ML20126K147
| ML20126K147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1981 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126K151 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-12663, TAC-12664, NUDOCS 8105120197 | |
| Download: ML20126K147 (24) | |
Text
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o UNITED STATES g
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-266 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 49' License No, DPR-24 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated necember 19, 1979 and modified by letter dated February 3,1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of the-Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and i
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
8105120\\9T 1
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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 49 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Tecnnical Specifications.
3.
This license snendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0N
~
Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 4, 1981 e
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-301 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMEN 0 MENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 55 License No. DPR-27 w
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated December 19, 1979 and modified by letter dated February 3,1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorizad by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
J
.. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 55, are hereby incorporated in the license. The ifcensee shall i
operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ro ert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 4, 1981 i
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24 AMENDMENT NO. 55 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27 DOCKET NOS. 50-256 AND'50-301 Revise Appendix A as follows:
Remove Pages Insert Pages 15.1-4 15.1-4 15.2.1-3 15.2.1-3 15.3.10-1 15.3.10-1 15.3.10-2 15.3.10-2 15.3.10-3 15.3.10-3 15.3.10-3a 15.3.10-4 15.3.10-5
-15.3.10-4 15.3.10-5 15.3.10-6 15.3.10-6 15.3.10-7 15.3.10-7 15.3.10-8 15.3.10-8 15.3.10-8a -
15.3.10-9 15.3.10-9 15.3.10-10 15.3.10-10 15.3.10-11 15.3.10-11 15.3.10-12 15.3.10-12 15.3.10-13 15.3.10-13 15.3.10-14 15.3.10-14 15.3.10-15 15.3.10-15 15.3.10-16 FIGURE 15.3.10-1 FIGURE 15.3.10-1
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2)
Cold Shutdown The reactor is in the celd shutdown condition when the reactor has a shutdown margin of at least 1% Ak/k and reactor coolant temperature is <200*F.
- 3) Refueling Shutdown The reactor is in the refueling shutdown condition when the reactor is suberitical by at least 10% Ak/k and T,y is <140*F.
A refueling shutdown refers to a shutdown to move fuel to and from the reactor core.
4)
Shutdown Margin Shutdown margin is the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor core would be suberitical if all withdrawn control rods were tripped into the core but the highest worth withdrawn RCCA remains fully withdrawn.
If the reactor is shut down from a power condition, the hot shutdown temperatur,e should be assumed.
In other cases, no change in temperature should be assumed.
h.
Power Operation The reactor is in power operating condition when the reactor is critical and the average neutron flux of the power range instrumentation indicates greater than 2% of rated power.
1.
Refueling Operation Refueling operation is any operation involving movement of core components (those that could affect the reactivity of the core) within the containment when the vessel head is unbolted or removed.
j Rated Power Rated power is here defined as a steady state reactor core output of 1518.5 MWT.
k.
Thermal Power Thermal power is defined as the total core heat transferred from the fuel to the coolant.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2,49 15.1-4 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2.E6
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Additional peaking' factors to account for local peaking due to fuel rod axial gaps and reduction in fuel pellet stack length have been included in the calculation of-the curves shown in Figure 15.2.1-1.
These curves are based e
N on an F'AH f 1.58, cosine axial flux shape, and a DNB analysis as described in Section 4.3 of WCAP-8050, " Fuel Densification, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 2" (including the effects of fuel densification and flattened cladding).
Figure 15.2.1-1 also includes an allowance for an increase in the enthalpy rise hot channel factor at reduced power based on the expression:
1.58 {1 + 0.2 (1-P)} where P is a fraction of rated power F
=
AH 1.58 when P > 1.0.
when P < 1.0. F
=
AH The effects of rod bow have been included in the determination of a conserva-tive value for F "E
I '*
H' available from the design limit DNBR, pitch reduction, design thermal diffusion coefficient and the fuel densification power spike, which were previously approved.*
The hot channel factors are also sufficiently large to account for the degree of ma1 positioning of full-lenth rods that is allowed before the reactor trip setpoints are reduced and rod withdrawal block and load runback may be required.
Rod withdrawal block and load runback occur before reactor trip setpoints are 7
reached.
The Reactor Control and Protective System is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions that would result in a DNB ratio of less than 1.30.
