ML20126A229
| ML20126A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1985 |
| From: | Martin G CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., EBASCO SERVICES, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126A209 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8506130275 | |
| Download: ML20126A229 (27) | |
Text
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June 10,1985 DOCKETEC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USHRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAYb Jim 12 A10 :30 0FFICE OF SECitt.TAF -
In the Matter of
)
00CKETING & SERVICf.
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BRANCH CAROLINA' POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN
)
Docket No.
50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY
)
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant)
)
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF GUY MARTIN, JR.
ON EDDLEMAN CONTENTION 57-C-10 (Protection Factors of Institutional, Commercial and Industrial Structures) kok6130275850610 7
DOCK 05000400 PDR
r DIRECT TESTIMONY OF GUY MARTIN, JR.
ON EDDLEMAN CONTENTION 57-C-10 (Protection Factors of Institutional, Commercial and Industrial Structures)
Ql.
Please state your full name, employer, position, and business address.
A 1.
My name is Guy Martin, Jr. I am employed by Ebasco Services,Inc. as Manager of the Radiological Assessment Department.
My business address is Two World Trade Center, New York, New York 10048.
Q2.
What is your professional training?
A2.
I graduated from the City College of the City of New York in 1974 with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering. I received a master's degree in -
nuclear engineering from the Polytechnic Institute of New York in 1976. I have also completed training offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for certification as a fallout shelter analyst. The requirements to become a FEMA-certified fallout shelter analyst are to be either a graduate engineer or architect and to successfully complete a graduate level course on shelter analysis given by FEMA.
The two-week course covers the fundamentals of shielding analysis of structures and the application of FEMA computer codes in the analysis.
Successful completion of the course is based on passing two approximately four-hour examinations.
- Q3.
Please describe your professional experience.
A 3.
Since joining Ebasco Services, Inc. in 1973, I have had extensive experience in developing engineering safety analyses for radiological and toxic chemical protection related to nuclear power plants. Among my areas of responsibility has been preparing the sections of Safety Analyses and Environmental Reports for 4
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.ON nuclear plants dealing with the impact of toxic chemical and radiological releases. This work includes estimating radionuclide releases from plant effluents and calculating radiological doses to biota and man. I have also been involved in preparing: radiological surveillance programs for nuclear power plants.
As a FEMA-certified fallout shelter analyst, I have performed shelter effectiveness studies of various buildings within several southern California school districts and the California Polytechnic State University (CPSU) at San Luis Obispo. These studies consisted of calculating protection factors for various radiation exposure pathways using FEMA's Shelter Analysis for Nuclear Defense (SAND) computer program and other analytical shielding methods. I have prepared reports for CPSU and the California Office of Emergency Services on the sheltering effectiveness of buildings.
I have served as manager of Ebasco's Radiological Assessment -
Department since 1982. A more detailed summary of my professional training and experience is appended hereto as Attachment 1.
Q4.
Mr. Martin, what is the purpose of your direct testimony?
A4.
The purpose of my testimony is to describe the activities that Ebasco has taken on
- behalf of Applicants and in conjunction with the State of North Carolina Division of Emergency _ Management (DEM) to ~ address the remaining. issues concerning-Eddleman Contention 57-C-10. As originally admitted by the Licensing Board, Eddleman Contention 57-C-10 stated:
The State Plan (PT I pp 45-46 and 50-53) provides no useful analysis or information on sheltering effectiveness; but without knowledge of sheltering effectiveness, a decision of that option versus evacuation will 0
be ill-informed and cuite possibly wrong.
The plan's discussion of protective actions is mostly a list of them and a little handwaving-it's hopelessly inadequate. The plan, for potential shelters in those in the SHNPP plume EPZ, does not comply with Evaluation Criterion J.10.m of NUREG-0654, which calls for inclusion in the plan of " expected local protection afforded in' residential units or other shelter for direct and inhalation exposure...." ;
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c' In admitting Eddleman Contention 57-C-10, the Board indicated that what is needed to comply with Criterion J.10.m. are " sound estimates of the protection afforded by potential shelters typical of the SHNPP plume EPZ." "Further Rulings on Admissibility of Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions Submitted by Intervenor Eddleman" (June 14,1984), at 18. In order to address the Board's '
ruling, Applicants commissioned a survey of structures within the Harris plume
. exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) which I directed. On the basis of the survey results, information regarding the sheltering effectiveness (measured by protection factor) of typical residences in the EPZ was derived. The survey fresults and protection factors were summarized in the Affidavit of Robert G.
