ML20127L866
| ML20127L866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1993 |
| From: | Brink B CITIZENS FOR FAIR UTILITY REGULATION |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#193-13555 NUDOCS 9301280032 | |
| Download: ML20127L866 (6) | |
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DOCKET NUMBER l 13555 PROD. & UTIL FAC.d'dI.
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Ar.C ZITICENS FOR FAIR UTILITY REGULATION
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~600 ANGLIN DRIVE FORT WORTH TEXA5 ~6140 917-479-6372 JANUARY 13. 1993 J
The United 5tates Muclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Commissioners Washington. DC 20555 REQUEST FOR ACTICH RE: TU ELECTRIC'S LICENSE REQUEET FOR THE COMANCHE FEAK STEAM ELECTRIC 2TATION'5 UNIT 2.
DOCEET MUMBERE 50-445. 50-446 Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation. hereinafter referred to as CFUR. respectfully requests the Commission to publish in the Federal Register a notice of proposed action with respect to TU Electric's application for a license for Unit 2 of its Comanche Peak 5 team Electric Station (CPSES) which would allow affected parties to request that a licensing board be established and a hearing in the public interest be instituted, allowing public participation and intervention.
CFUR believes that the Commission has the authority under 2.104 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations to find that "a hearing is required in the public interest" (2.104
- a)) regarding the licensing of Unit 2 of the Comanche Peak nuclear plant.
There are at least two serious and outstanding issues of safety which are now considered ' licensing issues by the Region IV NRC staff, anu which go to the neart of the licensing process and the public's right to know.
The two safety concerns are the continued failure of Bora-Warner check valves in Unit 2. and the installation of the fire barrier Thermolag in Unit 2, which continues to fall fire tests conducted by the utility as well as the NRC.
At the time of this filing. the UFC is putting out s report of its latest investigation into the failure-of S rg-Warner valves wnich failed in Unit 2 during recent ;reoperational testing.
Two of those valvee. in the component ecoiing water system. have oeen retestea nna have failed tne retest accorcing to a conversation between memoers of CFUR and tne NRC Regicn :V staff on January 22. CThe NRC report :n Borc-Warner,should be cut snis ween. '
.ne of the more disturbina :nings nat
- FUR nse.+srned scout the Etra-Warner valves
_s tnat 3 tollow up inspection 9301280032 930113 PDR ADOCK 05000445 3
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CTUR, PAGE 2 4
cv the Office of Muclear Reactor Regulation of tne i rg-
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Warner facility following a rather damning report in Januarv l
- f 1390 i eee CFUR 2.006 filing of Novemoer 18. 1990.
j sttacnment Fi has never been conducted.
An inspect :n s
tending now. two and ene nalf years later.
The anuary.
.2.10 report found many violations, especially in Borg-Warner's vendor GA program. The breakdown in Borg-Warner 'c WA program was one cause of the Borg-Warner valve failures at C:manene Peak, among others.
Problems with this particular brand of valve has been
- cnsistent at the Comanche Peak plant in both units.
The findings of the NRC inspection will have an impact On tne i
valves still located in Unit 1. CFUR -has been told by MRC staffers.
CFUR will not detail here the many failures and I
sttempted fi:ces of Borg-Warner valves at CPSES over the years especially without a final report from the NRC sn the latest failures and the potential consequences of those failures l
'and in light of the fact that at least two important
-documents regarding Borg-Warner were recently missing from j
the public document room at UTA where the Comanche Peak i
records are kept.) (Region IV is in the process of recovering those documents for CFUR.]
We urge the Commission to review the Borg-Warner history at Comanche Peak and CFUR's 2.206 filing of November 18. 1990 i
i snd find that this pattern of f ailures is a significant safety concern and warrants a full hearing with public i
participation.
There are unanswered questions which must be addressed as to why these valves, with their abysmal history
- f failures, continue to be used and installed in critical i
safety areas of the Comanche Peak facility.