- Memorandum from D. F. Ross and D. G. Eisenhut, USNRC, to D. B. Vassallo and K. R. Coller, " Revised Interim Safety Evaluation Report on the Effects of Fuel, Rod Bowing on Thermal Margin Calculations for Light Water Reactors,"
dated February 16, 1977.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 25, 49 15.2.1-3 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 30, 55 9-4e wv-*arww& v w sw 9,urwr ve-vi-t-w w, - w m p..,+yw,,,,pyp,-.ew'm,--,w+eyw,m,,.#e-,.:,yw-,,,n3e,,cy-w-,-pg9,,_
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15.3.10 CON ~ROL RCO AND PCWIR DISTE3CTICN LIETS A;;11cabilitv Applies to the cperation of tha centrol rods and t:
=re pcwer distributien li=its.
Chiective To insure (1) core suberiticality after a reacter trip, (2) a 11=1: en potential reactivity insertiens f:cm a hypothetical red cluster cent:01 assembly (RCOA) ejectien, and (3) an acceptable core pcwer distributien during power Operatien.
Seecification A.
Bank Inse icn Li=its 1.
When de reactor is critical, except for physi:s tests and centr:1 rod exercises, de shutdcwn banks shall be fully withdrawn.
2.
When the reacter is critical, the centr:1 banks shall be inte.~.ed no fur.her than the li=its shewn by the lines en Figure 15.3.10-1.
F.xceptions -tm the inser icn 11:1t are pe. itted fer physics tests and centrol red exercises.
3.
'"he shutdewn margin shall exceed the applicable value as shew. in Figure 15.3.10-2 under all steady-state Operating conditions fr =
350'F to full pcwer. An excepti n tc the setek RCCA ce=penent cf the shutdown =argin requirement is perr.itted for physi:s tests.
4.
T.xcept fer physics tests a shutd=wn argin of at least 1% ik/k shall be maintained when ce reacter cociant ta=perature is less than 35C*T.
5.
When the react:r is in the het shutdewn :endit:cn :: during any appreach to criticality, except for physics tests, de critical
- d positien shall net be 1:wer than d e inserti:n limit fe :er:
pcwer. That is, if the ::ntr:1 : ds were windrawn in ner:a1 seq er.ce with nc ether reactivit/ :hange, the :sa ::: w uld n::
he criti:s; un.il de ::nt :1 ba.%s were c:ve -he insertien *irit.
Unit 1, Amendment No. 49 Uni 2, Amendment No. 55 13. 3.10 - :.
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B.
Pcwer Distributien I.imits 1.
a.
F.xcept during icw power physics tests, the het channel facters defined in the basis must meet the fc11cwing 11=its:
F (:) < (2.32) x K( )
for ?>.5 Q
P Fg (2)<4.64 x K(:)
for P<.5 N
Fgl.58 x {1 + 0.2 (1-P) }
Where P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating, K(:) is the function in Figure 15.3.10-3 and : is the core height location of F.
Q b.
Following a refueling shutdown pri== to exceeding 90% of rated l
power and at effective full pcwer monthly intervals thereafter, pcwer distribution maps using the mcveable incere detecter system shall be made to confirm that the tot chadnel facte: lir.its are satisfied.
"'he measured het chamel f act= s shall he increased in the fc11cwing ways (1) The measurement of total peaking factor, F.{.eas, 33,;3 3, increased by three percent to acect.: for manufacturing tolerances and further 1.. creased by five percent to ace =unt fe measurement error.
(2) The =easurement of enthalpy rise het channel facter, FN_H, shall be increased by f ur ;ercent to ace:unt f=
measure-ment errer.
c.
If a measured het channel facter exceeds the full ;cwer li=it cf Specification 15.3.10.3.1.a, the reacter pcwer and pcwer range high setpcints shall he reduced until these li=its are met.
If l
sesegent flux =apping cannet, within 24 hcurs, fernnstrate that the full power he
- ..ar.el facte limits are met, the verpewer Unit 1, Amendment No. 25, 49 15.3.10-:
Unit 2, Amendment No. 30, 55
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and evertemperature iT trip setpcints shall be sd d'arly reduced a
'and reacter power limited such that Specificatien 15.3.10.3.1.a A
above is met.
2.
a.
The target flux difference as defined in the basis shall be measured at 1sast quarterly. A target fhx dif"erence update value shall be dete: mined monthly by measurement, er by linear interpolation between the last measured vahe and 0% at end of cycle life (that is when the beren ccncentratien in the cociant is zero ppm), er by extrapciatien of the last three measured peints.
Se target fhx difference and its assceiated ala = setpcihts need net be updated if the update value. for full pcwer target fhx difference is within +0.5% c' the presently empicyed full-pcwer target fhx difference vahe.
b.
