ML20116B252
| ML20116B252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1985 |
| From: | Owen W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Axelrad J, Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8504250162 | |
| Download: ML20116B252 (35) | |
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DUKE POWER GOMPANY POWER BUILDING, BOX 03180, CHAMLOTTE, N. G. 28242 W H. OWEN (7041 373-4120
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pCS SH6 So-ytf April 22, 1985 James N. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Jane A. Axelrad, Director Enforcement Staff Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Taylor and Ms. Axelrad:
On September 27, 1984, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) submitted a document to you requesting " issuance of a $250,000 civil penalty against Duke Power Company (Duke)".
Duke Power Company submits that the requested relief is unwarranted.
To assist the NRC,-
Duke has prepared the attached response to the allegations of GAP.
Sincerely, W. H. Owen Executive Vice President Engineering, Construction & Production Group WHO/avc/dm Attach.
lb 8504250162 850422 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G
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James N.LTaylor, Director Ms. Jane A. Axelrad, Director April 22, 1985 Page two c: (w/ attach.)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Director U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., N.W.,
Suite 2900 Atlanta, Ga. 30323 James Lieberman, Esq.
Director and Chief Counsel Regional Operations and Enforcement Division, OELD U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Harold R. Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ben Hayes, Director Office of Investigation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Billie P. Garde Government Accountability Project Institute for. Policy Studies 1901 Que Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
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Duke Power Company's Response to GAP's September 27, 1984 Enforcement Action Request 1
I.
Introduction On September 27, 1984, the Government Accountability Project
(" GAP") submitted a letter to the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement requesting the issuance of a $250,000 civil penalty against Duke Power Company (" Duke") for alleged " deliberate and persistent harassment of quality control (QC) inspectors" at Duke's Catawba Nuclear Station (Petition at 1).
As will be demonstrated below, Duke submits that the requested penalty is unwarranted.
The basic thesis of GAP's petition is that harassment (such as alleged at Catawba) affects the willingness of workers to come forward to the NRC with safety concerns and thus the requested relief is necessary to send a message not only to Duke, but to the industry at large (e.g., Petition at 2).
The lengthy record already compiled before the Catawba Licensing Board, and the Board's conclusions based upon that evidence, contradict this thesis, however.
In the case of the welding inspectors, the Licensing Board found that they did not hesitate to express all of their concerns to Duke and to the NRC. See 19 NRC at 1452-53, 1531-32, 1508-11.
In the case of the craftsmen interviewed during the " foreman overide" inspection, a review of the 300 some affidavits in evidence demonstrates that these workers stated all of their concerns as well. See App. Ex. 118; 20 NRC at 1492-93, 1506-07.
Indeed, the Board's questioning of those craftsmen whom 4
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' the intervenors (assisted by GAP) called to testify demonstrates that these workers did not raise concerns earlier with either Duke, the NRC, or the Licensing Board simply because they did not view the matters to which they testified as anything significant that would make the plant unsafe. See, e.g., Tr. 14146-47, 14189-91 (10/12/84); see also 19 NRC 1541-43 (access of Mr.
Hoopingarner, a craft employee, to NRC).
Thus there is no basis
-for the thesis underlying GAP's proposed civil penalty request, i.e.,
that a " climate of fear" has prevented Catawba workers from bringing forward concerns. See also 20 NRC at 1506-07.
Duke notes that all of the information upon which GAP's present enforcement request is based has previously been evaluated by the NRC -- either the Office of Investigations
("OI"), the Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E"), and/or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") in the Catawba licensing proceeding.1 This fact is not immediately obvious from GAP's petition, which refers to numerous incidents and allegations from the evidentiary record of the Catawba licensing proceeding without any citation.
When these citations 1/
See July 11, 1984 OI Report, entitled " Duke Power Company:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Harassment and Intimidation," Case No. 2-83-038; July 6, 1984 I&E Director's Decision, Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), DD-84-16, 20 NRC 161 (1984)(issued in response to a September 1983 GAP t
petition on these same issues); June 22, 1984 Licensing Board Partial Initial Decision ("PID"), Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-24, 19 NRC 1418 (1984);
November 27, 1984 Licensing Board PID, Duke Power Co.
(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-52, 20 NRC 1484 (1984).
- + - - - - - - - - -.
i r
, are supplied and the record is examined, it is immediately obvious that GAP has misrepresented many of the Board's findings and taken them significantly out of context.
Additionally, four separate Duke task forces and at least eleven NRC I&E inspection reports investigated and evaluated Quality Assuracae at Catawba.
The results of these investigations were all evaluated by the Licensing Board.2
-To assist I&E in addressing the assertions contained in GAP's petition, Part II of this response provides, wherever possible, record citations fer the specific allegations made in the petition.
A review of this record evidence provides a more accurate characterization of each incident, places each incident in its proper perspective, and is helpful in evaluating the significance of each incident.
In Part III of this response, Duke presents a legal analysis explaining why the civil penalty requested by GAP would be improper.
-2/
See App. Ex. 10, McMeekin, Att. 4 (Duke's Task Force I Report); App. Ex. 11, Cobb, Att. 4 & 5 (Duke's Technical Task Force Report); App. Ex. 12, Alexander, Att. 3 (Duke's l
Nontechnical Task Force Report); App. Ex. 116 (Duke's
[
" Foreman Override" Investigation Report); Staff Exh. 3 (Insp.
[
Report 80-12); Staff Ex. 4 (Insp. Report 79-21); Staff Ex. 6 (Insp. Report 82-21, 82-19); Staff Ex. 10A (Insp. Report 79-l 18); Staff Ex. 10B (Insp. Report 81-08); Staff Ex. 22 (Insp.
Report. 83-53, 83-40); Staff Ex. 26 (Insp. Report 84-03);
Staff Ex. 30 (Insp. Report 84-07, 84-06); Staff Ex. 31 (Insp.
Report 84-31, 84-17); Staff Ex. 32 (Insp. Report 84-73, 84-32); Staff Ex. 33 (Insp. Report 84-88, 84-39).
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5 P' II.
Factual Matters GAP's attempt to demonstrate that Duke Power Company undertook a deliberate and widespread " pattern of harassment, intimidation and discrimination" (Petition at 5) against certain of its employees seriously misrepresents the evidence heard in the Catawba licensing proceeding.
