ML20127M989
| ML20127M989 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1969 |
| From: | David Nelson NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | Shaper H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211300531 | |
| Download: ML20127M989 (8) | |
Text
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N O R T H.iR N-STATES POWER r*0MPANY
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4 t4 Nico.LET M4ct-MIN N E A PO LIS, MIN N E S OTA 8 9400 LAW OcPARTMENT TELEPHONE 3306000
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December 9, 1969 1
Mr. Howard Shapar
-Assistant General Counsel U. 4. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.
20545-s Re:
N,orthern States Power Company-
- v. State of Minnesota et al.
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Dear Howard:
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The. Federal Court case is pt oceeding routinely toward trial, j
possib'ly in January.
The Court has asket Northern States Pcwer Company.to file a brief with the Court establishing lthe Court's jurisdiction in i
this case.
Although attorntzy ; for - the State of Minnesota con-
-nde6 such jurisdiction in the State's' Answer, the Court is-under a duty to assure itself of the fact that it does have j ;
such jurisdiction.
The Court has-also-asked counsel to
'l attempt to. stipulate to as many of the material facts as the ti parties are able t:- ag ee upon by such stipulation.
Thus far, counsel for the' Compai,y nd the State of Minnesota have stipu-l}
latedithat the adequacy or inadequacy of the AEC or State i;
M ' ts upon the emission of radiation from the-Monticello i;
r.uclear Generating Plant to protect-public health and safety is not an issue in this' case.
The' Court has not.yet signed end returned the' Order based upon this stipulation.-
In p$eparing other phases of our testimony for trial, we believe that the United States Atomic Energy Commission, or-representatives thereof, could make a material contribution-4 in suppcrt of-the-Company'.s position in this case if-one or more represcntatives of the Atomic Energy Commission ~could bC*d 0.l. O)L 0 R63 "i
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Mr. Howard Shapat December 9, 1969 Page 2 act as witnesses at the time of trial.
I am enclosing a memorandum which describes in general terms the type of tes-timony which would be most helpful if it were presented by individuals from the Atomic Energy Commission.
I shall very much appreciate your reviewing the enclosed memo-randum and then referring it to the proper person for decision as to whether we may anticipate the assistance of the Atomic Energy Commission in providing witnesses who will be prepared to present the testimony outlined in the enclosed memorandum, Very truly yours, j!
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DONALD E. NELSON t
Enclosure 3
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Testimony Needed from AEC As you know, the State's answer raises the' defense that there is no " conflict" between the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and the United States Atomic Energy Co=uission restrictions applicable to this plant. As 1
you also know, the Unitcd States Supreme Court has said in several opinions that, in the absence of an unequivocal expression by Congress, it will decline to hold that Congress has entirely pre-empted a certain regulatory area _ absent i
x a showing that there is actual (or at least potential) conflict betueen the s
State and federal regulatory schemes. Therefore, we believe we should be pre-pared to demonstrate (1) the degree of the differences between PCA and AEC s
t requirements and (2) the potential or actual conflict.
ye will have testimony frca non-AEC expert witnesses that an attempt to comply with the PCA peruit would require the addition of certain buildings andejuipent, including the following.
(1)
A different gaseous radioactive waste system, including a charcoal filter, possibly in duplicate; (2) A different liquid radioactive waste system consisting of evaporators, condensers, a"'tional tankage, and a
. low icvel shielded laboratory.
ne laboratory and mm
. additional tankage would be necessary because of the PCA's apparent insistence that NSP attempt i.o measure t
,c indiv ' Sal radioisotope concentration' t extremely i
low levels. We understand that euch measurements would require laboratory techniques which would make neces-sary the accumulations of liquid waste for a period of severa,1 days while the chemical analysis was being carried out.
In addition, it appears that detection of certain i
radioisotopes at low levels (such as Strontium 90) would require waiting for the development of their daughter products and therefore a hold-up of two weeks would be
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i necessary.
It has been estimated that if literal compli-ance with the PCA permit is required, approximately 2J0,000 gallons of additional tankage might be necessary.
The evid'ence will indicate that each of these additional aystems 4
would create its o.;n potential hazards.- For example, the modified off-gas system would result in greater quantities of solid wastes to be dis;osed of.
In addition, it might be questioned whether installation of charcoal filtra-tion would be safe witho:: simultaneous instcllation of a recombiner, con-l I
t denser, dehumidifier and heater because of the ignition possibilities.
It might also be quest,ioned whether the additional exposure of plant personnel resulting from chemical analysis of the liqu'id and stack effluent would be justified in light of the knowledge to be derived from sampling and testing.
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The additional tankage and storage of liquid wastes in itself might be con-I sidered to create potential for accident not justified by the knowledge gained i
by attempting to detect isotopes at the low concentrations set forth in the pe rmit. Thus, it appears 'that the AEC might object to t'he installation of -*
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If that potential the additional facilities required by the State per%e.
exists, it would seem that such pctential ought to be brou;ht to the Court's that a attention, for this vould unquestionably support the Icgs1 argument single agency ought to balance the risks of the suggested devices against k
the bene fits to be obtained f rom them.
s Other benefit-risk calculations of a technical (not political) i j
n,ature made necessary by the State permit are as follows.
