ML20127C749
| ML20127C749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/30/1984 |
| From: | Spangler M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Case E, Denton A, Mattson R NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127C753 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-928 NUDOCS 8506220278 | |
| Download: ML20127C749 (60) | |
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January 30, 1984 Note to: Distribution List From:
M. B. Spangler
Subject:
HANDOUT MATERIALS RELATING TO SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM AND FINAL POLICY STATEMENT, ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING Enclosed are a set of VUGRAPHS of the following presentations to the ACRS Class-9 Subcommittee meeting on January 27, 1984:
(1) " Aspects of Standardization in Severe Accident Policy", Gary Meyer, NRR/DL (2) "The Applica' tion of the Reliability Research Program to the Proposed Safety Assurance Program", Carl Johnson, RES/DRA/RRBR (3) " Current Information Bearing on the Need for Generic Design Changes Appendix "X", Severe Accident Program)g Nuclear Power Plants" (Proposed or Further Regulatory Changes Affectin
, Miller Spangler, NRR/DSI (4) "Public Coments: An Overview", Section IV-B, Draft NUREG-1070; Severe Accident Program, James Henry, RES/DRA/RABR (5) " Interrelationship of NRC's Policy on Safety Goals and Pol.fcy on Severe Accidents", Jerry D. Griffith, Director, Office of Nuclear Power Systsns, Office of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Also enclosed is a copy of the technical issues paper by James Han of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research on " Hydrogen Production In Vessel".
This was presented at the January 11, 1984 meeting of the ACRS Class-9 Subcommittee meeting but was unavailable at the time of the prior distribution of handout materials on January 20, 1984.
Yk-Miller B. Spangler, Special Assistant for Policy Development Division of Systems Integration
Enclosures:
As stated Fo / A-N-%8 8506220278 850314 4 [gp D PDR FOIA SHOLLY84-928 PDR 1
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DISTRIBUTION LIST H. Denton W. Minners
- E. Case G. Sege' R. Mattson J. Rosenthal R. Bernero B. Sheron T. Speis L. G. Hulman F. Rowsome R. Barrett Z. Rosztoczy W. Butler D. Muller
.. M. Silbergerg J. Henry
.J. Malaro F. Miraglia M. Ernst R. W. Houston L. Rubenstein C. Heltenes E. Jordan D. Effenhut H. Thompson R. Vollmer
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D. Ross, Jr.
G..Arlotto
- 0. Bassett W. Shields J. Funches A. Thadani C. Grimes G. Meyer C. Thdmas J. Han J. Larkins
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R. Wright B. Burson C. Tinkler J. Milhoan R. Baer
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HANDOUT MATERIALS PRESENTED BY THE NRC STAFF AND U.S. D.O.E. AT THE ACRS CLASS-9 SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON " SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM AND FINAL POLICY STATEMENT" JANUARY 27, 1 984
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ASPECTS OF STANDARDIZATION IN SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY A PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS-9 ACCIDENTS, JANUARY 27, 1984 Gary Meyer Division of Licensing
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission es
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l-Meget PROPOSED COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON SEVERE ACCIDENTS AND REL4TED VIEWS ON NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION APRIL 1983 0
SECTION VI - STANDARDIZATION POLICY MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING APPLICATIONS USE IN CP APPLICATIONS PERIOD OF APPROVAL RULEMAKING t
SECTION X - IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR SEVERE
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ACCIDENT POLICY CONDITIONS FOR STANDARD DESIGNS FOR REFERENCE IN FUTURE CP APPLICATIONS INTERIM USE OF STANDARD DESIGN APPROVALS SPECIFIED
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CURRENT STANDARDIZATION POLICY e
COMMISSION POLICY PUBLISHED AUGUST.1978 e
FOUR OPTIONS PROVIDED (1)
REFERENCE SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTEXT CP/0L APPLICATIONS STAFF APPROVAL TO DESIGNER PDA/FDA (2)
DUPLICATE PLANT A NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR PLANTS OF SAME DESIGN.AT DIFFERENT SITES PDDA/FDDA (3)
MANUFACTURING LICENSE IDENTICAL PLANTS TO BE MANUFACTURED AT ONE LOCATION AND MOVED TO ANOTHER
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REPLICATE PLANT USE OF SAME DESIGN AS ONE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY THE STAFF es er m
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10 CFR 50, APP. M - MANUFACTURING LICENSE e
10 CFR 50, APP N - DUPLICATE PLANT l
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- PRELIMINARY OR FINAL DESIGN
- 10 CFR 50.3I4 REFERENCED FOR TECHNICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
- APPROVAL USED IN STAFF AND ACRS CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS REFERENCING THE DESIGN