Except fer physics testing, execre detecter calibratien (inchding recovery), c: as :cdified belew, the indicated axial flux diff erence shall be =ainta=ed wie.in a range of +6 and -9 percent of the target fhx differsnee. This is defined as the target band.
c,
.st a power level yteater than 90 percent cf rated pcwer, 18 the indicated axial fhx difference deviates f m its.arget band, the flux difference shall be returned to the target band immediately er reacter power shall be reduced := a level ne greater than 90 per:ent of rated pcwer.
d.
At a pcwer level no greater than 90 per:ent of rated pcwer, (1) The indicated axial f* ux dif derence may deviate f::= i.s -6 to -3% target band for a =aximu= cf :ne h::: ( cu=ulative) in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> peri:d p vided 9.e **"v ' '"erence d:es net ex:eed an envel:;e beu.ded by
- 1 per:ent a.d
-l'. per:ent P
at 9C% pcwer and increasing Y - % an' ~'i f:: each.i cf Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unit 2 - A=endment No. e.5
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rated power belew 90%.
2f the cu=ula.ive ti=e exceeds ene hour in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, then the reacter pcwer shall be reduced i= mediately to ne greater than 50% power and the high neutren flux setpcint reduced to no greater than 55%
of rated pcwer.
(2) A power increase to a level greater than 90% of rated power is contingent upon the indicated axial flux difference being within its target band.
e.
At a power level no greater than 50 percent of rated pcwer, (1)
I'he indicated axial flux difference may deviate f:cm its target band.
(2) A powerincrease to a level greater than 50% of rated pcwer is centingent upcn the indicated axial flux difference not being cutside 1.s target band fer mere than two hours (cu:m:lative) out of the preceding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. Cne half of the time the indicated axial flux difference is cut of its tar'get band up to 50% of rated power is to be counted as cent:1buting to the one hcur c"~'ative maximu= the flux difference may deviate f cm its target band at a pcwer level less than er eTeal to 90% of rated pcwer, f.
Alar =s shall normally be used to indicate non-cenfo. ance with the flux difference reecirement of 15. 3.10.3.2.c er the flux difference-ti=e reTeire=ent of 15. 3.10.3.2. d (1). 2f the alar =s are ta=perarily cut-cf-service, the axia* f'.ux difference shall be noted a.d cenfo.~ance with.he linits assessed every *. cur fer the first 24 hcurs, and half-heurly thereafter.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unit 2 - Amendment No 55
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3.
Except for physics tests, whenever the indicated quadrant pcwer tilt exceeds 2% the tilt ecnditien shall be el'Wated within two l
hours er the following ac.icns shall be taken:
a.
Reduce ccre power level and the power range high flux setpcint two percent of rated values fer ever/ percent of indicated quadrant power tilt.
b.
If the tilt is not corrected within 24 hcurs, but the het channel facters for rated power are net exceeded, an evaluatien as to the cause of the discrepancy shall be made and reported tc the Nuclear Regulatery Ccamissicn. Return to full pcwer is permitted, previding the het channel facters are not exceeded.
c.
If the design het channel facters for rated pcwer are exceeded er not determined within 24 hcurs, the Nuclear Regulater/ Ccamissien l
shall be notified and the everpewer'i; and everta=perature iT trip set-points shall be reduced by the equivalent Of 2% pcwer for ever/
percent of quadrant power tilt, d.
The execre nuclear instrumentatien system serves as t.he prinary quadrant power tilt alarm. If the alarm is net functicnal fer twc hcurs, backup =etheds cf assuring that the quadrant pcwer tilt is acceptable shall be used.
T..ese =stheds include hand calculatiens,
incere therecccupies using either a cceputer er anual calculatiens er incere detectors.
e.
Wien ene power range channel is inoperable and ther 41 ;cwer is gr,;3ter than 75% cf rated thermal pcwer, the quadrant power tilt shall be ccnfir:ed as acceptable by use of the ecvable incere detecters at least ence per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
C.
Ine;erable Red Cluster Centr:1 Asserbly 7C N 1.
An RCCA shall be censidered incperable if ene er =cre cf the felicwing cecurs:
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55 13.2.10 *
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a.
"'he RCC.A does net d:cp upon re icval cf statienary gripper cell l
- vcltage, b.
.The RCOA does not step in properly when the pr per voltage sequences are applied to the cent :1 : d drive mechanism coils. It shall then be assumed ineperable until it has been tested to verify that it does 6::p.
c.
If the bank demand pcsition is greater than er eqcal to 215 steps, cr, less than or equal to 30 steps, and the : d pcsition indicater channel shows a =isalignment of 15 inches.
O.e ECCA shall be assumed ineper-able until it has been tested to verify that it does step properly.
d.