Black, Jr. in Support of Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposition of CCNC Contention 2 and Eddleman' Contention 57-C-10 (January 11, 1985) (" Black Affidavit"), and the protection factors have. been -included in the off-site emergency plan for tlie Harris Plant.
In denying Applicants' motion for summary disposition of Eddleman Contention 57-C-10, the Board nevertheless ruled out litigation of many of the issues originally raised in this contention. The Board explicitly ruled out "the issue of.
protection factors afforded by the types of housing prevalent in the Harris plume EPZ" and stated that the Applicants undertook a "well-designed, well-executed, and ~ thoroughly documented review of these protection factors." " Memorandum and. Order (Ruling on Remaining Summary Disposition Motions)" (April 24, 1985),
at 3.
According to the Board, the 'one issue which remains concerning the Applicants' review of typical sheltering in the Harris plume EPZ is the " adequacy of the Applicants' review of sheltering other than single-family residential." The i
Board went.on to suggest that the offsite emergency plan for the Harris Plant 1 -..
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'should include information on the sheltering effectiveness of "typicalinstitutional structures (schools, churches, etc.),' commercial structures and industrial facilities in the plume EPZ" in order to bring it into complete compliance with Evaluation Criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654. Id. at 6-7.
' In order to address the issues identified by the Licensing Board in its April 24, 1985 Memorandum and Order, I have directed a survey of institutional structures, commercial structures and industrial facilities within the plume exposure EPZ of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This survey is a supplement to the earlier survey which concentrated more on ' residential structures.
We have analyzed the results of the latest survey in order to determine a range of protection factors for categories of institutional, commercial and industrial structures.
Q5.
Please explain what you mean by the Protection Factor of a structure.
A 5. - The sheltering effectiveness of a structure is measured in terms of its Protection Factor (PF). The PF is the ratio of the radiation dose outside the structure to the.
dose inside. It indicates the degree to which a structure would afford protection from a radiation release in comparison with no shelter at all. Thus, a building having a PF of 1 would not reduce radiation exposure at all compared to the absence of any shelter, while a building with a PF of 2 would reduce exposure by_
50 percent.
Q6.
Evaluation - criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654 calls for a determination of i
~ protection for both direct and inhalation exposure. Please explain the differences between these types of radiation exposure.
A 6.
Direct exposure is that which results from radiation impinging directly on the human body and organs either from airborne or deposited nuclides. Airborne 1-.
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nuclides are the source of radiation in the air; exposure results when radiation
- (mainly in the form of gamma rays) is absorbed by the body. Deposited nuclides may be on the outside _ of the structure, such as on the roof or in the ground surrounding a building; radiation from these sources may penetrate a structure and the occupants inside. In contrast to direct radiation which results from radiation impinging directly upon the body and its organs, inhalation exposure results from breathing radioactive materialin the air. In the event of an airborne release of radioactive material, the inhalation exposure to a person in a structure increases over time because air carrying radionuclides penetrates the building so that the concentration of radionuclides inside. eventually approaches the outside concentration.
How quickly this will occur depends upon the air exchange between the structure and the outside atmosphere.
Q7.
What structural characteristics are most important in determining the PF of a structure?
A 7.
The sheltering effectiveness of a structure is a function of the mass of material between the source of radiation and the person inside. The PF of a building will generally be greater for a building that is constructed of dense materials and in which there are a number of floors between the radiation source and the occupied area.-
Thus,- the most important structural characteristics are the type of construction and exterior finish, number of stories, and presence or absence of a basement. A building of brick, concrete or similar construction generally has a higher PF than one of wood frame construction. A multi-story structure generally provides more protection than a one-story structure. If a basement is available,it will provide even better protection. Since the inhalation exposure PF is a function of the air exchange rate between a structure and the outside, data concerning the windows and other exterior openings are also relevant. w
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Q8. -
How did you obtain information needed to determine the PFs of ins'itutional, t
commercial and industrial structures in the EPZ?
A 8.
Working with the DEM staff, I organized a' group of persons (all familiar with the building characteristics relevant. to sheltering effectiveness) to gather the necessary information.
