ML20127E281

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-413/85-04.Corrective Actions:Responsibility for Complying W/Tech Spec 3.7.11 Re Fire Penetrations Reassigned to Security Personnel

ML20127E281
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/28/1985
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20127E268	List: IR 05000413/1985004 ML20127E281
References
NUDOCS 8505200020
Download: ML20127E281 (2)

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- DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33189 CHARLOrFE, N.O. 28242 HAL H. TUCKER mernou mE."~'""._ M ***

ltEkcl$ 284 g9,85 47 Dr. J. Nelson Grace,- Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta,' Georgia 30323 Re: RII:PTB/SPB/MT 50-413/85-04

Dear Dr. . Grace:

Please find attached a response to Violation No. 413/85-04-02, as identified in the above referenced inspection report. Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in this inspection report to be proprietary.

Very truly yours,

(

Hal B. Tucker LTP/mj f -

-- Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

Robert Guild, Esq.

P. O.-Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Palmetto Alliance L 2135 Devine Street Columbia,. South Carolina 29205.

Mr. Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental. Study Group-854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 1

8505200020 850418 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G pop

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.O DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Violation:

Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires all penetration fire barriers protect-ing safety-related_ areas to be functional at all times. With one or more of the penetration fire barriers non-functional, a continuous fire watch is required to Inn established on at least one side of the affected penetration

.within one hour.- Fire doors in fire barriers are penetration fire barriers and must be maintained functional or a fire watch established.

-Contrary to the above, fire door S-400 was not identified as a non-functional fire penetration between the period of. January 29-30, 1985. This fire door was blocked open and compensatory measures were not established as required in Technical Specifications.

Response

1. Duke Power admits the violation.

2. Personnel did not identify the door as a fire door, therefore they did not inform the Shift Supervisor that a fire barrier was inoperable-and no compensatory fire watches were established. It should be noted that this door is between office areas and the control' room. Traffic through this door and adjoining areas is heavy and at no time was the plant in a degraded position as a result of this door being open. Even though a compensatory fire watch was not officially established personnel were in both adjoining areas while the door'was open, _ and any fire would have been quickly identified.

3. Personnel involved in this incident have been advised of the consequences of their actions.

4. After reviewing this incident, we feel that the procedures in place for complying with Technical Specification 3.7.11 may place an administrative burden on the Shift Supervisor. We are in th'e process of reassigning the responsibility for complying with Technical Specification 3.7.11 to our Security personnel. This reassignemnt should avoid further violations.

The Shif t supervisor will still be fully aware of any inoperable fire barriers. Until this reassignment occurs increased attention to the requirements for complying with Technical Specifications 3.7.11 will avoid further violations.

5. Reassignment of this responsibility will occur before July 1, 1985. Catawba will be in full compliance at this time.