ML20126J189

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Insp Rept 50-333/85-10 on 850415-19.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 84-11, Observation of NDE in Progress,Qa/Qc Activities & Review of NDE Personnel Qualification/Certification Records
ML20126J189
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1985
From: Durr J, Kortas A, Mcbrearty R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126J146 List:
References
50-333-85-10, GL-84-11, NUDOCS 8506100525
Download: ML20126J189 (7)


See also: IR 05000333/1985010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-333/85-10

Docket No.

50-333

4

License No. DPR-59

Priority

-

Category

C

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York

P.O. Box 41

'

Lycoming, New York

Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

. Inspection At:

Scriba, New York'

. Inspection Conducted: April 15-19, 1985

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Inspectors:

R. A, McBre rty ReactorEnpheer

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Approved by:

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 15-19, 1985 (Inspection Report

No. 50-333/85-10)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's response to

Generic Letter 84-11 including observations of NDE in progress; and inservice

inspection activities including program review, NDE data review, QA/QC

activities, and review of NDE personnel qualification / certification records.

The inspection involved 68 inspector. hours onsite by two regional based

inspectors and 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> in the regional office by one inspector.

Results: No violations were identified.

8506100525 85060S

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Power' Authority of the State of New York

  • R. Converse, Superintendent of Power

W. Fernandez, Operations Superintendent

H. Glovier, Resident Manager

  • D. Lindsey, Assistant Operations Superintendent
  • R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent
  • D. Sancic, luclear Operations, Maintenance Engineer
  • G. Sechler, QA, NDE Level III

EBASCo

  • A. Smith, ISI Coordinator, NDE Level III

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • L. Doerflein, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those present at the exit meeting.

2.

Licensee Response to NRC Generic Letter 84-11

Based on the results of inspections conducted pursuant to IE Bulletins 82-03, Revision 1 and 83-02, and the NRC August 26, 1983 Orders, the Com-

mission mandated an ongoing program for similar reinspections at all op-

erating BWRs. Generic Letter 84-11 was issued to define the reinspection

program required of all operating BWR licensees.

The inspectors reviewed the scope of the licensee's program to ascertain

that the mandated actions were included, and to determine the status of

the licensee's response.

The activities during the current outage included the examination of

welds not previously examined, and the reinspection of all unrepaired

cracked welds. This completed the required actions with the exception of

section 2(c) which requires the inspection of all weld overlays on welds

where circumferential cracks longer than 10% of circumference were

measured.

The overlays at FitzPatrick were applied in October 1984, and have been

in place a relatively short period of time. The requirement is based on

a full cycle of operation, and the licensee is developing an examination

technique to use during the next outage.

No violations were identified.

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Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program

The current refueling outage is the last scheduled outage of the first 10

year inspection interval which ends on July 28, 1985.

.The inspectors reviewed the following to ascertain compliance with

applicable ASME Code requirements, ifcensee commitments and regulatory

requirements:

Inservice Inspection Program for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power

Plant.

Procedure No. PS0-31A, Revision 0, "ISI Program for Piping Supports

and Pressure Retaining Components".

Procedure No. WACP-10.1.6, Revision 6, " Control of Modifications,

Component Changes, and Safety and Environmental Impact Evaluation

Reports".

The ISI activities during the current outage are governed by requirements

of the 1974 Edition of ASME Section XI through the Summer 1975 Addenda.

The current program is effective until the end of the current inspection.

interval, at which time an updated program must be prepared and submitted

by the licensee to the NRC.

,

Licensee responsibility for establishing and maintaining the ISI program

is assigned to the Nuclear Operations Maintenance Engineer at the corpo-

rate offices.- The site QA NDE Level III oversees the licensee's ISI

vendor activities during outages, evaluates examination results, and main-

tains the program at the site. He was aided during the current outage by

a consultant Level III employed by the licensee.

4

Program status is tracked by the licensee by comparing a master list of

required examinations with the examinations completed during each outage

in the 10 year interval. The licensee has recognized the weakness in

this system and is in the process of developing a computerized tracking

system for the next 10 year ISI program.

The inspectors' review of the aforementioned documents indicated that a

controlled system is in place for assuring that modifications and new

welds are incorporated in the ISI program.

No violations were identified.

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4.

Review of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Data

The inspectors selected for review data representing ultrasonic examina-

i

tions which were performed during the current refueling outage. These

included examinations which were done in response to Generic Letter

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84-11. The review was done to ascertain compliance with applicable ASME

code and regulatory requirements. Data representing the following welds

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.were included in the inspectors' review:

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 6" diameter reducer to pipe

weld 6-13-440.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 6" diameter Tee to reducer

weld 6-13-442.

Reactor Pressure Vessel shell weld VV-1B and -28.

Recirculation System 12" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 12-02-2-01.

  • *

Recirculation System 12" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 12-02-2-07.

Recirculation System 12" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 12-02-2-17.

  • *

Recirculation System 12" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 12-02-2-58.

  • *

Recirculation System 12" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 12-02-2-75.

  • *
  • - *

-Recirculation System 22" diameter manifold to end cap weld

22-02-2-22.

Recirculation System 28" diameter pipe to safe-end weld 28-02-2-48.

  • *

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Recirculation System 28" diameter elbow to valve weld 28-02-2-53.

  • *
  • *

Recirculation. System 28" diameter elbow to valve weld 28-02-2-112.

Denotes those welds which were examined in accordance with Generic

Letter 84-11.

The comparison of data regarding weld 22-02-2-22 indicated an increase.in

crack length from 2" as reported in 1983 to approximately.50" in 1985.