Initially, we attempted to identify what types of institutional, commercial and industrial structures could be considered " typical" of such structures within the Harris EPZ. To obtain this information, we relied in
. part upon information that had been previously developed during the earlier survey of potential shelters in the EPZ. Information on structures was obtained from the
- property tax records of the counties in the EPZ and by a field survey of selected highways within the EPZ. A shelter survey of the hospitals, nursing homes and family care facilities in the EPZ had previously been conducted to respond to
-Eddleman Contention 57-C-13.
This was supplemented by information from several additional sources.
We formed three survey teams (each composed of two persons) to gather field data. Two survey teams were composed of Ebasco personnel (including myself). The other team was composed of two DEM staff members. At least one FEMA-certified shelter analyst was on each survey team. In order to identify larger commercial / industrial facilities (which are likely to shelter larger numbers
'of persons), survey teams contacted Carolina Power & Light Company district managers in Cary, Fuquay-Varina, and Sanford. Listings and addresses of large commercial power users within the Harris EPZ were obtained from the district managers. In addition, discussions were held with various persons knowledgeable about the Harris 'EPZ, including members of local chambers of commerce, municipal clerks and postal employees.
Information was also gathered using f'
resources within the North Carolina State Government. Aerial photographic maps of the EPZ area, state listings of manufacturing facilities and state tax records were all used as aids to obtain information. Finally, the plume EPZ was divided into roughly 120 segments and a road survey was conducted by the three survey teams. During the road surveys, institutional, commercial and industrial facilities were observed. Major commercial and industrial facilities identified as a result of the previously outlined approaches were visited, and notes taken regarding their general construction and composition of the building material In addition, any facilities observed which were not previously identified were recorded.
Q9.
Using the survey results, how did you categorize these structures?
A 9.
With respect to commercial / industrial structures, the predominant type of such structures in the EPZ is small retail establishments, such as service stations, fast i
food restaurants, and convenience food markets.
These establishments are typically of brick veneer construction and are similar in terms of sheltering effectiveness to single family residences of the same construction. Although these facilities predominate in terms of number, a smaller number of major establishments has a greater capacity for sheltering the population. From the sources described above, we identified 51 large commercial and industrial facilities that may be occupied by a large number of persons on a regular basis.
These 51 facilities are listed by geographic location in Attachment 2 to my
- testimony. In order to study these larger commercial / industrial structures more closely, they were placed into six categories based on similaritics in the construction material and building design. The six categories are: (1) shopping centers; (2) Butler-type buildings; (3) steel frame, brick / concrete buildings; (4) multi-story homogeneous structures; (5) complex sites; and (6) downtown shopping districts. Attachment 3 lists the number of structures in each category and also describes _the major characteristics associated with each category. As can be seen from Attachment 3,70 percent of the large commercial / industrial structures fall in~ the categories of Butler-type buildings and steel frame, brick / concrete buildings.
With : respect to institutional buildings, most fall within three basic categories: (1) schools; (2) churches; and (3) hospitals and nursing homes. There
' are also a numb'er of other institutional structures in the EPZ, such as family care facilities, Homes for the Elderly (a senior citizen community), day care centers and Camp Agape (a Lutheran church retreat). However, the family care facilities, Homes for the Elderly, and Camp Agape were not separately analyzed since they are essentially residential-type structures.
The day care centers were not separately analyzed because they are either residential-type structures or are an integral part of another institutional structure (a church or school). Information on the PFs of residential structures is already in the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (the "ERP" or "offsite emergency plan").
Q10. How were the protection factors for commercial, industrial and institutional buildings determined?
A10.. For larger commercial / industrial structures, representative structures within each of the six categories listed above were selected for more detailed analysis. At least two structures were selected within each category except for the downtown shopping district category. For that category, only one building typical of the downtown Apex shopping district was analyzed. The buildings were selected so as to represent the range of construction type within each category. For example, in.
the steel frame, brick / concrete building category, the structures selected for detailed analysis include concrete block, brick and poured concrete structures. A conscious effort was made to avoid analyzing two buildings in each category which are composed of identical materials. Based upon this approach, a total of 13 large commercial / industrial faculties was selected.
These facilities are listed in
- Attachment 4. The schools in the EPZ were visited. As a result of these visits and inspections, two schools were selected as representative of the type of design and construction used by all facilities. These two schools, Apex Elementary School and Fuquay-Varina Senior High School, were analyzed in greater detail.