As GAP correctly notes (Petition at 1) the Licensing Board did find that some QC welding inspectors "were subjected to harassment by craft workers and craft foremen for doing their job." June 22, 1984 PID, 19 NRC 1418, 1531.
The Board went on, however, to place this problem in its proper perspective, stating that: "the dimensions of the harassment problem.
. should be viewed in the context of the duration and magnitude of the Catawba project -- some nine years of construction involving thousands of employees.
In that perspective, the number of significant harassment incidents is relatively small." Id.
Given all of the circumstances, the Board concluded, correctly, that " harassment was not a widespread phenomenon at Catawba." Id. at 1532; see also id. at 1439-40.
The Licensing Board concluded that in the few incidents where it found harassment had occurred, faulty conditions did not go l
uncorrected, and measures had been taken by Duke to improve working relations and reduce harassment. 19 NRC at 1530-31; see also Apps. Exh. 12, Att. 3, at 6-7, corrected at Tr. 3049, Alexander (10/13/83); Apps. Exh. 2, Grier, p. 54; Apps. Exh. 14, Davison, p. 35; Tr. 3139, 3541, 3597, Alexander (10/14 & 18/83);
l l
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r -Apps. Exh. 24, Dick, pp. 7-9, 12-13; Tr. 5381, 5616-17, Dick (11/01 & 02/83).
The Board further concluded that these measures were generally appropriate: "[i]n most cases, the Applicants acted in a reasoned manner to discourage repetition." 19 NRC at 1532.
While the Board did find that it would not have been unreasonable for Duke to have taken more " severe" corrective action, and that the company might have publicized their corrective actions more widely on the site, the Board concluded that clarification of Duke's harassment policy constituted an adequata remedy. Id.
With respect to GAP's assertion that there must now be a
" severe" penalty issued against Duke to ensure that harassment does not, recur (Petition at 3), Duke submits that the corrective measures imposed by the Board in the Catawba proceeding are both adequate and appropriate to assure such a result.3 While GAP is free to disagree with the Board's findings on the harassment and intimidation issue, this does not impugn the validity of the
-3/
The corrective action required by the Licensing Board's PID was that Duke revise its. written harassment policy (19 NRC at 1532).
The only other corrective action required by the Board (19 NRC at 1585) was that Duke upgrade its welding filler material control procedure (19 NRC at 1474), confirm to the Staff investigation of socket weld gaps (19 NRC at 1
{
1496), and modify its M-4 inspection procedures if necessary (19 NRC at 1527).
This corrective action is now complete and has been reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff.
See Inspection Report 84-82, 84-36 and Inspection Report 84-102, 84-47.
Duke's response to the harassment concerns included implementation of a harassment recourse procedure, and improving lines of communication, which produced positive results. See 19 NRC at 1530-31.
E
r Board's finding, which was based upon approximately fifty days of hearings on the intervenors' quality assurance contention.
During these hearings fifteen QA welding inspectors testified and were cross-examined at length by counsel for intervenors; additional inspectors submitted pre-filed testimony.
On pp. 3-4 of its petition, GAP lists seven alleged " actions taken by [ Duke] management to negatively influence the reporting of Nonconforming Item Reports (NCI) by QC inspectors."
The 4
Licensing Board's discussion of these incidents is summarized below.
It should be noted that GAP has failed to provide any evidence that these incidents (some of which did not involve management at all) reflect management attempts to limit the writing of NCIs.
(The numbers refer to those in GAP's petition.)
(1)
The Board's findings on several incidents wherein inspectors interpreted instructions to mean " ease off" on inspections are set forth in the June 22, 1984 PID, 19 NRC at 1511-13.
The Board concluded that these allegations were symptomatic of " problems with procedures and communication" because the inspectors felt they had to follow a procedure to the letter, while management felt that the inspectors should be accepting reasonable tolerances and using procedures other than
-4/
Since GAP provides no citations to the record for any of these allegations and couches its assertions in broad terms, it is difficult to pinpoint with absolute certainty the exact incidents to which GAP is referring.
Duke has matched each of the alleged " actions" with what appears to be the proper referent in the Board's June 22, 1984 PID.
r NCIs.
The Board also found " considerable evidence" that the inspectors tended to impose requirements on craft beyond those set forth in the procedures.
The Board ruled that there was no
" attempt by management to accept unsafe work"; and concluded that the confusion regarding procedures had been alleviated by changes made in these procedures. Id. at 1513.
(2)
This allegation apparently refers to the Board's finding of discrimination against welding inspector supervisor Beau Ross in his internal performance evaluations. 19 NRC at 1513-1520.
The Board concluded (based in part upon Mr. Ross' own testimony) that Mr. Ross' performance of his work was not negatively affected and that "the inspection process was not compromised."
Id. at 1519.5 (3)
A Catawba ironworker whose fit-up of containment plates had been repeatedly rejected by QC inspector Deaton pointed a rifle at Deaton from a passing car while both were on the way home from work.
The ironworker was allowed to resign the next day rather than being fired because Duke was uncertain of its 5/
The Board's finding (19 NRC at 1518), based solely on a memorandum to file written by Mr. Grier after a meeting with Mr. Ross (PA Exh. 33), that Duke's Corporate QA Manager George Grier " attempt (ed] to influence (Ross'] future testimony in this proceeding." is directly contrary to the record evidence.
Not only did Mr. Grier deny any improper intent to influence testimony (Tr. 3833-85 (10/19/83); 4206-07 (10/20/83)), but Mr. Ross himself testified that Mr. Grier had made no attempt whatsoever to influence his testimony.
Tr. 7049-50 (11/11/83).
Indeed, Mr. Ross stated that he felt that his meeting with Mr. Grier was helpful. Tr. 6798-99 (11/10/83).
Duke has asked the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to reverse this finding.
r legal position in an offsite incident. See 19 NRC at 1525-26 for the Board's discussion of this incident.
The Board found that Duke "took a reasonable approach" which allowed the problem to be resolved quickly.
It went on to note that it had no doubt about the company's " authority to discipline employees for offsite acts of harassment." Id. at 1526.
(4)
The Jackson-McKenzie incident, in which pipefitter supervisor McKenzie threatened to strike QC inspector Jackson, is described in detail at 19 NRC at 1443, 1522-25.
While the Board ruled that this incident did constitute harassment, the testimony also indicated that neither individual was entirely blameless.
