ML20127P810
| ML20127P810 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1985 |
| From: | Leblond P COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 0173K, 173K, NUDOCS 8507020521 | |
| Download: ML20127P810 (29) | |
Text
_
- Commonwealth Edison one First Nation 11 Pina. Ch.cago, Ilknois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, lilinois 60690 June 25, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Zion Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. OPR-39 and DPR-48 (EC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 References (a): February 29, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton to D. L. Peoples (b): January 27, 1984 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(c): October 19, 1984 letter from R. N. Cascarano f to H. R. Denton.
\
Dear Mr. Denton:
Attachment I to this letter is a proposed amendnent to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48. This change addresses the status of Items A.1 and A.2 that were transmitted with reference (a). References (b) and (c) both contained requests to rescind or modify the Confirmatory Order. It is our understanding that these requests should have been trans-mitted in the form of a request for a license amendment. Thus, Commonwealth Edison Company now considers these requests to be closed.
Item A.1 is concerned with the calculated peak fuel cladding temperature during a LOCA. Item A.2 places restrictions on when load changes are permissible. Commonwealth Edison Company is proposing to delete Item A.1, leaving the requirements of 10 CFR 50.(6 as the sole limitation on peak fuel clad temperature. The Company is also proposing to delete Item A.2 to allow operation with no restrictions on normal power changes.
Attachments 2 and 3 provide justification for the proposed changes to Items A.1 and A.2, respectively. Attachment 4 provides Commonwealth Edison Corpany's evaluations of no significant hazards consideration and concludes that there are none associated with this change. This amendment has been reviewed and approved by both On-Site und Off-51tu Review committees.
r \
/
A fY o 30 0507020521 850625 PDR ADOCK 05000295 d
Ii
( h l$O rj
,i P PDR NS 001p (fl
H. R. Denton June 25, 1985 A $150.00 fee remittance is enclosed in accordance with 10 CFR 170.
As provided by 10 CFR 50.91, the State of Illinois is being notified of this amendment request by transmittal of a copy of this letter and the attachments.
If there are any further questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies of this transmittal and its attechments are hereby provided for your review.
Very truly yours, Peter C. LeBlond Nuclear Licensing Administrator im Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector - Zion J. Norris - NRC G. Wright - State of Ill.
SUBbCRIGEO AND SW N to before fi ne) this JT ' day of L/f/tt , 1985 l bt1 6 Ohn j
Notary Public 0173K i
l
l l
l l
l l
l ATTACHIENT 1 l
i I
i 1
- Proposed Changes to Zion Operating License Nos.
DPR-39 and DPR-48 Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980 ,
Items A.1 and A.2 l
l l Page Modified .
l Page 1 of Appendix A of February 29, 1980 Order.
l l
- i l
i
(
0173K 1
A. The licensee shall:
- 1. Deleted
- 2. Deleted
- 3. Conduct a low pressure gross leak test of containment prior to any start up from cold shutdown conditions as indicated in Annex 1. If other means can be found to verify containment integrity, the licensee may propose such procedures to the Commission for its review and approval.
- 4. Maintain at least two senior reactor operators (SR0s), one of whom may be the shift supervisor, in the control room at all times during power operations or hot shutdown, except that the shift supervisor shall be allowed to leave the immediate vicinity of the control room as duties may require, provided he is available to respond to an emergency by returning to the control room with ten minutes. The shif t or watch supervisor's office is considered part of the control room.
- 5. Conduct testing to assure the LPI/RHR check valves are in fact installed correctly and functioning as pressure isolation barriers when the plant is at pressure and producing power. Verification of valve operability shall be performed prior to plant restart if shut-down at the time of issuance of the Order and thereafter whenever RC5 pressure has decreased to within 100 psig of RHR system design pressure.
- 6. Submit no later than March 1,1980 the results of a review of possible permanent plant modifications and procedures to further reduce the potential of a severe reactor accident and resultant radiation releases.