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EXPERIEllCE 0!! STAtlDARD DESIGN APPROVAL CAN BE GENERALIZED CONDITIONS FOR DESIGN APPROVAL IDENTIFI'ED e
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FINAL DESIGN CERTIFICATION (FDC)
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PDA - NOT SPECIFIED IN SAPS e
FDA - NOT SPECIFIED IN SAPS e
FINAL STAFF APPROVAL - SIX ELEMENTS SPECIFIED e
FDC - RULE MAKING COMPLETE USE"IN CP'APPLICATidNS e
PDA - CP APPLICATION CAN REFERENCE,'
PRA REVIEN
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FDA - SAME AS PDA e
FINAL STAFF APPROVAL - CP COULD BE ISSUED e
FDC - REQUIRED AS END PRODUCT FOR ALL PDA/FDAs, CP's/0L's ISSUED ON THE BASIS OF A " FINAL
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STAFF APPROVAL" ONLY NOULD BE SUBJECT TO BACKFIT UNDER EXISTING REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
N THE APPLICATION OF THE RELIABILITY RESEARCH
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PROGRAM TO THE PROPOSED SAFETY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DRAFT NUREG-1070 SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM A PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS-9 ACCIDENTS, JANUARY 27, 1984 CARL JOHNSON DIVISION OF RISK ANALYSES OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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APPLY TO OPERATING PLANTS AND NEW STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS 1
0 NRR USER'S NEED RADC STUDY KSC STUDY 9
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ASSURE THAT SAFETY SYSTEMS WORK WHEN CHALLENGED e
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ASSURE RELIABILITY OBJECTIVES ARE MET FOR LWR SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 4
PREVENT DEGRADATION OF THAT RELIABILITY DURING OPERATION /
MAINTENANCE
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EXAMPLES OF RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS 1
RELIABILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE ASSURANCE DESIGN:
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PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE PROPERLY SPECIFIED.
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DESIGN IS ADEQUATE TO SPECIFICATIONS.
X 3.
DESIGN ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH l
DESIGN PROCEDURES.
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SPECIFICATION OF THE QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION.
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SPECIFICATION 0F ACCEPTANCE TESTING CRITERIA.
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EXAMPLES OF RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS (CONTINUED)
RELIABILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE ASSURANCE MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION:
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ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORD WITH PROCEDURES.
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IMPROPERLY MANUFACTURED
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X 3.
INSTALLATION IS CORRECT.
X 11.
PERFORMANCE OF ACCEPTANCE TESTING.
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EXAMPLES OF RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS (CONTINUED)
RELIABILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE ASSURANCE SAFETY ANALYSIS: 1.
SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND CORRECTED FOR VULNERABILITY TO COMMON-CAUSE FAILURES.
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SURVEILLANCE TESTING INTERVALS AND LCOs e
ARE PROPERLY SPECIFIED.
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RELIABILITY QUALITY
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OPERATION:
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SYSTEMS MEET AVAILABILITY STANDARDS 1
DURING PLANT LIFETIME.
X 2.
SYSTEMS ARE PROPERLY MAINTAINED (PRE-VENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE).
X X
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SYSTEMS ARE PROPERLY CONFIGURED TO SUPPORT THEIR FUNCTION.
X 1
X 11.
SYSTEMS ARE PROPERLY OPERATED.
5.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE STAFF IS PROPERLY TRAINED.
X i
6.
MEASURES TO CONTROL SPECIAL PROCESSES (WELDING, ETC.)
X 7.
MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROLS ARE ADEQUATE TO ACCOMPLISH THE AB0VE.
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FULLY UTILIZE EXISTING NRC REQUIREMENTS i
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OTHER INDUSTRIES 0
INTEGPATE RELIABILITY PROGRAM WITH EXISTING REQUIREMENTS 1
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SCREEN RELIABILITY PROGRAM ELEMENTSTROMVARIOUS SOURCES 1
INCLUDING OTHER INDUSTRIES AND COMPARE HITH LWR PRACTICES AND REGULATIONS 0
DEVELOP RELIABILITY PROGRAM FOR LWRs IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY AND THE TECHNICAL COMMUNITY 8
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TRIAL USE 0
RECOMMEND RELIABILITY PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATON BY IE AND NRR.
