ML20126F931
| ML20126F931 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1981 |
| From: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Benaroya V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103231073 | |
| Download: ML20126F931 (15) | |
Text
. _ _ _
- 9a 0 0o og
. UNITED STATES y
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.:l WASHINGTON,0, C. 20555
/
MAR 171981 MEMORANDUM FOR:
V. Benaroya, Chief, Chemical Engineerirq 1rinc.h, DE FROM:
F. Miraglia, Acting Chief Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR GRAND GblF, i
UNITS 1 AND 2
+
Recently you transmitted a request for information to us regtrding your i
fire protection review on Grand Gulf (Enclosure 1). After discussions with Greg Harrison of your staff, we believe that it may not be appropriate to include certain of the questions in the request to the utility. indicates those questions,' and the reasons we believe they should not be sent. Please advise us of your position and/or agreement with Enclosure 2, as to whether.those specific questions are appropriate F
to be issued.
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irhidcting Chief Frank J.
Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated i
cc:
R. Tedesco V. Noonan i
J. Martore G. Harrison S. Rhow P; Check
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cn 8103231 0 %k
Enclosure i GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 COCKET NUMBERS 50-416/417 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH.
FIRE PROTECTION SECTION-Part 13. g,,
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.. c.,,agy3, t 013.la. Provide the results.of,;the, analysis.you refer to on page'9A-21alof your FSAR including drawings that'show the locations of all safe shutdown circuits in the corridor areas of the auxiliary building.
Indicate the proposed fire suppression systems and the fire rated
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barrier arrangements.
b.
It is our position that the automatic sprinkler systems proposed for the corridor. area at elevation.139' of the auxiliary building be extended to provide complete coverage for the corridor area at this elevation.
c.
It is our posit' ion that the automatic sprinkler systems proposed to provide protection where redundant shutdown systems are less than 20 feet apart be designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 13 with ceiling level sprinklers, with additional sprinklers as required below obstructions such as ducts, etc.
c.
Indicate the location of redundant safe snutdown system circuits that are closer than 20 feet apart in the centainment areas that are assess-ible during plant ooeration.
e, it is our position that the control room and remote shutdown panels be electrically isolated from each other se tnat a fire in either area that destroys redundant safe shutcown cir:uits in, tnat area will not dfect the safe shutdown capability frcm tne otherl area. Consicer that a postulated fire in tne remote shutcewn canel area will affect bo n remote shutcown panels simultaneously.
Incicate how you will ccmply witn this position.
f.
Revise your FSAR to reflect your statements during our site visit that redundant safe shutdown circuits are not located in a single cable spread-i ing room or in the Computer and Control Panels room.(room OC403) or indicate how remote shutdown capability will be provided if a fire in l
either of thne areas was to destroy redundant circuits in that room.
a 012.2 Cemonstrate that safe shutdcwn capability is maintained if a fire in a transformer at the west wall of the control building was to introduce sufficient smoke into the fresh air intakes to cause shutdcwn of all ventilation systems with fresh air intakes at -he west wall of the control building.
i 013.3
-Confirm that ventilation air flow monitors'are provided for the battery room exhaust systems and that alarms will sound in the control room on
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loss of ventilation air flow.
Cl3.4
'see Question 013.le.
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013.6 a.
Response is adequate.
b.-
It is our. position that the access door to the concealed ceiling space above the control room be maintained locked at all times, and that the limited-combustible ductwork insulation be replaced with noncombustible insulation. Also, revise your technical specifica-tions to indicate that no work of any. kind shall be condected in the. ceiling space unless the plant.is in a cold shutdown situation.
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L c.
Response is adequate.
013.6 N C0 10466 does not exempt Grand Gulf from the requirement to use Tef:el insulated' cable in the PGCC system; it only states that all BWR/6 plants use Tef:el insulated cables except Grand Gulf. However, we find your present. installation acceptacle with tne Halon suppression system installed provided you verify your statement made during our site. visit.that all termination and control cacinets in the control room which contain redundant safety-related systems will be proviced' with.an ionization-type smoke detector which will alarm in the controi room.
In addition, verify that the Halon system installed to protect the PGCC flocr sections is designed to provice a 3C% concentration, and is designed to protect the specific PC C floor layout at Grand Gulf.
