ML20125A748
| ML20125A748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Belisle G, Hardin A, Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125A747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-79-23, NUDOCS 7908170202 | |
| Download: ML20125A748 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1979023
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SulTE 3100
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ATLANTA,GEORotA 30303
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Report No. 50-348/79-23
Licensee:
Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, Alabama 35291
Facility Name: Farley Unit 1
Docket No. 50-348
License No. NPF-2
Inspection at Farley Site near Ashford, Alabama
Inspectors:THb%
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A. K. Hardin (June 4y7, 1979)
Date Sigded
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. Belisle-(June 6-8, 1979)
Date ' Signed
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Approved by:D
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E.H.Verdery, Acting)_ectionCL'.ef,RONS
Date Sighed
Branch
SUMMARY
Inspection on June 4-7, 1979
Areas Inspected
This special, announced inspection involved 57 inspector-hours onsite in the
areas of the licensee's actions taken in response to IE Bulletins 79-06,79-06A, and 79-06A, Revision 1; and to inspect plant operations.
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Results
Of the two areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified,
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager
- K. W. McCracken, Technical Superintendent
- D. C. Poole, Operations Superintendent
- J. W. Kale, Operations Quality Assurance
- J. E. Garlington, Operations Supervisor
- R. D. Hill, Plant Quality Assurance Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, and operators.
- Attended June 7 and June 8 exit interview.
- Attended June 7 exit interview only.
- Attended June 8 exit interview only.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 7 and June 8,
1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. There were no
questions raised by the licensee regarding the findings. The licensee
stated they were taking certain actions which they believed would enhance
their safety program. These actions are noted in the report as open
items associated with a specific inspection area.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Bulletin 79-06,79-06A, and 79-06A, Revision 1
The review and verification of licensee actions related to the bulletins
listed above was separated into three categories. These were:
(1)
onsite review of operator training; (2) ocrite inspection of engineered
safety features (ESF); and (3) onsite asses. ment of operating procedures.
Item 1, onsite review of operator training is reported in IE Report
Number 50-348/79-22. Also, the assessment of operator awareness of the
criteria for operation of reactor coolant pumps and how to determine the
50 degree sub:ooling of the RCS, as specified in Bulletin 79-06A, is
reported in IE Report No. 50-348/79-22. All other inspection items
related to the above bulletins are reported below.
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A.
Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features
(1) Inspection of Engineered Safety Feature (EST) Procedures and
Alignments
The inspector reviewed ESF system valve, breaker and switch
alignment operating procedures against current drawings to
verify the adequacy of alignment procedures.
In addition, a
system walkdown of ESF operating procedures was performed to
verify that accessible valves, breakerr. and switches were in
the proper position. The following ESF system operating
procedures (SOP's) were reviewed and walked down:
S0P 7.0 Residual Heat Removal System DWG. 175041
S0P 8.0 High Head Safety Injection System DWG. 175038
S0P 9.0 Containment Spray System DWG. 175038
SOP 22.0 Auxiliary Feed System DWG. 175007
SOP 23.0 Component Cooling Water System DWG. 175002
SOP 24.0 Service Water System DWG. 170119
(2) Review of ESF Surveillance Test and Maintenance Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance test proce-
dures and maintenance procedures to verify that when they are
completed the systems will be returned to an operable condition:
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3.2 Boric Acid Traasfer Pump and
Borated Water
Operability test
4.1 Charging Pump 1A
Inservice Test
4.2 Charging Pump IB
Inservice Test
22.1 Auxiliary Feed Pump 1A
Inservice Test
22.2 Auxiliary Feed Pump IB
Inservice Test
23.1 Component Cooling Water 1A
Inservice Test
23.2 Component Cooling Water IB
Inservice Test
23.4 Component Cooling Water IA Annual
Inservice Test
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23.5 Component Cooling Water IB Annual Inservice Test
23.6 Component Cooling Water IC Annual Inservice Test
23.8 Component Cooling Water Valve
Inservice Test
22.8 Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve
Inservice Test
24.7 Service Water System Valve
Inservice Test
4.3 Charging Pump IC
Inservice Test
4.4 Charging Pump 1A Annual
Inservice Test
4.5 Charging Pump 1B Annual
Inservice Test
4.6 Charging Pump IC. Annual
Inservice Test
10.2 ECCS High Head Runout Valves
Alignment Verification
11.1 RHR Pump 1A
Inservice Test
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11.2 RHR Pump 1B
Inservice Test
11.6 RHR Valves
Intervice Test
16.1 Containment Spray Pump 1A
Inservice Test
16.2 Containment Spray Pump IB
Inservice Test
16.6 Spray and Phase B
Actuation Test
16.7 Containment Spray System Valve
Inservice Test
5.1 CVCS/HHSI Pump Bearing Maintenance
5.4 Maintenance of Charging /High Head
Safety Injection Pump
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6.1 Repair of RHR Pump
40.1 Hydro Test of Turbine Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge
Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.
