ML20115G586

Emergency Svc Water Sys Water Hammer Preoperational Test Program

ML20115G586
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/09/1985
From:	Flemming F, Michael Lee, Whitehead C CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20115G579	List: ML20115G577 ML20115G586
References
PROC-850409, NUDOCS 8504220257
Download: ML20115G586 (35)

Text

r-ATTACHMEtTr FOR-ITEM D2.1-3

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April 9,'1985 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM WATER H AMMER PRE-OPERATIONAL TEST PROGR AM p

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" Project Piping Engineer D4te /

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t1Viechanical Engineer Date N $. bnu, 4f4 /fS' Approved n

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EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM WATER HAMMER PRE-OPERATIONAL TEST PROGRAM 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To verify during pre-operational testing that water hammer induced pipe vibrations,if they exist, are within acceptable limits for the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System piping.

1.2.

To demonstrate the following upon completion of water hammer vibration testing:

a.

Spring hangers returned to within the hot and cold setpoints.

b.

Snubber inspections revealed no evidence of snubber de. mage.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 The Cleveland Electric llluminating Co., Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1,IDI Inspection 84-29 Response, item D2.13.

2.2 ANSI /ASME OM3-1982, Requirements for Pre-Operational and Initial Start-up Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Piping Systems.

4 2.3 G Al Flow Diagrams D-302-791, Re'v. G and D-302-792, Rev. G.

3.0 TEST EQUIPMEN T 3.1 Portable vibration monitor, freq. range 60-600,000 CPM (1 to 10,000 Hz.);

amplitude range 0100 mils pk-pk (minimum): IRD Mech. analysis Model 360 Vibration Analyzer w/model 910 accelerometer (or EQUAL).

NOTE: The deflection range of the IRD 360, or EQUAL, may be increased as required by use of the follo. wing formula:

'(

V \\

(F x 10 6/

=D 52.3 Where: V = Velocity in inches per second (peak).

F = Most predominant frec uency in cycles per minute.

D = Deflection in mils (pea oto-peak).

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3.2 Rule,12 inch,1/16" graduations.

4.0 PRECAUTIONS 4.1 Periodic inspections of pipe support components should be performed during testing to detect possible component malfunction. Oil leaks, bent shaf ts, deteriorating grouting around anchor bolts, etc., are all symptoms of impending component failure. Pipe support components exhibiting these symptoms should be repaired and the cause for the malfunction analyzed.

4.2 The coaxial cable associated with vibration ~ monitoring equipment is easily damaged and susceptible to high noise pickup when cable runs are long

(> 100 ft) between sensor and signal conditioning unit. Care should be exercised when running sensor cable to avoid kinks, pinching and other cables classified as power lines to prevent poor quality vibration mesurements.

4.3 Numerous pump / motor starts & stops may be required to conduct testing in Section 7.0. To prevent excessive heat buildup and possible motor damage, manufacturer's limitations for successive motor starts shall be adhered to.

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5.0 PREREQUISITES 5.1 Piping in the system to be tested is supported and restrained in conformance with the design drawings.

5.2 An initial walkdown of the system piping to be tested must be performed to verify that no obstructions to pipe movement exist other than designed, and

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that suspension components are free of damage. Seismic clearance program items should be resolved prior to start of testing.

5.3 Communications have been established between the control room and test personnel performing piping observations.

5.4 The system has been properly filled and vented.

5.5 The system flow balance has been completed and all throttle valves are in their normal operating position.

6.0 INITIAt. CONDITIONS r

6.1 All pipe support components in the piping system to be tested are unblocked and free to operate. Spring hangers are at their cold settings.

6.2 Experienced test personnel have been familiarized with the sections of piping / support components they are to observe, and with the criteria for acceptable vibration in that piping / support component.

6.3 MANDATORY REQUIREMENT During water hammer vibration testing, a qualified piping engineer of Gilbert Associates,Inc. shall observe vibration testing and review test results.

' 7.0 TEST METHOD 7.1 Visually inspect the following piping for water hammer vibration in response to the transients listed. For water hammer testing, portions of the ESW piping that must be inspected are given below.