- d the bank dammM positien is between 215 steps and 30 steps, and the==d position indicater channel shews a misalignment of 7.5 inches.
The RCCA shall be assumed incperable until it has been tested :=
verify that it dcas step p cperly.
2.
Specificatica 15.3.10.C.1.b can be mcdified by the felicwings a.
If an RCCA does het step in upon de=and, up to six hours is allow-ed to dete=ine whether the probler. with stepping is an electrical pr blem. If the problem cannet be rescived within six hcurs, the PCCA shall be ass =ed incperable until it has been verified t..at it will step in c: wculd d: p upon demand.
b.
If mers than one RCCA does net step in, apparently due t elect-i-cal p chler.s, the situati:n shall be rectified c: clearly defined that it is an electrical problem and the RCCAs are capahle of d::p-ping upcn demand or an crderly shutdewn shall c =ence within six hcurs.
3.
No : re than ene incperable RCCA shall be pe=itted during sustained l
pcwer cperation.
4.
When it has been deter =i.ed that an RCCA dees net d: p :n rernval Of l
statienary gripper coil vcltage, the shutdew. argin shall be maintained by beration as necessa:7 :: Oc=pensate f:: the withdraa-. werth f the in:perable A00A.
If sustained power :perati:n is anti:ipated, the l
inser-icn limit shall be adjusted : ref".e:t the verth f the inepe:3,3; RCCAl Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49
.a..
-o Unit 2 - Amendment No. S o.
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D.
Misaliuned er Creeted FCCA 1.
If the red position bdicator channel is functienal and the associated PCCA is :nore than 7.5 inches indicated out of align =ent with its bank and ca=ot be aligned when the bank is between 215 steps and 30 steps, then unless the het channel facters are shown to be within design li=its as specidied in Section 15.3.10.3-1 within eight (8) hcurs, pcwer shall be reduced to less than 75% of rated power. When the bank pcshien is greater than er egaal to 215 steps, er, less than er egaal to 30 steps, the allowable indicated =isalign=ent is 15 inches.
2.
To increase power above 754 wi h an RCCA :ncre than 7.5 inches indicated out of align =ent with its hank when the bank positi:n is between 215 steps and 30 steps, an analysis shall first be =ade to dete % e the het channel facters and the resulting allewable power level based en Sectics 15.3.10.3.
When the bank position is greater than er egaal to 215 steps, or, less than or egaal to 30 steps, the alhwable indicated misalign:nent is 15 inches.
3.
If it is deter =ined that the apparent misalignment er d::pped F.CCA l
indicatien was caused by red pcsition bdicator cha= e1 failure, sustained pcwer operatien may be centinued if the felieving cenditiens are :nat:
Fc: cperatica between 104 pcwer and rated pcwer, the pcsitien of the a.
RCCA(s) with the failed red position indicater cha=el(s) will be l
l 1
checked indirectly by core instr entation (excere detectors, and/
l l
1 er ther:neccupies, and/or seveable incere detect:rs) every shift and after associated bank =cticn exceeding 24 steps in ene directien.
b.
Ter cperation belev 10% cf rated pcwer, ne special =cnitoring is
- egaired.
E.
FCCA Or:0 Times 1.
At Operath ; ta=perature and full flew, the d:Op time Of each..00A shall l
be no,reate: _han 1.8 secends f := the less Of stati: nary grippe; cc:a j
vcitage. dash;ct en.:7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 13*3*10~I
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i Basis
.hsertion ii.-its and shutdevn Marein The reactivity cent :1 cencept is that reactivity changes ace mpanying changes in reactor power are ecmpensated by cent :1 :Od moti n.
Reactivity changes asscelated with xenen, samarium, fuel depletien and large changes in react :
ecolan temperature (cperating temperature to ecid shutdown) are ce=pensated by 1
l changes in the schble beren concentratien.
i Ouring power operation, the shutdcwn banks are fully withdrawn and cent:01 ef l
1 reacter power is by the cent ci banks. The centr:1 rod insertien limits provide l
for achieving het shutdewn by reacter ::1p at any time and assume the highest i
worth centrol red re=ains fully withdrawn. A 10% margin in :sactivity werth cf the centrol :=ds is inchdad te asscre meeting the assumptiens used in the accidenti analysis. Se a react =r trip occurring during pcwer cperatien will put the reacter into the het shutdown condition. 2 addition, the bsertien li=its pr= vide a limit en the maximum inserted cd wcrth 6 the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection and provide fe acceptable nuclear peaking facters. The specified cent:ci :=d inser.icn limits take in a account the effects of fuel dehsificati n.
