ML20127E819
| ML20127E819 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1985 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85-323-000 ANPP-32751-TDS, DER-85-08, DER-85-8, PT21-85-323, PT21-85-323-000, NUDOCS 8506240670 | |
| Download: ML20127E819 (4) | |
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50 SM PicEIVED i
' NFC Arizona Nuclear Power Project 13% E1 -b M ii; 09 P O Box $2O34 e PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072 2034 May 30, 1985
'E ANPP-32751-TDS/PJC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Iirsch, Acting Director l
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
Subject:
Final Report - DER 85-08 A 50.55(e) Evaluation Relating To llysteresis Setpoint File: 85-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone conversation between L. Miller and T. Bradish on March 7, 1985 B) ANPP-32328, dated April 8, 1985 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-32623, dated May 13,1985 (Time Extension)
I
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the deficiency referenced above, which'has been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of l
10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21.
Very truly yours, EE C M / g l
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Project Director
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ANPP-32571-TDS/PJC May.30,L1985.
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cc:
. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection-and Enforcement _
U.JS. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 4
D. B. Karner.
W.-E. Ide-D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L.
A'. Souza -
D. E. Fowler T.
D.' Shriver C. N. Russo B. S. Kaplan
-J. R. Bynum
- J. M. Allen
- D. Canady
.A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G.-Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. ' R.. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman M. L. Clyde B. T. Parker T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J.~D. Houchen-J. E. Kirby Records Center
. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
. 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339 l
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..e FINAL REPORT - DER 85-08 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
Description of Deficiency Auxiliary feedwater flow is automatically initiated to the steam t
generators (SG-1 and SG-2) upon receipt of low level signal in the respective steam generators. A large differential pressure between the steam generators (SG-1 and SG-2) is indicative of a non-intact steam generator. Auxiliary feedwater flow to a non-intact S.G. is required to be inhibited.
The hysteresis setpoint valeus for the steam generator break identi-fication logic reset (differential pressure between SG-1 and SG-2) which generates the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) in-hibit reset signal were not specified in Combustion Engineering's (CE's) Setpoint Document. Because no setpoint had been specified, calibration of the high steam generator differential pressure bi-stables had not been accomplished.
The low (zero) hysteresis setpoint value could have allowed the re-establishment of AFW flow to a steam generator that is supposed to be isolated. This condition is inconsistent with the safety analysis in Chapters 6 and 15 of the CESSAR and FSAR.
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Evaluation The root cause of this deficiency is attributable to CE's failure to provide the Hysteresis setpoint value in their Setpoint Document (Bechtel log N001-1.01-413-14).
The potential impact of this deficiency on the safe operation of PVNGS was evaluated by CE (See CE letter V-CE-32234, April 10, 1985, MIC 242342) based on a review of the limiting feed and steam line break events considered in PVNGS FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 (through Amendment 14).
The evaluation assumed that the value for the hysteresis (reset) setpoint could have been zero, thereby allowing flow to an isolated steam generator to be reinititated when the differential pressure falls below the isola-tion setpoint. A small (zero) hysteresis value is not of concern in a feedwater line break event, since once the steam generator differenciti pressure reaches the isolation setpoint, it remains above the isolation setpoint for at least thirty minutes.
CE's reanalysis of the limiting mass and energy release events for FSAR Chapter 6 and the limiting Chapter 15 steam line breaks confirmed that the event consequences are not adversely impacted by a small hysteresis setpoint.
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Final Report DER 85-08 Page Two II.
Analysis of Safety Implications This deficiency constitutes the omission of information in a document required to have the system perform per the analysis presented in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.
However, based on CE's evaluation presented in Section II, this deficiency is not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21; since if left uncorrected, this condition vould not represent a safety-significant condition.
CE also reviewed all other non-AFAS Plant Protection System engineered safety features and actuators, and found all of them to have latching features (i.e., requires manual resetting), and therefore only a nomi-nal reset value is specified. These values are also documented in the CE Setpoint Document. Based on the above, it is concluded that this deficiency is an isolated case.
III. Corrective Action CE has transmitted the hysteresis setpoint information under CE letter V-CE-32169, dated March 29, 1985 MIC 241780, which is a new submittal of VP N001-1.01-413.
Setpoint adjustment and calibration was completed in Units 1, 2, and 3 under DCPs 10J 2SJ, 3SJ-SB-819, respectively.
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