffered severe damage and some have not even evi-denced any damage as a result of vane breakage. App. PF 169.

The Board notes that while maintenance and surveillance proce-dures may be unable to detect incipient vane failure (OCRE PF 75, see also OCRE PFC at 27), monitoring of turbine exhaust temperatures, as recommended by the Owners Group, can identify conditions which might lead to a greater likelihood of vane failure. Tr. 2355-56 (Berlinger, Kirkwood). Additionally, the Board finds evidence in the record that vane failures in the steady-state operation of an engine may be predictable with some accuracy, see App. PF 168, in contrast with OCRE's pro-posed finding 73 which states that "[ijt is not possible to predict when a vane will fail." See also OCRE PFC at 26.

OCRE states that it is questionable whether the PNPP turbochargers have been properly aligned to their mounting brackets. Id. at 27. The NRC Staff testified that it consid-ers the turborchargers' alignment adequate to prevent vibration problems. See App. PF 171. The Board also notes that vibra-tion testing will be performed at PNPP, id., and believes that this will confirm the adequacy of turbocharger alignment in operation. The Board, therefore, cannot agree with OCRE that the turbochargers are not suitable for nuclear service. OCRE PFC at 56-57.

Crankshaft. OCRE remains at odds with Applicants over use of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association's ("DEMA")

guidelines for the crankshaft, as opposed to use of the rules of the European Ship Classification Societies. See id. at 27-29. The PNPP diesels are not required to meet the ship classification rules. App. PF 113. Furthermore, the Board agrees with the Staff that these rules are inappropriate for land-based diesel engines. See App. PF 119. The Board finds DEMA to be a suitable, conservative standard for judging the

, adequacy of the PNPP crankshafts. App. PF 113.

OCRE questions the adequacy of the DEMA guidelines as well ,

as the usefulness of torsiograph testing in light of the prob-lems experienced with the crankshaft at San Onofre. OCRE PFC

O

• at 27-28. The situation at San Onofre was unique. See App. PF 117. San Onofre has a DSRV-20 engine and a crankshaft signifi-cantly different from PNPP's. Id. The problems experienced at San Onofre are, therefore, irrelevant to the PNPP crankshafts.

Id.

OCRE's other arguments concerning the San Onofre crank-shaft are similarly unconvincing. OCRE proposed finding 84 states that if the cracks on the San Onofre crankshaft had not been removed, they could have caused crankshaft failure. How-ever, one of the benefits of the Owners Group recommended inspections of the most highly-stressed journals on the crank-shaft is that a problem such as this can be identified before it leads to failure. Tr. 2331-32 (Berlinger). PNPP has in-spected the crankshaft journal oil holes and subjected them to eddy current testing to assure that they are free of defects.

See App. PF 116.

OCRE's proposed finding 84 also states that "[o]nly one of three torsiograph tests conducted on the San Onofre engine showed high stresses, due to sensitivity to initial crankshaft position." OCRE's proposed finding, as well as its line of questioning at the hearing, imply that it was only by chance that the high stresses were identified. In fact, the different crankshaft starting positions were purposely chosen for the

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torsiograph testing conducted on the unique San Onofrp engine.

See Tr. 2330-31 (Berlinger, Hardy).

Finally, OCRE states that "the analytical and testing techniques being relied upon by the Applicants failed to pre-dict the San Onofre problem." OCRE PFC at 28. The cracks in the journal oil holes on the San Onofre crankshaft were dis-covered during an onsite inspection. Tr. 2326 (Hardy). As discussed, supra, PNPP has inspected the oil holes on its crankshafts and confirmed that they are free of cracks. The problems with the San Onofre crankshaft were confirmed during onsite torsiograph testing. See Tr. 2327-31 (Berlinger, Hardy). Torsiograph testing has verified that no similar prob-lem exists at PNPP.

Torsiograph testing conducted at PNPP has confirmed that the crankshafts meet DEMA standards. App. PF 114. The Staff and PNL consider the crankshaft adequate, provided their review of the torsiograph test confirms the favorable results reported by Applicants. App. PF 122. While the adequacy of the PNPP crankshafts can, therefore, be considered "an open item", as OCRE suggests (OCRE PFC at 29), the Board notes that the Staff i

and its consultants have other bases for concluding at the present time that the PNPP crankshafts will operate reliably.

See App. PF 122. Thus, as previously noted at p. 34-35, the

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7 Staff has already concluded that 10 cycle testing will not be necessary to confirm the adequacy of the PNPP diesels as OCRE suggests. See OCRE PFC at 29; App. PF 179.