The : ds are withdrawn in the ser ence cf A, 3, T, O with everlap between banks.
The everlap between successive c=nt ci banks is provided to ce=pensate f:r the icv differential :=d verth near the cep and bette= cf the ccre.
When the insertien li=its are cbserved and the cent 1 : d banks are aheve the solid lines shewn en Figure 15.3.10-1, the shutdewn regaire=ent is =et.
The maxi =um shutdown argin regairement occurs at and of core life and is based en the vahe used in analysis cf the hypcthetical steam break accident. Figure 15.3.10-0 shews the shutdewn =argin eg 1 valent to 2.77% reactivity at end-ef-life with res-pect to an uncentrolled ::cidewn. All ether accident ana*yses assume it c greate:
reactivity shutdewn argin. Shutdewn =argin :al:ulatiens inc hde the effects Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unic 2 - Amendment No. Do
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of axial power distribution. Cne may assume no change in : re peisening due ::
l 1
xenen, samarium er scluble boren.
Part length red inser.icn is not pazzitted, thus el' ' ating carain adverse pcwer shapes which might occur during power operatien. S e part length rods have been rencved from the c=re..
Power Distribution Design criteria have been chosen which are censistent with the fuel integrity analyses. These relate to fission gas release, pellet temperature and cladding
- mechanical preperties. Also the minimum CNBA in the : re must net he less than 1.20 in nor=al cperatien er in shcrt-ter=.ransients.
In'additien to the aheve, the peak linear pcwer density must not exceed the li=iting kw/ft values which result frem the large' break less of ::clant accident
[
analysis based upcn the ECOS acceptance criteri.$., limit of 2200'F. This is required to meet the initial cenditiens assumed fer less of coolant accident.
To aid in specifying the limits en power distribution, the f=11cwing het channel j
factors are defined:
F (2), Heicht Cecendent Heat Flux Ect Channel Facter, is defined as the 1= cal heat flux en the surface Of a fuel red at cere elevation :
i divided by the average fuel red heat flux, all= wing' fer manufacturing y
tolerances en fuel rellets and reds. := posed limits pertain = the aviwm T ( ) in the tcr-.
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T, Eneigeering Heat Flux Ect Channel Facter, is defined as the allewance Q
cn heat flux required fer =anufacturing tolerances. The engineering facter all:ws fer 1 cal variations in enrith=ent, pellet density and diameter, s
surface area cf the fuel red and secentricity cf the gap hetween pellet and clad. Cec 61ned s atistically, the net effect is a fact:r of 1.02 :
f be applied to fuel red surface heat flux, F
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unic 2 - Anendment No. 55 m
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FYg, Nuclear Enthalev Rise Het Channel Facter, is defined as the ratio of the integral cf linear pcwer along a fuel rod to the average fuel red pcwer. :=pesedlimitspertaintothemaximumF{g in the cere, that is the fuel red with the highest integrated power. It should be noted t
that FY,H is based en an integral and is used as such in the CNB calculations. Local heat flux is obtained by using het channel and adjacent' channel explicit power shapes which take into acccunt variat1:ns in heri: ental (x-y) pcwer shapes throughout the core. Thus, the herizental power shape at the point of maximum heat flux is not s
necessarilydirectlyrelatedtoFjg.
i For ncrmal cperation, it is net necessary to measure these quantities.
- Instead it has been determined that, provided the f=11cwing eenditions are i
ebserved, the het channel facter limits will be met:
1.
Cente:1 rods in a single bank mcve together with ne individual red insertion differing by mere than 15 inches frem the bank demand 1
pcsitien, when the bank demand positien is between 30 steps and 215 steps.
22.5 inches misalignment is allowed when the bank i
positien is less than or equal to 30 steps, cr, when the bank positien
+
is greater than er equal to 215 steps, due to the small worth and censequential effects cf an individual red misalign=ent.
2.
Centrol red tanks are sequenced with everlapping banks as described in Figure 15.3.10-1.
3.
The full-length ::ntrol bank insertien limits are net violated, f
4.
Axial power distributien centrol procedures, whi=h are given in terms cf flux difference centrol and c:ntr:1 bank inserti:n limits, are observed. Flux difference refers to the difference in signals between the tcp and bottom halves of two-section execre neutron detectors.
The flux difference is a measure of the axial effset which is defined as the difference in ner=alized pcwer between the ::p and bett m halves of the cere.
The per=itted relaxatien f Fjg all ws radial ;cwer shape :hanges with ::d insertien te the insertien limits. :: has been deter ined that provided the abcve c nditiens 1 th : ugh 4 are Observed, these het :ha.nel fa :::
li.ats are net.
