ML20126L771

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Forwards Rept of Nondisclosure of Safeguards Info for First Quarter 1985,per Public Law 96-295,Section 207(a)
ML20126L771
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/07/1985
From: Palladino N
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Bush G, Oneill T
HOUSE OF REP., SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
References
NUDOCS 8506200141
Download: ML20126L771 (6)


Text

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The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with the provisions of Section 207(a) of Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980, enclosed is the report of the nondisclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Consnission for the quarter er. ding March 31, 1985.

Sincerely,

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Nunzio J. Palla ino

Enclosure:

As stated .

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OFFICE OF THE June 7, 1985 CHAIRMAN The Honorable George H. W. Bush President of the United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the provisions of Section 207(a) of Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980, enclosed is the report of the nondisclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission for the quarter ending March 31, 1985.

Sincerely.

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h'.~..[- < y cr~ w Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman

Enclosure:

As stated

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON NONDISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS'INFORMATION

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Section 147 6f th'e Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,fpfobibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information. This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Informatidn. NRC's regulations implementing Sec. tion 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 517,13). The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.

Section 147 also requires that the NRC repoEt on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As requ' ired-by Section 147, the following items indicate the Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under;the provisions of the implementing regulations during the period January 1,1985 through March 31, 1985. ,

I. Type of Information Withheld In response to a Freedom of Information Act request,,information was withheld from public disclosure which identified details of the physical

- security system at the Beaver Valley Unit 2 nuclear power plant, such as the location of vital areas and vital equipnent, and the size, armament, response time and patrol schedule of the on-site guard force.

Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Tha public disclosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthcrized entry into the facility, and the s information could be of considerable value to a potential sabeteur in considering or plar.ning a sabotage attempt.

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Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material _ at' facilities but does leave information gaps. A line-by-line

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review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.

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4 II. Type of I'nformation Withheld

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In r?sponse to a Freedom of Information Act request, information was withheld from public disclosure which identified details of the physical security system at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, such as the location of vital areas and vital equipment, and the identity and location of emergency power sources.

Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facility, and the information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.

Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave information gaps. A line-by-line review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.

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ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE

1. Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and power reactors.

Specifically:

(1) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.

(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.

(iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress  !

alarms.

(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.

(v) Details of the on-site and off-site comunications systems that are used for security purposes.

(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.

(vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection,  ;

as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.

(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.

(ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and

training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.

l (x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of responding forces.

s (xi) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reser e forces.

(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces comitted to respond to safeguards emergencies.

2. Physical Protection in Transit Information not etherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.

Specifically:

(1) The composite transportation physical security plan.

(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.

(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)

(iii) Details of vehicle imobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems.

(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.

(v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone comunications.

(vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.

3. Inspections, Audits, and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.

Specifically:

Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that centain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

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