To perform the detaned analysis for a structure, visits were made to each facility and information was obtained regarding the construction material, wall,
. floor and roof thickness. In addition, the size of the bunding, windows and doors and the distance between the shelter area and other buildings located nearby were obtained. The information was most often obtained by reviewing architectural and construction drawings of each of the buildings and through discussions with a responsible person at each facility such as the plant manager or plant engineer.
When facility drawings were insufficient or unavailable, direct tape measurements were performed.
After the detailed information for each structure was obtained, the data were transmitted to FEMA for input into FEMA's Shelter Analysis for Nuclear Defense (SAND) computer code. This computer code was used to calculate PFs for direct exposure to deposited nuclides. PFs for direct exposure to airborne nuclides were calculated using the models in David H. Slade, " Meteorology and Atomic Energy" (July 1968).
This document is a standard reference for radiological dose calculation methodology issued by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. To
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calculate PFs of the structures for inhalation exposure, the methodology described in Attachment 5 was followed.
The application of the above analytical techniques to develop the PFs for the various exposure pathways was restricted to the large commercial / industrial structures and schools. The identification of PF values for churches and small commercial structures was made by comparing their construction characteristics to those of typical residences for which protection factors have already been determined.
In general, churches and smaller commercial units (e.g., service stations, fast food restaurants, banks, etc.) have construction features which are, on average, comparable to or somewhat better than the typical residence in the Harris Plant EPZ in terms of sheltering effectiveness.
Whereas the typical private residence is of wood-frame construction with a large percentage having a wood outside covering, the small unattached commercial units are typically either of poured concrete or concrete block construction with or without a brick veneer covering. As such, these smaller commercial structures were evaluated relative to private residences. They were found to offei comparable or somewhat better protection against radiation than the typical private residence in the Harris Plant EPZ. The same was concluded for the churches. They were found to be of comparable construction material (wood frame with brick veneer or wood covering) to private residences. The added advantage of churches is their larger size which helps increase the isolation distance between their occupants and exterior sources of radiation.
The two hospitals, three nursing homes, nine family care facilities and Homes for the Elderly were surveyed earlier in order to address the issues raised.
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by Eddleman Contention 57-C-13, which concerned the identification of the best PF areas of these facilities. I personally visited each of these facilities. As a result of a detailed analysis of the structural features of each facility (such as types of co4truction, construction material, presence of basement, outside covering, type of windows), areas in the facilities with the best PFs were identified for the purpose of determining where to best shelter residents,1f a radiation release occurs. This information is reflected in the Affidavit of Jesse T.
Pugh, III in Support of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 57-C-13 (December 12, 1984). As I previously stated, the family care facilities and Homes for the Elderly are of residential-type construction.. The hospitals and nursing homes have construction characteristics that provide somewhat better protection than a typical residence. Both the hospitals and nursing homes are generally constructed of concrete blocks, sometimes with brick veneer exteriors. Their interior walls are also of concrete blocks. The hospitals offer better protection than the nursing homes because of two structural' characteristics: (1) they have flat roofs with a concrete base over a steel decking rather than asphalt shingle roofs; and (2) they have more interior rooms with concrete block walls and no exterior windows.
Q11. Please identify the range of protection factors within each category of institutional, commercial, and industrial structures.
All. The protection factors for direct radiation exposure for the 13 major commercial / industrial structures selected for detailed analysis are shown in. The comparable PFs for the two representative schools are given in Attachment 7. summarizes the range of direct exposure protection factors for the schools and for each category of major 1
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commercial / industrial structures. The range of inhalation protection factors for all commercial and industrial structures and schools is set forth in the table in, page 4 of my testimony.
For. the typical smaller commercial establishments and churches, the range of PFs for direct radiation exposure is comparable _ to that for residences in the EPZ. ' Because _ a typical smaller commercial establishment is of concrete or concrete block constrction, its PF range will be most similar to that for brick residences (which have higher PFs than wood frame residences). Because of the added isolation distance available in churches, the PF range for churches will be
- perhaps slightly higher than that for residences of like construction.
The derivation of the direct exposure PFs for residences was discussed in the Black
' Affidavit, and the PFs are provided in the offsite emergency plan at Part 1, section IV.E.8. The PFs are derived from information in EPA 520/1-78-001B on the degree of protection afforded by wood frame or brick single story homes without basements, which is the typical residential structure in the Harris EPZ.