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(3) Standard Operating Procedure Check Lists
The inspector reviewed some ESF equipment Standard Operating
Procedure System Checklist as an additional verification of
system operability. Those reviewed were:
7.0 Residual Heat Removal System
8.0 Safety Injection System Accumulation
8.1 Safety Injection System High Head Injection
9.0 Containment Spray System
10.0 Post LOCA Containment Pressurization and Vent System
22.0 Auxiliary Feedwater System
23.0 Component Cooling Water System
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24.0 Service Water System
36.0 Plant Electrical Distribution Lineup
36.1 S/U, Unit, Main Transformer Prep For Startup
36.2 4160V AC Electrical Distribution System
36.3 600, 480 and 280V AC Electrical Distribution System
No problems were identified.
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(4) Engineered Safety Feature Surveillance Tests
The following surveillance tests related to the engineered safety
features were reviewed to compare the as found data against the
acceptance criteria. There were no significant discrepancies
observed between data obtained in the tests and acceptance criteria.
The questions raised by the inspector on the test d ta were satis-
factorily resolved by the licensee at the exit interview. The
surveillance tests reviewed were:
- STP 28.3 Diesel Cencrator Load Rejection Test
- STP 28.4 Diesel Cencrator Emergency Start and Full
Load Test (for DGIC, 2E and 1-2A)
- STP 25.1 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 Inservice Test
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- STP 24.6 Service Water Buried Pipe Inspection
- STP 24.4 Service Water Pump ID, IE, and IC Annual Inservice Test
- STP 24.3 Service Water Pump 1A, IB, and 3C Annual Inservice Test
- STP 23,8 Component Cooling Water Valve Inservice Test
- STP 25.4 River Water Pumps 8, 9, and 10 Annual Inservice Test
- STP 25.3 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 Annual Inservice Test
- STP 23.6 Component Cooling Water Pump IC Annual Inservice Test
- STP 23.5 Component Cooling Water Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test
- STP 23.4 Component Coeling Water Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test
- STP 22.11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A (IB) LOSP Test
- STP 22.10 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Blackout
Start Test
- STP 22.9 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A and IB Auto Start Test
- STP 22.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Inservice Test
- STP 22.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Inservice Test
- STP 22.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train A Functional Test
- STP 22.6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train B Functional Test
- STP 16.7 Containment Spray System Valve Inservice Test
- STP 16.6 Spray and Phase B Actuation Test
- STP 16.4 Containment Spray Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test
- STP 16.3 Containment Spray Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test
- STP 16.2 Containment Spray Pump 1A Inservice Test
- STP 16.1 Containment Spray Pump IB Inservice Test
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- STP 13.0 Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Operability Test
- STP 12.0 Boron Injection Tank Operability Test
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- STP 11.2 RHR Pump 1B Inservice Test
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- STP 11.1 RHR Pump IA Inservice Test
- STP 10.3 ECCS Valve Inservice Test
- STP 10.2 ECCS High Head Runout Valves Alignment Verification
- STP 4.6 Charging Pump IC Annual Inservice Inspection
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- STP 4.4 Charging Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test
- STP 4.3 Charging Pump IC Inservice Test
- STP 4.1 Charging Pump 1A Inservice Test
(5) Reactor Protection System Revision
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The licensee has issued and is is:plementing Plant Change Notice
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No. B-79-382 entitled " Pressurizer Safety Injection". The
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purpose of the plant change notice is to provide for deletion
of the pressurizer level from coincidence with low pressurizer
pressure for safety injection and to install a 2-out-of-3 low
pressurizer signal to actuate the safety injection system.