Transients to be Monitored Remarks

a. Individual starts for pumps System lined up with flow through 1P45-C001 A/B and all branches. All piping in the ESW 1P45C002 system, except overflow to the swale, is to be observed.

b. Individual starts for pumps System lined up with the RHR Heat 1P45-C001 A/B Exchanger isolated (Valves IP45-F014A/B and F068A/B closed.)

All piping in the ESW system, except overflow to the swale, to be observed.

'c. Individual restarts for pumps Establish system flow and repeat 1P45-C001 A/B and 1P45-C002 test "a" starting pumps 40 seconds after trip. All piping in the ESW system, except overflow to the swale, is to be observed.

d.5ystem operation with With system operating with flow discharge to swale through all branches close valves 1P45 F525, F526, and F527 as rapidly as possible. Only piping downstream of the swale connection to the header need be observed for this test.

7.2 During observation of the above transients, operating conditions and test results shall be documented on the Data Sheet.

7.3 During observation of each of the above transients attention shall be given to small attached piping and instrument connections. They shall be monitored to ensure vibrations are within accbptable limits. Lines should be monitored to the first rigid su aport in each of the 3 orthaconal directions.

Special attention shall be paic to the axial movements of long sections of piping. Possible interference of the pipmg and their branen connections with surrounding piping, equipment and structures shall be carefully checked before and after each test.

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7.4 During piping system tr.ansients, observe pipe support components. Verify that spring hangers remain between their hot and cold setpoints at the end of each transient, and that snubbers do not become fully extended or retracted.

7.5

. When visualinspection detects questionable pipe movement or vibration, such movement or vibration shall be documented during retesting as follows:

a. Vibration shall be monitored with a portable vibration monitor. Axial movements shall be. monitored by scratch pads or other approved means.

b. As required, the portion of the test during which questionable vibrations.

originated shall be repeated. Retesting shall be in compliance with applicable CEI administrative procedures.

c. The results of system retestin'g shall be recorded on the Data Sheet.

d.The test shall be subjected to a hold or terminated when acceptance criteria are violated and as determined to be necessary by the qualified piping engineer.

7.6' As soon as possible after establishment'of a test hold or termination of the

-test, the following corrective actions are'taken:

a. installation inspection - a walkdown of the piping and pipe support components will be performed to identify any obstruction or improperly operating support components. The source of the excitation must be identified to determine whether it is related to equipment failure. Action is taken to correct any discrepancies prior to repeating the test.

b. Instrumentation Inspection - the instrument installation and calibration are checked and discrepancies are corrected. Additionalinstrumentation is added if necessary.

c. If items 7.6.a and 7.6.b above identify discrepancies that could account for failure to comply with acceptance criteria, the test is repeated.

d.lf items 7.6.a and 7.6.b above do not identify discrepancies that could account for failure to comply with acceptance criteria, the hold is continued and the discrepancy shall be forwarded to Engineering for resolution. The test may be restarted af ter resolution by Engineering.

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8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 8.1 Piping transient vibrations at the center of the span shall be within the peak-to-peak limitations of the enclosed Paragraph 8.1 Acceptance Criteria Table.

8.2 For spring hangers identified as being within the scope of piping'for transient vibration testing, at the completion of testing, spring hangers were inspected and spring hangers were within the hot and cold setpoints.

8.3 For snubbers identified as being within the scope of piping for transient vibration testing, at the completion of testing, snubbers were inspected and no evidence of snubber damage was found.

h0TE: Satisfying the requirements of paragrph 8.1 demonstrates snubbers do not become fully extended or retracted during transient vibration testing.

8.4 Small attached piping, test connections, branch line connections and instrument connections were not in resonance with the major sources of yibration in their respective systems during water hammer vibration testmg, and do not come into contact with other piping, equipment or structures.

8.5 During water hammer vibration testing, evidence of excessive stresses including weld cracks, loose nuts and bolts, loose threaded connections and flow instabilities was not found.

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4.

5.

I Paragrph 8.1 Acceptance Criteria Table VISUAL VIBRATION ACCEPTABLE CRITERI A ALLOWABLE DEFLECTIONS NOMINAL TYPE SIZE LENGTH OF SPAN IN FEET WELD INCHES L Minimum 6

.9 12 15 18 21 24 27

. 3/4" 20 @ L = 3.8' 50 112 I

Socket 1"

20 @ L = 4.2' 40 88 Welded 1-1/4" 20 @ L = 4.7' 32 70

- SPAN LENGTHS Pipe 1 -1/2 "

20 @ L = 5.0' 28 62 ARE NOT 2"

20 @ L = 5.7' 22 50 88 EXPECTED IN THIS 2-1/2" 20 @ L = 3.9' 48 108 192-REGION -

3" 20 @ L = 3.9' 40 90 160 4"

20 @ L = 4.9' 30 68 120 188 Full 6"

48 80 126 180 Penet.