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's SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM. DRAFT NUREG-1070 CONTENT AND PHILOSOPHY OF APPENDIX "X" INFORMATION BEARING ON THE NEED FOR GENERIC DESIGN CHANGES OR FURTHER REGULATORY C'lANGES AFFECTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS A PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS-9 ACCIDENTS, JANUARY 27, 1984 Miller B. Spangler Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission e.
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3 SPANGLER SLIDE 1 DERIVATION AND EVOLUTION OF APPENDIX "X" I.
DERIVATION FROM ACRS CLASS-9 SUBCOMMITTEE COMMENT ')N STATEMENTS
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IN SECTION IV-F-1 0F DRAFT NUREG-1070 (P. 31)
ISSUE - SHOULD THERE BE ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS TO REQUIRE MORE e
CAPABILITY TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS IN OPERATING PLANTS AND PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION?
INSIGHTS FROM SARP RESULTS - RESULTS TO DATE HAVE NOT YET e
PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT NEW INSIGHTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FURTHER REGULATORY CHANGES NOR HAVE THEY YET SHOWN A CLEAR NEED TO MAKE FURTHER DESIGN CHANGES.
II.
APPENDIX "X" BROADENS THE QUESTION OF WHAT INSIGHTS ARE AVAILABLE FROM CURRENT INFORMATION OF RELEVANCE TO CERTAIN ISSUES IN SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT A.
MORE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE TO BE EXAMINED: TMI ACTION j
PLAN; PL ANT-SPECIFIC PRAs; SPECIAL STUDIES OF PLANTS WITH
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UNIQUE H. ANT / SITE CHARACTERISTICS; IE BULLETINS; AE00 REPORTS; l
SARP PROJECTS B.
TYPES OF CHANGES HISTORICALLY RESULTING FROM NEW SAFETY INFORMATION GENERIC jfS PLANT-SPECIFIC CHANGES e
PROCEDURAL V_S, DESIGN CHANGES S
e MINOR _V_S MAJOR CHANGES (COST OF BACXFITTING)
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e RULE CHANGES (SEE P. 28)
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1 SPANGLER SLIDE 2 OUTLINE OF APPENDIX "X" CURRENT INFORMATION BEARING ON THE NEED FOR GENERIC DESIGN CHANGES OR FURTHER REGULATORY CHANGES AFFECTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS I.
INTRODUCTION: 'THE MEED FOR FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY DEVELOPMENT II.
TECHNOLOGICAL MATURATION: THE OUTLOOK FOR SURPRISING DEVELOPMENTS III.
MODIFICATIONS DUE TO THE TMI ACTION PLAN IV.
MODIFICATIONS FROM PLANT-SPECIFIC PRAs V.
CHANGES RESULTING FROM UNIQUE PLANT / SITE CHARACTERISTICS (INDIAN POINT, ZION, LIMERICK, BIG ROCK POINT)
VI.
. MODIFICATIONS DUE TO CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING REACTOR EXPERIENCE A.
I&E BULLETINS B.
AEOD REPORTS C.
UTILITY QA AND STAFF REVIEWS i
VII.
GENERIC INSIGHTS FROM SARP PROJECTS A.
TOO EARLY FOR DESIGN-SPECIFIC JUDGMENTS ON SOURCE TERMS:
CONTAINMENT DESIGN AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES WILL BE IMPORTANT B.
PRELIMINARY ACCIDENT SEQUENCE INSIGHTS (FROM PRA REFERENCE DOCUMENT AND ASEP)
C.
PRELIMINARY RISK INSIGHTS (FROM PRA REFERENCE DOCUMENT AND SARRP)
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS n
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SPANGLER 3
INFORMATION NEEDS OF FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY DEVELOPMEN'T I.
MAJOR PURPOSES OF SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY STATEMENT e TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY OF REACTOR REGULATION e TO ASSURE THAT SEVERE ACCIDENT SAFETY ISSUES ARE IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER e TO ASSURE THAT OPERATION OF NUCLEAR PLANTS WILL NOT RESULT IN UNDUE RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY II.
POLICY STATEMENT SERVES DIFFERENT PURPOSES FOR DIFFERENT CLASSES OF REACTORS e ors -- NOTHING YET TO BE REQUIRED e NEW OLs -- SAME AS ors; COMMISSION RESERVES FOR ITSELF FUTURE DECISIONS e NEW DESIGNS -- WHAT ARE THE. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE?
III.