" Protective Action Evaluation, Part II, The Effectiveness of Sheltering As A
~ Protective Action Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases" (EPA 520/1-78-001B) at 18, 24.
In EPA 520/1-78-001B, the level of protection is expressed in terms of the reduction factor or attenuation factor. The PFs in the offsite emergency plan are the reciprocal of the reduction factor or attenuation factors. For typical smaller commercial establishments, the range of PFs for inhalation exposure is as set forth in the table in Attachment 5, page 4 of my.
testimony. For a typical church, the range of PFs for inhalation exposure would be comparable to that for residences. The methodology for calculating these PFs is the same as that described in Attachment 5 to my testimony, and the PFs are provided in the ERP at Part 1, section IV.E.8.
"As I stated earlier, the family care facilities which we surveyed are of residential construction. Their range of PFs is the same'as for typical residences in the EPZ. The relevant structural characteristics of the nursing homes are similar to those for the smaller commercial establishments. Thus, the nursing
.home PFs have 's range comparable to that for the typical small commercial structures. Finally, the two hospitals have structural characteristics comparable to certain wings of the schools that were visited and analyzed. Thus, the hospital PFs fall within the range of school PFs identified in Attachment 5, page 4,' and
. Attachment 8. The hospitals and nursing homes have some areas where patients could be sheltered where the PFs are significantly better than other areas of the 1 -
same facility.
Q12. In your opinion, does the availability of this information satisfy the requirements of Criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654?
A 12.~
Yes. With the availability of this information, DEM will be able to amend the offsite. emergency plan for the Harris Plant to include information on the protection factors of typical institutional, commercial and industrial structures in the EPZ.
Along with information on PFs of typical residences (which has previously been incorporated into the offsite plan), this will comport fully with the literal wording of Criterion J.10.m., which calls for inclusion of information on the " expected local protection afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct and inhalation exposure."
Q13. Does this conclude your testimony?
A 13. Yes.
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ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 3 GUY MARTIN, JR Manager Radiological Assessment
SUMMARY
OF EXPERIENT (Since 1965)
Total Experience - Twelve years participation in preparation of engineering safety analysis of radiological and toxic chemical protection. Six years in cost analysis for insurance premium determination.
Professional Affiliations - American Society of Mechanical Engineers Health Physics Society American Nuclear Society Intern Engineer in New York State Certified Fallout Shelter Analyst Education -
M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of New York, 1976 8.M.E., City College of the City of New York, 1974 REPRESENTATIVE EBASC6 PRO,ECT EXPERIENCE (Since 1973)
Manager - Radiological Assessment Department Areas of complete responsibility include the preparation of Safety Analysis and Environmental Reports (part of the Construction Permit and Operating License application for nuclear power plants) sections dealing with impact analyses of toxic chemical and radiological releases. Such analyses are performed for both routine plant operation and under accident conditions. In this regard, conduct reviews of radwaste handling systems, air handling and cleanup systems and habitability systems. Estimate radionuclide releases from plant effluents and calculate radiological doses to biota and man. Calculate the in-plant dose rates to equipment and personnel from airborne radionuclide exposure and perform "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA) reviews of air cleanup systems. Perform safety reviews of engineered safety systems, their specifications and operation from a radiation protection viewpoint and provide design recommendations based on assessed radiological doses and established nuclear safety criteria. Perform the analysis of transport of toxic chemicals postulated to be released accidentally and calculate their concentration in critical locations of a power plant and, provide technical feedback on required protection level. Assist responsible disciplines in determining toxic chemical detector specifications based on worker and equipment protection criteria.
Additional area of responsibility include the preparation of radiological environmental surveillance programs. In this regard, prepare detailed surveillance program description based upon site-specific critical pathways of exposure.
Specify samples, frequency and types of analysis to be performed, prepare vendor and/or laboratory bid request, select contractor, assist in monitoring equipment selection and review periodic surveillance reports submitted by contractors.
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ATTACIDTNT 1 Page 2 of 3 l
GUY MARTIN, 2 (Cont'd)
Participate in the defense of the licensing documents. Activities involve preparation of responses to intervenor interrogatories, testimonies and furnishing technical support to Ebasco's clients in
' licensing presentations (e.g., ACRS, NRC, etc.) and, ASLB safety and environmental hearings.