8" 34 60 94 136 184 girth -

10" 28' 48 76 108 148 butt 12" 22 40 62 90 122 160 welded 14" 34 54 78 106 138 pipe 16" 30 46 68 92 120 18" 26 42 60 82 106 136 20"

'24 38 54 74 96 122 22"

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22 34 50 66 88 110 24" 20 32 46 62 80 102 i

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NOTES 1)

Tabular values are for:

(a) Mid-span deflect,ionsin the plane of the end supports (b) Transientoperation (c) Displacements given in mils (1 mil =.001 inch) peak to peak (d) Simple span of straight pipe (e) Carbon steel pipe (f) Schedule 40 wall thickness and greater

'(g) End points of the span at rigid supports: struts, anchors or equipment connections (h) At least one socket welded fitting or one full penetration gir'th butt weld in the span or at an end point of the span (i) Pipe tests at low temperatures where pipe stresses from thermal ef fects will not be significant and thermal pipe growth will not affect the nominal assumed 1/32" minimum clearance at pipe supports other than rigid struts, anchors and equipment.

(j) long radius elbows.

2)

A Maximum Allowable Visual (MAV) displacement will be determined for each pipe span surveyed visually, if pipe motion is not observed by the Qualified Pipina Engineer (OPE) at the maximum observino distance (MOD) the vibration is acceptable.

3)

Determine MOD,in feet, by dividing MAV by a factor of between 2 and 3, to be determined on-site prior to testing by th'e QPE, consistent with the visual acuity of designated surveyors.

4)

Determine MAV by one of the following methods:

(a) For the case of both ends of the pipe span supported rigidly with either rigid struts, anchors, or equipment connections, use the expression:

MAV = CF x SF x TV where: CF = configuration factor, or product of all applicable factors-see notes.5 or G below SF = steel factor see note TV = tabular value fro.n above fof corresponding pipe size and span length b) For the case of only one end of the piping span sup' ported rigidly with i

either a rigid strut, an anchor or an equipment connection. Use the higher of the following two values:

(i) MAV = 25 mik; or (ii) MAV = CF x SF x TV c)

For the case of neither end of the piping span supported rigidly with cither a rigid strut, or anchor or an equipment connection, use the higher of the following two valuet l

(i) MAV = 40 mils; or f

(ii) MAV = CF x SF x TV 7-i

l 5)

Configuration factors (CF') for socket welded piping sizes 3/4" through 2",

inclusive-(a) Simple span of straight pipe including at least CF = 1.0 l

one socket welded fitting within the span or at l

either end.

(b) No socket welded fitting at either end or within CF = 4.0 the span

'(c) Cantilever CF = 10.0 l

(d) One elbowin rv.i, motion out of plane L /L

<.5, CF = 2.7 2 1 measure at center of long leg Li (e) One elbowin run, motion out of plane L /Li 2 5, CF = 8.0 2

measure at elbow (f) Guided Cantilever CF = 4.0 6)

Configuration factors (CF) for full penetration girth built welded pipe sizes 21/2' through 24", inclusive..

l (a) Simple span of straight pipe including at least CF = 1.0 l

one full penetration girth butt weld within the span l

or at either end.

l (b) No full penetration girth butt weld within the span CF = 1.8 or at either end.

(c) Cantilever CF = 10.0 l

(d) Guided Cantilever CF = 1.25 l

(c) One elbow in run, motion in plane CF ='O.3 (f) One elbow in run, motion out of plane L /Lt <.5, CF = 1.0 2

measure at center of long leg L.

(g) One elbow in run, motion out of plane L /Li 2 5,

• CF = 2.5 2

measure at elbow l

(h) Two elbow in the span joined within one pipe diameter CF = 0.2 of each other motion in plane of elbows l

(i) A single short radius schedule 40 elbow in run, pipe sizes 12" through 24".

inclusive.

