ML20125B249

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Proposed Tech Specs Adding Four Smoke Detectors in Reactor Auxiliary Bldg & Clarifying Identifying Numbers of Three Containment Isolation Valves
ML20125B249
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/1985
From:
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20125B221 List:
References
NUDOCS 8506110358
Download: ML20125B249 (14)
v • d • e


Text

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INSTRUMENTATION FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With any, but not more than one-half the total in any fire zone Function A fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, restore the inoperable instrument (s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or within the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument (s) is located inside the containment or annulus, then inspect that containment or annulus zone at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or for the containment, monitor air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5.
b. With more than one-half of the Function A fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any Function B fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any two or more adjacent fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument (s) is located inside the contain-ment or annulus, then inspect that containment or annulus zone at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or for the containment, monitor air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5.
c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.8.1 Each of the above required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Fire detectors which are not accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless performed in the previous 6 months.

4.3.3.8.2 The NFPA Standard 720 supervised circuits supervision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months. Circuits which are not accessible during plant opera-tion shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless performed in the previous 6 montO .

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 J/4 i9 8506110358 850606 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS ,

TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

  • ELEVATION HEAT FLAME SMOKE ZONE ROOM NAME/ NUMBER (ft) (x/y) (x/y) (x/y)
1. REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued)

RAB 25 Equip. Access Area /226 (wing area) +21 15/0 RAB 27A H&V Room /124 +7 0/6 RAB 278 Electrical Area and Health Physics +7 0/35 Offices /122 RAB 27C I&C Room /120 +7 0/2 RAB 270 Communicati,ons Equip. Room /123 +7 1/0 RAB 31 Corridors and Passageways -4 0/24 Corridors on eastside -4 0/21 RAB 32 Wing Area westside - Auxiliary Com- -35 32/0 ponent Cooling Water Pump "A"/B53 &

and Pipe Penetration Area /8100 -4 Wing Area Center /B53 and B100 -35 & 28/0

-4 Wing Area eastside-Component Cooling -35 31/0 Water Pump "B"/B53 and Pipe Penetration Area /B100 -4  !

RAB 33 S/D Cooling Heat Exchangers A&B/B20 -35 0/18 {

& B48 l RAB 34 Valve Operating Enclosure Bay Room -15.5 2/0 "A"/854 )

Valve Operating Enclosure Bay Room -15.5 4/0 "B" B55A RAB 35 Safety Injection Pump Room B/B16 -35 10/0 RAB 36 Safety Injection Pump Room A/815 -35 10/0 RAB 37 Motor-Driven Emergency Feedpump -35 0/1 "A"/B49A RAB 38 Motor-Driven Emergency Feedpump -35 1/0 "B"/B49B RAB 39 General Equipment Area /B5, 12, 13, -35 0/10

& 49 Corridors & General Equip. Areas /B5, -35 0/28 1, 2, 3, 4, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44 & 46 East Corridor & General Equip. Areas / -35 0/15 B17, 23 & 25 BA Make-up Tank "A"/B38 -35 4/0 BA Make-up Tank "B"/B53A -35 4/0 RAB 40 Diese1' Storage Tank "A"/B50 -35 3/0 RAB 41 Diesel Storage Tank "B"/B52 -35 3/0 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-52

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ATTACHMENT B

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TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

  • ELEVATION HEAT FLAME SM0KE ZONE ROOM NAME/ NUMBER (ft) (x/y) (x/y) (x/y)
1. REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued)

RAB 25 Equip. Access Area /226 (wing area) +21 15/0 RAB 27A H&V Room /124 +7 0/6 RAB 278 Electrical Area and Health Physics +7 0/35 Offices /122 RAB 27C I&C Room /120 +7 0/6 RAB 27D Communications Equip. Room /123 +7 1/0 RAB 31 Corridors and Passageways -4 0/24 Corridors on eastside -4 0/21 RAB 32 Wing Area westside - Auxiliary Com- -35 32/0 ponent Cooling Water Pump "A"/B53 &

and Pipe Penetration Area /B100 -4 Wing Area Center /853 and B100 -35 & 28/0

-4 Wing Area eastside-Component Cooling -35 31/0 Water Pump "B"/B53-and Pipe Penetration Area /B100 -4 RAB 33 S/D Cooling Heat Exchangers A&B/820 -35 0/18

