ML20127L310
| ML20127L310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127L297 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-85-09, 50-416-85-9, NUDOCS 8506270868 | |
| Download: ML20127L310 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1985009
Text
MAY 071985
-
.
2
g.
Violation (50-416/85-09-07), Failure to follow procedure, by performing
steps out of sequence resulting in an actuation of an ESF Containment
isolation valve (paragraph 5).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status'and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff.
The inspector made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included
instrument readings, set points and recordings; status of operating systems;
tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;
adherence to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in
effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and
access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable.
The
confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path
alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,
lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis.
Portions
of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside
areas were visited.
Observations included safety-related tagout verifica-
tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant
conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress;
radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification
systems; and containment isolation.
At 9:18 a.m. CST, on February 23, 1985, with the unit in cold shutdown,
technicians were placing the Division 2 battery chargers on equalize per
surveillance procedure 06-EL-IL21-0-0001, to charge the battery banks in
preparation for a battery discharge test.
The chargers are adjusted by
turning a potentiometer until voltage of approximately 140 VDC is observed.
One charger had been adjusted to 140 VDC and while adjusting the second
charger, the inverter tripped on a high voltage of 147 VDC. This caused a
loss of power to Division 2 reactor level instruments and the instruments
failed low on a loss of power, thus indicating a reactor low water level
signal.
After the inverter tripped, technicians returned the equalizing
voltage back to the normal float value of 132 VDC. The inverter automatically
reset and restored power. A relay powered from the inverter energized before
the level in.trumentation could recover causing the ESF systems to initiate on
an erroneous reactn-
ater level signal.
The ESF actuation raised the
'
f.D
DOC
pp
MAY 0719s
.
4
06-EL-1L11-0-001,
Rev. 24
Surveillance procedure, 125-volt Battery
Bank All Cell Check
06-EL-IL11-R-001,
Rev. 22
Surveillance procedure, 125 volt Battery
Bank Physical Condition Check
06-EL-1L51-R-001,
Rev. 21
Surveillance procedure,125 volt Battery
1A3, 183, 1C3 Capacity Discharge Test
06-EL-IL21-0-001,
Rev. 22
Surveillance procedure, Battery 1A3, 183,
IC3 Capacity Discharge Test.
C & D Batteries Division Eltra
Installation and Operating Instructions
Corp.
for Stationary Batteries
C & D Auto' Reg. Charger Eltra
Installation and Operating Instruction
Corp.
Manual.
The Inspector found the following discrepancies:
a.
The criteria in procedure 06-EL-1L21-0-001 are incomplete.
Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.2.1.f,
in part requires an annual capacity
discharge test if any battery has reached 85% of the service life
expected for the application or if capacity drops more than 10% of
rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests.
These
criteria are not imposed in this or any other procedure.
b.
Procedure 06-EL-1L11-Q-001 has a statement that the 72-hour equalizing
charge may be omitted if maintenance engineering has determined that an
equalizing charge is not needed at this time.
The procedure does not
reference the corrective action guidelines of paragraph 3.4 of IEEE Std. 450-1975 which defines criteria for when an equalizing charge is
required. The statement was just recently added to the procedure and
the licensee has routinely been accomplishing the 72-hour equalizing
charge every quarter.
The licensee is revising their procedures to correct the above
discrepancies.
This will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item
(50-416/85-09-02).
8.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the control
room atmospheric control and isolation system.
The walkdown consisted of an
inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve
alignment, including valve power available and valve locking, where
required; instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instru-
mentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence
of rodents; and system free from other degrading conditions.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
NAY '071985
.
a
5
9.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The determination
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems, and the relative safety
significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with
plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for the reports indicated by
an asterisk.
The LERs were reviewed using the guidance of the general
policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions.
The following LERs are
closed.
LER No.
Report Date
Event
'
- 85-009
March 15, 1985
Inadvertent
Emergency
Core
Cooling System (ECCS) actuation
and
reactor
while
shutdown.84-054
December 20, 1984
Chemistry
surveillances
on
effluent
cumulative
dose
calculations performed one day
late.85-006
March 7, 1985
Spurious Residual Heat Removal
(RHR)
equipment
area
high
temperature signal
surveillance
not performed
85-005
February 28, 1985
Surveillance
not
performed
within time limit
84-061
January 28, 1985
Fire watch not performed due to
disabled door.84-051
December 3, 1984
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
(RCIC) isolation on high steam
flow signal.83-174
November 28, 1983
Division
II
diesel
generator
fuel oil leak.
The event of LER 85-009 was discussed in Inspection Report 85-06 and is
being tracked as violation 50-416/85-06-01.
Similar events of LER 84-051
were discussed in Inspection Report 85-03 and licensee actions are being
tracked as inspector followup item 50-416/85-03-04.
LER 84-45 and LER
85-008 both remain open.
Both LERs address a problem with the precoat
filters isolating and resulting in a reactor scram on loss of instrument
air.
LER 84-45 was previously discussed in report 84-49 as part of scram
No. 8.
The event of LER 85-008 is discussed in paragraph 10 of this report
in scram number 20.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.