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7)

Steel factor (SF)

(a) For carbon steel CF = 1.0 (b) Forstainlesssteel CF = 2.0 8)

If pipe motion, estimated to be greater than MAV,is observed by the QPE at the MOD then the Relative Displacement (RD) must be determined at mid-span. The RD is the mid-span measured peak-to-peak displacement minus the average of the end point measured peak to-peak displacements along the axis of interest.

(a) If RD < MAV, the vibration is acceptable (b). If RD > MAV the OPE will take the necessary steps to resolve the condition.

9)

The stop test limit is = MAV x 2.5.

10)

The asterisks (*)in the table above indicate that operating stresses in short spans cannot be inferred using peak to peak relative displacements at mid-span using hand-held instrumentation.

11)

Interpolation of span length within the table is permissible.

12)

In all cases, vibration readings must be parallel to the axes of the supports acting as the end points of the span.

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ENCLOSURE NO.,1 i

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DATA SHEET f-Date:

Time:

WATER HAMMER TRANSIENT TESTING Documentation of Transient VisualInspection Results -

System:

Identify Running Pumps:

System Flow Rate (gpm):

Fluid Temperature (oF):

Piping Section Monitored:

Transient Monitored:

(as defined in Section 7.1)

Satisfactory Visual inspection Results Obtained:

Yes (Check appropriate blank)

No

. IRD Vibration Readings (Mils):

(N/A for satisfactory Visual Results)

Satisfactory Instrument inspectin Results Obtained:

Yes (Check appropriate blank)

No N/A Remarks:

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4

ATTACIDIENT FOR ITEM.DS.9-1 r

ELECTRICAL DESIGN ENGINEERING cc:

W. M. Barrentine San Jose, California S. Dua W. Froloff M. R. Lane W. R. Marklein R. Muralidharan E. C. Spencer J. W. Stone R. K. Waldman E. Wester U. Verceles March 18, 1985 N. R. Barker M/C 399

SUBJECT:

IDI - PERRY CONTROL ROOM DIRECT FILL CONCERNS

Reference:

1)

Letter B.

K.

Grimes (NRC) to M. R. Edelman (CEI), "Inte-grated Design Inspection 50 440/84-29," Docket No. 50-440 (date uncertain).

2)

Letter O. D. Parr (NRC) to G. G. Sherwood (GE), " Review of General Electric Topical Report NEDO-10466, PGCC Design Criteria and Safety Evaluation," dated 7/13/78.

During an NRC IDI at the Perry site, concerns were raised regarding the duct fill in the PGCC floor sections.

These concerns were previously answered but resulted in apparent rejection and the generation of two briefly worded con-cerns (Reference 1):

1.

"A duct completely filled (to the deck plate) with cables might have a calculated fill greater than 50%," and 2.

"Use of 8 inch full height ducts in PGCC may be contrary to FSAR commit-ments and may result in exceeding duct fill criteria (when filled to the deck plate)."

Response to Concern Regarding FSAR Commitments Both I and 2 above contain the same basic concern which is the apparent failure to comply with the Perry FSAR regarding cable tray fill limitations.

In addition, 2 appears to tie PGCC to a FSAR commitment for cable trays of 4 or 6 inch side rails. This is incorrect since NED0-10466-A was approved by the NRC, clearly shows 8 inch high ducts, and should have been referenced in the FSAR since the approval letter (Reference 2) states, in part,

"...the report is acceptable for reference in specific license applications."

It should be emphasized that Perry FSAR criterion governing cable tray rail heights of 4 to 6 inches does not apply to PGCC ducts which are 8 inches deep and were approved by the NRC (Reference 2).

i 'b R. Baker M;rch 18, 1985 2

Page 2 Response to Concern of Duct Filla Creater than 40%

The design criterion (stated in both the Licensing Topical Report and confirmed in the first CE response to the IDI concern) is a maximum duct fill of 40%.

This is based on electrical practice which assumes that all cables are fully energized to. their full operating current capacity.

In PCCC, on the other hand, only a fed cables per duct are ' " power cables" carrying significant amounts of current continuously while the rajority are signal and control cables whf ch carry far less than rated current.

Because of this, a plan was instituted following rejection of the first CE response to show by conservative thermal analysis that ducts filled in excess of the 40% criterion would not result in excessive temperature in the cables. is a report of the thermal analysis approach, assumptions, results and conclusions.