In Specification 15.3.10.3.1.a, F-is arbi::ari'.y li.ited f:: ; 1 0.3 (ex:ept f:r 1:w pcwer.:hysics tests).
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 l
p' ' '3 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55
An upper beund envelepe of 2.32 times the normali:ed peaking facter axial dependence cf Fig =e 15.3.10-3 ::nsistent with the Technical specificati:ns en power distributien cent: 1 as given in secticn 15.3.10 was used in the 1.CCA analysis. The results cf the analyses based en this upper bcund envelepe indicate a peak clad temperature of less than the 2200*F ll=it.
When an Fg measurement is taken, both experimental errer and manufactring telerance must be allcwed fer. Five percent is the apprcpriate allowance fer a full c :e map taken -
with the moveable incere detect r flux mapping system and three percent is the apprepriate allewance fer manufacturing Mlerance. In the design limit of P]3, there is eight percent allowance fer uncertainties which means that ncrmal operatien cf the cere is expected to result in a design.n}g i 1.58/1.08.. "h e icgic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is that (a) normal perturhatiens in the radial pcwer shape (i.e., red misalignment)' af fect r}H, in mest cases withcut necessarily affect Fe, (b) while the cperater has a direct influence
=
cn Fg threugh mevement cf reds, and can limit it to the desired value, he has ne direct cent:ci cver P2H and (c) an er:cr in the predictions fer radial power shape which may be detected during startup physics tests can he c:::::pensated fer in Fg by tighter axial cent::1, but==mpensatienferP}gislessreadily available. WhenameasurementOfFygistaken,experimentalerc:mustbe alicwed fer and four percent is the appr:priate allewance fcr a full cere map taken with the meveable incere detecter flux mapping system. TheP]g limits in specificati=n 15.3.10.3.1.a take into account the effects cf red bcw.
This is further explained in the assis en page 15.2.1-3.
.v.eas=e=e.ts cf the het channel fact:rs are required as part cf startup physics tests, at least each full power month ep'eratien, and whenever ahnc mal pcwer distributica conditiens require a reducti:n Of core power te a level hased upcn measured het :hannel facters. The incere map taken ic11: wing initial 1:ading pr=vides confi.::atien of the basic nuclear design bases inc1; ding preper fuel 1:ading :::atterns.
"he peri: die menthly incere mapping ;;;vides addiu :nal assurance that M.e nuclear desiga bases remain inviciate and identify Operati:nal Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 15.: ;-;;
Unit 2 - Amendment Nc. 55
m.
-~.__.. _.. _. _ _
m.
ancmalies which would, othe: vise, affect these bases.
Axial Power Oistributien The proced=es for axial pcwer distribution cent:ci are designed to =ind d e the effects of xenen redistribution en the axial power distribution d=ing icad f=11ow maneuvers.
maically, centrol of flux difference is required to li=it the difference between the current value of flux difference ( AI) and a reference 3
value wh:ch cc respends to the full power equilibrium value of axial effset l
hxial effset = AI/fractienal power).
The full power target flux difference is defined as that indicated flux i
difference of the core in the fellowing conditions egallibrium xenen C.ittle er no oscillaticr) and with the full-length red cent 1 rod bank mere than 190 steps withdrawn (1.e., the normal ' full power pcsiticr).
Values,f== all ether cere pcwer levels are obtained by raiti;1ying the full power value by the facti nal pcwer.
At :ero power the target flux difference is Ct. S ince the indicated arcilibrium
)
value was noted, no allewances for excere detecter er:cr are necessary and I
indicated deviatien of +6 and -9 percent A are permitted f cm the indicated j
reference value. Ouring parieds wh6.= extensive lead fc11: wing is reg ired, it may be i= practical to establish the required cere cenditiens fe measuri.g the target flux difference every month. For this reascn, the specificaticn pr:vides three matheds for updating the target flux difference.
3::ict cent ci cf the flux difference (and rod positier) is net as necessary d=ing reduced pcwer operatien. This is because xenen distributien cent::1 at l
reduced pcwer is net as significant as the cent:ci at full pewer and allevance l
has been made in predicting the heat flux yeaking fact::s for less strict cent:cl at reduced pcwer. s trict centrol cf the flux difference is t pessible l
d= ing certain physics tests :: d=ing required periedi: ex:::e calibrati:ns whi:h reg ire larger flux differences tha. pe: :.tted.
