ML20126L159

Forwards Nonproprietary Version of Application to Amend License SNM-561 & Supporting Documentation,Allowing Addl Pu-239,Pu-238 & Np-237 as Check Sources & Activation Foils & Providing for Storage Only of 1,716 G U-235.W/o Application

ML20126L159
Person / Time
Site:	07000622
Issue date:	04/23/1981
From:	Taras D ARMY, DEPT. OF, HEADQUARTERS MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML20126L157	List: ML20126L153 ML20126L159
References
19032, NUDOCS 8106010385
Download: ML20126L159 (15)

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l DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY T. Grucci/seb/AUT0 VON 284-9340 y M (6A-HEA0 QUARTERS US ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND 5003 EISENHOWER AVENUE ALEXANDRIA. VA. 22333

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DRCS7-P/81-0012 23 April 1981 f,.,

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Director Nuclear Material Safety and Saf eguards 1

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Gentlemen:

vi co Forwarded is US Army Armament Research and Development Command application for amendment to Special Nuclear Material License Number SNM-561.

This request is for additional plutonium-239, plutonium-238, and neptunium-237 o%}as check sources and activation foils.g'; age only of 1716 grams of uranium-235 In addition, there is a request for n

fuel elemeE~.g sealed source of uranium / aluminum alloyclad in ale =ir.um.

Inc1 1 to application is yv Armament Research and Development Command's response to this office's queqtions ct. *c9:ning security and criticality or urani tm fuel rods in storage.

Please acknowledge receipt of correspondence oDn'c~ M 'ul ioE'. 209 Mail Reply

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2 Incl A.viIh J as Chief, Health Physics daf e:y Of fice CF:

EQDA (DASG-PSP-E) WASH DC 20310 Director, DARCOM Field Saf ety Activity, Charlestown, IN 47111 Commander, US Army Armament Research and Development Command, ATTU:

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SUBJECT:

Amendments to Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) License SiiM-561-f 3.

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US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Comand ATTN: ORCSF-E i

5001 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22333 1.

It is requested that the ARRACCCM Oover Site NRC License SNM-561 be amended by adding to the license'as follows:

y a.

Add 100 microcuries of Plutonium-239 (less than 2X10-3 grams).

b.

Add 5 microcuries of Plutonium-238 (less than 1X10-6 grams).

c.

Add 10 microcuries of Neptuniun (less than.015 grams).

d.

See also' para 4 below.

2.

The material will be used in research and ceveivpment work as well as

, in the health physics laboratory.

The items are in the tcmn of assorted calibration, neutron activation foils, or check sources to be used vor equipment setup and for research studies. An amount beyond that which n currently on hand is requested se additional unspecified sources may be obtained for this work, as necessary in the future, without requesting further amendments. The overage is the minimal amount considered necessary, and the current inventory is noted at Inclosure 1.

y 3.

The sources, scme of which are on hand, have previously been carried i

on a DA authorization, since individually, each is an exempt quantity.

Because this ccmmand possesses a valid special nuclear materials license e

and the total quantity of such materials on this installation could exceed the exempt quantity, this request is made to seek an amendment to SNM-561 y

to add the small amounts noted of these items to that license.

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It is also requested that the SNM-561 License be amended to pemit the

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storage only of U-235 for the CFX system for which a license application is being prepared by the IRT corporation of San Diego, CA on behalf of 19032 r

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1 C? CAR-SF 20 January 1981

SUBJECT:

Amendtrents to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License SNM-561 ARRADCOM, Gover Site. The request is for possession and storage of s'pecial nuclear material consisting cf 1716 grams of Uranium-235, 93.17'4 enriched for a total of 1842 grams of uranium. The form is MTR (Material Test Reacter) type fuel elements: sealed source of uranium / aluminum alloyclad in aluminum.

5.

This material is new being stored by the contractor at a cost to the gcvernment of $1,094 per month. However, the contractor has informed this ccirrand that he cannot retain the system or the V-235 until the license is approved. The new license. application will not be able to be processed and M

'; ? > approved in sufficient time before contractual arrangements and funds expire.

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Since the storage site is a secure building located in the heart of a military installation, it is anticipated that there should be no problems with the storage of this material in this location until the license is approved for its installation, operation, and use.

8.

This quantity of material is classified as being of moderate strategic significance. The protection described should be more than adequate for the protection of this material.

FOR THE COMMAS 0ER:

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• Ai ifff' 'Q DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY O'J., ' _,,. ;,, d US ARMY ARMAMENT RES;M.CH AND DIVELOSMENT COMMAND

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mm DRCAR-SFO 16 April 1981

SUBJECT:

Amencments to l'uclear Regulatory Cccaission License SiiM-561-ARRA0COM Cocmander US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Cent:and ATTil:

ORCSF-P/81-0012 5001 Eisenhower _ Avenue Alexandria, VA 22333 1.

