ML20127J697
| ML20127J697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1966 |
| From: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211190400 | |
| Download: ML20127J697 (11) | |
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pu UNITED STATES. GOVERNMENT
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Memorandum h THE FILES To DATE: October 26, 1966
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THRU:
Roger S. Boyd, Chief Research & Power Reactor Safety Branch, DRL Walton Jens Q Research & Power Reactor Safety Branch FROM Division of Reactor Licensing
SUBJECT:
MEETING TO CONSIDER CONSTRUCTION PERMIT h
FOR NOTHERN STATES POWER MONTICELLO PLANT On 0ctober 12,-1966, a meeting was held between the Regulatory Staf f and the applicant for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The following persons wcre present:
R. J. McWhorter.
GE-Washington J. B. Graham H. Hollinghaus GE-APED W. Schultheis A. P. Bray L. C. Korke J. B. Violette R. J. Jensen NSP-A. V. Dienhart NSP D. E. Nelson E. C. Ward D. McElroy VP-NSP H. R. Denton AEC-C0 R. Boyd
.DRL D.-Muller J. Shea B. Grimes W. Jensen-P.
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- 1. Spickler-On the previous day,-the pro)1 ems of field conducting the reactor vessel were discussed with the staff and its consultants. Based on this meeting ~
the applicant was informed, pending the consnents of the staff's consultants, that-they should provide in-detail the reference design of a field fabri-cated vessel and an evaluation of why the construction procedures will ensure that the same quality standards would be maintained as for a shop fabricated vessel.
Problems of a more general nature were discussed on October 12fvith emphasis
-placed on proposed features in which the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant will be different from other recently-considered General Electric nuclear boilers.- These items are as follows:
Buy U.S. Satings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Satings Plan 9211190400 661026
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Coolinn Towers These were described by Art V. Dienhart of NSP. The cooling towers' will be used to a varying degree that will be determined by the availability of river water and allowable discharge temperature during dry summer months. A synopsis of cooling tower operation was E ven out by NSP and i
is attached to this meno. The maximum discharge temperature from the reactor-is limited so that the mixed river water temperature is less than 93 F down stream; however, the temperature of therdischarge canal could 've considerably higher. The river flow limitation is that no i
more than 75% of the total flow can be diverted for plant use. Since the minimum plant requirement is 72 cubic feet /second at full power, river flow less than 96 cubic feet /second would require power operation. An a
additional limitation is that the buildup of dissolved solids in the circulation water not exceed-1.5 of the river concentration. Water is pumped to the towers from the condensers and the back-flow is by gravity.
Air flow is forced through'the towers by blowers. Since the towers do not meet the Class I earthquake criteria, the staff raised questions concerning cooling tower loss during operation and requested the cooling capacity remaining in the ci*rculating water system following lo'ss of the towers. Apparently, however, this system has not yet been sized by General Electric.
GE also stated that no radioactive scale buildup was expected in the cooling towers based on operation of the EBWR.
A Radioactive Waste The radioactive waste treatment system of the Monticello plant utilizes Powdex demineralizers and is similar to the Quad-Cities design. The low river flow in summer months, however, may provide dilution by as little as 75%. General Electric outlined the principal sources of liquid waste and discussed the plant flow design which allows the-vaste streams to be recycled through the resin filtration units to ensure the 3
radioactivecontentinthedischargecanalwillnotexceed.lgue/cm7uc/gm even with maximum fuel failure. An effluent activity of 10~
corresponds to the Part ; limit for unidentified isotopes. Average' daily concentrations wil. be much less than the Part 20 limit due to J
the batch discharge nature of the rad waste system which operates.
for a discharge time of 57 minutes.. Maximum failed fuel is defined.as that which would correspond to a stack gas release of 0.30 g/sec.
The corresponding activity in the coolant would be 8 micro c/cm and the number failsd rods would be approximately 300. The applicant also stated that a continuous stack discharge of 1.0 c/see would produce 0.5 rem per year off-site. A table of the expected liquid waste dis-charge was handed out by the applicant and is attached.
Solid waste will consist mainly of the spent resin.from the Podex units.
Spent resin will be backwashed into storage tanks which are designed to permit a two-month decay period to reduce shielding. The final container will be 55-gallon drums. No high concentration waste will be produced as in regenerative resin process streams.
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! Engineered Safeguards General Electric stated that the core protection systems submitted in These will the Quad-Cities application will be supplied at Monticello.
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be designed so that for all primary system breaks, including a' double-ended rupture of a recirculation exit line, either of two systems vill prevent any fuel melting without outside power. The protective systems for small breaks, when the vessel pressure might remain too high for the core spray or flooding systems to be operated, consist of the high pressure injection system and depressurization of the vessel through the relief valves to allow operation _of the _ low pressure systems. The-2 staf f had reservations on using vessel depressurization as an engineered safeguard since it would, in effect, transform a small break into a j
large break and since inadvertent operation of the system might initiate i
an accident.