Id. at 1523.
The Board also found that the corrective actions taken by Duke "were much more forceful and supportive of inspectors than the general perception on the job," suggesting that the reprimand to McKenzie's crew and the warning to McKenzie should have been communicated to all of the welding inspectors.
Id. at 1525.
(5)
This incident apparently refers to QC inspector Cauthen, although this is not entirely clear.
The Board found that Cauthen was harassed by other welding inspectors, whose prior inspections had approved welds that Cauthen found to be substandard, and who did not like another inspector criticizing their work. See 19 NRC at 1526-27.
The Board further noted that
" craftsmen were not involved and there is no suggestion of construction scheduling pressures." Id. at 1526.
Cauthen
r testified that the resentment of some fellow inspectors did not make him "stop looking hard" for defects. Id.
(6)
The incident in which ironworker foreman Mullinax i
threatened to " whip" QC inspector Harris or " knock his teeth out" if-Harris did not " leave his men alone" is discussed at 19 NRC at 1527-28.
This disagreement was referred by each individual to i
his supervisor, and the parties' relationship improved in a subsequent meeting. Id. at 1527.
The Job Superintendent at Catawba also orally reprimanded Mullinax and cautioned him against any repetition.
Harris had no continuing concerns and testified that his inspections were not affected.
The Board found that Duke's corrective measures "were in the right direction," but should have been communicated to the welding inspectors. Id. at 1528.
(7)
The Board's findings on the issue of alleged retaliation against inspectors for going to the NRC are set forth at 19 NRC at 1508-11.
It concluded that while Duke " felt uncomfortable with complaints being made directly to the NRC" and urged employees to first take their problems to Duke management,6 n y, find no attempt to punish inspectors for going directly to the NRC." Id. at 1511.
The testimony " reflected an understanding that employees could contact NRC without retribution" -- and some inspectors contacted the NRC frequently. Id.
Thus, contrary to
-6/
Such position is consistent with the NRC notice (Form 3).
App. Ex. 37, Att. E; see 19 NRC at 1508-11.
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r.
r GAP's allegation, there was no harassment of inspectors for contacting the NRC.
The allegation of Mr. Hoopingarner, a former Catawba employee who testified for intervenor Palmetto Alliance, that he was told not to talk to the NRC is discussed at 19 NRC at 1541-43.
In sum, the Board found that Hoopingarner was improperly instructed that he should not approach an NRC inspector, that this directive was withdrawn at least twice immediately thereafter, that the erroneous instruction was "an isolated occurrence, not part of a pattern of restricting access to the NRC," and that Mr.
Hoopingarner was clearly not deterred from contacting the NRC.
Id. at 1542.
Indeed, he "went well beyond any reasonable standard" in raising concerns with the NRC during working hours.
Id. at 1548.
The Board did not find that Hoopingarner was harassed.
On pp. 4-5 of its petition, GAP lists ten additional incidents (#8-17) involving Duke employees' alleged " intimidation about their freedom to bring their concerns to the NRC under threat of some type of retaliation from the company."
The Board's findings on these allegations are summarized below.
GAP ha~s failed to demonstrate how many of these incidents are related to access to the NRC.
(8)
It is not clear whether this allegation refers to the velding inspectors or the craft.
In any event, the Licensing Board fully discussed access to the NRC of both craft and QC inspectors, as detailed in (7), above.
e
, (9)
The meeting between QC welding inspectors and Duke Executive Vice President Construction and Engineering, Warren H.
Owen, is discussed at 19 NRC at 1510-11.
While one inspector testified that Mr. Owen's words suggested that he should not go to the_NRC, other inspectors present at the meeting rejected this interpretation.
The Board itself also listened to a tape of Mr.
Owen's speech and found that "Mr. Owen's talk did not come across as threatening." Id. at 1510.
(10) This allegation apparently refers to an incident involving inspector Burr and his supervisor Mr. Ledford, which is discussed at 19 NRC at 1511-12.
The Board found that each individual had misinterpreted the other, that Ledford had not intended to threaten Burr about future promotions, and that Ledford did not exert pressure on Burr "to let procedural-violations go undocumented or uncorrected." Id. at 1512. See (1),
above.
Burr continued to do his job. 19 NRC at 1511; Tr. 5930-31, 5933, 5937, Burr (11/3/83); App. Ex. 29, Burr, p. 4.
(11) This allegation apparently refers to inspector Beau Ross' conversation with George Grier, discussed at 19 NRC at 1518-19.
Duke disputes the Board's finding that "a reasonable person would interpret (Grier's] comments as an attempt to influence future testimony in this proceeding." Id. at 1518. See (2), above, and footnote 5.
(12) This allegation apparently refers to an incident involving inspector Bryant and a welder, discussed at 19 NRC at
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, 1528-29.
The situation was amicably resolved and the welder apologized to Mr. Bryant. Id. at 1528.
(13) See (2), above, relating to welding inspector supervisor Beau Ross (see especially 19 NRC at 1517-18). See also (5),
above, relating to welding inspector Cauthen (see especially 19 NRC at 1526).
(14) This allegation apparently refers to inspector Cauthen.
See (5), above.
(15) The vagueness of this allegation makes it difficult to tie to the PID. See 19 NRC at 1511-13.
See also 19 NRC at 1505-08, wherein the Board discussed the welding inspectors' suspicions of Mr. Davison.
The Board found "no substantial evidence that Mr. Davison actually did retaliate against welding inspectors for expressing their concerns." Id. at 1507-08.
(16) See (5), above.7 In response to the welding inspectors' concerns, Duke promptly responded by the creation of three separate task forces.
See 19 NRC at 1434-37.
Contrary to GAP's assertions (Petition at 5), the Licensing Board found that expression of the welding inspectors' concerns indeed were triggered by the inspectors' pay reclassification. See 19 NRC at 1446-47, 1449-50.
In fact,
-7/ GAP asserts (Petition at 5) that the above facts fit the Catawba Licensing Board's definition of harassment.
The Catawba Licensing Board concluded otherwise: only four incidents were identified as constituting harassment. See 19 NRC at 1443, 1522-25 (Jackson-McKenzie), 1443, 1525-26 (Deaton), 1526-27 (Cauthen), 1443-44, 1527-28 (Harris-Mullinax).
i e -during the course of the OI investigation, some of the inspectors acknowledged that pay was the root cause of the welding i
inspectors' concerns. See OI Report #2-83-038, Summary at p. 2.