- 7. Require that all reactor operators and senior reactor operators conduct simulator training and in-plant walk-through of the following emergency procedures. Due to thu licensee's large operating staff the 0173K i
6
t .
ATTACHENT 2 l
l l
JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGE TO ITEM A.1 A new LOCA ECCS analysis for Zion was submitted in October, 1984, supplementeo in February,1985 for minor changes in containment cooling parameters and revised in April,1985 to reflect improved code interfacing for core reflooding rate data. The major differences in this set of reanalyses compared to the October 22, 1979 analysis (upon which the Zion f Confirmatory Item A.1 was based) are as follows:
- 1. The new analyses utilized the BART computer model which is a mechanistic core heat transfer methodology approved by the NRC in 1983 that l represents improvement over heat-up methods utilized in the 1979 l
analysis. The analysis used initial fuel conditions generated by the Revised PAD Thermal Safety Model (WCAP-8420 Addendum 2) and, in general, j a modified version of the 1981 Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model (as i
described in WCAP-9221 - P-A Revision 1).
i
- 2. The new analyses also incorporate additional margin to account for increases in steam generator tube plugging. The 1979 analysis assumed a tube plugging level of only 1%. The current analyses assume that 10% of the steam generator tubes have been plugged. This increase accounts for the current average plugging level cf 4.7% in Unit 1 and 0.3% in Unit 2.
- 3. The new analysis conservatively assumes a higher total peaking factor for the core power distribution prior to the postulated design basis LOCA.
An Fo of 2.32 is bounded by the new analysis whereas the 1979 analysis originally assumed a 2.20 (which was subsequently reduced to 2.17 for Unit 2 and 2.13 for Unit 1 to reflect additional tube plugging). In l
! addition, Zion flux maps for normal steady-state power distributions typically indicate measured Fn's of 1.9 l
are calculated to produce maximum Fg's 2.2. of, and Thus theload follow maneuvers new analyses i l provide significant additional margin not reflected in the calculated PCT. ;
The final results of the new analysis (as supplemented and revised) were:
l (a) 2159 T Peak Cladding Temperature l (b) local clad oxidation of 6.94% l i
(c) total core hydrogen generation of less than 0.3%.
l l
ATTACHMENT 2 t
These are each within the corresponding criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K and the Standard Review Plan; that is, (a) PCT must be less than or equal to 22000F (b) local clad oxidation must not exceed 17%
(c) core wide hydrogen generation must not exceed 1%.
Since all criteria are satisfied, and in view of the improved modeling and conservative assumptions discussed in items 1 through 3 above, the new analyses demonstrate that the consequences of a postulated Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident are acceptable for the Zion units.
0173K
ATTACHENT 3 l
JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGE TO ITEM A.2 i
The stated purpose of ',he NRC imposed license amendment entitled l
" Confirmatory Order", dated February 29, 1980, is to impose measures that
" ...will significantly increase the level of safety at the Zion Station and l
thereby further reduce the probability of a severe reactor accident." Item i i A.2 required that the Zion units operate in a base load mode except for load l changes required for grid stability, maintenance, or the Technical Specifica-l tion requirements.
Since the imposition of the restriction, a large amount of l operational information has been obtained which demonstrates that load
! changes above 50% of rated power neither decrease the level of safety nor i increase the probability of a severe reactor accident.
A review of the reactor trip history of the Zion units has been !
l terformed. There have been a total of 69 reactor trips for both Zion Units 1 and 2 for the five year period from 1/01/80 through 12/31/84. None of these l trips occurred during or as a result of load changes above 50% of rated power.