The second area of concern CFUR has is the installation of j
Thermolag fire barrier materials in Unit 2. even though the MRC has cautioned TU that it continues to install the material 'at its own risk. '
Multiple tests dating to the early 1980s prove that this fire barrier is a failure.
Tests conducted to date have not chown that Thermolag can meet the MRC criteria for fire protection. As recently as uc::cer of this year. Thermolag was shipped to the Comanche Feak site with voids and found filled with staples wnere voids were filled at-the factory prior to shipping.
Questions scout the vendor. Thermal Eciences. !nc.. of It. 1;uis, snd
-he independence of its cwn testing Of this materisi nave seen raised and verified.
Further. there is a preliminary report from the EC~a Office
- f Inspector General which found that. dating caen
- : 1380.
- ne NRC staff received information that brought the fire
- arrier's ability to withstand fires for the requireo lencth f *.ime into ;uestion, rut -he NRC riaff c-h n;
'M : L: n.
~hm f
3's report ;f August 17 has :onta ea many vf ne nntentions raised by tne Nuclear Informati;n Snd Resource l
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CFUR, PAGE 3 i
2ervice in a C.206 filing in July Of 1992. detailing the.:ng nistory Of Thermolag failures at Ccmanche Peak as well as Lther ;isnts around tne country.
There is valid cncern that Thermolag itself is combustible. snd because the materials nave ceen installed with confusing and wrong ampacity ratings. the material itself could he the initiator of a
- fire, r
CFUR uncerstands that the IG's report was incomplete sna the final report of its investigation is still not out.
Due to this and the fact that, regardless of the numbers of tests.
Thermolag continues to fail the criteria established by the NRC for the Comanche Peak facility. this issue deserves a full public hearing and no license should be issued without such a hearing.
The Thermolag test f ailures alona with the f ailures of the Borg-Warner check valves constitute a pattern of failed safety-related components which. incredibly. continue to be installed at the Comanche Peak facility. It is inconceivable to this petitioner that such conditions meet either the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the intent of Congress.
In 1965. in an unrelated case.
Commissioner Ross of the Federal Power Commission in arguing for the right of the people to know, said, "I do feel that the public is entitled to know on the record that no stone has been left unturned.
How much better if the public is clearly advised under oath and cross examination that there is truly no alternative?"
(Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference...v Federal Power Commission.. United States Court of Appeals. 2nd Circuit.
December 29. 1965.)
It has been well over eight years since full public hearings have been held on the licensing issues surrounding the Comanche Peak nuclear plant.
It has been three years since the Commission licensed Unit 1.
CFUR believes that full, sd.iudicatorv public hearings are in the best interest of the puolic st this point in the history of the Comanche Peak plant.
Surely before Unit 0 is licensed to operate. the public. which will not only pay for the plant but which stanas to be adversely affected if sn accident occure there
- ver *he next JO to 40 years. has a right to-hear tne final issues of catetv surrounding this clant debated uncer the
~4enness that can only happen when 311 parties are uncer :s:n and Tucaect to cross examination.
Tonficence, not only in the saretv si tne :: ant tnat will te
- ur neignoor :cr the next several necaces, but also in :ne system itself and the soility of :ne NRC te ruily regulate muciest :cwer.icensees sna trotect ne cuclic ta si stane.
2 ful. tublic nearina :nn restore nat confidence ;r crina
.isnt.:suee that -he 'smmis s ion ;:self shculd.:now ;f it
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CTUR, PAGE 4 to make a decision based en a full snct adequate reccrd and meet its mandate to always find on the side of the health and safety of the puolic above all else.
For these and all cf the above reasons. CFUR trays that the Commission will grant its request for a notice to ce issued.
in the Federal Register regarding the license request.by TU Electric for sn operating license for Unit 2'of its Comanche Peak nuclear plant thereby giving an opportunity to affected parties to petition for a hearing and leave to 1
intervene.
Respe tfully submitted.