OCRE notes that the Staff has recommended that steps be taken to limit the engines' speed range (OCRE PF 83), and to evaluate the effects of cylinder imbalance. OCRE PFC at 28-29.

PNPP has taken steps to limit the engines' speed range. App.

PF 115. Tests have also been conducted at PNPP to simulate radical cylinder imbalance.35/ App. PF 120. The Board, there-fore, finds OCRE's discussion at 28 (concerning the use of DEMA versus the European Ship Classification Societies rules) on cylinder imbalance irrelevant, as Applicants have already per-formed such an evaluation even though DEMA did not require it.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Board rejects OCRE's assertion that the PNPP cranksha fts are inadequate. OCRE PFC i at 57. The record reveals that Applicants have' established that the crankshafts are suitable for their intended service.

35/ OCRE states that "[t]he fourth order critical speed . . .

is driven by imbalance between the right and left banks of cyl-inders." OCRE PFC at 28. At the hearing, it was established that there are two driving forces for the fourth order criti-cal: (1) difference in timing; and (2) imbalance between the engine banks. Tr. 2245, 2511 (Kammeyer). Difference in timing between banks is normal, id. at 2245, and some engine imbalance is expected. Id.

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Cylinder Block and Liner. OCRE continues to question the design adequacy of the block and liner. Id. See also OCRE PFC at 29-31. OCRE's findings center around the Owners Group's inspection interval for the block and block cracking.

OCRE's proposed finding 86 enumerates the four types of cracks identified in the Shoreham engine blocks. Jee also id, at 29; Wood at 56. The Board notes that all of these cracks connected with the block-top surface and could be detected by surface inspection. Wood at 56. PNPP's 100 percent inspection of cylinder block tops and liner landings found no evidence of any cracking. App. PF 127.

OCRE's proposed finding 87 states that the Owners Group analysis of the block "found that ligament cracks are predicted to occur, and that their presence then increases stresses in the block and increases the likelihood of stud-to-stud cracks."

See also OCRE PFC at 29. The Board finds this proposed finding incomplete and, therefore, misleading. A review of the docu-ment cited by OCRE reveals that the Owners Group analysis indi-cated that ligament cracks were predicted to occur "after accu-mulated operating hours at high load and/or engine starts to high load. These cracks were considered to be benign . . . .

Field experience is consistent in both the prod'iction of liga-ment cracking and the lack of immediate consequences." Staff Ex. 5 at 4.5. Furthermore, while the presence of ligament cracks does increase stresses in the block, stud-to-stud cracks are only predicted to initiate "after additional operating hours at high load and/or engine starts to high load." Id.

In its proposed finding 89, OCRE concludes that because the Owners Group recommends inspection of the blocks after 572 hours0.00662 days <br />0.159 hours <br />9.457672e-4 weeks <br />2.17646e-4 months <br /> of operation at 7,000 kw, the blocks are unacceptable for continuous operation. See also OCRE PFC at 29. The implica-tion is that the engines, therefore, fail to meet the PNPP per-formance specification which requires the diesels to have a

" continuous" rating of 7,000 kw. OCRE PF 4. Similarly, OCRE's proposed finding 11 states that because the length of time PNPP may experience loss of offsite power is not predictable, the diesel generators must be capable of supplying onsite power

" continuously." See also OCRE PFC at 30. OCRE fails to dif-farentiate between the requirement of " continuous operation" and " indefinite operation." While the length of time offsite power may be lost is not predictable, the length of time the plant would require emergency power (to ensure adequate cool-ing) is known. Tr. 2221 (Kammeyer). One week's time is more than adequate for emergency power. Id. at 2221-22. The diesel generators provide a backup power supply to the* plant. They are not intended to run indefinitely. Obviously, the Owners Group requirement of an inspection after 572 hours0.00662 days <br />0.159 hours <br />9.457672e-4 weeks <br />2.17646e-4 months <br /> of engine i

I i

4 operation has nothing to do with the engines' ability to meet the specification for continuous rating.

\

OCRE's proposed finding 7 notes that "[t]he actual loads experienced by the diesel generators have not been verified by testing."36/ See also OCRE PFC at 30. However, actual loading on the diesel generators, including the range of loading in the FSAR (see Applicants' Ex. 16-1) will be verified by testing in upcoming months. App. PF 181. While "[ajdditional loads may be added to the diesel generators through the 40 year life of PNPP" (OCRE PF 8, OCRE PFC at 30), this would require an amend-ment to the FSAR which would be reviewed by the NRC Staff.