THE PENALTIES AND BENEFITS OF EARLIER V_S. LATER DEVELOPMENT OF SEVERE S
ACCIDENT POLICY: SENDING THE "RIGHT" SIGNALS TO PA'1 TIES OF INTEREST A.
WILL NEW SAFETY INFORMATION OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS RESULT IN:
e PRINCIPALLY A CONFIRMATION OF PRESENT SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS, BUT WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION
(
OF UNCERTAINTY IN RISK ASSESSMENT?
s A NUMBER OF SURPRISES LEADING TO REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR (I.E.,
COSTLY) CHANGES IN PLANT DESIGN FOR ANY NEW PLANTS THAT MIGHT BE ORDERED IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS?
e A NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS FOR MINOR CHANGES IN PLANT DESIGN FOR ANY NEW PLANTS THAT MIGHT BE ORDERED IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS?
8.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS REFLECTING ON PENALTIES AND BENEFITS OF EARLIER VS LATER POLICY DEVELOPMENT e EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES OF VENDORS WHO ARE ALREADY PROCEEDING TO DEVELOP NEW STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS WITH A. VIEW TO NRC CERTIFICATION FOR FORWARD REFERENCEABILITY o EFFICIENT PLANT DESIGN RE SAFETY-COST TRADEOFF CRITERION e PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN NRC TREATMENT OF SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES n
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SPANGLER SLIDE 4>
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STATUS OF TMI ACTION PLAN (AS OF '9/1/83) 8 I.
SUMMARY
OF MUREG-0737-ACTION ITEMS e 132 ACTION ITEMS APPROVED (AVERAGE OF 90/ PLANT) e 6471 SEPARATE ACTION ITEMS e 5300 ACTION ITEMS IMPLEMENTED (82%)
II. BREAK 0UT OF ACTION ITEMS. BY TYPE e 39 EQUIPMENT,BACKFIT ITEMS; 18 IMPLEMENTED e 31 PROCEDURAL CHANGES; 25 IMPLEMENTED i y REQUIRED ANALYSES OR REPORTS e132TOTALACTIONITEMS(SEEABOVE)
III. REMAINING ITEMS COMPLETION TARGET
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e ALL BUT A FEW ITEMS IN-PLACE BY FY 1986 IV. ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE-CHANGES V.
ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF THE CHANGES r
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SPANGLER SLIDE 5 POTENTIAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR APPENDIX "X" e
OPERATING REACTORS LICENSING ACTIONS SU! WARY (NUREG-0748) e IE BULLETINS (EIGHT IN 1983)
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e IE INFORMATION NOTICES (84 IN 1983) e NRR GENERIC LETTERS (41 IN 1983) e AEOD - LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS ( + 4000/YR).
e AE00 - CASE STUDIES (SEVERAL/YR) e AEOD - ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS (30 IN 1983) e AEOD - TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORTS (41 IN 1983) e AEOD - POWER REACTOR EVENTS (6/YR).
e REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES (12/YR) k e
NRC MONTHLY STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS (BEVILL REPORT)
MISCE'LLANEOUS NUREGs; CASE-RELATED HEARING TESTIMONIES, TRANSCRIPTS, ETC; e
PLANT-SPECIFIC PRAs e
FOREIGN EVENT INFORMATION i
INP0/MSACINFORMATION l
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~- u PUBLIC COMMENTS: AN OVERVIEW DRAFT NUREG-1070 SECTION V-B SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM A PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS-9 ACCIDENTS, JANUARY 27, 1984 JAMES HENRY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEA7.CH US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0r, m
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NUREG 1070 - SECTION V-B PUBLIC COMMENTS:
AN OVERVIEll 1.
INTRODUCTION PROPOSED SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY STATEMENT PUBLISHED APRIL 13,1983 j
e 26 LETTERS OF COMMENT IN PDR UNDER PR PART 50 - 43 FR 16014 e
9 LETTERS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EROUPS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS 14 LETTERS FROM NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS 3 LETTERS FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES l
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REPRESENTATIVE C0fflENTS e
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS PRA UNRELIABLE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN POLICY STATEf1ENT AND SAFETY G0ALS BIAS IN UTILITY'S PRA POLICY STATEMENT EXCLUDES PUBLIC PARTICIPATION e
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY l
RECONSIDER USE OF EXISTING ENSEMBLE OF PRAs MEETING CP RULE CONFLICTS WITH PREPARATION <0F PRA HOLD MEETINGS TO DISCUSS ISSUES NEED MORE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN FACTORS ELIMINATE " FINAL" FROM " FINAL DESIGN INFORMATION" e
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES CONFLICTOFINTERESTINNRChDESIGNINGCllANGES
' ACCEPTABLE CRITERIA RELATED TO BACKFITTING ESSENTIAL CONCERN ABOUT APPARENT OPEN-ENDEDNESS OF PROCESS
J. Henett 3.
3.