The safety evaluation contained in the PCN package concludes
that the existing or original analysis is valid for safety
injection (SI) as a function of pressurizer pressure signals
only in that SI would be actuated at least as soon as with the
cofacident signal. The licensee stated they are about 90
percent cociplete with the installation and expect to complete
it by June 9, 1979 prict to reactor startup from the current
refueling outage.
(6) Return of Safety System to Service Following Extended Outages
The adequacy of administrative controls to assure that engineered
safety features are returned to operability at the conclusion
of an exter.ded outage were reviewed by discussion with licensee
representatives and review of Surveillance Test Procedures
(STP's), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's), and Administra*
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tive Procedures (AP's).
A.
System Alignment Verification
On April 18, 1979, the licensee issued a temp,rary change
to AP-16 which requires double verification of system
alignment and operability for all safety related systems.
The inspector observed that a double verification of valve
alignment was being performed on returning systems to
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service following the present refueling outage. The
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licensee stated they were trying to determine the extent
they would continue to perform double verific ation of
system alignments, but expected that the final revision of
AP-16 would include at least double verification of Engi-
neered Safety Features (348/78-23-01).
D.
Onsite Assessment of Operating Procedures
(1) The licensee does not require partial actuation of
safety injection to assist in pressurizer level
control during routine operation event induced
pressurizer level transients. On the Farley plant
the safety injection system, on initation, goes
through the boron injection task, injecting water
containing 20,000 ppm boron, therefore no routine
event would require cartial actuation of the SI
system. - Operating trocedures do allow the operation
of an additional charging pump to control transients
in pressurizer level using the normal operating flow
path.
(2) The licensee does not have procedures for feeding a
dry steam generator. The licensee stated that proce-
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dures were available for controlling feed to a generator
in which level had fallen below the feed ring but
that these procedures were for water hammer control.
(3) The licensee's resent tagging practices do not con-
tain specific requirements to preclude tags obscuring
switch positions. The licensee has stated they are
putting two new tagging devices into effect. For
horizontal switch mountings, boxes will be fabricated
which fit over the switch being tagged out. The box
will be transparent and contain the lockout tag.
For
vertically mounted panels the licensee is procuring
small tags of a size that when installed on vertical
panel switches will reduce the potential for the tag
to obscure any other indicator status.
(348/79-23-02).
(4) The operating conditions and precautions when securing
a reactor coolant pump are contained in Emergency
Operating Procedures 1 and 3.
These instruct the
operator to secure the reactor coolant pumps on
actuation of phase B containment isolation, verifi-
cation that high head safety injection pumps are
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operating and if reactor coolant pressure is below
1550 psig.
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7.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment
System checklist S0P 22.0 A was used to observe the position of auxiliary
feedwater system valves. On April 28, 1979 the licensee had aligned the
system for service and the system had been reverified as being correctly
aligned for service on May 28, 1979. There were no valve positions
observed to be incorrectly aligned. However there were a number of
valves which did not have an identification tag or mark and, in order to
ascertain that the correct valve was being locked open or locked closed,
the valve had to be traced from a known position in the line. The licensee
stated at the exit interview that they planned to have the valves tagged
before returning to power operation from the current refueling outage
(348/79-23-03).
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