GAP's assertion (Petition at 5) that harassment of an entire crew of inspectors was " condoned" by Duke management and
" promulgated" by the Catawba QA Manager for five years is simply unsupported by the record in the Catawba' proceeding. See 19 NRC at-1505-08 (Davison's relationship with inspectors Rockholt and Bryant); 1511-13 (Cauthen); 1520-32 (discussion of harassment incidents).
As noted above, the Board did find discrimination against inspector supervisor Ross in his Duke performance evaluations, but this did not adversely affect the work done by Mr. Ross or his crew, let alone the numerous other aspects of the Catawba QA-program unrelated to Mr. Ross. See 19 NRC at 1519-20.
In an attempt to show pervasive QA problems, Part III of GAP's petition quotes a portion of Welding Inspector Supervisor Ross' statement in the OI report alleging harassment and intimidation of two QC civil inspectors, Jim Norris and Wrenn Vassey (Petition at 6).
GAP fails to mention that OI investigated Ross' statement, interviewing both Norris and Vassey, and both of them flatly denied that they had never been I
l harassed or intimidated. See OI Report, #2-83-038, at pp. 72-73.
l The Licensing Board's conclusion that harassment was not a widespread problem at Catawba is fully supported by the extensive i
hearing record and sound reasoning. See 19 NRC at 1531-32.
No i
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e witness, including R. McAfee, a former QC electrical inspector called as a witness by Palmetto Alliance, raised harassment or intimidation as a concern outside the area of welding inspection.
See 19 NRC at 1532-39.
No record evidence supports GAP's allegations of a broader harassment problem at Catawba.
At the top of page seven of its petition, GAP apparently refers to the practice of " verbal voiding" of NCI's.
After a thorough review of the record, the Licensing Board concluded that this was not a problem. 19 NRC at 1481, 1483-92, 1504.8 In part IV of its petition, GAP refers to what it purports to be "new evidence of an atmosphere of harassment and intimidation" (Petition at 8).
The evidence GAP relies on is a series of over 300 affidavits taken by Duke investigators from approximately 217 Catawba construction workers, all done under the oversight of Region II. See 20 NRC at 1490-94.
All of the affidavits, including those to which GAP alludes (see Petition at 8), were subsequently received in evidence by the Licensing Board as Applicants' Exhibit 118
(" App. Ex. 118"), with the identity of each affiant indicated by a code number.
See 20 NRC at 1494; App. Ex. 118.
This evidence was fully evaluated by the Licensing 8/
See also App. Ex. 2, Grier, pp. 41-43; App. Ex. 9, Wells, p.
Ili App. Ex. 14, Davison, pp. 30-1; App. Ex. 18, Morgan, pp.
8-9; App. Ex. 19, Shropshire, pp. 5-6; App. Ex. 20, Baldwin, pp. 7-8; App. Ex. 21, Allum, p. 4; Tr. 9842-43, Van Doorn (12/06/83); Tr. 4994-95, Baldwin (11/27/83); Tr. 5894-95, 5954, Burr (11/03/83); Tr. 5822-23, Deaton (11/13/83); Tr.
6986-87, 7052, Ross (11/11/83); Tr. 6365-67, 6379, Rockholt (11/08/83); Tr. 6160-62, Bryant (11/04/83); Tr. 8559, Gantt (11/29/83).
s e Board (see 20 NRC at 1494-1502), which properly concluded that the evidence does not indicate a significant breakdown in quality assurance at Catawba. Id. at 1506-07.
The specific incidents that GAP mentions are put in the context of the rest of the 1
record below.
The incident involving a violent statement (incorrectly quoted by GAP) by a foreman (Mr. Moore) was not connected with violating procedures. See App. Ex. 118, #70 at p. 2 (4/17/85).
A second worker who was also present when the foreman made the statement did not view the incident as threatening anyone.
App.
Ex. 118, #32 (6/20/84).
Mr. Moore was identified by both the NRC and Duke (20 NRC at 1489; see also id. at 1495) and Duke removed him from his supervisory position as a result of the investigation.
Id. at 1507.
Both above-mentioned workers are satisfied with Duke's resolution of the situation.
App. Ex. 118,
- 32 (9/20/84), #70 (8/21/84).
The two individuals who expressed fear of losing their jobs nonetheless raised with the Duke investigators those concerns that they had.
App. Ex. 118, #8 (6/4/84), #192.
Individual #8's only concern was with his general foreman, Smith, who was removed as a result of the investigation.
App. Ex. 118, #8 (6/14/84); 20 NRC at 1492-93, 1507.
Individual #192 is satisfied with the resolution of his concerns.
App. Ex. 118, #192 (8/22/84).
Only one worker speculated that his foreman (again, ex-foreman Moore) was on drugs, a charge that was never
.- substantiated or in any way corroborated.
App. Ex. 118, #196 at
- p. 3 (6/15/94).
This individual testified in camera at the licensing hearings and did not even mention any concern about foreman drug use.
IC Tr. 2014-98 (10/12/84).
All of his concerns were resolved through Duke's investigtion.
App. Ex.
118, #196 (8/17/84).
The general allegation of pressure to meet construction schedules without regard to work quality was the basic thesis of Palmetto's contention 6, which was litigated during nearly fifty days of hearings and rejected by the Licensing Board as unsubstantiated.
See 19 NRC at 1439-40, 1583-84; 20 NRC at 1507.
The issue of alleged excessive force on pipes (" cold springing") was litigated twice and found to be without safety significance.
See 19 NRC at 1552-53; 20 NRC at 1499-1500.
Alleged welding interpass temperature violations were the primary subject addressed in the last phase of the Licensing Board hearings.
After considering all the evidence (including that alluded to by GAP in its recent request for a civil penalty), the Licensing Board found instances of interpass violations to have been isolated and rare, involving only two foremen (primarily ex-foreman Moore), both of whom have been removed from supervisory positions. See 20 NRC at 1495-96, 1506.
These incidents are without safety significance. See id. at 1503-06.
. The concern over the adequacy of night shift inspector staffing was unfounded.
The inspector who raised this concern is satisfied with Duke's investigation into the issue.
See App. Ex.