& B48 RAB 34 Valve Operating Enclosure Bay Room -15.5 2/0 "A"/854 Valve Operating Enclosure Bay Room -15.5 4/0 "B" B55A RAB 35 Safety Injection Pump Room B/816 -35 10/0 RAB 36 Safety Injection Pump Roorr. A/B15 -35 10/0 RAB 37 Motor-Driven Emergency Feedpump -35 0/1 "A"/B49A RAB 38 Motor-Driven Emergency Feedpump -35 1/0 "B"/849B RAB 39 General Equipment Area /B5, 12, 13, -35 0/10

& 49 Corridors & General Equip. Areas /B5, -35 0/28 1, 2, 3, 4, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44 & 46 East Corridor & General Equip. Areas / -35 0/15 B17, 23 & 25 BA Make-up Tank " A"/B38 -35 4/0 BA Make-up Tank "B"/B53A -35 4/0 RAB 40 Diesel Storage Tank "A"/B50 -35 3/0 RAB 41 Diesel Storage Tank "B"/B52 -35 3/0 I

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-52 l

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I NPF-38-03 4

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DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-03 This is -a request to: revise Table 3.6-2 " Containment Isolation Valves" of :

Technical' Specification 3.6.3 " Containment Isolation Valves" by. correcting the. identification numbers of three valves. ,

Existing Specification-See Attachment "A" r Proposed Specification-See Attachment "B" Description Table 3.6-2 lists those containment isolation valves required operable by Technical Specification 3.6.3. In listing the valves, two unique valve

. numbers are supplied for each. For instance..the manual / remote manual SIS from HPSI loop 1A valve associated with penetration 55 carries the number 2SI-V1550Al (SI 225A). The first number (2SI-V1550A1) is the unique identifier _ assigned by the Architect-Engineer while the second number in parentheses '(SI 225A) is the unique identifier assigned by LP&L.

-The proposed change involves correcting typographical errors in three LP&L identifiers for manual / remote manual valves in Table 3.6-2. These changes are:

Penetration Existing Valve Proposed Number ' Number- Change 253 2CA-V600 (CVR'301B) 2CA-V600 (CVR 301A) 63 2SA-Vil4 (LRT 101) 2SA-Vll4 (LRT 109) 63 2SA-V604 '(LRT 102) 2SA-V604 (LRT 110)

Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a-significant hazards-consideration if there is a positive finding'in any

- of the following areas:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?

Response: NO-l The proposed change will place the correct LP&L valve number in Table 3.6-2 resulting in agreement between the Technical Specifica-1 tions and other plant documents. Therefore, the proposed change i

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will.not involve-an increase ~in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

12. .Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create .the possibility of a new or--different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: NO Substituting the correct valve numbers in Table 3.6-2 introduces

-no new perturbation to_the plant hardware or procedures. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any any accident previously evaluated.

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: NO

. Substituting the correct-valve numbers in Table 3.6-2 introduces no new perturbation to the plant hardware or procedures. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.-

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether.a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. Example (i) relates to a purely administrative change to technical specifications, (i.e. a change to ~ achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature).

The purpose of the proposed change is to correct the identifying numbers for three containment isolation valves of Table 3.6-2 and bring the Technical Specification into conformance with other plant documents. Therefore, the proposed change is similar to example (1).

Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.91; and (2) there is a reasonable assurance that.the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the ,tanosed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described-in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

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O ATTACHMENT A

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) specified in Table 3.6-2 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
d. Be in at least HOT STAN0BY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

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I l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 6-19

% TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) b!' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES **'

E PENETRATION VALVE MAXIMUM NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)

E Z 6. Manual / Remote Manual (Continued) w 48 2HV-B190A (CAR 202A)* CARS Exhaust N.A.

51 2FS-V145A/B (FS405)* Refueling Cavity Purification Inlet N.A.

51 2FS-V144A/B (FS406)* Refueling Cavity Purification Inlet N.A.