Since Item A.2 was in effect for virtually the entire time period '
discussed above, one would expect that there would be no correlation between !
reactor trips and load changes. However, Item A.2 did allow for load changes for grld stability, maintenance, Technical Spccification requirements, and i l normal start-ups and shutdowns. These conditions were encountered quite l l
frequently. :
l A review of NUREG-0020 for the timo period of 1/01/82 through !
l 1/31/85 showed that approximately 103 load changes of 10% or greatur wero !
l performed above 50% of rated power. This information is provided in Table 1 l of your review. i Thus load follow maneuvers in compliance with Item A.2 were common during this period. The data's conclusion is evident. There la no i observable correlation between load changes above 50% and the frequency of l l
reactor trips. It should be noted that load changes below 50% havo resulted ;
in reactor trips. For example the feedwater instabilities encountered i between 0 and 30% havu resulted in reactor trips during the start-up phase of i operation. However, load changus below 50% of rated power are normally performed only in conjunction with either a sturt-up or a shutdown. They are ,
not considered to bo part of any load following manuovers. j 1
Commonwealth Edicon Cornpany bulieven the reason for thu apparent l Inck of corro1ation is that the oporation of thu lion Units above 50% of l rated power is relatively simplo. inoro are no changos in plant configura- l tion between 50 and 100% (e.g. feedwater pumps on or off, etc). The oporator !
selects the magnitudo of thu loud chango and its rato, and subsequently controls the average reactor temperature to within a pre-set, automatically controlled band. Thus, Correnonnontth Edison Company believes that load follow l manouvers have been (ktmonstrated to bo rollable und unrolated to any decreaso in reactor safety. !
i ATTACHMENT 4 i
Evaluation of Significant Hazards Consideration Proposed Changes to Zion Operating License !
Nos. OPR-39 and DPR-48 i
i Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980 t
Items A.1 and A.2 Description of Amendment Request l An amendment to facility Operating Licensu Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 is proposed tol
- 1. Delete the requirement to restrict power level to maintain u calculated peak fuel clad tempurature of 20500F under the conditions of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K analysis submitted on October 22, 1979.
- 2. Delete the restrictions on load following maneuvers.
Basis for Proposed tb Sionificant Hazards Consideration Determination i t
! The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standard for determining whether a significant hazards considuration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). The examplos of actions involving no significant hazards that apply to each of the proposed changos are discussed below.
Propor,ed Chnnao #1 Attachment 2 discusses the calculational superiority of the current 1979 submittal.
analysis It also esmanstrates over the methodology that Zionused forintho will be October 22,ith complianco w 10 CFR 50.46 and the Standard Review Plan.
Thus, oxample (vi) is applicable in this instanco. Example (vi) i roads as follows:
(vi) A chango which oither may result in some increase to the probability or consequencos of a pruviously-analyzed accident or may reduco in somo way a safety margin, but where tho results of the chango nro clearly within all ncceptable criterin with rospect to the system or component speciflod in the Standard Huview Plant for ounmplo, a chango resulting from the application of a smull ,
refinement of a previously used calculationni model or design method. !
I l
n.__ .. - - -
i i
t ATTACt+ENT 4 i
Proposed Change #2 I
Attachment 3 discusses the operating stability of the Zion units whilu performing load changes above 504 poner. The excellent stability l of the load follow mode of operation is clearly demonstrated by the l historical information presenteo. While load follow maneuvers may have l been considered to represent an additional risk in 1980, the experience !
gained since that time has shown that these load changes are routine in nature. i l
Thus example (iv) is applicable in this instance. Example (iv) reads as follows.
l (iv) A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation '
l frot an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable ;
operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating -
restriction and the criteria to be applied to a request for relief have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met. i based upon the above, the proposed changes ute similar to the i l Commission's examples and Corrrnonwealth Edison Company has mado a determination I l that no significant hazards consideration 15 involved. i I
l !
l l
017JK l
l
[
I
r Zion Unit 1 Year 1965 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/15/85 98 > 50 91utdown due to 2 D/G 0.0.S.
01/21/85 50 > 65 Start-Up 1
01/26/85 65- > 50 9)utdown for refueling l
l l
l 017M i
Zion Unit 2 Year 1985 i
Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/01/85 50 > 95 Return from RCP oil addition l
0173K
Commonwealth Edison One First National Plata. Chicago, Illinois
{,
Address Reply to Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Ithnois 60690 June 25, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
)
Subject:
Zion Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating j License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 I NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 !
