ML20126M656
| ML20126M656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126M654 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8506200417 | |
| Download: ML20126M656 (3) | |
Text
'
o UNITED STATES
~g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
- E
<I wAswimo1rON, C. C. 20555
,/
a SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION R_ ELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA ELELIMIC COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND ATLANTIC CITY ELECIRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Introduction s
By submittals dated September 28, 1983 and supplemented November 21, 1984, Public Service Electric and Gas Company requested a change in the surveillance requirements in the Technical Specifications for the control room emergency air conditioninq system for Salem Unit 2.
The request i
involved reducing the positive p essure at which the control room is maintained during leak test from 1/4 inch water gauge (W.G.) to 1/8 inch W.G. relative to the outside atmosphere.
Evaluation and Sumary The value of 1/4 W.G. exceeds that which is currently required in the Standard Technical Specifications for control rooms (1/8 inch W.G.).
Therefore, the staff finds this request acceptable. However, review of the licensee's request indicted that an important Standard Technical Specification parameter -- namely, the pressurization flow rate -- had been omitted from the surveillance requirement. Analyses of radiation dose to control room operators following a LOCA perfonned in the SER and the licensee's response to NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, assume an unfiltered infiltration rate corresponding to a cressurization flow rate of 200 cubic feet per minute (CFM) at a relative pressure of 1/8 inch W.G.
The staff would use this value in the specification. However, the licensee indicated that the pressurization system is designed to deliver a maximum of 300 cfm of filtered air into the control room following an accident.
In addition, in discussions with the licensee, the licensee stated that the control room would be isolated upon detection of a high radiation signal and that pressurization would be result of operator actions, not an automatic function.
The licensee's logic was that if the outside air was contaminated, then bringing this air into the control room could result in unnecessary doses to the operator.
The staff agreed with the licensee, but indicated that the licensee's logic would be acceptable if:
M $&530 ey
' 1.
radiation detectors existed in both the control room and the outside air intakes which would allow the control room operators and health physics personnel to make a detemination as to whether to remain in an isolated mode, or to pressurize the control room; and 2.
the plant procedures should be revised to reflect consideration of the bases for determining when the control room should be pressurized.
In a letter dated November 21, 1984, the licensee verified the monitoring capability, and committed to revising the plant procedures for detemining when to pressurize the control room.
In a subsequent telephone conversation with the staff on February 21, 1985, licensee representatives.
i indicated their intent to include considerations of the monitors and air
~
handling equipment in the emergency procedure, and to provide health physics personnel with trafning related to design and operation of the air handling, equipment and radiation monitors to ensure adequate post-accident dose management.
With respect to the test flow rate, the operators would be provided with better protection using a pressurization flow rate of 326 cfm (which is filtered) than allowing contaminated air leak into the control room in an isolated mode.
Therefore, the staff finds:
1.
that testing of the control room at the 326 cfm designed flow rate is acceptable and the Technical Specifications should be modified accordingly; and 2.
that the control room emergency response of isolation first, then on the basis of available monitoring, then detemining whether pressurizing the control room would provide better operator protection under accident conditions is acceptable and meets the 7
intent of GDC 19.
The licensee's submittal of November 21, 1984 was made to verify that procedures were in place, and did not contain substantive changes to the original submittal dated September 28, 1983.
Environmental Consideration-i This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has l
previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no
3-significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(gibility criteria such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eli c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliarce with the i
Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
May 30,1985 Principal Contributors:
K. Dempsey T. Quay e
6 h W W fi
.