- heref:re, the specifi-Unit 1 - Amendment No. 26, 49 Unit 2 - Anendnent Sc. 31, 55 Ae 9vamr
-tr= T 9M*Wi*-ytd 9 M ust--"'YErrdi-Midd y 'm "PFMe gifW e dvD-T-t**/
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cations en ;cwer distributien centrol are not applied during physics tests c:
ex=cre calibrations. This is acceptable due to the increased cere =ccitoring 1
performed as part of the tests and low pr:bability of a significant. accident eccurring during these operations.
In some ins ances of rapid plant pcwer reductien, automatic : d metien will cause the flux difference to deviate fr:m the.arget band when ce reduced pcwer level is tached. This dcas not necessarily affect the xenen distribution r
sufficiently to change the envelepe of peaking facters which can be reached en a subsec,uent return to full pcwer within the target band. Ecwever, to si=plify i-the specificatien fer cperatien up to 90% cf full pcwer, a limitatien cf cne hour in any period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is placed encperatien cutside the band. This insures that the resulting xenen distributiens are not significantly different f =m these resulting f:cm creratien within the target band.
Fer normal cperatics and anticipated transients, the core is protected from everpower and mini =um CNBR cf 1.30 by an aut==atic protection system. C =pliance with cperating'p ccedures is assu=ed as a p n-cenditien; hcwever, cperater errer and equipment =alfuncti:ns are separately assured to lead to the cause of the transients censidered.
Cuadrant Til S.e excere detect::s are semewhat insensitive t: disturhances nea: -he core center such as misaligned inner cent:01 reds.
!: is theref::e possible that a five percent tilt =ignt actually be present in the core when the excere detecters respend with a tvc percent indi:sted quadrant tilt. Cn the ether hand, they are everiy respcnsive :: disturbances near the periphery.
e.
Unit 1 - Amendment 23, 49 Unit 2 - A=endment 30, 55 irJ w -
-e w
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Tilt rest:10:icns are act applicable d=ing the startup and initial testing cf a relcad cere which =ay have an inherent tilt. : uring this ti=e sufficient testing is perf =ed at reduced' pcwer to verify that the het channel facte:
limits are met and the nuclear channels are p cperly aligned.
The execre detectors are ner:nally aligned indicating no quadrant pcwer tilt because they r,re used to alarm en a rapidly develeping tilt. Tilts which develes slowly are mere accurately and readily discerned by incere measurements.
The execre detecters serve as the prime indication of a quadrant power til,t.
If a channel fails, is cut-of-service f:: testing, c: is u. reliable, two hcurs is a sher. ti=e with respect to the pr:bability of an unsafe quadrant power til:
develeping. Two hcurs gives the operating persennel sufficient time to have de p cblem investigated and/cr put into operati:n ene of several pcssible alta=ative me ceds of date: ining tilt.
Inceerable RCCA An incperable : d i=pesas additional de= ands en the cperaters. The pe=.issible nu=ber of inoperable cen. cl : ds is li=ited to ene in ceder to limit the magnitude of the cperating burden.
F cm cperating experience to date, an RCCA which steps in pr:perly will d: p when a trip signal occurs because the enly f :ce acting to drive the : d in is gravity. When it has been dete-Med that a ::d dces net d::p, ex.ra shundewn margin is gained by beratien c: by adjusting the insertien limi to acecunt for the werth of the ineperable centrol red.
Further experience indicates thatcent :1 : ds which de ne: step are usually affected by electrical p :blems. That is, nc= ally the p::blem is in the : d
- en.:cl cabinets. If Operability cannet be restered, the ROCA will be declared in perable and ::::ective acti:ns can be taken :: :::pensate f:: the assceittad redu::icn in shutd:wn.argin.
If there is : e than ene ECOA affe -ed, an i
- ferly shu dewn wculd be star ed.
Su:h an evoluti:n wculd have :: be perf: ed l
Unit 1 - Amendment No. d9 l
.. =...... _..,
Unit 2 - A=endment ho. :--:
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in a dsliberato manner without.undus prostura en the operating personnel bsecuse
- cf the unusual techniques to.be used to accer=cdate the reactivity changes associated with the shutdewn.
Misaligned RCCAS The _varicus control :=d banks (shutdown banks and cent: 1 banks, A, 3, C, and )
are each to be seved as a bank; that is, with all reds in the bank within ene step (5/8 inch) cf the bank position. Oirect infor=atien en red position indication is previded by two motheds: A digital ecunt of actuating pulses which shows the demand position of the banks and a linear positien indicater (IVOT) which indi-cates the actual red position. The
=d positien indicator channel has a demen-strated accuracy of 54 ef span (17.2 inches). Therefere, an analysis has been perfc=med to shcw that a misalignment of 15 inches cannet cause design het, channel facters to be exceeded. A single fully =isaligned RCOA, that is, an RCCA 12 feet cut of alignment with its bank, dcas net result in exceedihy core ll=its in steady-state operatica at power levels less than er eg al te rated pcwer.