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Paragraph 2(c) of the Special Conditions Relating to Radioactive c
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,It is Wastes requires routine ion exchange treatment of low purity wastes.
our understanding that an attempt to deminerali;r 1-1 purity wastes would rather quickly foul the resins and would greatly increase the amount of solid waste to be handled in the plant and disposed of off-site with a con-t i
!l (in some degree) increase in the risks associated therewith.
current Paragraph 2(d) seems to suggest that the PCA vill attempt to regu-late the methods of inspect. ion of fuel elem:nts for tramp uraatum and seems-
.dl, to suggest that on-site inspection and dccontamination migi.t be required.
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- f. question arises as to whether such inspection and decontamination is feasi-ble and whether it would raise risks to the persons performing that function.
Again, it would seem that the benefits from such inspection would have -to be l')
balanced against the risks thereof. In addition, a question arises as to whether this would be permitted by the AEC.
Paragraph 2(e) suggests that tha PCA cight require the identifi-cation and replacement. of leaky fuel rods between normal fuel replacements.
A question perhaps arises as to whether the AEC would consider it-desirable Some to shut down the plant and hunt f or leakers between normal refueling.
, of the considerations that might indicate the undesirability of this practice are:
I (1)
The increase in the number of thermal cycles to which i
the plant and equipment would be subjected; (2) The increase in the amount of liquid waste to be pro-cessed; t
(3) The hazards involved in the "sippins" process nececcery to locate leahers; i
(4) The possibility that the detection procedures themselves could create leakers; and (5) The greater exposure to plant personnel because of the s
increase in the number of times it is necessary to open i
f the reactor.
Several questions arise with respect to the foregoing permit require-i ments which we would like to explore with the AEC. These questions include:
(1) could any of the additional facilities mentioned be added to the plant without AIC approval, in light of 10 C.F.R. 550.55(n); (2) what procedures i
would be necessary to obtain AEC approval (assuming approval would be forth-coming) ; (3) how mqch delay would result in the issuance of an operating permit, assuming that the mentioned changes in the plant were proposed by the operator; (4) are any of the added vaste treatment or testing procedures in conflict with the F.S. A.R. now being studied by the Commission, within the metaing of 20 C.F.R. 550.59; (5) are any of the risks postulated because of the additional facilities, or the additional inspection, decontamination, or treat:ent suggested by paragraphs 2(c), 2(d), or 2(e) significant enough 0 -
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i so that there is uncertainty whether the AEC would approve these state imposed procedures; (6) is there a prospective witness on the AEC or,on its staff,who has an opinion whether the risks of the various added facilities and procedures are justified by the advantages to be gained from these addi-I tions; (7) would any of the mentioned changes in design or operating procedures 4
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, conflict with any of the usus1 requirements of the AIC7 t
Another area of possible con'lict arises because of paragraph 13.
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This paragraph incorporates by reference pages 90-97 of the Tsivoglou report l
dated Januery 31, 1968.
This report says, among othe~t things:
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'Hence, in the unlikely event of such an accident, primary responsibility for all aspects of control and protection of the public health should rest with the Minnesota State i
Board of Health.
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"The MSSH should also have authority to direct the control i
and containnent activities of NSP plant personnel to what-ever extent the MS3H deems necessary."
l We believe we should explore uith the AEC the question whether its usual procedures permit a state board of health to control the activities of the i
operator in the event of an emergency when the particular state involved has not entered into a section 274 agreement with the Conaission.
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Another: area for possible testimony from the AEC arises because t
I of -the Supreme Court's repeated reference to the " pervasiveness" of the federal regulatory scheme as a f actor bearing upon the question of pre-emption. Of ten this pervasiveness (or lack thereof) is found by the Court ii merely from an examination of the applicable statute and regulations. At i
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times, it appears that there has been testimony in the district court with 4
i reference to the scope of the agency's functions.
The regulations contained 5-tw
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in 10 C.F.R. are unusually difficult for lauyers and judges to comprehend.
And the licensing regulations contained in 20 C.F.R., part 50, do not really demonstrate the amount of detailed information apparently required of power plant operators who apply for construction permits and operating licenses. Therefore; it might be helpful to of fer testienny concerning the extant to which the design, construction and operation of a ne:lcar power, plant is regulated by the Commission.
It would also help, in explain-
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ing the effect of section 274 of the act, to have a witness explain the areas
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of regulation which are properly covered by agreements with states for the regulation of persons uho deal with " byproduct caterial, source material, J
Or special nuclear material in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass". '
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These are the major points which suggest themselves as topics for discussion with AEC personnel.
Perhaps you will have additional sug-N gestions and perhaps the AEC will htve others. We would, of course, welcome all suggestions for ensuring a successful outcome of the litigation.
E.J.3.
11/17/69 i
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