STAFF RESPONSES TO K Y ISSUES e
SCOPE OF SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES LARGEST SOURCE TERMS l
MOST IMPORTANT FROM PUBLIC HELATH AND SAFETY PERSPECTIVE DBA COMBINED WITH MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND OPERATOR ERRORS l
L e
SAFETY-COST TRADEOFF CRITERION N0 ONE FORMULA RELATING RISK REDUCTION TO MONETARY VALUE WILL BE TAKEN AS DEFINITIVE RANGE AND VARIETY OF CONVERSION FACTORS ARE SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY e
APPROPRIATE USES OF PRA PRA SUPPLEMENTS DETERMINISTIC ENGINEERING ANALYSIS PRA PROVIDES GENERIC INSIGHTS FOR SAFETY OF EXISTING PLANTS o
PROGRAM FOR REDUCING UNCERTAINTY RESEARCH CAN NARROW BUT CANNOT ELIMINATE UNCERTAINTY SCREENING CRITERIA CAN NARROW SPECTRUM 0F OPTIONS REGULATORY ANALYSIS DEVELOPS Tile REGULATORY OPTIONS i
J,Henr(L s{.,
e ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION NRC WILL CONSULT WITH ACRS, INDUSTRY., NATIONAL LABORATORY EXPERTS, AND OTilER INTERESTED MEMBERS OF PUBLIC ON LIST OF P0TENTIAL ALTERNATIVE IMPROVEMENTS FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT SAFETY NO PUBLIC MEETINGS DEV0TED TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS PLANNED DESIGN C!!ANGES AD0PTED TilROUGH RULEMAKING: WILL REQUEST PUBLIC COMMENTS i
AT PROPOSED RULE STAGE i
DESIGN CHANGES BACKFITTED BY AMENDMENTS OF CP OR OL:
WILL PROVIDE i
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING e
OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY PUBLIC.
CONFLICT BETWEEN POLICY STATEMENT AND SAFETY G0ALS:
SEVERE ACCIDENT l
DECISIONS FULLY CONGRUENT WITH SAFETY G0AL POLICY l
CONTROL 0F PRA ABUSE:
SAFETY ASSURANCE PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE FOR l
INDEPENDENT, TilIRD-PARTY REVIEW l
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COMMENTERS' ADV0CATEi) CHANGES IN APPROACllES o
3-STEP PROCESS REPLACED BY STRONGLY DETERMINISTIC APPROACH i
PRA SUPPLEMENTS DETERMINISTIC ENGINEERING ANALYSIS SEPARATE PRA NOT CONDITION FOR APPROVAL 0F REFERENCE DESIGNS l
NEW CONDITION:
SAFETY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
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POLICV ON SAFETY GOALS AND POLICV ON SEVERE ACCIDENTS i
PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS A PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLASS-9 ACCIDENTS, JANUARY 27, 1 984 JERRY D. GRIFFITH ll l
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY l
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY l
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Summary of DOE Presentation
==
Introduction:==
The NRC's. policies on safety goals and severe accidents are interrelated, but we believe problems are emerging with regard to implementing them in a consistent and compatible manner. The thrust of my remarks here today is that, given the apparent divergences in these evolving NRC policies, the NRC should consider taking steps to assure that the Policy on Severe Accidents
. continues to be developed in a manner compatible with an overall policy on
~
safety goals. My main purpose in being here is to offer some suggestions, which I believe could improve the safety goal evaluation and implementation process to facilitate development of this compatibility between the safety goal and severe accident policies.
My initial remarks will briefly summarize DOE studies that support the thrust of the suggested safety goal modificat' ions. This will be followed by a presentation of the suggested modifications and a discussion of expected benefits.
Thrust of Initial Remarks:
DOE does not believe the present NRC policy on safety goals adequately addresses the funiamental shortcomings associat'ed with the stability and manageability of the regulatory process that were the original impetus for the developnent of safety goals.
Surmary Discussion of Suggested Modifications:
DOE's suggested modifications woulc:
Specify a probability target for loss of core protective function.