In other words, a single dropped RCOA is alicwable from a cere pcwer distributien viewpoint. If the =isalignment cendition cannet be readily corrected, the specified reducticn in pcwer to 75% will insure that design argins te cere limits will be =ain ained under both steady-state and anticipated transient cenditiens.
The eight (8) hcur pe:=issible 11=i: en :=d =isalign=ent at rated pcwer is shcrt with respect to the probability of an independent accident.
Because the red pcsitien indicater systa= =ay have a 7.5 inch er:cr when a
=isalignment of 15 inches is cecurring, the Specificatien alicws enly a 7.5 inch 4-dicated =isalignment. Ecwever, when the bank demand positien is greater than c: egal to 215 steps, er, less than c: equal to 30 steps, the censequences of a =isalign=ent are much less severe..The differential werth of an individual FCCA is less, and the resultant pur.urbatien en pcwer distributiens is less than when the bank is in its high differential wer.h regien. At the tcp and bette= cf the core, an indicated 15 inch =isalign=ent =ay be representing an actual =isalign=ent of 22.5 inches.
The failure cf an :7.:0 in itself dces net reduce the shutdew. capability cf the Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49
.5.2..:-15 Unit 2 - Amend:ent No. 55 g T tr* *
- Pf T 'F 't' v f *W " N"M r e'91"*w - m- *ts w-wf-w e-et s*
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- w i g-w -t e-e* w v '--W e -"' 9 'st ais h w e-vv e=-191 m-www ew Ne-ww m t 'er-se---c'
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reds, but it dess reduce the operater's capability for dete :.ining the positien of that red by direct means. The operater has available to hi:n the excere a
detecter recordings, incere ther:necouple readings and periedic incere flux traces for indirectly date.@.ing =cd position and flux tilts should the cd with the inoperable IVOT become :naipesitiened. The excere and incere instr.:menta-tien will not necessarily recognice a =isalignment of 15 inches because the conect=ni ant increase in pcwer density will ner:nally be less than it fer a 15 inch misalignment. The execre and incere instr.:mentatien will, however, detect any red
=isalignment which is sufficient te cause a significant increase in het channel facters and/cr any significant icss in shutdewn capability
~he increased surveil lance of the ccre if ene er more cd pcsition indicater channels is cut-cf-service serves to guard against any significant 1 css in shutdown :nargin c: margin := core ther:nal ' limits.
The histerf of malycsitioned RCCA's indicates that,in nearly all such cases, the
=alpesitioning occurred during~ bank movement. Checking red position after bank
=ction exceeds 24 steps will verify that the RCCA with the ineperable UCT is
=cving p cperly with its bank and the bank step counter. Malpesitiening cf an ROCA in a statienary bank is very rare, and if it does cecur, it is usually g css slippage which will be seen by external detecters.
Should it ge undetected, the ti=e between the red pcsition checks perferred every shift is shcre with respect
.c the prebability cf cecurrence of ancther independent undetected situatien which wculd further reduce the shutdown capability cf the rods.
Any ce=binatien of =isaligned reds below 10% rated pcwer will net exceed the design limits. Ter this reasen, it is not necessary te check the pcsitien cf I
=cds with incperable UCT's belcw 10% pcwer; plus, the incere inst:rentatien is not effective fer deter =ining red positien until the pcwer level is aleve I
apprcximately 5%.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55 15.3.10
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FIGURE 15.3.10-1 CONTROL BAllK IllSERTICil LIMITS
' ([,
POINT BEACH U"ITS 1 AND 2 (22)
(77) 100
_,/ -
228
/
f--,
. J Bank B
/
/
--/
80 (79)
/,
182 g
(180)
.4 (67)
(153) z
.c 3ll
/
- c-p g
60 16 g
a
-,# Bank C -
/- _
u z
a
/
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/= ---*
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6 0
o
=
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~ ~ ~ ~-------
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_p 0
i-
- y'= --
0 10 20 30 (34) 40 50 60 70 80 90 1C0 1
l l
Percent of-Full Power t
t I
i.
I Unit 1 - Amendment No. 25, 49 l
Unit 2 - Amendment No. 30, 55 r4 mgy -em^--dvgr+qgM+
y,*e 3 yt fygy-
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