ML20115H222
| ML20115H222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1992 |
| From: | Skolds J SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210270054 | |
| Download: ML20115H222 (3) | |
Text
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' ' ' A South Carolina Electric & Oss Company Johe L Skoids P O. Dos 88
%ce Presiden?
Jenkintville. V 74065 fluclear Operations (603) 345 4040 lSCE&G
..co
-.m September 25, 1992 S2 CCI 5 Pg og Mr.
S.
D. Ebneter Regional Administrator U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30323
Dear Mr. Ebneter:
Subject:
VIRGIL C.
SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-395/92-11 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE FINDINGS This letter provides the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) response to two (2) weaknesses identified during the July 13-17, 1992 inspection of the Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) annual emergency response exercise. Additional information is also provided for the non-cited violation (NCV) on inadequate training or emergency commun.icators in their group call-in responsibilities.
Actions and review results tor deficiencies noted during this inspection are as-follows:
50-395/92-11-01 Exercise weaknuss Requests for off-site assistance were not made in accordancis with procedures and some follow-up notification information was inc^' rect.
SCE&G has stressed the necessity - of procgdure adherence and documentation to all communicators during-training. sessions in September of 1992.
Additional emphasis was placed on-this issue through written correspondence to each communicator to document knowledge of the error.
The importance of providing accurate and comprehensive follow-up information during notification of offsite agencies will be stressed to key personnel in.both the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
SCE&G has scheduled a practice drill in McVember 1992 and will exercise this corrective action.
Additionally, this issue will be further emphasized during the annual refresher training for plant personnel scheduled to be completed during the first quarter _of 1993.
50-395/92-11-02 Failure to adequately train emergency NCV communications for group page call in responsibilities.
As noted in the inspection report, the shift fire protection officers (FPos) are responsible for initiating the call-in of.
1 0; 9210270054 920923 PDR-ADOCK 03000395 G
PDR f655.
Mr.
S.
D.
Ebntter September 24, 1992 l
.Page 2 of 3 emergency personnel at the onset of an emergency via the group pagers.
The performance oriented failure of the FPOs was due to a lack of practica)
(hands-on) experience in performance of tasks which are addressed in procedures and also covered during training sessions.
Additionally, a review of emergency plan procedures has found them to be deficient in providing adequate instructions during the initial notifications.
The following corrective actions were initiated by SCE&G following identification of the deficiency:
- 1. The FPOs wete provided additional tre.i".ing on performance of the call-in from the Shif t Supervisor's of. ice immediately following identification of the deficiency.
The task was performed by each FPO under the observation of Emergency Planning personnel.
2.
Two pagers have been located near the phone in the Shift 1
Supervisor's office to provide positive indice. tion that pager messages were actually transmitted.
3.
Enhancements are currently being made to the Emergency Plan Procedures that will provide better instructions on activating the cal)-in pagers.
The revisions to the affected procedures are expected to be complete by October 15, 1992.
4.
To provide realism during future drills, an identical phone to the one currently installed in the Shift Supervisor's office will be installed at the simulator.
50-395/92-11-03 -- Exercise Weakness - Delayed flow of information between emergency response personnel resulted in SAE declaration 16 minutes after the EhL was met.
This weakness has been evaluated very carefully by SCE&G.
Had this baen a real event, the personnel in the TSC would have known the condition of the facility immediately following loss of one train of essential lighting.
Without the visual stimulation, there was a nine minute delay during the Emergency Directot briefing before the TSC sas notified of the loss which led to the upgrade in the emergency classification.
SCE&G does not consider the time delay during the drill to be excessive; however, it ir, recognized that if the controller in the TSC had made the announcement that lights were being lost due to plant conditions the delay might not have occurred. The Emergency Planning organization has been tasked with previding updates to the Emergency Director, via controllers, of changes in plant conditions which would normally he recognized by the TSC staff or provided through communications from the adjacent Control Room in'an actual emergency.
Reviews have also been made on the advantages / disadvantages of the EOF having the responsibility of making emergency classification l
M
1 r.
.i Mr. S. D._Ebneter September
- 24, 1992
]
.*] Pzrge 3 of~3 l
l
.d e te'rminations.
Following this evaluation, VCSNS management still believes that the responsibility should remain with the EOF so that the Emergency Director can continue to concentrate on accident mitigation.
This decision is further suppo-ted by the fact that the personnel responsible for recommending protective actions report to the EOF.
Should ;ou have any questions on the above response to the items identified during this inspection, please contact Mr.
Charles McKinney at (803) 345-4723.
Very truly yours, l
0
(,o<h!/,L.L it/ m p r Skolds CJM:cjm c:
O.
W. Dixon R.
J. White General Managers G.
F.
Wunder S.
R.
Hunt H.
L. O'Quinn NRC Resident Inspector i
J.
B.
Knotts Jr.
File (815.01) l
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