ML20116H456
| ML20116H456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1985 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-128(85)), NUDOCS 8505020210 | |
| Download: ML20116H456 (2) | |
Text
bMb THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMP ANY P.O. BOX 5000 - CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - lLLUMINATING BLOG.
- 55 PUBLIC SQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN April 18, 1985 VICE PRESIDENT NUCUAR Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Voltage Drop Affecting ESW Pumps / Valves [RDC 128(85)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the potential significant deficiency regarding voltage drops affecting the Division 1, 2, and 3 Emergency Service Water pumps and their associated discharge valves.
Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on January 30, 1985, by Mr. T. A. Boss of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company that this problem was being evaluated per our Deviation Analysis Report Number 224, and an interim report was subsequently submitted on February 28, 1985.
As a result of our analysis, we have determined that this condition is not reportable per the requirements of 10CPR50.55(e).
This report contains a description of the potential deficiency and the results of our evaluation.
Description of Potential Deficiency Calculations had indicated that the control circuit voltage drop in the close control circuits of the Division 1, 2 and 3 Emer-gency Service Water (ESW) pumps, 1P45-C001A, IP45-C001B, and 1P45-C002 may be large enough to result in nonoperation of those pumps.
Results of Evaluation As noted in our previous report, our remaining concern involved the operation of both the Division 1 and 2 ESW pump close control circuits in response to a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with a simultaneous loss of both divisional battery chargers.
This sit-uation has been determined to be overly conservative in that sin-gle failure criteria does not require the assumptivn of this simultaneous loss.
h5000k4o APR 2 21985 PDR (0
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i Mr. JEmms G. Koppler April 18, 1985
+
In the event of a Design Basis Accident accompanied by the loss I
of a battery charger in one division, the offsite power source or diesel generator for the redundant division will supply AC power to its associated battery charger.
This will assure that normal DC voltage is maintained for that division.
Field testing has shown that the affected close control circuits will function properly with normal DC voltage present.
Therefore the identified potential deficiency does not represent a condition that would have a significant impact on the safe i
operation of the PNPP.
Please call if there are any questions.
Sincerely, Murr Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:sab cc:
Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office Mr. D.
E. Keating USNRC, Site Office Director l
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
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