118, #32 (9/20/84); see also Int. Ex. 151.9 GAP's allegations (Petition at 8) of impropriety and lack of zeal during the Region II investigation are belied by the Licensing Board record.
See 20 NRC at 1488-89, 1493; Staff Ex.
33, 36; see also 19 NRC at 1499 n.19.
III.
Legal Analysis Apart from the fact that the imposition of a civil penalty is clearly unwarranted on the facts in this case, such a sanction also cannot be justified as a legal matter.
Whatever else may be said about GAP's representations, an assertion that Duke has ever been held by the Department of Labor to have violated section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. S 5851, is conspicuous by its absence.
For this there is good reason, because in fact no such finding has ever been made.
To the extent that 10 C.F.R.
S 50.7 purports to create independent authority to impose sanctions for violations of section 210, it is clear that the Commission never intended to place itself in the position of determining in the first instance that such a violation has occurred.
This is apparent, first, from the structure of the regulation itself, in which the
-9/
GAP's allegation of bias in Duke's investigation was specifically refuted by expert testimony before the Licensing Board. See 20 NRC at 1490-94.
e
.. description of proscribed acts set forth in section 50.7(a) is immediately followed by a description in subsection (b) of the procedures available in the Department of Labor for employees believing themselves to have been the subjects of discrimination made unlawful by section 210.
Moreover, the Statement of Considerations accompanying the promulgation of section 50.7 expressly couched the authority provided for in the regulation in conditional terms:
In addition to redress being available to the individual employee the Commission may, upon learning of an adverse finding against an employer by the Department of Labor, take enforcement action against the employer because the employer engaged in illegal discrimination.
47 Fed. Reg. 30452 (1982).
Further evidence of an intention that NRC jurisdiction under section 50.7 was not to be exercised preemptively, but rather only in consequence of findings adverse to an employer initially made by the Department of Labor, is to be found in the response provided in the Statement of Considerations to concerns raised in comments to the proposed rule that it would engender harassment of employers by allowing employees to assert frivolous allegations.
The Commission dismissed this concern out of hand, finding all necessary reassurance in the fact that "it appears that at an early stage, DOL denies complaints that are without merit."
Id. at 30454.
This observation would, of course, only beg the question if NRC jurisdiction under section 50.7 could be
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- invoked irrespective of whether there had first been a finding of a violation of section 210 by the Department of Labor.
The position assumed by the Commission in its Statement of Considerations on 10 C.F.R. 550.7, furthermore, is in all respects consistent with views expressed within the NRC at the time that the Commission was asked to comment on the bill (S.
2584) containing the provision that, with minor modifications not pertinent here, became section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act.
In a contemporaneous memorandum for the Commission, Howard K. Shapar, Executive Legal Director, gave voice to the conclusions that became the NRC's position on the pending legislation.10 There are two aspects of the positions embraced in that memorandum that are of particular relevance for the present discussion.
First, one of the options evaluated was that the Commission support the conferral of the "whistleblowers" protection authority upon NRC.
In rejecting that alternative, OELD acknowledged the clear desirability of deferring to the expertise of DOL with regard to questions concerning employment i
j relationships:
--10/ The memorandum is appended hereto as Attachment A.
In addition, a September 18, 1978, memorandum from OELD is appended hereto as Attachment B.
The latter confirms that the Commission endorsed the contents of OELD's original memorandum, and that OELD was directed to communicate the positions set forth in the memorandum to both majority and minority representatives of the Senate Committee on l
Environment and Public Works.
s
.* As a second option, one could provide authority for NRC to investigate and take administrative action for discriminatory actions.
I&E, SD, NRR and ELD all agree that any legislation dealing with employer-employee relations (as would be the case if the remedies to be made available to the employee included reinstatement and backpay) should be implemented by an agency (such as the Department of Labor) with more expertise than NRC has on labor management relations.
Attachment A at p.
4.
Thus, the decision to support S.
2584 as proposed, with its provision for reposing authority for determination of when unlawful discrimination had occurred solely in DOL, reflected a conscious recognition that the Commission possesses no special expertise that would qualify it "to investigate and take administrative action for discriminatory actions."
Id.
This clear and conscious choice to endorse a i
legislative scheme reposing authority only in the agency with the admittedly greater expertise with respect to such questions would be perverted if, as GAP's letter suggests, NRC were free to make its own determinations in such cases.
The second relevant point in the memorandum is its consideration of the necessity for and the desirability of providing for the imposition of civil penalties.
' Presuming that the Commission already had authority at the time by virtue of the then-current version of 10 C.F.R. Part 1911 to impose civil i
~~11/ The version of 10 C.F.R. part 19 that was current in late 1978 bore the title " Notices, Instructions and Reports To Workers; Inspections," and addressed the occupational health (footnote 11 continued on next page)
.' penalties on licensees that discriminated against employees for providing NRC information on radiological working conditions, the memorandum addressed the issue of whether "the bill [S. 2584]
should be broadened as to non-licensee employers who discriminate against their employees for providing information to NRC so as to not only subject them to Department of Labor proceedings leading to remedial actions that would compensate the employee, but subject them to NRC or Labor civil penalty proceedings as well."
Attachment A at p. 5.
The OELD memorandum points out two difficulties with that approach:
(footnote 11 continued from previous page) and safety of employees of nuclear licensees as they were affected by radiological working conditions.
Section 19.16 provided, in relevant part:
(a)
Any worker or representative of workers who believes that a violation of the Act, the regulations in this chapter, or license conditions exists or has occurred in license activities with regard to radiological working conditions in which the worker is engaged, may request an inspection by giving notice of the alleged violation to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, to the Director of the appropriate i
Commission Regional Office, or to Commission inspectors.
l Any such notice shall be in writing, shall set forth the specific grounds for the notice, and shall be signed by l
the worker or representative of the workers.
(b)
No licensee shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any worker because such worker has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be i
instituted any proceeding under the regulations in this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such worker on behalf of himself or others of any option afforded by this part.
l
.- Whether a civil penalty, when added to the
" penalties" of employee reinstatement, awards of back pay and dameges to the employee, and assessment of the costs of the proceedings before the Department of Labor, would provide any further dissuasion to employers considering discriminatory acts, is problematical.
An NRC civil penalty provision would have the disadvantage of making the employer subject to two proceedings before two separate agencies on the same factual circumstances.
