ML20127G744
| ML20127G744 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1973 |
| From: | Skovholt D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Mayer L NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211170418 | |
| Download: ML20127G744 (13) | |
Text
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,.l C MAR 2 1973 Nce.e t..o.
50-203
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.;ortaern States Power tou;>any
..W., : :fr. L.
J. :.ayer
.>1 rector of Juclear Sepport Survices
-.1...ico11ct all 2aaccpolis,.lunesota 254,01
...eu tlec.en :
' unar.e. o..:
License do..?R-22 lour atter oateu February.', li?73, sroposeu caaum - to tac rechnicci
~ccifications of l'rovisional Operating 1.icense..
'R-22 for the
..onticello.,uclear Generating Plant.
Tae proposcu unges concern:
1.
the option to bypass :.nc rod biccK conitor unscale anu oovnacale trips at powur levela below J0!.
2.
openina, of control rou c. rive housing anu instrument thimbic for naiutenance while the suppression enancer la drained, reactor recirculation systen crosatie valve interleciu..mu grovisAons for bypaaming the refucilag interlocks unen tho reactor tomu switca is lockea in the ':le fueA poattion.
de nave revicvea tne enan.;es proposeu by the Morthern States Ptwor company (WSP) anu on tha basis of the information provided by F.SP's letter outec February 2,1973, ano chu supplemental information aubnittau uy setter cateu February
.'O, 1973, we uave conclucca ti.at:
1.
Tae roa block nouitor c.ovuscaiu anc upscale trin nicuaia can be bynassed when the reactor is operatin;; at less tuan Jul et rateu power lavc1 t,ecausu taere la.: ore thaa 40'. rar:;in to the power level above wnica tne rod block monitor is requirec.
T'.in is uuificient margin to assure Int cae cara cesi;;n limit (P.C11FR 41.C) la not excecuec.
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---i Northern States Power Company M 2 13/J l
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2.
The change to permit opening a control rod drive housing or l
instrument thimble (one at a time) while the suppression pool l
1s drained is acceptable because ample core cooling can be provided from the irradiated fuel storage pool in the event of maximum leakage through the larger of the two openings in the bottom of the reactor vessel.
j 3.
The change requiring reactor recirculation system crosstie valve interlocks to the main recirculation pumps including the provision to make the interlocks inoperable with both reactor recirculation pumps operating, if at least one of the two valves are closed is acceptable bec use closure of the crosstie valve limits ghe double-ended recirculation line break to an area of 4.2 ft. The peak clad temperature following such a break when operating at rated power is less than the 2300*F permitted by the AEC Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systens dated June 1971.
l 4.
The refueling interlock input signal for a control rod that i
has been removed from the reactor vessel may be bypassed after the four fuel bundles next to that control rod have been removed because the reactor is less reactive with the strongest remaining control rod driven out of the core. The required shutdown margin is thereby preserved.
We have concluded that the proposed changes do not present significant hazards considerations not described or implicit in the Monticello Safety Analysio Report and that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation of the reactor in the manner proposed.
Accordingly, the Technical Specifications are hereby changed to replace the existing pages 57, 58, 59, 67,'108, 113 and 187 with the enclosed i
revised pages bearing the same numbers and additional pages 108a,188a and 189a. The revisea pages also include corrections to previous minor typographical errors.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Robert J. Schea'el
,/ h, Donald J. Skovholt, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Directorate of Licensing A m i.
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Northern States Power company MAR 2 W3
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Enclosures:
j Revised pages 57, 58, 59, 67, 108, 10Sa, 113, 187,'188a and 189a.
[
cc w/ enclosures:
bec:
1 Gerald Chatuoff, Esquire Docket File l
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge & Madden AEC PDR 910 - 17th Street, N. W.
Branch Reading l
Washington, D. C.
20006 BP Readin2 F1le i
JRBuchanan, ORNL Howard J. Vogel, Esquire TWLaugh11n, DTIE i
Knittle & Vogel EPA (3) 814 Flour Exchange Building DJSkovholt, L:0R i
R0 (3)
Steve Gadler, P. E.
OGC / I $
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i 2120 Carter Avenue DLZiemann, L:0R #2 l
St. Paul, Minnesota 55108 TJCarter, L 0R NDube, L:0PS l
Harriet Lansing, Esquire FUinks (4)
Assistant City Attorney RMDiggs, L:0R #2 City of St. Paul JJShea, I *0R #2 g
f l
b38 City Bal1 0 G d { G. (5, /.,ata )
i S t. Paul, Minnesota -55102 i
f-Ken Dzugan Hinussota Pollution Control Agency 717 Delaware Street, S. E.
l Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440 Warren R. Lawson, M. D.
l Secretary & Executive Officer State Department of Health i
717 : Delaware Street, S. E.
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Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440 (also NSP 1tra dtd 2/2 and 2/20/73)
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Environmental Library of Minnesota i
I 1222 S.E. 4th Street.
Minneapolis, bdnnesota-55414 i
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Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 u a GOWERWEN'T PRWTWd3 ONCE 1972 466-333 i
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,3-_.
EXilIHIT B (Continued) 3ases Continued 3 5:_
G.
Emergency Cooling Ava11ab11ity The purpose of Specification G is to assure that sufficient core cooling equipment in available.at all times.
It ir during refueling outages tlnt unjor mlintenance in performed and during such time that al' core o d cantalwet cooling cubsynt.:as m,y be out of service.
Specification 3 5.G.3 allows all i
core and cantM=ent cooling subsystems to be inoperable provided no work is being done which has the potentim)
- ' draining the reactor vessel.