The licensee attributed the difference in measured length to the use of

newly developed transducers and scanning equipment. The early examina-

tions were performed using manual techniques for scanning and recording.

The 1985 examinations were done manually, and also with a fully automatic

system. The-transducers included models which were specially designed for

the detection and sizing of IGSCC. The automatic scan incorporated a

technique whereby the transducer movement could be controlled within 1 mm

of distance. This, in conjunction with the remote, radiation free area

from which the automatic scan was conducted contributed to improved crack

discrimination ability in 1985. The difference in length measurements can

-be attributed to the factors stated above.

Weld 22-02-2-22 will be repaired by the weld overlay technique.

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Data associated with weld 28-02-2-112 showed an increase in crack length

-from

".in 1983 to approximately 4" in 1985. The licensee stated that

the measurement ~was made by tracking the crack signal until it was lost

in the low amplitude material noise signals. The earlier measurements -

were terminated when the crack signal dropped to 50% of.the maximum

. amplitude. This:was confirmed by-the inspector's_ review. At the in-

spector'.s sugg'estion_the licensee's Level III requested that his ISI

. vendor re-measure-the crack by..using the amplitude drop method to deter-

mine whether changes had. occurred. The inspectors witnessed the re-mea--

.surement of 28-02-2-112 and the re-examination by the licensee's Level III

of'a portion of weld 22-02-2-22. The observations are discussed in para-

'g'raph.5 of this report.

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No' violations were, identified.

5.

.0bservations.of Nondestructive Examinations

The inspectors observed the ultrasonic measurement of- the crack in the

28" diameter recirculation system elbow to valve weld 28-02-2-112 and the

ultrasonic examination of~a portion of the 22" diameter recirculation

system end: cap weld-22-02-2-22.

The observations were made to ascertain

that regulatory requirements were met and whether a change in crack-

length had occurred in weld 28-02-2-112.

The crack in the 28" diameter weld was. measured by an EBASCo Level III

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individual who is-qualified in-accordance with IE Bulletin 83-02 and

.under the program conducted at the EPRI NDE Center. - The measurement was

obtained by locating the maximum crack signal amplitude and tracking _the

crack in both directions circumferential1y until the signal amplitude

dropped.to 50% of the maximem amplitude. This resulted in a measured

length of %" which indicated that no change from previous measurements

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had occurred.

(See paragraph 4 of this report.)

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-The licensee's Level III performed an examination of~a portion of the 22"

. diameter end cap weld which showed an' apparent increase in crack length

from-2" to approximately 50".

The examination demonstrated the difficulty.

of. discriminating the crack signal from the numerous non-relevant signals

in'close proximity to it, and the tracking problems caused by the non-rel-

evant signals and the varying amplitude of the crack. signal. The dif-

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^ ficulty was compounded by the dress requirements in the. dry well and also

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by exposure to radiation in the area.

Based on the aforementioned observations the inspector concluded that'the

crack in the 28" diameter weld has not changed from previous years. He

concluded also that.the improved equipment and approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />

scan time of the end cap weld contributed to the significantly different

results obtained during the current outage.

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No violations were identified.

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6.

Personnel Qualification / Certification Record Review

Selected NDE personnel certification records were examined for conformance

with ASNT-TC-1A standards. The Inspector reviewed documentation regarding

the following:

previous nondestructive testing experience

education background and applicable training

NDE examination scores

eye excmination results

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EPRI qualification of personnel involved in the detection and sizing

of IGSCC.

No deficiencies in' personnel qualifications were identified in reviewing

certification records, data records or by observing work in progress.

No violations were identified.

7.

QA/QC Activities Involving ISI

The inspector reviewed QA/QC activities pertaining to the Inservice In-

-spection Program for compliance with 10 CFR 50 App. B requirements. QC

daily activities were evident within the QC witnessing log, by QC review

signatures on examination data sheets, and by Deficiency and Corrective

Action Reports (DCAR's) initiated by QC personnel. The following DCAR

packages were examined in part for (a) a complete description of condi-

tions, (b) the content of the disposition and (c) any rework requirements-

and applicable re-examination data:

DCAR NO.

RELATED SYSTEM AND TOPIC

85-0098

.Sys. 14 Core Spray weld No. 16-14-700,

MT indications

85-0099

Sys. 13, RCIC weld No. 6-13-1043, MT

indications

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85-0155

Sys. 2, recirculation loop A Hanger

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Lugs 28-02-2-31C, PT indications

85-0219

Sys. 10, incompleted weld No. 20-10-2348,

identified for PT

85-0249

Sys. 14, Core Spray weld No. 8-14-879,

inadequate under VT examination

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ISI related surveillance reports completed in Surveillance Reports File

-4.06, 1985 Included:

' REPORT N0.

DATE

TITLE

1006-

3/28/85

Review of ISI Contractor (EBASCo) Compliance

1007

3/28/85

Review of ISI Contractor (UTL/KWU) Compliance

1008

3/28/85

Review of ISI Contractor (NES) Compliance

1011

4/01/85

Review of ISI Contractor (NES) Compliance

T

1012

4/01/85

Review of ISI Contractor (UTL/KWU) Compliance

1013

4/01/85

Review of ISI Contractor (EBASCo) Compliance

The documents listed above were' reviewed in part regarding surveillance

report scope, frequency, references and standards, and results.

No violations were identified.

8.

Exit Interview

The _ inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph

1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 19, 1985. The inspectors

summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. At

no time during this inspection was written material provided by the

inspector to the licensee.

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