ML20127L310

Corrected Pages 2,4 & 5 to Insp Rept 50-416/85-09 Re Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Unresolved Items,Operational Safety Verification,Esf Sys Walkdown & ROs

ML20127L310
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/07/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127L297	List: ML20127L291 ML20127L310
References
50-416-85-09, 50-416-85-9, NUDOCS 8506270868
Download: ML20127L310 (3)

See also: IR 05000416/1985009

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MAY 071985

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g. Violation (50-416/85-09-07), Failure to follow procedure, by performing

steps out of sequence resulting in an actuation of an ESF Containment

isolation valve (paragraph 5).

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status'and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

plant operating staff.

The inspector made frequent visits to the control room such that it was

visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included

instrument readings, set points and recordings; status of operating systems;

tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;

adherence to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in

effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and

access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal

discussions with operators and their supervisors.

Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The

confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path

alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,

lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety-related tagout verifica-

tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant

conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress;

radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification

systems; and containment isolation.

At 9:18 a.m. CST, on February 23, 1985, with the unit in cold shutdown,

technicians were placing the Division 2 battery chargers on equalize per

surveillance procedure 06-EL-IL21-0-0001, to charge the battery banks in

preparation for a battery discharge test. The chargers are adjusted by

turning a potentiometer until voltage of approximately 140 VDC is observed.

One charger had been adjusted to 140 VDC and while adjusting the second

charger, the inverter tripped on a high voltage of 147 VDC. This caused a

loss of power to Division 2 reactor level instruments and the instruments

failed low on a loss of power, thus indicating a reactor low water level

signal. After the inverter tripped, technicians returned the equalizing

voltage back to the normal float value of 132 VDC. The inverter automatically

reset and restored power. A relay powered from the inverter energized before

the level in.trumentation could recover causing the ESF systems to initiate on

an erroneous reactn- '

ater level signal. The ESF actuation raised the

DOC pp

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MAY 0719s

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06-EL-1L11-0-001, Rev. 24 Surveillance procedure, 125-volt Battery

Bank All Cell Check

06-EL-IL11-R-001, Rev. 22 Surveillance procedure, 125 volt Battery

Bank Physical Condition Check

06-EL-1L51-R-001, Rev. 21 Surveillance procedure,125 volt Battery

1A3, 183, 1C3 Capacity Discharge Test

06-EL-IL21-0-001, Rev. 22 Surveillance procedure, Battery 1A3, 183,

IC3 Capacity Discharge Test.

C & D Batteries Division Eltra Installation and Operating Instructions

Corp. for Stationary Batteries

C & D Auto' Reg. Charger Eltra Installation and Operating Instruction

Corp. Manual.

The Inspector found the following discrepancies:

a. The criteria in procedure 06-EL-1L21-0-001 are incomplete. Technical

Specification (TS) 4.8.2.1.f, in part requires an annual capacity

discharge test if any battery has reached 85% of the service life

expected for the application or if capacity drops more than 10% of

rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests. These

criteria are not imposed in this or any other procedure.

b. Procedure 06-EL-1L11-Q-001 has a statement that the 72-hour equalizing

charge may be omitted if maintenance engineering has determined that an

equalizing charge is not needed at this time. The procedure does not

reference the corrective action guidelines of paragraph 3.4 of IEEE Std. 450-1975 which defines criteria for when an equalizing charge is

required. The statement was just recently added to the procedure and

the licensee has routinely been accomplishing the 72-hour equalizing

charge every quarter.

The licensee is revising their procedures to correct the above

discrepancies. This will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item

(50-416/85-09-02).

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the control

room atmospheric control and isolation system. The walkdown consisted of an

inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve

alignment, including valve power available and valve locking, where

required; instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instru-

mentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence

of rodents; and system free from other degrading conditions.

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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NAY '071985

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9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if

the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination

included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or

planned, existence of potential generic problems, and the relative safety

significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with

plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for the reports indicated by

an asterisk. The LERs were reviewed using the guidance of the general

policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions. The following LERs are

closed.

LER No. Report Date Event

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• 85-009 March 15, 1985 Inadvertent Emergency Core

Cooling System (ECCS) actuation

and reactor scram while

shutdown.84-054 December 20, 1984 Chemistry surveillances on

effluent cumulative dose

calculations performed one day

late.85-006 March 7, 1985 Spurious Residual Heat Removal

(RHR) equipment area high

temperature signal surveillance

not performed

85-005 February 28, 1985 Surveillance not performed

within time limit

84-061 January 28, 1985 Fire watch not performed due to

disabled door.84-051 December 3, 1984 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

(RCIC) isolation on high steam

flow signal.83-174 November 28, 1983 Division II diesel generator

fuel oil leak.

The event of LER 85-009 was discussed in Inspection Report 85-06 and is

being tracked as violation 50-416/85-06-01. Similar events of LER 84-051

were discussed in Inspection Report 85-03 and licensee actions are being

tracked as inspector followup item 50-416/85-03-04. LER 84-45 and LER

85-008 both remain open. Both LERs address a problem with the precoat

filters isolating and resulting in a reactor scram on loss of instrument

air. LER 84-45 was previously discussed in report 84-49 as part of scram

No. 8. The event of LER 85-008 is discussed in paragraph 10 of this report

in scram number 20.

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.