/
References (a): February 29, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton to D. L. Peoples (b): January 27, 1984 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(c): October 19, 1984 letter from R. N. Cascarano to H. R. Denton, f
Dear Mr. Denton:
}
l Attachment 1 to this letter is a proposed amendment to Facility 1 i
Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48. This change addresses the status of Items A.1 and A.2 that were transmitted with reference (a). References (b) and (c) both contained requests to rescind or modify the Confirmatory Order. It is our understanding that these requests should have been trans-l mitted in the form of a request for a license amendment. Inus, Connonwealth Edison Company now considers these requests to be closed.
Item A.1 is concerned with the calculated peak fuel cladding temperature during a LDCA. Item A.2 places restrictions on when load changes are permissible. Commonwealth Edison Company is proposing to delete Item A.1, leaving the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 as the sole limitation on peak fuel clad temperature. The Company is also proposing to delete Item A.2 to allow operation with no restrictions on normal power changes.
Attachments 2 and 3 provide justification for the proposed changes to Items A.1 and A.2, respectively. Attachment 4 provides Commonwealth Edison Company's evaluations of no significant hazards consideration and concludes that there are none associated with this change. Inis amendment has been reviewed and approved by both On-Site and Off-Site Review concittees.
H. R. Denton June 25, 1985 A $150.00 fee remittance is enclosed in accordance with 10 CFR 170.
As provided by 10 CFR 50.91, the State of Illinois is being notified of this amendment request by transmittal of a copy of this letter and the attachments.
If there are any further questions regarding this matter, please ,
j contact this office.
Three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies of this transmittal and its attachments are hereby provided for your review.
Very truly yours, PA 4Ed.J Peter C. LeBlond Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m l
Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector - Zion J. Norris - NRC G. Wright - State of Ill.
l SUBSCRISED AND SWORN to before me this -Q'Td day of 1. , 1985
^Y: l'*j) ]. ITl d'.S Notary Puolic d 0173K
1 I
ATTACHENT 1 1
1 1
Proposed Changes to Zion Operating License Nos.
DPR-39 and DPR-48 Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980 Items A.1 and A.2 i
l Page Modified Page 1 of Appendix A of February 29, 1980 Order.
4 Ol73K
A. The licensee shall:
- 1. Deleted
- 2. Deleted
- 3. Conduct a low pressure gross leak test of containment prior to any start up from cold shutdown conditions as indicated in Annex 1. If other means can be found to verify containment integrity, the licensee may propose such procedures to the Commission for its review and approval.
- 4. Maintain at least two senior reactor operators (SR0s), one of whom may be the shift supervisor, in the control room at all times during power operations or hot shutdown, except that the shift supervisor shall be allowed to leave the immediate vicinity of the control room as duties may require, provided he is available to respond to an emergency by returning to the control room with ten minutes. The shift or watch supervisor's office is considered part of the control room.
- 5. Conduct testing to assure the LPI/RHR check valves are in fact installed correctly and functioning as pressure isolation barriers when the plant is at pressure and producing power. Verification of valve operability shall be performed prior to plant restart if shut-down at the time of issuance of the Order and thereafter whenever RCS pressure has decreased to within 100 psig of RHR system design pressure.
- 6. Submit no later than March 1, 1980 the results of a review of possible permanent plant modifications ano procedures to further reduce the potential of a severe reactor accident and resultant radiation releases.
- 7. Require that all reactor operators and senior reactor operators conduct simulator training and in-plant walk-through of the following emergency procedures. Due to the licensee's large operating staff the S
Ol73K
7..
ATTACHMENT 2 JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGE TO ITEM A.1 A new LOCA ECCS analysis for Zion was submitted in October, 1984, supplemented in February, 1985 for minor changes in containment cooling parameters and revised in April,1985 to reflect improved code interfacing for core reflooding rate data. The major differences in this set of reanalyses compared to the October 22, 1979 analysis (upon which the Zion Confirmatory Item A.1 was based) are as follows:
- 1. The new analyses utilizeo the BART computer model wnich is a mechanistic core heat transfer methodology approved by the NRC in 1983 that represents improvement over heat-up methods utilized in the 1979 analysis. The analysis used initial fuel conditions generated by the Revised PAD Thermal Safety Model (WCAP-8420 Addendum 2) and, in general, a modified version of the 1981 Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model (as described in WCAP-9221 - P-A Revision 1).