Id.
In conclusion, the memorandum expressed opposition to the notion that S.
2584 should be amended to provide for civil penalties.
The opposition of ELD, NRR and I&E was said to have been based on the perception that civil penalties would add no additional deterrence to that provided by the sanctions already provided for in the bill, and the memorandum noted that "SD believes that no showing has been made that such an employee protection program is needed, but that
. S.
2584 is adequate." Id. at p. 7.
Again, the clear and conscious decision of the Commission to eschew support of a civil penalties provision in the legislative proposal that was to become section 210 undercuts the application of 10 C.F.R. 550.7 that GAP seeks in this case.
For one thing, the failure to pursue through the legislative process an j
acknowledged opportunity to obtain express congressional r i
authority for additional administrative sanctions casts serious l
doubt on any argument that such authority existed implicitly all along.
More to the present point, however, it is at best highly f
doubtful that the same agency that embraced the consignment of l
i
i
.. employment disputes to DOL's superior expertise and spurned the opportunity to seek a civil penalty provision on the ground that such a provision could not improve on the proposal then before the Congress, would just over three years later promulgate a regulation arrogating to itself the power to decide in the first instance whether an employee had been discriminated against and, if so, then to impose a civil penalty.
Quite apart from this, however, the memorandum provides eloquent testimony to the fact that NRC has long since recognized that civil penalties can be employed only for remedial, not punitive, purposes.
The consideration that figured most prominently in the Commission's decision not to seek a civil penalties provision in section 210 itself was the perception that the deterrent effect of such a provision was, to use the memorandum's term, " problematic."
Yet GAP's entire argument for the imposition of a massive civil penalty on Duke is couched in terms of deterrence -- for Duke and for all of the rest of the nuclear industry.
Where the Commission itself has expressed doubt about the incremental value of civil penalties in such cases and the ASLB has expressly found that any harassment was isolated and did not perceptibly diminish the effectiveness of the Catawba QA programs, however, deterrence is at most a weak i
reed on which to lean in justifying the imposition of a civil penalty.
i l
l
i
.v
... Finally, it must be noted that most of the allegations raised by GAP in its effort to obtain the imposition of a penalty by their terms have nothing whatever to do with interference with an l~
employee's right to provide information to the NRC.
Indeed, only numbered allegations 7, 8, 9, and 11 even carry any suggestion of such interference.
As has been pointed out supra (see p. 7), the first three of-these were soundly refuted by express findings of the ASLB.
The allegations that employees were " harassed" and 1
" reprimanded" (nos. 7 and 8) for taking their concerns to the NRC can provide no basis for sanctions, inasmuch as the Board, after a lengthy examination of the issue in a full-blown trial,-found E
"no attempt to punish inspectors for going directly to NRC" and that "the testimony reflected an understanding that employees could contact'NRC without retribution." 19 NRC at 1511.
Similarly, the allegation that "QC inspectors were warned by top-level executives not to take their concerns to the NRC at a meeting between the Executive Vice President and welding QC 4
i inspectors" (no. 9) cannot justify a civil penalty in the face of the ASLB's finding, after listening itself to a recording of the meeting in question, that the " talk did not come across as threatening." Id. at 1510.
. Only with regard to the allegation (no. 11) of " intimidation" of an inspector scheduled to testify at a hearing was there any l
finding by the Board of an attempt to interfere with an
!~
employee's providing information to the NRC.
As was pointed out r-W' v
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.* supra (see p. 7), however, this finding is manifestly at odds with the evidence of record, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the employee's own contrary testimony that no attempt was made to influence his testimony. Tr. 7049-50.
As to all of the remaining allegations, no sanctions may be imposed because it is clear that 10 C.F.R. 150.7 was intended only to authorize sanctions for retaliation against employees for providi'ng information to the NRC.
The very first sentence in the Statement of Considerations accompanying the issuance of section 50.7 plainly states:
"The NRC is amending its regulations in regard to job protection for employees who provide information to the Commission." 47 Fed. Reg. 30452.
To the same effect, the Commission's description of its purpose in its notice of proposed c
e rulemaking said that the intention was to amend the Commission's regulations "in regard to protection for employees who provide the Commission" and to "make employers aware that discrimination against employees who provide such information to the Commission is prohibited.
Thus, all of the remaining allegations raised in GAP's brief are not cognizable under 10 C.F.R. 550.7.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Duke submits that the NRC should deny GAP's enforcement action request as unwarranted by the facts and improper as a matter of law.
f 4
I
3, 7._s i ATTACHMENT A Memorandum for the Commissioners from Howard K.
Shapar,_ Executive Legal Director, regarding. questions about S.2584 t
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For:
The Commissioners
- 1 From:
Howard K. Shapar Executive Legal Director Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
SECY-78-308 - PROTECTION OF INFOR!4 ANTS - RESPONSE TO COMMISSION QUESTIONS REGARDING SECTION 7 0F S. 2584 1
1
(,
Purpose:
A Commission p~osit! ion on the above legislation.
l l
Discussion:
INTP.0 DUCTION l
l During the Commission meeting on the above subject on i
September 5,1978, OELD was requested to prepare an analysis of Section 7 (Employee Protection) of S. 2584, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorization bill.
l The Commission requested this review in order to formulate a position on this section of the proposed legislation.
Attachment A is a copy of the proposed amendment (a new Sec. 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended), which provides authority to the Department of Labor to protect employees of NRC licensees and others from discrimination for i
having J rovided information to the NRC.
Attachment B is a copy of the section analysis contained in Senate Report No.95-848, which accompanies S. 2584.
6
=
Attachment C is a copy of the Commission's letter to Congressmen John Dingell and Richard Ottinger, dated August 9,1978, responding to several questions, one of which concerned the need for additional leg-islative authority to protect workers at nuclear C'ontact:
Martin G. Malsch 492-7203.
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power reactors who raise questions about complianc' '*
e With NRC requirements.
Also attached are the pertinent enclosure pages to the letter which discuss that' subject.
In essence, the Commission indicated that the NRC did not presently possess full authority tot 3
protect employees who provide information, such as authority to require reinstatement of a discharged
~
employee or payment of back wages, and that the
~
Commission was considering whether it needed addi-tional authority in this area.