Experience to date spans over the following Ebasco projects:
Client Project Heactor Type Houston Lighting & Power Cog any Allens Creek 1 BWR Comision Federal de Electricidad Laguna Verde 1 & 2 BWR Taiwan Power Corporation Chin Shan 1&2 BWR Louisiana Power & Light Company Waterford 3 PWR Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris 1-4 PWR Washington Public Power Supply WNP 3 & 5 PWR System Florida Power & Light Company St Lucie 1 & 2 PWR As a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) certified fallout shelter analyst, performed shelter effectiveness studies of various buildings within several Southern California school districts and the California Polytechnic State University (CPSU) at San Luis Obispo. These studies consisted of calculations of protection factors for various radioactive plume exposure pathways using FEMA's SAND coguter program and other analytical shielding methods. Prepared reports for CPSU and California Office of Emergency Services on building shelter effectiveness.
In addition to the above, participated in the following tasks:
Decommissioning Requirements for Nuclear Waste Repository Licensing i
Was principal investigator on a study whose principal component was the establisnment of comprehensive data base covering D&D as it applies to a high-level waste repository located in specific geological formations.
- The report prepared by Envirosphere presented a compilation of the various regulations and existing industry guidance and experience l
- alternatives which may apply to such waste repository facilities along pertinent to D&D.
In addition, a discussion of the various D&D
~
with D&D strategies and scenarios were presented.
Remedial Action Project - Kellex Laboratory Site 1
Supervised (on part-time basis) the health physics activities related to the decontamination work. Such activities included personnel and environmental monitoring, field radiation surveys and quality control.
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r ATTACHMENT 1 Pag 3.3 of 3 gly MARTIN, JR (Cont'd)
PRIOR EXPERIENCE (6 years)
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the US Cost Analyst Work involved calculating and analyzing cost of various activities performed throughout the company; assisting departmental managers in their budget preparation work. Made statistical studies for determination of activity costs and providing company's actuaries support information for premium detennination.
Publications Martin, G and J Thomas 1978. Meeting the dose requirements of 10CFR100 for site suitability and general design criteria 19 for control room habitability: a parametric approach. Transactions of American Nuclear Society 24th Annual Meeting. Vol. 28.
~
Martin, G, D Michlewicz and J Thomas 1978. Fission 2120: a program for assessing the need for engineered safety feature grade air cleaning systems in post - accident environment. Proceedings of 15th DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference..
- Letizia, A P, G Martin and J F Silvey 1979. - Implications for nuclear facilities of changes being initiated in the NRC standard atmospheric diffusion model.
Proceeding of the 41st Anneal Meeting of the Anerican Power Conference.
Bhatia, R K, Mauro, J, Martin, G.
Effects of Containment Purge on the Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident. Transactions of Anerican Nuclear Society 1980 Annual Meeting.
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ATTACHMENT 2 LISTING OF MAJOR COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES WITHIN THE TEN MILE EPZ Apex Vicinity Fuquay-Varina Vicinity Aper Shopping Plaza Fuquay-Varina Shopping Center Piggly Wiggly Grocery Store Milkove Shopping Center Apex Shopping Center Variety Wholesalers Data General Corp.
Tobacco Grower's Services Amsco Medical Products Servisco Uniform Rental Carolina Plywood Stephen's Hardware Plunkett-Webster, Inc.
Francis Feeds N.'C. Fire and Safety Equipment El Dorado Tire Co.
Jeff Mullins Chevrolet Green Seed Co.
Tastee-Freez of North Carolina Fuquay Cooperative Warehouse Potter Industries Betts Tackle Co.
Henry Wurst, Inc.
Arrowhead Tool Builders Tipper-Tie Watkins Johnson Almay Cosmetics Fidelity Bank of Fuquay-Varina Ramada Inn Hudson Belk Cooper Group Lufkin Universal Polymer Apex Town Hall Lan-O-Sheen
= Apex Downtown Shopping District Flex-Line Shaddock Construction Co.
Kendall Company B. Everett Jordan Project Office Cornell Dubilier Electronies Fuquay-Varina Downtown Shopping District Moncure Vicinity Haywood-Moncure Comm. Health Center Cherokee Brick E
Chembond Corp.