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2 Specify additional minimum containment and emergency preparedness 2.
features consistent with qualitative and quantitative goals.
For this design and for a characteristic site, evaluate the marginal 3.
cost per unit of risk reduction (i.e., $/MR) as related to further reductions in the probability of loss of core protective function.
Add additional containment and emergency preparedness mitigation 4.
features only if cost per unit of risk reduction is less than or equal to that obtained in step three above.
It is believed that these suggested modifications could evolve during the 2-year evaluation period, which NRC has proposed to implement safety goals.
The following benefits can be argued for the suggested modifications:
Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide cost optimal design decisions as related to 1.
plant risk.
The proposed approach reduces uncertainty in regulatory decisions by 2.
providing a stable way of dealing with the relative large uncertainties Since associated with consequences of low probability accidents.
postulated consequences sipilarly affect all regulatory design decisions, the marginal costs of risk reduction associated with l
uncertain consequences do not destabilize the design optimization process.
A probability target is used only in the area where data exists and where l
3.
j definition and monitoring of operational requirements is an important l
aspect of plant safety (1.'e., step 1).
)
e Q
s, 3
Step 2 provides a minimum specified defense in-depth, which i:
4.
relatively easily connected to existing designs and regulatory practices.
The approach provides the following benefits for national policymakers:
1.
The national policy expressed in the safety goals thus established can be defended as a responsible allocation of national resources since the allocation is optimized for the nuclear system at a level of cost consistent with but very conservative compared to other national allocations.
There would be improved manageability of the regulatory apparatus and 2.
less impetus for intervention as day-to-day regulatory decisions would be largely associated with optimization processes as opposed to determination of level of risk.
There would be both improvement in safety and accountability to the 3.
public as emphasis shifted in the regulatory process to d:finition and monitoring of operational requirements and experience as they relate to obtaining design and regulatory goals.
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NINE INTERRELATED. COMPONENTS OF SEVERE CORE ACCIDENT POLICY
- 1. POLICY ON SAFETY GOALS
- 2. USE OF PRA IN SEVERE ACCIDENT DECISIONMAKING l
l
- 3. LESSONS LEARNED FROM TM1
- 4. STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
,s. STANDARDIZATION POLICY
- 6. FURTHER RESEARCH ON SEVERE ACCIDENTS
- 7. TREATMENT OF SEVERE ACCIDENT 8 IN ONGOING LICENSING PROCEEDINGS y
)
- 8. PRESENT VIEWS ON OTHER SAFETY ISSUES AND EFFORTS.IN PROGRESS
- 9. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY 1
l l
i ur.
COAUG"3 I
. NEC2OOOt.04
.I I
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LACK OF HIGH COSTS i
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INCREASING VISIBILITY OF THE PROBLEM l
l SEISMIC EXAMPLh:
e NUCLEAR PIPING INSTALLATION COSTS 2-3 TIMES i
FOSSIL
=,
J e OVERSTRE$ SING OF PIPING IN NORMAL OPERATION
- RESTRAINTS PULLED OUT OF WALLS e ANALYTICAL " PAPER SAFETY" TRADED FOR l
EXTENSIVE ENGINEERING BASE OF KNOWLEDGE l
l
........o.
i i
I i
s u = =u- -
i NE*2050t.06 INCREASING VISIBILITY OF THE PROBLEM RISK BENEFIT QF NRC TORNADO GENERATED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS CONCRETE THICKNESS INCREASE FROM 6-10 e
INCHES = $1490 t
CONCRETE THICKNESS INCREASE FROM 10-20 e
INCHES = $96 BASIS:
$2 MILLION PER LIFE 40 YEAR PLANT LIFE E
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O WA'SH 1400 RISK COMPARISON 10 Aa,
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Figure 2
COMPARISON OF RESIDUAL RISK s
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teUMBER OF FATALmES Figure 3 69 o
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i NRC REVISED l
BAFETY GOAL POLICY STATEMENT l
l LACK OF EMPHASIS ON SYSTEM SAFETY APPROACH e
NUMERIC PROBABILITY GOAL SPECIFIED FOR CORE l
MELT AS OPPOSED TO LOSS OF CORE PROTECTIVE
[,
FUNCTION RISK TO AN AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL IN THE VICINITY OF e
A NUCLEAR POWERPLANT IS SPECIFIED TOO LOW TO j
l ELIMINATE UNDESIRABLE REGULATORY DISTORTIONS e
n692856v.07 I
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1 POPULATION RISK DISTRIBUTION FOR DAM FAILURES l'
I a
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i 10-1 Average Probability of g 10-2 Accidential Death From g
All Causes 5
l 10-3 J
-_______L-___
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10
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10-5 I
t 4 10-6
~
10-7
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4 10 10 8
8 10 7
10 10 4
5 106 10 2
3 10 10 1
10 10 10
~
Number of Most Highly Exised Population
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1 Economical, Rellable, Safe, Power I
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Core Continrnent b erge m Normal and Plant Integrity Preparedness Operation Protection
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ThMJL.JO^L.J Activtry Characteristice Activtty Charseteristics P:
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COST OPTIMAL / CONSEQUENCE l
INDEPENDENT SAFETY GOAL I
l PREVENT LOSS OF CORE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION TO l
1.