013.7 It is cur position that you verify that a crack er eucture of the recirculation. pump luce oil system at any point in :he system (incluc-in; the, reservoir and bearings) will not allow oil to leak outsice of L
- ne meter housing. Or, if nis cannet ce cemenstratec than an' engineered cil containment and collection system must be installec wnich will mest Reg. Guide 1.29, paragraph C.2.
I
+
013.3 Previde revisec Table gA-2 and prov de rehised Figures 9.A (includin; i
a.
Figures 9.A-16 thru 9 A-35) so that they reflect ycur commitment to install automatic fire detection in all areas of the plant which contain safety-related equipment or circuits.
l b.
Respense is adecuate.
t 013.9 (1) It is our pcsition that all flecr/ ceiling construction in safety.
related builcings will have the structural steel protected to previce comoliance witn the referenced UL design nutoers 0903 and D916.
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addition, identify and justify tne fire rating of all flocr/ ceiling cen-l struction in the safety-related ' buildings that are less than 3-hours.
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(2) Response is adecuate.
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- (2). Indicate 'where and justify the use of any "non-fire rated pene,
'i trations," wnich you reference in Tacle 9A-1, sheet 5 of 20,
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subitem J.
013.10 Your. response indicates that water. spray systems will be installed to avoid direct impingement en Class-IE equipment and Class IE cables near such equipment. Indicate how this will be compatible with the requirement for total area sprinkler coverage where recundant.
shutdewn systems are located in the same fire area.
013.11 Verify that the control room and the react'e shutdown panel area are the only areas that need to be occupied to perform all functions required to achieve a cold shutdown.
In accition, our position on 8-hour emergency lignting also ap: lies to a::ess and egress routed to all fire areas that need to be usec durinc safe shutdown. Verify tnat you will ecmply with this position, i
013.12' Response is adequate.
013.13 E.
Provide the results of the field acceptance tests of the fire pumps, i
- . Sections E.2(d) and (e) cf Appencix A c ET: 9.5-1 state that fire water supplies snould be calculated on the basis of :ne largest expectec flow rate for a period of two hours (but nc: isss tnan 300,000 gallons),
and tnat, if tanks are used te supply :ne water, tw: 100% capacity talks should be provice:. The maximum ceman; a: 3 rand Gulf was given to te 2700 gpm for sprinklers plus 500 g;m fer nose streams, or a total of 3200 gpm. The recuire: water su::1y for a 2-neur duration is 354,000 caliens. Two 300,000 gallen tanks co not ee: the A:;endix A guidelines.
Ineref ore, indicate how you will 00mply witn cur Ap:endix A guicelines.
On page 9A-17 cf y:ur FSAR you state :na: :ne fire ;rc e::icn water sup;1y also :revices water fer ::nstructicr. use.
It is our positi:n tnat you ecmply wi:n :ne recuirements of Se::icn 0.1.e Of A;;encix A regardine tne fire water supply.
Indicate your inten: to : mply witn this requirement.
l 013.14 No response was received for this cuestion. Provide the Cesign criteria for the Halen and CO2 system used in safety-relatec areas cf the plant.
012.15 Response is adequate.
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(i) Verify that the five men assigned to :ne fire trigade on each snif:
will not be r6:uire; to perform any etner fun::icns (i.e. emergency
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shutdown) in a fire emergency.
i (2) Respense is ade:uate.
012.17 Response is cue:uate.
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013.18 It is our position that all valves. in the fire prete::icn water supply system be provided with electrical su;ervisory switenes arraccec to give visual and audible alarm in the centrol rec: if the valve position.is changed. An ac:e;;acie alternate for sectionalizing valves whien Oc not contrei su;cression systems is that the valves be locked cpen with'a strict key centrol prc:ecure, with periodic verificatien of :ne valve position.
013.19 Your fire prete: icn system diagrams indicate na the suppression and stancpipe nose systems in containment are not connected to ne plant fire water supply system.
It is car Oesi icn :nat tnese systems ce part of tne overall plan fire etter system and re:eive their water sup ly frc that system. As an alternate, ce cnstrate tha: the concensate and refueling water storage anc transfer system is acequate to su: ply the require fire flex, assuming loss cf off site power, anc :nat it otherwise meets ne re:uirements for re-liatility and water supply s:crage reserve ex:ected of fire water supply systems. Als0, verify that the fun: icnal capab'iity of the c ncensate and refueling water transfer system acuid nc
- e ce-grace:.