'ihus events requiring core cooling are precluded.
Speci fi ce._.
._.5.G.h recognia s tint coueu
/.t with contml rod drive maintenan;c durIns the refueling outage, it m?y ce necessary to drain the r %pression chamber for raaintenance or for the inspection required by Specification 4 7.A.l.
In this situation, a sufficient inventory of water is maintained to assure adequate core cooling in the unlikely event of Joss of control rod drive housing or Instrument thimble sen] integrity.
i H.
Extended faintenance i
flearly all ns intenance can be conpleted within a few days.
Infrequently, however, major maintenahce i
might be required. Replacement of principal system components could necessitate outages of more than the tire allcwed for a system or component to be out of service.
In spite of the best efforts of the operator to return equipment to service, some maintenance could require up to six months.
4 I.
Reci rculation System The capacity of the Emergency Core Coolant System is baced on the potential consequences of a double ended recirculation line break. %e peak fuel clad temperature is a function of the size of line break presented in a document entitled, "M>nticello Ilue] ear Generating Plant ECC3 Conformance to New AEC Adopted Interim Acceptance Criteria" submitted September 21, 3971. A double ended recirculation line break involvec 4.2
~t.
ft. When the cross tie valves are c1>ced and 5.6 sq. ft. when the cross tie valves are open.
The refere. ad report shows ti.at the peak fuel clad temperature for the 4.2 sq. ft. rupture while operating at rated - power i
is suffielen*Jy 3ess than the 2300 F limit set forth in the "AEC Adopted Interim' Acceptance Criteria for Perfornnnee of ECCS for Light {ater Power Ecactors" dated June 19, 1971.
However, a break of 5.6 sq. ft O
i e
vill result in clad temperatures in excess of 23OO F.
Therefore, at Icast one cross tie valve must remain 4
closed to redu ce the potential break area.
I The cross tie valve is a))oved to be open during one pump operation. With only one pump, rated power cannot be echteced.
Under these conditions, the expected peak elnd temperature during a loss of coolant accident is Jess.than that foi two pump operation with the cross tie valve closed.
r 3 5/h.5-18 113 i
4
1 y
30 IJMITIUG Coi!!ETI0lt! FOR 01'EMT101 1.0 suliVEILIAliCM REQUIRH4MITS 4
1.30 1R3'UErana 3.10 RWUELYlL9 4
Apy]$cability.
lyplicabi3 ity_:,
App 3ien to fuel handlj ng aryl core reactivity App 31ec to the periodic testing of those limitation:,
inter 3ceks and inntrumento used during
,,I s
refue31ng.
Objective:
Objectivei To onnure core reactivity lu within capability Tu verify the operability of instgentation of the control rodn and to prevent critJeality and inLerlocks uced in re1Neling.
during rente3 ins.
Specif.i cation:
Specification:
A.
Refueling Interlocko A.
Refueling Interlocks 4
a
'lbe roccior mode cultch sha33 be locked Prior to any fuel handling, with the in the "Eefuel" position during core head off the reactor vessel, the alterations and the refueling interlocks refteling interlocks shall be fune-shall be operable except as specified in tional]y teci.ed.
They chall also be tested at veckly intervals thereafter ]
specification 3.10.E.
until no Jonger required and following any repair work annociated with the interlocks.
t-3 30/1.30-1 187 8
. n. a
. - - - ~~
i i
i t
e EXIIIBIT b (Continued) b 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIOIB FOR OPEMTIdN 1.0 SUltVELLIAUCE REQUIREMENTS 6
i
~..
E.
Extended Core and Control Rod Drive Ibintenance g
Control' rods rnay be withdrawn from the reactor core 9
provided the follouing conditions are satisfied:
1.
Tne reactor mode cwitch shall be locked in the
')
" Refuel" position.
The refueling interlock input signal from a withdrawn control rod may
~
be bypacsed on a withdrawn control rod when the fuel assemblies in the cell containing (controlled by) that control rod are removed from the reactor core.
All other C
refueling interlocks shall be operable..
2.
SRM's shall be operable in the core quadrant where fuel or conta al rods are being reoved, and in an adjacent quadrant.
The require-ments for an S.::4 to be considered operable are given in 3.lO.B.
~
t 3.lo/4.lo-2a l
188 a i
I
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.~
{
i.
EXHIUlT B (Continued)
Bases Continued:
a The intent'of this spec'ification is to permit the unloading of ^. significant portion of the
'. E.
reactor ' core for.such purposes as removal of temporary control curtains, control rod drive maintenance, in-service inspection requirementn, examination of the core support plate, etc.
When the refueling. interlock input signal from a withdrawn control rod is bypassed, administra-tive controls will be in effect to prohibit fuel from being loaded into that control cell.
These operations are performed with the mode switch in the " Refuel" position to provide the t-refueling interlocks normally available during refueling as explained in Part A of these Bases.
In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling ' interlock on each withdrawn control rod.
'Ihe requirement that the fuel assemblies
-in'the cell controlled by the control rod be removed from the reactor core before the inter-lock can be bypassed insures that withdrawal of another control rod does not resu3t in inadvertent criticality.
Each control rod essentially provides reactivity control for the fuel assemblies in.the cell associated with the control rod.
Thus, removal of an entire cell (fuel assemblies plus control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the core.
i 9
4 6-4 t-f 310/4.10-3a 189 a
)
_ - _ _ _. - - - -. _ _ _ - - - - -, _ - -. - _.. - _ - - _ - -