~
ANALYSIS
.:: ~
Present Law I.#
C As explained in more d'etail in SECY-78-308, !!RC
~ presently has authority to adopt and enforce (by li.
license suspension, license revocation and civil penalties) regulations prohibiting licensees from F
discharging or otherwise discriminating against b
their employees for providing radiological safety y,
or common defense and security related information Q(
to NRC.
10 CFR 519.16(c) of the Commission's regulations does implement some of this authority
,{
as applied to licensees, other than construction H
permittees, who discharge or otherwise discriminate
.P against employees who file complaints with NRC,
[-
initiate proceedings before NRC, or testify or propose to testify in NRC proceedings on occupa-g tional radiological safety matters.
Howey.ef, the
[cgregisdo) presently igcTs3.07. Clea~r_ autho~,ity to s
r take action to directly protect the employee (for example, by ordering reinstatement, bac_k_pjty or
{o_t"exte7F_dTo Tron-l'ic'ensh g.f other compensation)Jho, ty take effectivF enforcement c'tE n r_obahly foes, I
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THE LEGISLATION Section 7 of S. 2584 adds to Title II of the Energy Reor'anization Act a new Section 210 entitled g
" Employee Protection." This provision establishes a framework for the direct protection of employees of NRC licensees, applicants, subcontractors of Commission licensees or applicants, and others who assist or participate in any proceeding under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 or'the Atomic
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Energy Act of 1954 or assist or par'icipate in any other action to carry out.the purposes of thes~e Acts.
The. provision would protect these employees from reprisals by their employers in connection with such assistance or participation. An employee 8
~~
against whom reprisals have been i aken b'y his t
employer may seek redress through an administrative proceeding in the Department of Labor.
The. Department could order reinstatement of the employee, back pay, and compensatory damages, and assess costs of the proceeding against the employer.
Review of the outcome of the administrative proceeding may be had in the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.
. The Secretary of Labor and the employee himself may l
enforce any order resulting from the administrative i
proceeding in an action in the appropriate United States District Court.
The Court is granted authority I
to gward litigation costs including reasonable
}
attorney and expert witness fees in such enforcement
}
proceedings.
Section 7 thus provides explicit authority for the protection of workers who disclose information to the Commission by providing a mechanism for the Department of Labor to investigate charges of discrimination against such employees, and a remedy if such discrimination has in fact occurred.
- The bill"'does"not, bf'HTtFras, grant any nej (a'titfio7i~ty~to' IdO'IThe neTis uthbr'it' TTn'the DTp'a711c'nY6TTabor. -
As the Committee report on the bill indicates, the provision is substantially identical to counterpart provisions in the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, enacted in 1972 and 1977, respectively.
We discussed these provisions with
'the Department of Labor and' EPA, and were informed that it is too early in the implementation of the respective employee protection provisions to assess the impact or contribution of such legislative 1
provisions.
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. BASIC COMI.IISSION SUPPORT FOR THE BILL The. initial question is, of course, whether NRC should support legislation that would provide additional protection to employees who provide
- 5 information to NRC.
This was the main issue discussed in SECY-78-308 and the pros and cons for additional legislative authority are discussed therein. As indicated in that paper, I&E and
-l'.
NRR both supported additional legislative authority C
in this area, while SD questioned whether the need
- l' for a program for protection had been demonstrated.
6 ELD believes that it will be extremely difficult s-for NRC not to support such_ legislation in the radiological fsafety and common defense and security
.~
~
when present law already provides for area employee protection in the clean air, clean water, J
and occupational safety areas.
(N The'next question relates to the basic form such
'y legislation might take.
This is also discussed in SECY-78-308.
There are three basic options.
f['-
One could provide a statutory remedy to the employee that cannot be administratively enforced i.
but which requires the employee (or someone acting on his behalf) to bring an action in court.
f.
SECY-78-308 suggests that this type of provision gives rise to delays in obtaining effective remedies. As a second option, one could provide authority for NRC to investigate and take admini-strative action for discriminatory actions.
The third option would be to vest this authori.ty__in, another agency.
J&E,gNRP,~iind~ELDialfagWef that any.-legi_slation-deal,ing with emplompployfe p
fdTa;tionEr.(aGwo'dlTliii Die case if the remedies l:..
to be made available to the employee included f
reins'tatement and back pay) should~bf]hTeiEntid by an' a wjth Tiio@re"expe(such as the_DipE.tisil1%f-tabor) rtTs e D;FaiQiRtJia' lon -1 abor %ana ge-s
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jent"r'elallonsE a POSSIBLE CMNGES TO THE BILL
?
I' As indicated, Section 7 of S. 2584 does not grant
~~
i; any additional authority to NRC, although NRC's k
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5-present authority to take enforcement against licensees for discriminatory acts would not be-affected.
The bill does provide authority to the Departrhent of Labor to investigate and order remedial action with regard to discriminatory s
acts along the lines of thatyp,ested in the foregoing discussion.
The qu,e,s_tjon remains w
~
.theyoMsjonr,of the bill phould-be broXde~
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to-mon-licensee employers who ' dis ~crisDiatTXoainst 'd the iFNipMHs~foUroEdiiD_n fd rma tion. tiNMC_s 03 e
as to not only subject them to Department of Labor
~. -
proceedings leading to remedial actions that would i,>
compensate _thyp1oyge pu,ty; dings as wellVsv Q c y o Labor. _
il penalty.pr_ocee j
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l As a general matter, up to now,JLony;1.~i, pen _se.~e;employersj ha vem eyeFte eirl esmy s ub] ect to' s ubs t8 n tivi.AEC/ riR0 8
regaTiRYrG5iremeritg703175ihen 10 CFR Part 21
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6ecame effective (implementing section 206 of the 5-Reorganization Act requiring reports to f!RC of E.
safety defects and violations) did.non-licensee (EoritractorsNbecome directly subject to civil pen ~alties j
, t/
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for nucTear' safety related violations. Making N.
g@d g)
- g' discriminatory actions by non-licensee employers
~
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subject to civil penalties would not appear to pro-.
g.,9 @ 830 vide any direct additional protection to the employee, but would add an additional penalty on the employer.
I Whether a civil penalty, when added to the " penalties" of employee reinstatement, awards of back pay and damages to the employee, and assessment of the costs I
of the proceedings before the Department of Labor
- 7 would provide any further dissuasion to employers s
- S considering discriminatory acts, is problematical.