City of Sanford Water Treatment Plant CP&L Cape Fear Steam Electric Plant Jones Memorial Park Rec. Center Allied Corp.
Boise-Cascade Weyerhaeuser Federal Paperboard Co.
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y ATTACHMENT 3 NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES BY CATEGORY Category Number Description I.
Shopping Centers 5
Single story structure, 3 load bearing walls, subdivided into smaller stores with concrete block partitions, flat roof, glass front.
II.
Butler-type Buildings 20 Single story, steel frame, metal roof and siding, typical warehouse style building.
III.
Steel Frame Brick / Concrete 15 Single story, steel joists, brick or concrete curtain wall, flat or sloped roof.
IV.
Multi-story Homogeneous 6
Multi-story buildings, brick or block construction, homogeneous construction on all floors.
V.
Complex Industrial 3
Manufacturing sites with several Groups buildings which may or may not be of similar construction.
VI.
Downtown Shopping 2
Early 1900s downtown shopping Districts districts of brick or block construction. Storefronts have adjoining walls.
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ATTACHMENT 4 COMMERCIAL / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES SELECTED FOR DETAILED PROTECTION FACTOR ANALYSIS Category Facilities Analyzed I.
Shopping Centers Fuquay-Varina Shopping Center Apex Shopping Center
. H.
Butler-type Buildings Amsco Medical Products Weyerhaeuser m.
Steel Frame Brick / Concrete Henry Wurst Almay Cosmetics Lan-O-Sheen IV.
Multi-Story Homogeneous Ramada Inn Fidelity Bank of Fuquay-Varina Data General (office area)
V.
Complex Industrial Groups Cooper Group Lufkin Allied Corp.
VI.
Downtown Shopping Districts Apex o
ATTACHMENT 5 Pags I cf 4 METHODOLOGY AND CALCULATION OF INHALATION PROTECTION FACTORS FOR INSmUTIONAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL l
STRUCTURES IN THE SHNPP PLUME EPZ The protection factor of a structure for inhalation exposure can be determined by evaluating the fraction of the radiation dose avoided by remaining in the structure. For a structure with a given ventilation rate and for a given immersion time, the fraction of dose avoided can be calculated using mathematical equations which describe the l
concentration history of the airborne contaminants in the structure. Rather than present the fairly complex calculations in this testimony, a graph illustrating the results has been taken from an available reference. This graph, which is reproduced on page 3 of this Attachment, is excerpted from a planning document issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The curve shown in the graph represents the fraction of dose avoided for various ventilation rates and immersion times. Since inhalation protection factors are for the most part a function of the building air exchange rate (or ventilation rate), this parameter was evaluated for representative institutional, commercial and industrial structures. The range of values of air exchange rates used varied from.5 to 1 air exchange per hour. The choice of this range is based on known values of ventilation rates for residential dwellings and structures designed for air-tightness. Typical ventilation j-rates for private residences have been found to range from 1 to 2 air exchanges per hour.
" Protective Action Evaluation, Part I, The Effectiveness of Sheltering As A Protective Action Against Nuclear A:cidents Involving Gaseous Releases" (EPA 520/1-78-001A), at 8. Structures such as control rooms for nuclear power plants which are of low-leakage design typically do not permit more than.15 to.5 air exchanges per hour.
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The representative institutional, commercial and industrial structures which were l
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surveyed have construction features better than the average private residence but not i
specifically designed as low-leakage structures. They fall into an intermediate category
ATTACHMENT 5 Paga 2 cf 4 with respect to ventilation rates. Consequently, the use of the air exchange rate values of.5 to 1 air exchange per hour is justified. _ Several types of structures (churches, family care facilities, day care centers, Camp Agape and Homes for the Elderly) are exceptions; they are more comparable to residences in terms of ventilation rates.