App. PF 181.

OCRE's proposed finding 10 reflects the frequency and duration of testing to be performed at PNPP pursuant to Regula-tory Guide 1.108. In this context OCRE states that "[t]he max-imum frequency and duration of operation is unknown." OCRE PF

10. See also OCRE PFC at 30. The Board notes that the reason for this fact is because Regulatory Guide 1.108 requires the diesels to be tested more frequently only if a failure occurs 36/ The Board finds OCRE's statement that "[t}he ability of large motors to reach rated speed before the next loading step on diesel generators has . . . not been verified," OCRE PF 7, to be inaccurate. At the time of the hearing, the capability of some of the motors had already been verified. Tr. 2215 (Christiansen).

during engine operation. Tr. 2206 (Christiansen). WEile it is, therefore, impossible to state with absolute, certainty how many hours and how frequently the diesels will operate, a con-servative estimate is twenty-five to thirty-five hours between outages. Tr. 2255 (Kammeyer).

OCRE's proposed finding 92 cites the disagreement between the Owners Group and Dr. Bush over the acceptable length of.

stud-to-stud indications in the block.37/ See also OCRE PFC at

30. Applicants also recognized this difference of opinion.

See App. PF 127. OCRE neglected to state that Dr. Bush's posi-tion is premised on the condition that ligament cracking of the block has.already occurred. Id. Additionally, while Dr. Bush believes the block should be replaced if stud-to-stud indica-

.tions 0.4" to 0.5" exist in the presence of ligament cracks, he also testified that even in this situation he believes a factor of safety exists. See Tr. 2373 (Bush). As PNPP's inspection of the cylinder block top and liner found no evidence of any cracking, this difference in opinion is of no relevance to PNPP. See App. PF 127.

37/ The Board finds the record unclear with reference to OCRE's proposed finding that the 9/ners Group cumulative damage index utilized crack growth from ) 6" to 3.0" in'its analysis.

OCRE PF 92, OCRE PFC at'30. In any event, the Board fails to see the relevance of this point as the range is greater than

.the 1.5" limitation the Owners Group established for stud-to-stud indications. See App. PF 127.

. o OCRE's proposed finding 90 (see also OCRE PFC at 30),

quotes from Dr. Bush's testimony in the Shoreham proceeding that blocks with known or assumed ligament cracks should be in-spected-after every operation. See Tr. 2370-71. There is no evidence that Dr. Bush would make this same recommendation for PNPP, or, indeed, what the context of his Shoreham testimony was. In any event, the PNPP blocks have been inspected and show no signs of cracking. App. PF 127. The Board makes this observation only because the blocks at Shoreham had already ev-idenced many problems at the time of Dr. Bush's testimony. See Wood at 56. For example, one of the Shoreham blocks had abnor-mal microstructure. See App. PF 130. The PNPP blocks have been inspected, per Owners Group recommendations, and reported to-be composed of typical Class 40 grey cast iron. W M. The Board also notes that PNL's final recommendations on this point mirror those of the Owners Group. See Staff Testimony (Attach-ment). For these reasons, the Board rejects OCRE's claim that the Owners Group recommended inspection interval is inadequate.

OCRE attacks the Owners Group cumulative damage index by noting that the Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Coolant Accident 38/ The Board finds the fact that "this has no't been verified

'by the NRC Staff" to be irrelevant. OCRE PF 94. See also OCRE PFC at 31. The uncontradicted evidence of record is that the PNPP blocks have normal microstructure.

. s

(" LOOP /LOCA") loads assumed for the Owners Group analysis of the block do not correlate with current FSAR load predictions for PNPP. OCRE PFC at 30, OCRE PF 89. A change on the order of 1,000 kw in PNPP's calculated LOOP /LOCA loads (i.e., from 4,500 kw to 5,500 kw), is considered to be "very minor."

Tr. 2220 (Kammeyer). The evidence clearly shows that minor changes in peak loading at PNPP will result in only a small c..nge in the number of hours between recommended block inspec-tions (i.e., the 572 hour0.00662 days <br />0.159 hours <br />9.457672e-4 weeks <br />2.17646e-4 months <br /> interval may decrease to 480 or 490

' tours ) . Id.

OCRE states that "[t]he effectiveness of reduced proudness i: reducing stress levels has never been determined" (OCRE PF'95), implying that it may, therefore, be ineffective. See also OCRE PFC at 31 The Owners Group consultant concluded that reducing line proudness reduces the probability of cracking. Tr. 2508 (Christiansen). While the effectiveness of this procedure may never have been quantitatively determined, id. (Kammeyer), the Board notes that reduced proudness reduces pressure and should reduce the probability of cracking. Tr.