013.20 Your fire prc ection system diagrams indicate that the ::n:rci buil:in; anc diesel genera:Or tuildings water su::rassi:n anc stan: i;e an: h:se station systers are succlied cy a single ::nne :icn c :ne icceec.firi water system fr r eacn tuilcing.
I is cur ::sition :na you provice additi0nal c nne::icns.:: Ocr:icts of ne ice:e: fire water syster ar:
rovi:e sufficien: valves sc :na; a sir.gie :reat in :ne fire aa er system aill n
- reclude all fire etter su::.y c any areas cf :ne
- 1an.
013.31 Y ur fire ;r::e:-icn system ciagrams inci:1:e :na: :ne ra:was e Ouilcing fire Or: e: icn atter su::1y nea:er 1: *c se::icnali:e:
Dy snu:cf' valves.
It is Our posi:icn na valves :e previced in :ne ra:naste cuilcin; heacer sc :na a singie :rea4 in :ne hea er er in the systems connected to tne header will not necessi ate snu :ing ccwn the fire protection water supply for the entire building.
013.2; Verify :na: a single fire wni:n :Ould :es r:y the RER "A" in: "B" instrument panels and the RCIC instrumen :anel in :ne eas c:rrider at.eleva icn 93'-0" Of :ne auxiliary :uil:ing wcui: not nave any acverse effe: On safe snut:cwn systems.
013.23 Ycur analysis states tha: :ne ner:n aali :f :ne HFC3 pump r::c, r:::
1AiO9 at eleva icn 93'-0" cf :ne auxiliary builcing, is ncn-rate:..
Your ra.re erote: tion rian, igure 9.e.-a, incicates that :nis wa., is r
ti a 3-neur rated fire aail. Confir :ha: :nis waii, inclucing pene-tration seals, is a 3-ncur rated wall.
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3-013 24 It is cur posi-ion that the unassignec area (rces la 404) en elevatica 166'-0" cf the auxisiary builcing,De provided with a s:cke detecticn system as a ninimu=, and :nn an aute=atic sprinkler system be previced if the rc:a cc:upancy causes co=ustibles to te s:cred.
012 25 During our site visit we ncted tha: many of tne decrs identified en your Fire Prc:ection Plan drawings as 3.ncur rate fire decrs are actually air-tign: decrs er other -d: Ors that have not been tested fer fire resistance. Althcugh yce have a statement frc= the -
manuf a: urer :na: :nese doors are "similar" in design to rated fire decrs, it is Our ::siticn :na.: you provide 3-neur ra:ed, labeled fire cocrs at all such ic:atien, wnien incluce tne decrs frcc :ne turbine building-:: tha auxiliar.v and :ntr:1 Ouildings.
013.25 During our site visit ycu indicated that re:undant safe shutd wn system cable was reu:ec. hrough bc:n the Divisi:n I and Divisien II switchgear areas on elevati:n lil'-C" cf :ne centrei building. These areas are presently prete::ed by CO2 :::al. flecding syster:, and you indicated tha: :ne reduncant train of ca:les in ea n area wculd be wrapped witn a One ncur fire ratec tarrier.
- is Our position tna:
an au:cenic wner su;;ressi:n syste :s ins alled in eacs grea in at:ition :: :ne One hour fire rned carrier ar une ene division Of
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013.25 Verify :na: all ficer c;enings be:'aeen.ne.::n r:1 roem and the 1:wer cable spreading re: will be sealed t: Orovide a 3-nour fire resistan:e, including the coening identified en Figure 9.A-25 as " Openings in ceiling abow wnere recuired for b ::c: entry :: terminaticn cabine:s in cen rel re.="
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t 013.30 Incicate tne ty;e of ficer : ve-ing ar.icn till De used in :ne cen:rci
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room.
It is our ; siti:n :na: carpet n - be utiTi:ed.
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013.31 Verify that the interface between the con:rol reem viewing gallery (rcom OC 501) and :ne concealed space acove the con:rci rec:
suspended ceiling will be separated with at.least a 1-nour fire barrier.
t 013.32 It is our position tnat the wall separating the Unit 1 and Uni: 2 sides cf the centrol roca be replaced witn noncroustible material if it is.to remain in. place when Unit 1.is Operating and Unit 2 is under construction.