Using these ventilation rates, a range for the fraction of dose avoided can be estimated for various immersion times using the graph on page 3 of this Attachment. To estimate the fraction of dose avoided, it is necessary to determine the product of the ventilation rate (air exchanges / hour) and the immersion time (in hours). Where this number intersects the curve on the graph, the fraction of dose avoided is shown on the vertical axis of the graph.I For example, if the immersion time is five hours, the fraction of dose avoided would be approximately 0.28 with a ventilation rate of 0.5 air exchanges per hour and 0.2 for a ventilation rate of one air exchange per hour. The relationship between the protection factor and the fraction of dose avoided is given by the following mathematical equation:
PF = 1/(1-F)
Where PF = protection factor = ratio of dose outside the shelter to dose inside the shelter, and F = fraction of dose avoided by remaining in the shelter Based upon the estimated ventilation rate of 0.5 to one air exchange per hour, the graph illustrating the fraction of dose avoided and the mathematical relationship described above, estimated PFs of commercial, industrial and institutional structures for Inhalation exposure are presented in the table on page 4 of this Attachment for various immersion times ranging from one-half hour to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. As previously discussed, the figures in the table on page 4 show that the level of protection afforded by a structure from inhalation exposure is reduced over time.
IThe graph showing fraction of dose avoided assumes that a person either leaves the structure or ventilates the structure promptly once the plume passes.
ATTACHMENT 5' Paga 3 cf 4 r
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$VE4fitAfi0m paf fl a tiuwtR1'0m TIMEl Effect of ventilation rate and immersion time on fraction of dose avoided. Ventilation rate is measured in air exchanges / hour and immersion time is in hours.III III Source: Planning for Off-site Response to Radiation Accidents in Nuclear Facilities, Safety Series No. 55 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna,1981.
I ATTACHMENT 5 Paga 4 cf 4 INHALATION EXPOSURE PROTECTION FACTORS FOR TYPICAL INSTITUTIONAL, COMMERCIAL / INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES LOCATED IN THE SHNPP PLUME EPZ*
Immersion Time (Hours)
Protection Factor 0.5 10-5 1.0 5-2.5 1.5 3-2 2.0 -
2.5-1.7 5
1.4-1.2 10 1.2-1.1
- Excluding churches, family care facilities, day care centers, Camp Agape, and Homes for the Elderly. The range of inhalation exposure PFs for these institutional structures is comparable to that for a typical single-family residence in the Harris EPZ. These values are listed in the Harris offsite emergency plan at Part 1, section IV.E.8.
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ATTACHMENT 6 DIRECT RADIATION EXPOSURE PRdTECTION FACTORS (PF)*
FOR MAJOR COMMERCIAL / INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ANALYZED IN SHNPP PLUME EPZ Airborne Deposited Type Structure Nuclides Nuclides of Structure Fuquay-Varina Shopping Center 1.2 3-5 Shopping Center
. Apex Shopping Center 1.2 2-3 Shopping Center Amsco Medical Products 1.1 2
Butler Building Weyerhaeuser 1.2 2
Butler Building Henry Wurst.
1.2 3-6 Steelframe, Brick / Concrete Almay Cosmetics l.2 2-6 Steelframe, Brick / Concrete Lan-O-Sheen 1.2 2
Steelframe,
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Brick / Concrete Ramada Inn 4-7 4-20 Multi-Story Homogeneous Fidelity Bank 1.2-2.3 3-20 Multi-Story Homogeneous
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Data General (Office) 1.2-2 4 Multi-Story i
Homogeneous Cooper Group 1.3 3
Complex
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Allied Corp.
2-5 6-40 Complex-Downtown Apex Business D* strict 1.1 3-4 Downtown Shopping Dist.
w The protection factor is 'the ratio of the radiation level outside of the building relative to that inside. A PF=1 Indicates no protection.
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ATTACHMENT 7 DIRECT RADIATION EXPOSURE PROTECTION FACTORS FOR SCHOOLS SURVEYED IN SHNPP PLUME EPZ School Airborne Deposited Nuclides Nuclides Fuquay-Varina Sr. High School 1.6-5.7 10-25 Apex Elementary School 1.2 4
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ATTACHMENT 8
SUMMARY
OF PROTECTION FACTOR RANGES FOR DIRECT RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR CATEGORIES OF MAJOR COMMERCIAL / INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES AND SCHOOLS IN THE SHNPP PLUME EPZ Protection Factor Range Type of Structure Airborne Deposited Nuclides Nuclides I.
Shopping Center 1.2 3-5 II.
Butler-type Buildings 1.2 2
III.'
Steel Frame / Brick or 1.2 2-6 Concrete Wall Buildings IV.
. Multi-Story Homogeneous 1.2-7 3-20 Buildings V.
Complex Industrial Groups 1.3-5 3-40 VI.
Downtown Shopping Districts 1.1 3-4 VII.
Schools 1.2-5.7 4-25
.