TARGET OF $ 1 X 10-4 SPECIFY MINIMUM CONTAINMENT AND EMERGENCY PRE 2.
FEATURES FOR A CHARACTERISTIC SITE, EVALUATE THE MARGINAL COST PER UNIT OF RISK REDUCTION FOR THE ABOVE DES l
e 3.
TO FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE PROBABILITY OF LOS CORE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION ADD ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT AND EMERGENCY PRE l
- 4. MITIGATION FEATURES IF COST PER UNIT OF RISK RED
< TO THAT OBTAINED IN STEP THREE ABOVE.
SET MINIMUM SITING REQUIREMENTS, WHICH MAY CHANGE AS 5.
SOURCE TERM UNCERTAINITIES ARE RESOLVED.
NE92856t.03 1
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REDUCED UNCERTAINITY IN REGULATORY DECISIONS l!
i DAY TO DAY REGULATORY DECISIONS ARE NOT j
l e
EXTENDED INTO LOW PROBABILITY HIGHLY t
l UNCERTAIN AREAS.
i l
e MARGINAL COST PER UNIT OF RISK REDUCTION l
ASSOCIATED WITH EACH RULE IS SIMILARLY AFFECTED BY UNCERTAIN CONSEQUENCES.
THEREFORE, COST BENEFIT DECISIONS ARE l
STABILIZED WITH REGARD TO UNCERTAIN CONSEQUENCES.
j ne92856t.10 I
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. nasz szt.ti SIMPLIFIED IMPLEMENTATION WELL CONNECTED TO PAST REGULATORY PRACTICES e
EXISTING REGULATORY PRACTICES CAN FIT UNDER TOP-LEVEL UMBRELLA t
EVOLUTION IN QUANTIFICATION GREATER QUANTIFICATION FIRST IN AREA WHERE e
MOST EASILY DONE AND WHERE INVESTMENT AND INSURANCE NEEDS FOR QUANTIFICATION ARE GREATEST DESIGN OPTIMlZATION IS INDEPENDENT OF UNCERTAIN e
CONSEQUENCES i
DESIGN OPTIMlZATION RULES AND SITING RULES CAN e
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l IMPROVED REGULATORY STABILITY l
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MORE DEFENSIBLE TOP-LEVEL REGULATORY POSTURE j
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- DEFENSIBLE NATIONAL POLICY OF RESOURCE i
ALLOCATION
- MORE MANAGEABLE AND MEASURABLE (ACCOUNTABLE) REGULATORY SYSTEM i
I I.
LESS IMPETUS FOR INTERVENTION e
- LESS CONTENTIOUS DAY TO DAY REGULATORY DECISIONS
- REGULATORY DECISIONS LARGELY ASSOCIATED l
WITH OPTIMlZATION PROCESSES AS OPPOSED TO DETERMINATION OF LEVEL OF RISK l
l
/
- GREATER PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF HOW SAFETY IS j
BEING PROVIDED AND TO WHAT EXTENT REQUIRE-l MENTS ARE BEING ACHIEVED F
i ne92856t.14 i
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IMPROVED SAFETY R&D l@
COST EFFECTIVENESS j.
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LESS EMPHASIS ON LOW PROBABILITY e
~(OR IMPOSSIBLE) PHENOMENA
..i
~I-MORE EMPHASIS ON THE ABILITY TO e
i' DEFINE, MONITOR, MAINTAIN, AND IMPROVE THE ASSUMED AND REGULATED LEVELS OF PROTECTION IN A COST EFFECTIVE MANNER I
f n492856t.15 i
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MORE DEFENSIBLE i.