'013.33 It is our positien that you comply with Secticns 0.1(d) of Appencix A.
to BTP 9.5-1 by replacing all Ssulatien, ractation snielding and sound-proofing caterials that are other than ncnce.custible witn i
noncccbustible materials in all safety rel4:ed areas of the plant.
This includes the. limited-cccbustible duct insula:ica presently :,eing installed.
013'.31 It is our position that, in addition to the au cmatic sprinkler system proposed fer the area, cne of the twc civisions of diesel generator cable re;uired for safe snu:de,,n be enciesed in a =inimum 1-hour fire barrier in the ccrridor between the auxiliary building l
and the diesel genera cr builcing (Rec 1A 301).
013.35 It is cur posi-ion that the diesel genera :r. rec: cuiside air fans i
te arranged te start au cmatically in the "ivisien I or II. diesel cenerater rec.s upon cetection of s:cke in eitner of the other two diesel generator reem to ;r' event :ne s:cke frer a fire in ene roem frem filtering bacx into tne other recrs :nrcu;n the exhaus c;enings to tne cc=cn ccrricer, rec 1A 301. As an ai:ernate, the fire da ccrs presently installed in the exnaust cpenines snculd te arranced :: also c1cse as a smcke camper.
I 013.35 Verify tha: tr.e ce ection systems which are ; sed :c actuate fire su;pression systems will alarm in :ne cen:rci recm incepencently cf the scccression syster actua-icn.
013.37 In Table 9A-1 of your FSAR, you incica:e.na the ner a1 plan:
ventilation systee.s wcuic te used te ventilate smoke and c ner pro-cucts of cccoustion. Since the ventilation equipment may not hancle the smcke because of clogged filters, it is our position that pertable s:cke exhaus: fans anc cucts be provided. The ;crtable units previced snould be designec' fer suen use, snoulc ce ca:acle of being used wi:n-out.cffsite acwer, anc shcuic be sufficien in nur:er anc ca aci y :c provide ventila icn for any area cf :ne cle.n. wnere nertal ventilatien
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systeras cannct te relied ucon.
0i3.33 Verify :na: automatic fire ce:ection is ceing previced in tne new and spent fuel pcol area.
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013.39 It is our position that water type portable fire.extinguisners be installed a: strategic locations throu:n:u: ne 21 ant...inclucing
- ne centroir ro:: and cable spreacing rec s.
- nfir: :nc: yo: will meet -his position..
013.40 I:Lis our position that, due to the large fire load, the miscellan-
'i ecus equip ent. area (r::: 1A 509) a: elevation 154'-0" cf the c:c:ain-men; building be prc:ected witn an au ::atic sprinkler system.
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C.'.a.(l) cf NRC Standard Review Flan and section !!!.G Of new A;;er. dix ?. ::
-l 10 FR Far: 50, it is the staff's p:sition tna cabling for redun: ant safe'
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sh :i:wr. systems should be separated by walls having a :nree-hour fire rating
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required for er associated with :he primary se*h:: Of snu d:an, sh:uid :e
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s:*.in; required for er assetiated with :ne redundar. Or alterr; ate metr.:d Of sh;;::wn. Tc assure that redundan snu:d:-n :!bie sysians and ali : her : :le r
sys:e 3 :na: are asso:f a ed wit.~. :ne snut::-n :::le system; are se: ara:Ed fr::
ea n 0:ner so tna; both are n:: subje: :: :arage from a single fire ha:ard, j
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we require the felicwing information f:r each syste needed :: tring the plan:
)
F
- a s,a fe shutd:wn.
i.
Fr:vi:e 4 tadie that lists all equi;sen; incia:ing instrumen;a:icn an: vi ai E
s u;pcr: system equipment required to a:hieve and maintain h:: and/:r ::1:
snut::wn.
F:r each equipment listed:
I a.
Oifferentiate be een equipment required :: a:nieve and lir.:ain no:
s,hu:down and equipment required :: achieve and maintain ::Id shu d:wn, I
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b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area, Define each equipment's redundant counterpart, i
i d.
Identify each equip:ent's essential cabling (instrumen:ation, control, and power).
