ML20126K391

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Instrumentation & Control Sys.Info Requested by Nov 1981

ML20126K391
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	05/11/1981
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 8105140039
Download: ML20126K391 (5)

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Docket Nos. 50-440 50-441 ,

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Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson  % -

Vice President. Engineering ' 4 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating i Company l P.O. Box 5000  :

Cleveland Ohio 44101 j

Subject:

Request for Additional Infornation - Instrianentation and l Control Systess j In the performance of licensing reviews, the staff has identified  !

four concerns in regard to instetsnentation and control systems. Some  :

of these concerns have already been transmitted to you in IE Bulletins.  !

i However, explicit instructions were not given for making a submittal '

as part of the licensing review. The purpose of this letter is to state  ;

our instructions for a submittal in regard to these concerns. The infor-  !

mation that we require is identified in the acciosure. j l

We request that you provide the infonnation not later than November,1981.  !

If you require any clarification of this request, please contact M. D. l Houston, Project Manager (301) 492-8593.  ;

I Sincerely, j l

Robert L. Tedesco  !

Assistant Director for Licensing (

Division of Licensing l

Enclosure:

DISTRIBUTION bec: ACRS (16)

Request for Additional Docket File TERA Information hC cc w/enclosu m See next page DEisenhut/RPurple I "

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Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson Vice President, Engineering The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44'i Ol  !

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cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.  ;

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge l 1800 M Street, N. W. '

Washington, D. C. 20036 i Donald H. Hauser, Esq.  ;

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company i P. O. 30x 5000 j Cleveland, 0h,io 44101 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

Resident Inspector's Office Parmly at Center Road Perry, Ohio 44081

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4 3.06 Control' System Failures - - - , ,_  ;

j The analyses reported in Chapter 15 of the FSAR are intended to demonstrate tne aceouacy of safety systems in, mitigating anticipated operational j occurrences and cccidents.  :

Based on the conservative assumptions made in defining these design-basis l events and the detailed review of the analyses by the staff, it is likely that tney adequately bound the consecuences of single control system l failures. . . _

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To provide assurance that the design basis event analyses adequately  !

bound other more fundamental credible failures you are requested to l provide +5e following information:  !

l (1) Identify those control systems whose failure or malfunction could  ;

seriously impact plant safety.

(2)

Indicate which, if any, of the control systems identified in (1) receive power from common power sources. The power sources considered  !

should include all power sources whose failure or malfunction could lead to ' failure or malfunction of more than one control system and should extend to the effects of cascading power losses due to the failure of higher level distribution panels and load centers. 4 (3) Indicate which,1f any, of the control systems identified in (1)  ;

receive input signals from common sensors. The sensors considered t should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, common ,

hydraulic headers or impulse lines feeding pressure, temperature, j level or other signals to two or more control systems.

(4) Provide justif.ication thatinany(s' altaneous ralfunctions of the2) and (3l control system; identified or malfunctions of the applicable centon power source or sensor are bounded by the analyses in Chapter 15 and would not require action or response beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.

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420.04 Encineered Safetv Features (EST) Reset Controls (IE Bulletin EO-Of) ,

If safety eouipment does not remain in its emergency rode upon reset of an engineered safeguarcs actuation signal, system modificaticr.,  ;

design change or other corrective action should be planned to assure that protective action of the affected equipment is not comorm:ised  :

once tne associated actuation signal is reset. This issue was accressed [

in IE Bulletin 8D-06. IE Bulletin 80-06 recuired that reviews be  :

conducted to determine which, if any, safety functions might be ur,- l available after reset, and what changes could be implemented to correct i the problem. With minor modifications the wording of the original ,

Bulletin BD-06 is an appropriate basis for the current OL applicants [

. j to review their syste=s.

Provide your response to IE Bulletin 80-06 with two exceptions. First, the 90-day limit for response in Item 4 is not applicable. Second, ,

your response should be in the form of an amendment to the F5AR. l 420.05 Oualitication of Control Systems (IE Information Notice 79-22)_  !

If control systens are exposed to the environment resulting from the I rupture of reactor coolant lines, steamlines or feedwater lines, the ,

control syste=s may malfunction in a manner which would cause consequences !

to be more severe than calculated in safety analyses. This concern was addressed in IE Information Notice 79-22.  !

l Provide the results of an analysis of interactions between non-safety  !

grade or control equipment to demonstrate they will not cause consecuences i more severe.than those found in safety analyses when subjected to the l harsh envirc.iment of a hi5h energy line break. j l

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i ENCLOSURE .

420.0 Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch I 420.03 Loss of Non-Class 1E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus Durino Power Operation (IE Eulietin 79-27)

If reactor controls and vital instruments derive power from common j electrical distribution systens, the failure of such electrical distribution systems may result in an ever.t requiring operator action j concurrent with failure of important instrumentation upon which these ,

operator actions should be based. This concern was addressed in ,

IE Bulletin 79-27. On November 30, 1979, IE Bulletin 79-27 was sent to operating license (OL) holders, the near term OL applicants .

(North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon, McGuire, Salem 2, Sequoyah, and Zinmer),

and other holders of construction permits (CP). . [

Of these recipients, the CP holders were not given explicit direction for making a submittal as part of l the licensing review. However, they were informed that the issue would j be addressed later. I Provide your response to IE Bulletin 79-27 with two exceptions. First, f the 90 day limit in Item 4 is not applicable. Second, your response should be in the form of an amendment to the FSAP.. 1 l

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