53 2CA-V600 (CVR 301B)* Instrument H&V N.A.

w 55 2SI-V1550A1 (SI 225A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 1A N.A.

1 m 55 2SI-V1545B1 (SI 2258)* SIS from HPSI Loop 1A N.A.

E

56 2SI-V154082 (SI 2268)* SIS from HPSI Loop 18 N.A.

57 2SI-V1542A3 (SI 227A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2A N.A.

57 2SI-V154783 (SI 227B)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2A N.A.

58 2SI-V1548A4 (SI 228A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2B N.A.

58 2SI-V154484 (SI 2288)* SIS from HPSI Loop 28 N.A.

59 2SI-V1570 (SI344)* SIT Drain to RWSP N.A.

62 2FS-V165A/B (FS416) Refueling Cavity Drain N.A.

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-m5{ TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES **

E PENETRATION VALVE MAXIMUM NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)

E Z 6. Manual / Remote Manual (Continued) ca 62 2FS-V164A/B (FS415) Refueling Cavity Drain N.A.

63 2SA-V114 (LRT101) ILRT Connection N.A.

63 2SA-V604 (LRT102) ILRT Connection N.A.

65 2SA-V609 (LRT202) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

, 65 2SA-V611 (LRT204)- ILRT Test Connection N.A.

as 65 2SA-V610 (LRT201) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

O N.A.

65 2SA-V612 (LRT203) ILRT Test Connection 65 2SA-V620 (LRT2011) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

65 2SA-V621 (LRT 2031) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

65 2CA-V601 (CVR 3018)* Instrument H&V N.A.

69 2SI-V1556 (SI 506A)* SI Hot Leg Injection N.A.

70 2SI-V1559 (SI 506B)* SI Hot Leg Injection N.A.

71 20W-V642 (CMU244)* Demineralized Water N.A.

a-ATTAGIMENT B

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{ TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) k CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES **

E PENETRATION VALVE MAXIMUM

' FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)

NUMBER NUMBER E

Z 6. Manual / Remote. Manual (Continued) w 48 2HV-B190A (CAR 202A)* CARS Exhaust N.A.

51 2FS-V145A/B (FS405)* Refueling Cavity Purification Inlet N.A.

51 2FS-V144A/B (FS406)* Refueling Cavity Purification Inlet N.A.

53 2CA-V600 (CVR 301A)* Instrument H&V N.A.

w 55 2SI-V1550A1 (SI 225A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 1A N.A.

1 m 55 2SI-V154581 (SI 2258)* SIS from HPSI Loop 1A N.A.

E

56 2SI-V154082 (SI 226B)* SIS from HPSI Loop 1B N.A.

57 2SI-V1542A3 (SI 227A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2A N.A.

57 2SI-V1547B3 (SI 227B)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2A N.A.

58 2SI-V1548A4 (SI 228A)* SIS from HPSI Loop 28 N.A.

58 2SI-V1544B4 (SI 2288)* SIS from HPSI Loop 2B N.A.

59 2SI-V1570 (SI344)* SIT Drain to RWSP N.A.

62 2FS-V165A/B (FS416) Refueling Cavity Drain N.A.

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m TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES **

PENETRATION VALVE MAXIMUM NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)

E

6. Manual / Remote Manual (Continued)

I 62 2FS-V164A/B (FS415) Refueling Cavity Drain N.A.

63 2SA-V114 (LRT109) ILRT Connection N.A.

l 63 2SA-V604 (LRT110) ILRT Connection N.A.

65 2SA-V609 (LRT202) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

65 25A-V611 (LRT204)- ILRT Test Connection N.A.

m 65 2SA-V610 (LRT201) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

l 65 2SA-V612 (LRT203) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

l 65 2SA-V620 (LRT2011) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

65 2SA-V621 (LRT 2031) ILRT Test Connection N.A.

65 2CA-V601 (CVR 301B)* Instrument H&V N.A.

69 2SI-V1556 (SI 506A)* SI Hot Leg Injection N.A.

70 2SI-V1559 (SI 506B)* SI Hot Leg Injection N.A.

71 20W-V642 (CMU244)* Demineralized Water N.A.

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