- 2. The new analyses also incorporate additional margin to account for increases in steam generator tube plugging. The 1979 analysis assumed a tube plugging level of only 1%. The current analyses assume that 10% of the steam generator tubes have been plugged. This increase accounts for the current average plugging level of 4.7% in Unit 1 and 0.3% in Unit 2.
- 3. The new analysis conservatively assumes a higher total peaking factor for the core power distribution prior to the postulated design basis LOCA.
An Fg of 2.32 is bounded by the new analysis whereas the 1979 analysis originally assumed a 2.20 (which was subsequently reduced to 2.17 for Unit 2 and 2.13 for Unit 1 to reflect additional tube plugging). In addition, Zion flux maps for normal steady-state power distributions typically indicate measured Fg's of ~ 1.9, and load follow maneuvers are calculated to produce maximum Fg's of ~ 2.2. Thus the new analyses provide significant additional margin not reflected in the calculated PCT.
The final results of the new analysis (as supplemented and revised) were:
(a) 21590F Peak Cladding Temperature (b) local clad oxidation of 6.94%
(c) total core hydrogen generation of less than 0.3%.
ATTACHMENT 2 These are each within the corresponding criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K and the Standard Review Plan; that is, (a) PCT must be less than or equal to 22000F (b) local clad oxidation must not exceed 17%
(c) core wide hydrogen generation must not exceed 1%.
Since all criteria are satisfied, and in view of the improved modeling and conservative assumptions discussed in items 1 through 3 above, the new analyses demonstrate that the consequences of a postulated Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident are acceptable for the Zion units.
0173K
f ATTACHrENT 3 JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGE TO ITEM A.2 The stated purpose of the NRC imposed license amendment entitled
" Confirmatory Oroer", dated February 29, 1980, is to impose measures that
...will significantly increase the level of safety at the Zion Station and thereby further reduce the probability of a severe reactor accident." Item A.2 required that the Zion units operate in a base load mode except for loao changes required for grid stability, maintenance, or the Technical Specifica-tion requirements.
Since the imposition of the restriction, a large amount of operational information has been obtained which demonstrates that load changes above 50% of rated power neither decrease the level of safety nor increase the probability of a severe reactor accident.
A review of the reactor trip history of the Zion units has been performed. There have been a total of 69 reactor trips for both Zion Units 1 and 2 for the five year period from 1/01/80 through 12/31/84. None of these trips occurred during or as a result of load changes above 50% of rated power.
Since Item A.2 was in effect for virtually the entire time period discusseo above, one would expect that there would be no correlation between reactor trips and load changes. However, Item A.2 did allow for load changes for grid stability, maintenance, Technical Specification requirements, and normal start-ups and shutdowns. These conditions were encountered quite frequently.
A review of NUREG-0020 for the time period of 1/01/82 through 1/31/85 showed that approximately 103 load changes of 10% or greater were performed above 50% of rated power. This information is provided in Table 1 of your review.
Thus load follow maneuvers in compliance with Item A.2 were common during this period. The data's conclusion is evident. There is no observable correlation between load changes above 50% and the frequency of reactor trips. It should be noted that load changes below 50% have resulteo in reactor trips. For example the feedwater instabilities encountered between 0 and 30% have resulted in reactor trips during the start-up phase of operation. However, load changes below 50% of rated power are normally performed only in conjunction with either a start-up or a shutcown. They are not considereo to be part of any load following manuevers.