Betty Brink. Board Member Citicens for Fair Utility Regulation January 13, 1993 l
l
v4 4o gyya ujfUDPM FROM US tRC RlU TO 63013043735 P.06 PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE JANUARY 16. 1993 FROM: CITIZENS FOR FAIR UTILITY REGULATION (CFUR) t i
CONTACT: BETTY BRINK. 478-6372 TODAY CFUR IS FILING WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A FETITION ASKING THAT THE NRC EXERCISE ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER TO ALLOW FOR PUBLIC HEARINGS LICENSING OF UNIT 2 OF THE COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR Ut3 DER CONSTRUCTION NEAR GLEN ROSE.
IT HAS BEEN EIGHT YEARS SINCE FULL PARTICIPATO HEdRINGSWEREHELDOtlTHECOMANCHEPEAKFACILI IT HAS BEEN THREE YEARS SINCE UNIT I WAS LICENSED.
FAIRNESS DICTATES THAT THE PUBLIC WHICH WILL NOT ONLY PAY THE $12 BILLION OR MORE COSTS OF THE PLANT BUT WILL ALSO SUFFER TH ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACC PEAK, DESERVE TO HEAR AND PARTICIPATE IN A FULL ADJUDICA HEARING ON OUTSTANDING SAFETY ISSUES.
CWR HAS FOUND THAT TWO SUCH ISSUES CONTINUE T THE PLANT AND ARE CONSIDERED " LICENSING ISSUE THE ABILITY TO PROTECT THE PLANT'S ELECTRICAL FIRE IS IN QUECTION BECAUSE OF THE INSTALIATION OF DEFECTIVE FIRE BARRIER KNOWN AS THERMOLAG.
THIS HATERIAL HAS A LONG HISTORY OF FAILURES IN TESTING AT COMA OTHER OPERATING PLANTS AND IS THE SUBJECT OF AN IN INVESTIGATION NOW IN PROGRESS BY THE NRC'S INSP
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JANUARY 15 PRESS RELEASE CRJR PAGE 2 THE SECOND OUTSTANDING ISSUE HAS TO DO WITH FAILED BORG-WARNER VALVES IN SAFETY AREAS OF THE PLANT.
THE BORG-WARNER j
VALVES HAVE FAILED AT VARIOUS TIMES IN TESTING SIllCE 1985 AND i
CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF NRC INVESTIGATIO!!S AND OUICK FIXES i
BY THE UTILITY.
CFUR BELIEVES THESE VALVES AND THERMOLAG i
i SHOULD BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH COMPONENTS WHICH WORK AND 1-1 MEET THE NRC'S OWN CRITERI A FOR SAFETY.
WE BELIEVE THIS CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE i
LONG ESTABLISHED PROCESS OF OPEN PUBLIC HEARINGS WITH ALL i
i, PARTIES. INCLUDING THE NRC. UNDER OATH AND SUBJECT TO CROSS EXAMIllATION.
WE HERE IN NORTH TEXAS WILL BE NEIGHBORS OF THIS PLANT FOR 30 OR 40 YEARS.
WE DO NOT THINK IT IS TOO MUCH TO ASK 2
OF THE NRC TO' ALLOW US TO HEAR THE ISSUES AND ASK QUESTIONS REGARDING A NUCLEAR PLANT WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR MASSIVE i
l DESTRUCTION OF OUR ENVIRONMENT'AND LONG RANGE IMPACT ON THE l
HEALTH OF OUR CHILDREN.
THIS PLANT, AFTER ALL, HAS BEEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR 20 YEARS.
A FEW MONTHS OF HEARINGS IS OF NO SIGNIFICANCE TO i
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THE NRC AFTER ALL THIS TIME, AND IT COULD MEAN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH FOR THOSE OF US WHO MUST-i LIVE IN THE FATH OF COMANCHE PEAK'S RADIATION AND/OR PAY THE COSTS TO CLEAN UP A CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT.
l i TOTAL P.07-
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