This letter is provided to supply additional information on "913 exempt special nuclear material" as requested in casic letter and by fonecon with T. Grucci.

1 2.

As noted in 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1.b. beginning on line 6, there will be no 918 material placed in the, building with the U-235 system which is to be ac'okd to the subject license.

It'should also be noted that ARRADCOM, Dover Site, does not dow Asve, has never had, and does not now intend to acquire any 918 material.

3.

Point of contact for additional inf' orc #co fr. clarification is J. McCahill, AV 880-6821.

FOR THE COMMAtiDER:

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lbV 1 Inci RuBERT A. WALTERSCHI 0 as Chief, Safety Office b

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7.JsR-SP] (26 Feb '81) 1st Ind S;3 JECT: ;;end. Tents to' Nuclear Regulatcry Commission License SNM-561 - US Army Armament Research and Development Command EQ US Army Armament Research and Development Ccamand', Dover, NJ 07801 13 Mar 81 1

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HQ US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Ccmmand, ATT.'i:

DRCSF-P/81 -0012, 5C01 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333

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Para 1.b. refers to criticality of the system.

Inclosure i speaks to this

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issue and should adequately explain that the system cannot go critical. As descri-bed, any changes to the system ~1essens the chance for criticality.

Therefore, an exemption from the criticality alarm requirement is requested as per Regulatory L

Guide 8.12, position 1.

Since building 0030 is completely under the control of.

the RPO~ and staff, no one can enter without our people being present.

Even though other radioisotopes are present, this precludes the possibility of any other neutron emitters, including 'any 91 B material, being placed in the building.

It

- also precludes the possibility of any changes to the source configuration. The

.CPX system will be kept intact as it arrives from the company in the storage con-figuration until it is properly licensed and installed in the new facility now under construction.

Para 1.c. refers to entrance procedures and safety measures in regards' to c.

tnis system.

This building has been and is in use as a radioisotope storage area under centrol and jurisdiction of the RPO.

Only he and his staff are authorized A

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R3,:R-SFD S'J3d ECT : Amendments to.t:uclear Regulatory Commissica License SiiM-561 - US Army Armament Research and Development Command to gain access to the building. The staff has had training and experience in, en, and.with nuclear reactors during shutdown. and clean up cperations. As such, all personnel are thoroughly familiar with and accustomed to this type of caterial and the-safety measures and procedures in 10 CFR 19 and 20. Also, Army

- regulations which must be followed, are more stringent in this regard than l4RC regula tions.

All personne1 have been correctly entering this building with.its alarm system as described without incident.

It is expected that this procedure will continue upon the arrival of this one additional radicactive device.

2.- POC for additional information or clarification relative to the foregoing is J. McCahill, autovon 880-6821.-

FOR THE C0f@iAtIDER:=

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Chief, Safety Officeg

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/m m.M@J'.;& s DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY T. Grucci/seb/AUTOVON 224-934C Si,%G Z.,4:

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ORC 5F-P/81-0012 26 February 1981 l

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SUBJECT:

Amendments to Nuclear Regulatory Comission License SNM-561-- US Army

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Armament Research and Development Comand Commander l

US Army Armament Research and Develocment Ccamand ATTN: DRDAR-SF.

Dover, NJ 07801 l

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Subject application has been reviewed and the following comments are made:

Insure that a movement alarm system with emergency power capability is a.

installed on the Uranium-235 fuel element container in such a manner that neither

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the con.tainer with fuel elements nor the fuel elements alone may be removed without

, detection"iG 30 CFR 73.45(c)(1).

b.

IAW 10 CFR 70.24(a) insures that the Uranium-235 fuel elements and container will always be in,a safe configuration whfie*in storage to include a safe configuration l

with any neighboring neutron sources (Pu-Be), and under nu u t.~umstances allow dis-assembly while in storage such that an accidential criticality may oc.::m.

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Insure that S0P is changed and properly posted at the entrance to the storage facility with instructions to entering personnel regarding the movement alarm system ano the necessary safety measures described above IAW 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20.

2.

Upon receipt of your reply to comments, application will be forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Coranission. Your reply is expected to reach this office by 16 March 1981.

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3. PURPOSE 3.1 SYSTEM The special nuclear material requested by this license application is for use in a

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CFX Model 103, a subcritical assembly designed and constructed by IRT Corperation of San Diego, California.