General Electric stated that rapid depressurization would l
cause vessel damage and that they were not satisfied with the system
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but that it was included only to meet the two safeguards without off-l site power criteria.
i' The problem of the single sparger from the suppression pool to supply all engineered safeguards vas-discussed. GE stated that in the event of a sparger rupture that the water would flow into an enclosed area below the torus and that they would provide calculations-showing that water would still be supplied to the engineered safeguards even if.the sparger ruptured.
Steam Isolation Valve i
A drawing of the recently designed steam isolation valve was presented.
i The valve is designed to close:following the operation of solenoid valves.
i by either air pressure or spring action. Once closed, a 957. axial load unbalance will keep the valve closed. The staff stated that full-scale tests of the valve sho.:1d be performed to_ verify its proper design., GE at present plans no such tests but stated-that if tests were made that the Moss Landing equipment would not be satisfactory and conditions should more nearly_apprcatmate_an actual reactor..
Core Integrity During 81owdown An analysis was made by GE of the capability of the control rod to enter the core'followi.ig a-blowdown in which plastic _ deformation of the channels had occurred ar.d was presented in-Amendment I to Dresden III. The staff
-requested that the dynamic forces on the rods from elastica 11y bent channel boxes _during tee blowdown-also;be considered.
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Heat Transfer test were described by GE for boiling with-no flow and no
. makeup: of boilof f.
The rod bundles were electrically heated to-approxi-mate decay heat. The heat transfer coefficient was found to decrease from an initial valve of h = 100 to h = 10 in approximately 15 seconds.
These-tests will be used to validate acceptable delay-times to actuate engineered safeguards.
Missiles i
j The staff requested an analysis of possible missile generation from
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machinery within the containment and evidence that the engineered safe-guards would be protected.
s Loss-of-Load Accident
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The Monticello plant turbine bypass system as proposed will only be sized -
for 15% of full power. Previous plants have had bypass capabilities from j
50% to greater than 100%. Thus, it would seem that the Monticello plant would have's higher probability of scramming from load fluctuations. NSP l
and GE stated that the primary purpose of-the bypass was for startup and shutdown ~of the reactor. They appeared to be uncertain of the capability of a plant to accept load swings without a scram even if the oscillation were within the range'of the bypass unless special valving is provided.
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The staff will request further information on this topic.
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Attachment:
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Distribution:
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R&PRSB Reading E. G. Case l
B.-Grimes i
D.-Muller J. Shea K. Woodard f
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} October 10, 1966 FmI'Ir'Run NUCLEAR CEIRATING PIANT E5979 SlMM OF RIVdR WICER REQUIIDERS Figure 1 shoas a flod diagram for our bbnticcilo Nuclear Cencrating Plant. It shows the various water lines linking the river, plant, cooling tower, and discharge canal together.
Figure 2 shcus a sche:mtic dit. cram of the four rxxles of operation of the plant. The plant design is proceeding on the following estimated water requirc:rnts for each tro6c.
s I.
Opan Cycle A.
Service Water - 22 cfs (temperature rise 25'F - design value),.
B.
Circulating Water - 950 cfs (t.cmperature risc 17.8'F - su:mer design valw).
II.
Helper Cycle A.
Service Water - 22 cfs.
B.
Circulating Water - 950 cfs.
C.
Cooling Tbwcr Evaporation - 5 cfs.
III. Partial Recirculation A.
Service Water - 22 cfs.
B.
Circulating Water - less than 950 cfs.
C.
Cooling Tower Evaporation - 5 cfs.
IV.
Closed Cycle A.
Service Water - 22 cfs.
B.
Cooling 'Ibwer BloMiuan (at 1.5 concentrations) - 54 cfs (discharge temperature 90'F - design value).
'Ibtal raakeup requircrrent for closed cycle is 72 cfs. Service water can be used for a portion of bleadown and evaporation makeup requiremants.
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2 Figure 3 shoas graphically the node of operation for all conbinations of river flos and tunperature. Figure 3 was developed by assuning that 75 percent of the flow is available and that 93'F after mixing in the river is Open cycle nuans that the floa is great enough and inoczntng river alloaed.
temperature is los enough so that the water can be used once through. lielper cycle is a nodification of op2n cycle and is c:nployed under conditions of In this code, the cooling high river water temperature coupled with high floa.
tower will be used to reduce the temperature of the water discharged to the river to insure that the river water tenperature after mixing will not exceed 93'F.
In the ranga of flows betw en 96 cfs and 1300 cfs either a closed hhich j
cycle operation or the partial recirculation operation would be used.
In either case, river water' one is selected would depend on plant econony.
temperature after mixmg would be 93'F or less, and the water derand would b2 less than 75 percent of th floa. Closed cycle operation will be required when river flew is less than 96 cfs.
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