ML20126G878

Forwards Power Sys Branch Request for Addl Info Re Evaluation of Fire Protection Plan.Response Is Required by 810619

ML20126G878
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/20/1981
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 8104020108
Download: ML20126G878 (8)

Text

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'* 8  %,, ' UNITED STATES

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' [\g ) ny g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 b '

l Docket Nos. 50-440 MAR 2 01981 , . . j and 50-441 f , s Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson b

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Vice President, Engineering I

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~3 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company g ud* *J O*,A [ '  :

P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 y '

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SUBJECT:

REQUEST.FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - FIRE PROTECTION b.

Our review of your application. indicates that additional information is required for our evaluation of your fire protection plan. The information that we require is identified in the enclosure.

We request that you provide the information not later-than June 19, 1981.

If you require any clarification of this request, please contact' M. D. Houston, Project Manager, (301) 492-8507. 1 Sincerely, CShik-u Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for licensing  :

Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:  ;

See next page t

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g 8104020308

9 Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson Vice President, Engineering The Cleveland Electric 111uminating Company MAR 2 019OI P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.

Washington, D.-C. 20036 Donald H. Hauser Esq.

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Parmly at Center Road Perry, Ohio 44081 S

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f;kE PROTECT 10h SUPPLENDiTAL Quf 5710Ns POWER SYSTEMS BF.ANCH .

In accordance with section 9.5.1, Branch Te'chnical Position ASB 9.5-1, posit C.4.a.(1) of NRC Standard Review Plan and section III.G of new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, it is the staff's position that cabling for redundant safe shutdown systems should be separated by walls having a three-hour fire ratin or equivalent protection (see section III.G.2 of Appendix R). That is, cabling required for or associated with the primary method of shutdown, should be physically separated by the equivalent of a.three-hour rated fire barrier from cabling required for or associated with the redundant or alternate method of shutdown.

To assure that redundant shutdown cable systems and all other cable systems that are associated with the shutdown cable systems are separated from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard, we require the following information for each system needed to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.

1.

Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown. For each equipment listed:

a.

Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown,

b. Define each equipment's location by fire area,

c. .

Define each equipment's redundant counterpart. - -

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d. Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumentation, control,andpower). For each cable identified: (1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown system, and

e. List any problem areas identifi'ed by item 1.d.(2) above that will be corrected in accordance with Section III.G 3 of Appendix R' (i.e. , alternate or dedicated shutdown capability).

2. Provide a table taat lists Class 1E and Non-Class 1E cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems identified in item 1 a bo ve. For each cable listed: (* See note on Page 3).

a. Define the cables' association to the sa fe shutdown system (coman '

power source, common raceway, separation less than IEEE Standard-384 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),

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b. Cescribe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source I t to termina), ton, and

c. Identify each location where the associated cables are separated 1

by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system. .

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3. Provide one of the following for each of the-circuits identified in item i 2,. c a bo v e : ,,

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(a) The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect it's .

associated shutdown sistem, *~ Note

• t (b) Identify each circuit requiring a solution

• in accordance with

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section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or (c ) Identify each circuit meeting or that will be modified to meet the

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requirements of section III.G.2 of AppOndix R (i.e., three-hour wall, -

20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or une-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).

4. To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following infomation be provided for the control room. If credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas '(as identified.by ite:n 1.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G'.3 ' fonew Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the following infomation will also be required for each of these plant areas.

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a. A table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown. .

• NOTE Option 3a is considered to be one method of meeting the requirements of Section II.G.3 Appendix R. If option 3a is selected the information requested in items 2a and 2c above should be provided in general terms and the infor-mation requested by 2b need not be provided. ,

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b.

A table that lists all equipment th*;luding instrumentation and vitti '

support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and caintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.

c.

Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed in item 4.b above with essential cables (instrumentation, control, and power) that are 1

located in the fire area containing ,the prir.ary shutdown equipment.

Mr each e:;uipment listed c-ovide one of the following:

(1) Detailed electrical schematic orawings that show the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and are electrically isolated from the subject fire areas, or n

(2) The results of an analysis that demonstrates -that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will

• not affect the capability to achieve and maintain hot or cold shutdown. '

d.

' ProYide a table that lists Class IE and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the alternate, dedicated,or remote method of shutdown.

For each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the prir.ary shutdown equipment. For each cable so identified -

provide the results 'of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated.or remote method of shutdown.

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5. 1 The residual heat removal syst'ed is generally a low pressure system that

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' nterfaces with the high pressure pridary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recor. enda-i tions of Branch Technical Position PSB 5-1. Thus, this interface most itkely.  !

consists of two redundant.and independent motor r>perated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSS 3. These'  !

two motor operated valves and their.4ssociated cable may be subject to a

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single fire hazard. It is our concerti that this single fire could cause

.the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the

't subject high-low pressure system interface. To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the fol?owing inforcation:

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a.

Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant t electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant '

boundary.

b.

Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and

. describe the -

cable routing (by fire area) from source to t

termination, t

c.

Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by.less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for the redundant device. '

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d. For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if any), provide the bases and justification as to the* acceptability of the existing design or any prop: sed modifications.

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