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The CFX is a suberitical assembly of enriched uranium surrounding a pCf neutron source. The subcritical assembly serves as a multiplying medium tc enhance 52 the ef fect of the spontaneously fissioning Cf source. The system is designed such that the effective multiplication constant (k is 0 M O Ms is the maxircum k eff cif

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posgible; thus,.the multiplier can never become a critical assembly. An assernbly with'

- this vakue'of'k has a fission source multiplication of 100. The CFX has a thermal eff 2M

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flux multiplication of about 28 relative to the flux from an unmultiplied Cf seurce in a hydrogenous moderator. It is polyethylene moderu d ar d reflected. The fuel is enriched uranium aluminum alloy fully clad with aluminum, a type proven m ~any low-power reactors over the past 20 years. The system is optimally moderated with a hydrogen-to-uranium-atom ratic so that any change in the geometric arrangement of the fuel will result in a less raactive system, and fully reflected so that reactivity changes by additional reflections are precluded. The system has a positive expansion coef ficient and hence a negative temperature cocificient of reactivity. The asse qbly incorporates alumi..um-encased cadmium plates as safety rods to provide fer system.

shutdown, and is equipped with a backup safety system similar to that of a reactor. In addition to providing system shutdown by means of the safety rods, provision is made to remotely remove the source from the core, thus further reducing the flux level.

The system provides for activation analysis operations and neutron radiography operations. A complete description of the system and its operating characteristics is given in Section 6..

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3.2 GENERAL PROGRAM The system will be used as a tool for research and development in the area of nondestructive testing and inspection of armaments. General areas of interest inc!ude radiographic real time imaging, image enhancement, film evaluation, image transfer techniques, and investigation of neutron filtte systems for special purpose radioge'aphy.

lThis program wout i be under the direction of the Quaiity Assurance Directorate i

e Tvhich is responsible:for assuring the quality of armaments. This device would be an adjunct to the other inspection systems used by this organization. These include a 252 60 g

Cf based neutron radiography. system, a photon scattering gauge utilizing Co,and a 300 kev x-ray systert N

These : inspection programs involve the.use of radioactive materials and/or radiation producing machines and therefore come under the control of the U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), which has recently assumed responsibility for radiation protection.. Army regulations provide a system of controls from DARCOM down to local activities within the Army organization.

3.3 LOCATION Gr re:rlVITIES 4 7 These prograrns will be carried out at me U.L A r~/ Armament Research and Development Comrnand at its experimental facilities located at Picatinny maci.d near Dover, New Jersey.

i-3.4 DURATION Ot Tile PROGRAM t

This experimental program is expected to be ongoing for many years. This license is'reqaested to be for a rninimum of five (5) years.

3.5 EXEMPTIONS Because of the nature of this device ARRADCOM specifically requests exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 6

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9. SAFETY ANALYSIS

- 9.1 CRITICALITY 9.1.1 Installation and Fuel Loading

.The fuel loading of the CFX et the ARRADCOM facility will be governed by the experimental data taken when the assembly was initially loaded at IRT Corporation.

Calculations have been performed which parameterize the core, but the experimental values derived from measurements.on the actual assembly determined the exact fuel f 0.990.

The following items were determined loading necessary to reach a keff experimentally during the initial approach.

Reac&.i y worth of the fuel 1.

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Temperature expansie coefficient 3.

Reactivity eff ect of hydrogen change in the INx a-ap 4.

Safety rod worth 5.

Reflector worth 6.

Effect of materials in the activation analysis port.

All fuel-handling operations at the installation site which include initial un-packaging of fuel, initial inventery, and fuel loading will be done by IRT personnel.

Once loaded, there is no need for any operation requiring the manipulation of fuel plates.

The fuel will be loaded at ARRADCOM in precisely the same configuration as it was loaded at IRT, i.e., each fuel plate will be in the same location within the core. A map has been prepared designating fuel plate position. Sinec the configuratien of the systern is the same at ARRADCOM as at IRT, the fully loaded core will have the same reactisity as measured at IRT, and the loading operation ca'n be performed In a single step. To deterraine t' hat the system is as it was at IRT, flux measurements wi!! be made in the thermal neutron activation analysis nort with the safety rods at " full in" and at intermediate positions between " full in" and " full out" prior to total withdrawal of the rods. These measurements will be co: m, red with measurements made at IRT to assure s

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hat a k,ff of 0.990 wi!! not be exceeded with the rods fully withdrawn. These flux measurements will be made with the same detectors and associated equipment as used at ' tRT. In aedition to the comparison of flux measu.ements, power level information from the linear and logarithmic channels (these are also the same as used at IRT) will be compared to further establish that the system is identical. The safety rods will,not be fully withdrawn until it has been determined that the neutron flux is the same as that measu.ed at San Diego when the reactivity was 0.990.