For each cable identified: (1) Describe the ca bl e routing (by fire area) from sour:e :: t er-:ination, and I
(2) Identify each fire area locati:n wt.tre the : ables are se; ara ed by less than a wali having a three-hour fire rating frc: cabies fer any redundant shutd:wr, sys e=,
and I
List any problem areas identift'e'd by item 1.d.(2) above tha will e.
be corrected in ac::rdance witn Secticn III.G.3 of Appendix R (i.e., alterna:e or dedicated shu:::wn capability).
2.
- :vice a ta:1e ina: iis:: Cla ss II and.' n-Cl a s s.1 E ca:1 es that are a sse:iated with :ne essential sa fe shutd:wn systems identified in ite: 1 as:ve.
For each ca:1e lis ed:
a.
Define the cables' association :: the safe shuid:wn syste: (c:r..:n p wer sour:e, cor=cn ra:eway, separatien less than Regulatory Guide 1.75 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation
- will adversely affe:: shutd:wn systems, e::.),
i 2.
Cescribe each associated :atie r:uting (by fire area) frc= s:urce to termination, and Identify each location nere the associated cables are separated
,by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating fe : cables i
s 2
required for er assoc.ated with any redundant shutd:wn syste.
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3.
Provide one'of the' following for each of the circuits identified in ite:
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2.c above:
(a) The results of an analysisL that dem nstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not a ffect it's associated shutdown system, i
(b) Identify each circuit requiring.a solution in accordance with 4
section III.G.3 of Appendix P., or i
(c) Identify each circuit meeting the requirements of section III.G.2 cf Appendix R (i.e., three-hcur wall, 20 feet of cl ear space with aut:matic fire suppression, r one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).
t Tc assure compliance with GD; li, we require tne f:11 cuing information be 4
pr:vided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken for an altarnate or dedicated shutdca method fer'other fire artzs (as identified by ite-r 1.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G'.3 of new Appendix R l
to 10 CFR Part 50, the following infomation will also be required for
,each of these plant areas.
a.
A table that lists all equip:ent including instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of
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unieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
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A table that lists all equipment i'o:1uding instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are. required by the al:ernate, dedicated, i
or remote method of achieving and maintaining h:t and/or cold shutdown.
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Identify each alternate shutdown ecuipmen listed in ita: 4.5 above c.
with essential cables (instrumen ation, con:rol, and p:wer) that are located in the fire area containing the primary shutd:wn equipment.
~ r etc.i e:uipment listed :revide ene of the f:11: wing:
t (1) Detailed ele:trical schecatic crawings :ba; sh:w the essential cables that are dupli:ated elsewhere and are ele: rically isolated fr:: the subject fire areas, Or i
(2) The' results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure B
(open, ground, or h:: sn:rt) Of each :able icenti'ied will i
not affect the capability := achieve and maintain h: or l
- old shutd:wn.
d.
Fr: vide a table that lists Class 1E and F n-Class 1E cables that are 5
associated with the. alternate, dedi:ated,:r re cte method of shutd:wn.
For each ite listed, identify ea:h associated :able located in the fire area c:ntaining the primary shutd:wn equip:en:.
F:r ea:h cabic s: identified pr: vide the resul:s of an analysis that demanstrates tha failure (o pen, i
ground, or ho: sh:rt) of the ass"5ciated cabie will n:t adversely affe:t i
the alterr. ate. dedicated.or remote method of shutdcen.
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The residual heat rem: val.systeF. is generally a low pressure system na:
interfaces with' the high pressure primary c :lan: syste.s. To preclude I
I a LOCA.thr: ugh this interfa:e, we require c :;1iance with the re::::endte t
tions of Branch Technical Fosition RSS 5-1.
Thusi this interface m:s likely
- nsists Of tw redundant and inde;enden.t ::::r ;trated valves with diversa interlocks in ac:Ordance with Eran:h. Technical 70sition IC513. These j
two m tor operated valves and their ass:ciated cable may be subjet: :: a single fire ha:ard.
It is our c:ncern that this single fire c:uld cause t
the :ae valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA threugh the
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subject nign-lew pressure syste: interface.
I: assure tha: this interface and c her high-law pressure interft:es are adequately prote::ed fr m the t
- effe::s of a single fire, we re;, ire the f:11:.in; inf retti:n:
a.