NATIONAL POLICY e RESPONSIBLE ALLOCATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES TO OBTAIN COST EFFECTIVE SAFETY e MORE STRUCTURED AND MEASURABLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE NRC e MORE ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PUBLIC i
'8 ne92856t.12 I
=
- I 8
t SUPPLEMENTAL HANDOUT PRESENTED BY J. HAN, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR RESEARCH
~
AT THE ACRS CLASS-9 SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON " SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM AND FINAL POLICY STATEMENT" JANUARY 11, 1984
.ew 9
HYDROGEN PRODUCTIm IN VESSEL
- A PasuMINEY E/CONIPACTORS P.ESPONSE To IDCDR PResenciaNs AT IWtPet's FEUtY, WEST VIRGINIA Novenst 29 - DECDSER 1,1983 C0NTRI M M S J. HAN, E -RES
- 6. M I!O, E -RES R. EAPETT, E-M
~J.lmG,E-M
~
C. ALLISDN, !!E. (SGAP)
P. CYBULSKIS, BCL (PWR-MVD0 S. IGGE, ORNL GWR-MAROD JAE S N, E -RES l
ACRS SLlBC[miTTE Gi CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS MM E L%
i HAM I.
HYDROGEN PRODUCTim lll VESSFI DEFINITION: TO DETER 11E llE HYDROGEN GBBATION PATE AS A 0F TIfE Ifl A EACTOR VESSEL DURITE SEVERE ACCIDDITS.
~
mise & UKE: ORAllittlT [9DITE NO ETIRET SLRVIVABILIT/
6 4
o 68
H AN 2.
HYDROGENPRODUCTIONINVESSEL PRESENTATION OUTLIfE
- 1. SiffARY OF IDCOR APPRDACH
- 2. PRELIMINARY OMENTS ON IDCOR APPRDACH
- 3. PJ0 POSED RESOL M ION e
l L
HAR g,
HYDROEN PRDWCTION IN VESSEL
- 1. SLft%RY OF IDCDR AF990AG
- THIS Sat %RY ADDRESSES LDS PLDR1 WDR0 GEN P90 DUCTION:
ZR IN CORitM (PUE1/h0fh) + H O *2R0 + $
2 2
CORE ELTIE v
CORIlli ASST!E.TD ACQJillATE N CORE SUPPDRT PLEE(SP)
, D M 50 * *f P *
- V y
SP FAILS AT CORllM > USER IIFUT y
C[RIt!) ENTERS LDE PLBU1 9
STEAM PRODUCTION /HYDRGEN PfGUCTIM
- IIIDR CRE1EES MINIf1F10X1D12ATICH IN Las PLBE BEC#EE O LARE PAPJ10I SI2ES, RATE-LIMITED EACTION, SIET T1!E TD VESSEL FA
--,,,w,,-
[AN HVDROEN PRODUCTION IN VESSQ,
- 2. PRRIMINARY Cat 9fTS ON IDCOR APPROACH IDDELIfE OF HYDROGEN PRODUCTION IN REACTOR CORE IS GEERALLY e
VALID EXEPT T10SE ISSUES Gi BLOCKAGE tm.CT, BLOCKAGE R)RMATIGI, REL ELOCATIW, RCS SYSTEM EFECT IFON HYDROGEN PRG)UCTIW, #0 IULTI-DIffNSIONAL TEWAL-HYDRAULICS #0 RADIATION EAT TPANSFER.
t0DELIIG #0 PPB &BOLOGY ARE COSALLY SCUND FOR HYDROGEF e
PRODUCTION IN TE VESSEL LOWER PLEIF REGION.
IDEVER, (flCERTAINTIES EXIST IN THE FOLLOFIfE AREAS:
e h
PLElfi BEFORE LGER CORE SUPPORT PLATE FAILS ?
B. NHEN TE LGER CORE StPPCRT PLATE WILL FAIL 7 l
~
C. IDI EIT IS TE CDRIlPI ?
D. MiAT IS CORIlli PARTICLE SI2E DISTRIBLTION AFTER FPAGDITATION 7 O
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HYD00GDI PiEUCTION IN VESSEL
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( THIRD NRC/IDCOR fRGi.
- IDCOR I40 flRC SUJLD DEFIE IIRE FOR SElICTED SASA CALQH.ATI0tS
( EXCUJDING &!R PIMS WITH MARK I OR f%PK II NITP0reblERED C0tEAIIIBITS).
- IDCOR VERSUS NRC CALCULATIGS 90L1D E CTPARED.
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