The fuel platus are aluminum-clad, uranium-aluminum alloy, and contain approxi.

235 mately 10.3 grams of U per plate. An individual lot of fuel will consist of up to 16 s

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- full plates, which therefore are critically safe by. virtue of their mass. The plates are aqi not brittle by nature, and:therefore not subject to breakage if they are dropped. It is not credible that an accident could be associated with any fuel-handling operations.

There are no additional plates available, so inadvertent criticality during the on-site fue! loading program is also not considered credible.

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9.13 Cperational The CFX desiih is. based on a requirement to preclude any credibility of l

inadvertent criticality after the syster6 har hem 40?.ded_to,it,s design reactivity and put into routine opera' tion as a neutron radiography and activation 3alyss' faci!!Ly%This_

requiren ent means that no operating functions, such as safety rod manipulation, can cause criticality, and that all credible spontaneous non-operating changes result only in negative reactivity changes. For operational and personnel protection purposes, the CFX deugn incorporates a noinber of safety characteristics which are:

1.

Nuclear safety system to detect changes in power and reactivity.

2.

Optimum moderation - the system is loaded with an H/U ratio at the

- minimum of the critical mass versus H/U, and any composition changes increase the _235U mass required for criticality.

3.

Negative temperature coefficient.

Limited volume for activation samples.

5.

Firrnly obstruct.:d radiography port.

6.

' Highly re!lecteJ canfiguration.

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l'uly clad f oci or proven :.afety.

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t Our analysis of the CFX has shown that it is not possible for the systern to beco ne critical except by the addition of more fissile material. Recognizing this, we have designed access to the system such that a critical addition cannot be made other than through the activation analysis port. Administrative operatienal procedures at ARR ADCOM !!mit any fissile materials in the activation analysis samples.

Figure 9-1 shows the calculated effect of starting up the system with a critical loading and the transient eflects.- that follow.

This assumes that the period trip malfunctions and that the overpower trip is set 25 percent above full power. The total integrat'ed yield is negligible.

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INITIAL REACTIVITY - 0.1257 RCO REACTIVITY

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RT-06544 Figure 9-1. Transient power for a critical loading Figure 9-2 is another accident scenario involving the rapid addition of plutenium i

into un operating system.

Even with enough plutonium to cause the system to be critical the accident is negligible. Again the puiod trip would have caused a faster e

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' hut down of the system. The maximum keff reached was 0.9972. The power spike is l-approximately twice. the normal operating power and the time span is about 200

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6.l.1 Fuel Assembly Figure 6-3 shows a horizontal cross section of the CFX fuel assembly and

. Figure 6-2 shows a partial vertical cross section of this same area. The fuel assembly consists of the flux trap with the activation analysis and radiography ports, the fuel region, the reflector, and saf ety rods.

6.1.1.1 Flux Trao. The control portion of the CFX fuel assembly contains the flux trap which is a small cube of high-density polyethylene. A central vertical hole provides access for a central irradiation tube to the center of the flux trap. Adjacent 252 to the central penetration is a smaller hole which allows.for insertion of the Cf neutron source: there is a. shaped horizontal penetration into th center of the flux trap which constitutes the inner portion of the radiography port.

6.1.1.2 Fuel Region. The fuel consists of MTR type fuel plates. Each plate has a 235 ) sandwiched 0.020-inch-thick core of uranium-aluminum alloy (93% enriched in U

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o.n10-inch plates of aluminum. This type of fuel has been extensively used throughout the woric a6 m..-v low-power reactor f acilities. The inherent safety of the plates has been proven over the past 20 years et ournuno of up to 45% The burnup over the anticipated lifetime o! the CFX, even if operated continuously,is negligible.

Approximately 56% of the fuel is loaded in four rectangular boxes which are arranged as shown in Figure 6-3. The remaining fuel is loaded in a small region above and below the central flux trap. Fuel plates are separated by sheets of polyethylene such that the hydrogen-to-uranium ratio is ~425:1. This ratio was experimentally measured to be the optimum; consequently, any rearrangement of the fuel and polyethylene moderator is likely to result in a less-than-optimum ratio and a less.

reactive 'ysteris.

Each of the four major fuel containers have a pressure plate at one end to insure' that no voids exist between the fuel and the moderator plates.

The polyethylene in the moderator and flux trap will satisfactorily withstand the radiation doses accumulated for a period of at least ten years. Negligible radiation damage to the fuel will occur over this same period. Clad metallic fuel is used, since it provides for retention of fission products, particularly gaseous ones; hence, the system requires no special air monitoring or filtering.

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