Commonwealth Edison Company believes the reason for the apparent lack of correlation is that the operation of the Zion Units above 50% of rated power is relatively simple. There are no changes in plant configura-tion between 50 and 100% (e.g. feedwater pumps on or off, etc). The operator selects the magnitude of the load change and its rete, and subsequently controls the average reactor temperature to within a pre-set, automatically controlled band. Thus, Commonwealth Edison Company believes that load follow maneuvers have been demonstrated to be reliable and unrelated to any decrease in reactor safety.
E ATTACHMENT 4 Evaluation of Significant Hazards Consideration Proposed Cnanges to Zion Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and OPR-48 Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980 Items A.1 and A.2 Description of Amendment Request An amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 is proposed to;
- 1. Delete the requirement to restrict power level to maintain a calculated peak fuel clad temperature of 20500F under the conditions of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K analysis submitted on October 22, 1979.
- 2. Delete the restrictions on load following maneuvers.
Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standard for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). The examples of actions involving no significant hazards that apply to each of the proposed changes are discussed below.
Proposed Change #1 Attachaent 2 discusses the calculational superiority of the current analysis over the methodology used for the October 22, 1979 suomittal.
It also demonstrates that Zion will be in compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 and the Standard Review Plan.
Thus, example (vi) is applicable in this instance. Example (vi) reads as follows; (vi) A change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consecuences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan: for example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.
r ATTACHMENT 4 Proposed Change #2 Attachment 3 discusses the operating stability of the Zion units while performing load changes above 50% power. The excellent stability of the load follow mode of operation is clearly demonstrated by the historical information presented. While load follow maneuvers may have been considered to represent an additional risk in 1980, the experience gained since that time has shown that these load changes are routine in nature.
Thus example (iv) is applicable in this instance. Example (iv) reads as follows:
(iv) A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating restriction and the criteria to be applied to a request for relief have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met.
Based upon the above, the proposed changes are similar to the Commission's examples and Commonwealth Edison Company has made a determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved.
0173K
TABLE 1 SOURCE: NUREG 0020 Zion Unit 1 Year 1982 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/08/82 98 - 80 Steam generator conductivity (*)
01/09/82 80 :: 98 Steam generator conductivity (*)
02/13/82 100 : 50 Shutdown for steam leaks / refuel.
07/13/82 50 :: 70 Start-up 07/14/82 70 := 88 Start-up 07/17/82 88 : 97 Start-up 09/11/82 97 : 80 High heater drain pump seal temperature 09/12/82 80 ;- 90 High heater drain pump seal temperature 09/13/82 88 > 98 High heater drain pump seal temperature 10/05/82 50 2197 Start-up 10/16/82 96 ?-50 Shutdown for 2 D/G 0.0.S.
10/18/82 50 ; 98 Start-up 11/06/82 98 : 78 Fuel conservation 11/24/82 78 :50 System stability 11/28/82 50 3r 78 System stability 12/24/82 78 : 50 System stability 12/26/82 50 :78 System stability
- Best Estimate 0173K
e 1
. ~
l Zion Unit 2 Year 1982 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/02/82 75 := 50 Condensor tube leaks 01/10/82 50 >= 98 Start-up 01/13/82 98 :: 50 Condenser tube leaks 01/18/82 50 > 98 Steam generator conductivity return to spec 01/26/82 99 1; 50 Shutdown for tube repairs 02/06/82 58 ;- 50 shutdown for turb. vibration 03/21/82 50 :n '60 Start-up 03/22/82 60 : 50 Turb. vibration 04/16/82 50 : 98 Start-up 04/20/82 98 tr 85 Feedwater pump control problems 04/21/82 85 ;98 Feedwater pump control proolems 05/16/82 50 2 98 Start-up 05/29/82 98 Or58 Locate condensor tube leak.