2447-48 (Henriksen).

Cylinder liner proudness has been reduced at PNPP to re-duce the possibility of block cracking. App. PF '131. While the owners Group consultant never approved this procedure (OCRE F -

6 w PF 95, see also OCRE PFC at 31), it was unnecessary to obtain such approval; TDI was free to make this design change.

Tr.'2446 (Henriksen).

On the basis of the record before it, the Board finds the cylinder block and liner at PNPP adequate. The Board rejects OCRE's conclusion to the contrary. OCRE PFC at 57.

D. Phase II Components Dresser Couplings. While OCRE feels the Dresser couplings on the PNPP engines should be replaced prior to plant operation (OCRE PFC at 31), no immediate problem is posed by their use.

App. PF 172.39/ While the Staff believes that more rapid fail-ure is possible (OCRE PFC 31, OCRE PF 96), the Staff also be-lieves that "because most ' operating' time will consist of a lowered temperature for standby mode, . . . the conditions do not suggest urgent replacement." Staff at 52. Given the fact that PNPP will monitor these couplings and replace them, as necessary (App. PF 172), the Board agrees with Applicants and l Staff that the couplings need not be replaced prior to plant i

operation.

I l

39/ The Staff stated that replacement prior to startup "would seem best," but it continued by saying that "in [its] judgment,

[ replacement] could be delayed to the first refueling outage."

Staff at 52. See OCRE PFC at 31, OCRE PF 96.

i l

l l

( 4 . ..

Foundation. OCRE believes that the condition of the PNPP engine foundation is unacceptable. OCRE PFC at 32. The suffi-ciency of the contact between the engine base and chocks was a concern which Applicants addressed, in some detail, at the hearing. Although PNL was under the impression that the 85 percent contact requirement had been imposed by TDI, see Tr. 2417-18 (Kirkwood), the requirement had been imposed by PNPP's architect / engineer. See App. PF 173. PNL felt that there should be a full evaluation of any discrepancy between recommended and actual contact. Tr. 2419 (Kirkwood). The PNPP foundation chock plates were inspected for 85 percent contact and an engineering evaluation was performed for plates with less than 85 percent contact. App. PF 173. Hot and cold crankshaft deflection measurements have confirraed that the en-gine is well-supported. Id. The Board finds no evidence in the record to question the adequacy of this procedure, as OCRE suggests. OCRE PFC at 32. The Board, therefore, finds that

! Applicants have satisfactorily addressed this issue. The Board l

l disagrees with OCRE that "an unacceptable condition" exists.

See id.

( In conclusion, the Board finds Applicants' implementation of the DR/QR program at PNPP complete and "an excellent revalidation program" for the diesel generators. See App. PF

! 106. The Board rejects OCRE's proposed conclusion that would l

f 's e o have us find PNPP's implementation of the DR/QR progr*tm to be inadequate. OCRE PFC at 57.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

/ cV /

Ja, . S lbe(g, P.C.

M'c ael . Swiger Ro e An C. Sullivan Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000

. Dated: June 10, 1985 4

i 4

I l

l June 10, 1985 l DOCKETED

/ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I 85 JuN 13 A10:49 CFFICE or S5cy,;7,p v 00CXf.ilhG A SEBv; ;

l In the Matter of ) SRANCH

! }

l 9

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-441

! ) '

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

l l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing

" Applicants' Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by the other Parties (Emergency Planning and TDI l Diesel Generators)" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 10th day of June 1985, i to all those on the attached Ser e List.

b /I $

Jdy E S lberg DATED: June 10, 1985 l

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

, BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )  !

}  !

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-441

).

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

l SERVICE LIST l ,

James P. Gleason, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing 513 Gilmoure Drive Appeal Board Panel Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l

Mr. Glenn O. Bright Colleen P. Woodhead, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

! Christine N. Kohl, Chairman l Atomic Safety and Licensing Terry Lodge, Esquire l Appeal Board Suite 105

! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 618 N. Michigan Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Toledo, Ohio 43624 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Appeal Board Lake County Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Center Washington, D.C. 20555 105 Center Street Painesville, Ohio 44077 Gary J. Edles, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l John G. Cardinal, Esquire Ms. Sue Hiatt Prosecuting Attorney 8275 Munson Avenue Ashtabula County Courthouse Mentor, Ohio 44060 Jefferson, Ohio 44047

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