I entify each high-1:w pressure interfa:e that uses refundant eler.trically c:ntr:11ed cevi:es (su:n as te series :i:::r :; era:e:
i valves) t: is late er. pre:1udi ru::ure f a.y primary :::lan:
i 5:undary, f
1 t
b.
Identify each device's essential :abling (;:wer and c:ntr:1) and describe the cable routing (by fire area} fr:m s:urce ::
termination.
i e
c.
Identify each lo:ati:n hare the identified cables are separated i
ty,less than a wall having a th.et-h:ur fire rating frem ; ables t
.fer the redundant device.
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12 For the areas identified in item 5,: at:ve (if any), pr: vide :ne teses and justification as :: the accepta bility o f
..e existin-design or any prop; sed..:dificaticns.
e 4
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B 4
d 4
er s
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I COMMENTS ON FIRE PROTECTION REQUEST.
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FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION' i
013. la There is no reason to request that the location'of all safe shutdown circui;ts be detatled, Grand Gulf has already submitted their Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), and the staff indicated that for the most part it was one of the better evaluations received. At the site visit it was agreed that MP&L would indicate those redundant cables within 20 feet (the staff's required separation distance) and that
. proposed barrier arrangements would be submitted.
However, the staff agreed that this woul.d be done by way of marked up drawings informally submitted for information only, not by way ~of a formal request for information.
G. Harrison indicated that this question could be deleted and the infonnation submitted informally.
013.5b After discussions with G. Harrison it was acreed that the words "and that the limited combustible ductwork insulation be replaced with noncombustible insulatiori' be deleted.
We agree that the ouestion should be issued as so modified.
013.9 There is no reason to request that all floor / ceiling fire rating be identified. Only those barriers separating areas / items where safe shutdown equinment nees to be protected should be identified. The question should he modified accordinaly.
013.10 Why are we requesting that Class IE switchgear be directly sprayed?~
Other protection is provided, and in addition all redundant cables are separated by the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barriers, except in the switchgear room.
It was agreed that the second sentence of the question should be revised to read:
" Indicate how this will be compatible with the use of fire hoses where redundant shutdown systems are located in the same fire ' areas."
013.22 This question should not be asked, The subject corridor is about 150 feet long, with the 3 pane.ls equally spread out. Only the RHR "A" and "B" panels are redundant and they are on ooposite ends of the corridor.
It is unreasonable,to think that an exposure fire could spread across this distance, especially ;ince the NRC l
position is that a 20 foot separation is adequate.
Finally, what type of verification is expected that is not already in the FHA?
It was agreed that this question should be deleted. At most, we i
could ask whether a sing,le fi.re in this area.could impact safe shutdown systems.
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013.25 This ques",fon should be deleted. This concern was discussed at thel site visit, and the staff was told that t'he manufacturer has indicated that the dcors are made of similar materials and to similar standards and specifications as other fire rated doors. This question would require that each and every " unique" door, be tested even though its "uniquenes:" may be iasignificant (i.e., a different type of latch, bolt,etc.)
013.26 This question should be deleted. Again, why 'are we requesting that
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switchgear be sprayed? This area has very limited cables, is accessible for manual fire fighting,- is protected by CO systems, and is alarmed.
2 013.27 This question should be revised, since it is uncertain how a fire can spread over the 40 foot distance between the-cables.
013.29 This question should be deleted. There are no redundant hot shutdown cables in the cable spreading rooms.
013.33 This question should be deleted. See'connent on question 013.5.
013.34 This question should be deleted.
Why require a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire barrier around one cable when a sprinkler system is already provided. Also, the cables are 20.4 feet apart, and our position is that e 20 foot separation is considered to be an acceptable fire barrier.
It is our understanding that CEB staff also agrees that this request is not appropriate.
Part 3 This entire part should be deleted.
I understand that it is a generic
'i question that is sent to all plants, but it may not be appropriate to issue it at this late stage since many of the contbrns may have already been addressed. At a meeting held about a year aco, the fire protecticn staff discussed our positions with the aoplicant and advised' them to follow the Appendix R proceedings.
The applicant has done this and has submitted their FHA addressing our concerns.
Why then do we ask for this type of information now, when it could have been easy supplied, if needed at all, if we asked for it when the FHA was being performed.
It is our understanding that PSB will review the FHA to determine the appropriateness of these ques'tions and will revise them as needed.
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