1 An fiRC civil penalty provision would have the dis-i advantage of making the employer -subdec+-to-two procexMr-3s boiara--two.-separate-esench7mW'thD'ame fastual--e4cevetences.
On the other _ hand,_ the sameg wo ul d - b e-t r u e7Wi tfrrega MB 11 c en s e e.~v'.f o liti oiidiT
~
M.M.t'-i'2 NsI6t*ab{fo71EiPp^reservedt.T._his problem p
p"pYiEtFtT nin-licenseel w'oulTEe~ avoided if I
Labor, rather than !!RC, were to be given the civil penalty authority..
-?
POSSIBLE ITD!S OF CLARIFICATION 1.
While providing the Depart ent of Labor with new authority to investigate and provide a remedy 8
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to the employee who had been discriminated against,
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the bill does not by its terms int. fere with the Commission's current authority to investigate the'
alleged discrimination and take appropriate enforce-ment action directly against a licensee' employer for such discrimination (such as civil penalties, license suspension, and license revocation).
3 However, it would be useful if the legislative history would emphasize this point.
Itiwould also he useful to indicate that the pendancy of a pro-ceeding under Section 7 before the Department of Labor need not delay any necessary action by HRC g
to carry out the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act.
.:l b,
2.
The bill is intended to prohibit employers from f;,/
discharging or discriminating against e.nployees who participate or assist in f6rmal proceedings or 7
participate or assist in "any other action" to.
carry out the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act or
- i. -
Energy Reorganization Act.
The language could be s
read to limit employee remedies to those circum-stances which lead up to formal IRC proceedings.
s
.b Therefore, the meaning of the phrase "and eny other F.
action" appearing in section 210(a)(3) could be i.
clarified in the legislative history so as to f
indicate clearly that an employee would still be
_!(-
. protected even if no proceeding before the imC was actually instituted.
~
3.
The Committee report indicates that the ne.1
[.
section will help assure that employers do not violate Atomic Energy Act requirements.
Since as t._
a general matter only licensees are subject to Atomic Energy Act requirements, the Committee report could be read incorrectly as implying that only employer-licensees were intended to be covered..
/
This could be clarified in the legislative history.
1 4.
Subcontractors are specifically subject to the section but contractors are not.
Imile the section by its terms applies to all
- employers", a term which would include contractors as well as subcon-tractors, the legislative history could clarify that the term " employer" is to be given a broad 3
meaning.
5.
It would be useful if, upon receipt of a
~
complaint, the Department of Labor was recjuired i.
to' notify the NRC as well as the employer.
This could be done by adding "and the fluclear Regulatory Commission" after the word " complaint" on line 17 0
of S. 2584, as reported.
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Recomendation and ELD believes that l'P.C should support Section 7 of.
Coordination:
S. 2584, with the items of clarification noted above.
Surely employees who provide information to IRC regarding radiological safety or cor.non defense and security natters are as deserving of protection as employees who provide information to i
EPA about air and water pollution.
Yet,.under present law, only the latter enployees are fully protected.
S. 2584 is due to be taken up by the Senate very shortly, so any HRC letters of support, along with a discussion of the clarification itens noted above, should be sent to House and Senate con ferees. A sample letter is included as Attachment D.
ELD ~ opp 5ses7nywsBtirdTdEdrent orc 2584
[to naTEnon51fcenaEe5"iuS$c~t"tFc171 5
IT ETDs'"YieCEii~e's;II'6yEIiii6ritiTnlme7 i s c rih
. - natory action' uho is not dissuaded by the prospect of a Department of Labor proceeding leading to
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?j,, f, s
awarding of back pay, compensatory damages and litigation expenses and employee reinstateacnt would not itkely be dissuaded by the additional 3
'(
prospect of a civil penalty.
-y
- ?-
NRR and ILE concur.. SD believes that no showing
-(
has been made. that such an employee protection program is needed, but that if the Commission does decide to support legislation in this field, Section 7 of S. 2584, with the itens clarified as suggested, is adequate.
Howard K. Shapar Executive Legal Director i
Attachments:
"A" - Proposed Amendment i
"B" - Section Analysis "C" - Commission's letter to 9
Dingell.and Ottingei' "D" - Sample Letter
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g oe s-ATTACHMENT B September 18, 1978 memorandum for the Commissioners from Howard K. Shapar, Executive Legal Director, regarding passage of S.2584 with NRC recommended clarification
NUCyAcR AcGUl.ATORY CO;JMisSION g.
in IN FO PJM A.TIO N REP O R f f.
5.d
\\
. For:
The Commissioners
]
From:
Howard K. Shapar 2=;{
Executive Legal Director iEi h,
4h
=.55
.,Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
~,.;
i fi
Subject:
SECTION 7 0F S. 2584 - PROTECTION OF INFORMANTS 25 m
Purpose:
Information EJ 5
Discussion:
On' September 13, 1978, OELD forwarded to the Comission its analysis of section 7 of S. 2584, the NRC authori-M 5
zation bill.
Section 7 adds a new section 210 to the
'li Energy Reorganization Act of' 1974' to protect employees
.Z who. assist or participate in any proceeding to admin-
((]
ister or enforce the requir ments of the Energy LM
, Reorganization Act or the Atomic Energy Act cf 1954.
bs2 On September.15,1978,0PE informed OELD that the Comission, had agreed to the Staff's recommendation ff" that the Comission support section 7, with certain M-if clarification iteds.
At OPE's request, OELD contacted
?E both. majority (Larry Roth) and minority (Jim Asselstine)
EE
(
staff members of the Senate Comittee on' Environment
==
(
and Public Works to indicate Comission support for j
the section and to request that certain matters be
==
clarified in the bill language or legislative history as recomended in the Comission paper.
On September 18, iE 1978, the Senate passed the authorization bill, including section 7 with all the clarifications made as proposed
'by OELD.
A copy of the Senate floor remarks on section 7 is attached.
Howard K. Shapar
=^ A Executive Legal Director
Attachment:
Congressional Record--Senate h
=
September 18, 1978, p. S 15318 1
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.m SECY NOTE:
The analysis paper referred to was received on September 14, 1978 3
and circulated and discussed by OPE with the Commissioner staffs.
.!5 As a result of these discussions and because of the impending IE passage of S.z584 the actions described above were taken and the IM analysis paper not formally issued.
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