05/29/82 58 :- 98 Return 06/12/82 50 ::97 Start-up 06/18/82 98 :: 50 Steam generator conductivity 06/20/82 50 ;-98 Steam generator conductivity 07/04/82 50 ;195 Start-up 07/12/82 50 3r 95 Start-up 08/02/82 50 > 95 Start-up 08/26/82 95 ; 80 Aborted shutdown per technical specifications
Zion Unit 2 Year 1982 (Cont'd)
Date Approx. Power Range Reason 08/27/82 80 95 Aborted shutoown per technical specifications 09/07/82 95 > 50 Shutdown for turb. blade 10/25/82 50 ;-95 Start-up 12/04/82 50 7 95 Start-up 12/22/82 95 7 80 System stability (*)
12/24/82 80 7 95 System stability (*)
- Best Estimate Ol73K
r Zion Unit 1 Year 1983 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/03/83 50 :- 75 Normal return to power (*)
01/18/83 50 > 75 Start-up 03/25/83 80 ;;50 Fuel conservation 06/14/83 50 3- 80 Start-up 06/18/83 78 3 85 Normal return to power (*)
06/22/83 85 ::95 Normal return to power (*)
07/06/83 95 ::50 Shutdown for steam leaks 07/07/83 50 : 90 Start-up
- Best Estimate Ol73K
F i
Zion Unit 2 Year 1983 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/14/83 95 > SO Shutdown for ESS bus 005 01/15/83 50 0= 95 Start-up 02/24/83 80 ? 50 Shutdown for refueling 06/01/83 60 ; 85 Start-up 06/10/83 85 7 95 Start-up 06/25/83 95 ? 50 Repair of MSIV 06/25/83 50 3-95 Return after repair 07/04/83 95 ?r 70 Repair of reactor coolant loop flow channel 07/05/83 70 ? 95 Repair of reactor coolant loop flow channel 07/26/83 90 ;r 50 Repair of HDT rupture disk 07/26/83 50 :: 95 Return after repair 08/09/83 50 3r 85 Start-up 08/15/83 85 ?: 95 Normal return to power 11/14/83 98 77 50 Shutdown to repair containment spray 11/17/83 50 3 98 Start-up 0173K
r Zion Unit 1 Year 1984 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 02/14/84 50 := 90 Start-up 02/19/84 90 y 100 Start-up 02/24/84 50 ;_ 100 Start-up 03/05/84 97 :: 50 Shutdown for HDT rupture disk 03/05/84 50 > 98 Start-up 04/04/84 50 : 100 Start-up 07/18/84 100 ;; 50 Shutdown for ILRT 09/03/84 50 > 70 Start-up 09/10/84 70 := 50 Shutdown for tube leak 10/07/84 50 ; 85 Start-up 10/09/84 85 : 97 Start-up 10/23/84 97 : 70 Steam generator conductivity 10/24/84 70 ; 97 Steam generator conductivity 12/07/84 50 :: 95 Start-up 12/20/84 95 - 50 Shutdown to inspect generator 12/22/84 50 :: 95 Start-up 0173K
I Zion Unit 2 Year 1984 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/07/84 50 # 98 Start-up 01/17/84 50 : 98 Start-up 03/01/84 50 5 97 Normal return to power (*)
07/15/84 50 : 85 Start-up 07/20/84 85 ::98 Start-up 07/24/84 98 : 65 Repair of letdown isolation valve 07/24/84 65 ;; 98 Repair of letdown isolation valve 08/11/84 99 :- 89 RCP oil addition 08/12/84 89 ;= 95 RCP oil addition 08/14/84 95 :: 50 Shutdown due to containment temperature 08/15/84 50 ;196 Start-up 09/05/84 95 > 70 LER 50-304/84-25 09/05/84 70 ;-98 LER 50-304/84-25 09/11/85 98 : 65 RCP 011 addition 09/12/85 65 :: 98 RCP oil aodition 12/30/84 95 ;- 50 RCP oil addition
- Best Estimate Ol73K
1 l
Zion Unit 1 Year 1985 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/15/85 98 > 50 Shutdown due to 2 D/G 0.0.S.
01/21/85 50 > 65 Start-Up 01/26/85 65 > 50 Shutdown for refueling 0173K
r Zion Unit 2 Year 1985 Date Approx. Power Range Reason 01/01/85 50 > 95 Return from RCP oil addition 0173K L_