In summary, the results of tne study, which evaluated cable temperature effects of duct fill in excess of 40% show that the maximum insula-tion temperature in the ducts in question does not approach the continuous temperature ratings of the insulations involved and thus demonstrates that the

" overfill" condition does not constitute any impairment of safety.

Further-more, as more control cables are added the maximum temperature tends to decrease, due to the increased thermal conduction af forded by the additional control cables.

(

L. E. Pohl, Manager Interface Design Engineering LEP: ras /11-1604

/

NUCLEAR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES DEPARTMENT MEMO DATE: March 15,1985 TO:su"9ehT/J.W. Stone cc:

P.W. Ianni S.S. Dua M.R. Lane FROM: W. Froloff

SUBJECT:

CABLE TEMPERATURES IN RACEWAYS (PERRY - JOB # 8Y619)

REFERENCE 1: NEDO-10466-A " POWER GENERATION CONTROL COMPLEX DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY EVALUATION "

REFERENCE 2:

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS itAY/ JUNE 1971, "Ampacities for Cables in Randomly Filled Trays" by J. Stolpe REFERENCE 3:

HEAT TRANSFER AND FLUID FLOW, GE DESIGN DATA BOOK REFERENCE 4:

IEEE TRANSACTIONS, MARCH 1983, VOL. 57, "THE CURRENT-CARRYING CAPACITY OF RUBBER-INSULATED CONDUCTORS" by S.J. ROSCH REFERENCE 5: AIEE TRANSACTIONS, 1944, VOLUME 63 " CURRENT RATING OF CABLES AS AFFECTED BY MUTUAL HEATING IN AIR OR CONDUIT", by IPCEA COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH REFERENCE 6: GE DRF# A00-02303 " Control Room Duct Heat Calculation"

SUMMARY

An analysis was carried out to study the insulation temperature rise in power cable insulation inside a duct, under a reactor control room floor, for ducts filled with power and control cables in excess of the specified value of 40% by volume. This analysis shows that the maximum insulation temperature in the ducts in question does not approach the continuous temperature rating of the insulation involved and thus demonstrates that the condition does not constitute any impairment of safety as explained below.

Furthermore and as shown below, the maximum insulation temperature tends to decrease as more control cables are added inside a duct.

INTRODUCTION Currently the percent fill of cables in the control room floor ducts (Figure 1) has been specified not to exceed 40% by volume, consistent with the convention established by the National ElectH c Code (NEC) and the industry standards for raceway systems in general.

This restriction has been applied to the PGCC based primarily on the conservative assumption that all cables in a particular duct might be power carrying cables and excess fill of power carrying cables could cause local hot spots which might exceed the allowable continuous temperatuce limits for the cable insulation. During construction and operation gradual settling will cause some compaction of the cables and may reduce effective air circulation throughout the mass of cables. The recomended cable ampacities and the cable duct fill criteria likewise are based on the conservative assumption that cables are tightly packed with the principal mode of heat transfer within the duct being heat conduction through insulation, conduit, and stagnant air (see reference 2).

The specified 40% cable-tray fill limit has been exceeded in some instances at sites due to " looping" the of control cables to take up excess cable lengths. This has raised NRC concerns, particularly in the case of the Perry control room, regarding the possibility of the maximum temperature in the cable insulation exceeding the maximum allowed temperature of 115 C (239 F).

It is the purpose of the current analysis to demonstrate that the deviation from the 40%

fill limit in the existing cases does not constitute an impairment of safety.

It is important to recognize that in the case of the Perry control room only control cables have been looped and not the power conduits. The heat dissipation in the control cables is insignificant compared to that in the power cables.Thus heat generation rates per unit length of cable duct remain essentially the same with or without looping of the control cables. Also the increased cable fill does r.ct affect the volume or the surface area of the steel conduits carrying the power cables but only increases the thermal conductivity of the heat flow path surrounding the power cable conduit by reducing the void space.

The objective of this work is to develop a methodology to calculate the the maximum insulation temperature in cable trays with fills of 40% and above; and apply this methodology to the Perry plant control room ducts. The major parameters involved are percent duct fill and ratio of power conductors to control cables inside the ducts. The input variables include cable layout, duct dimensions, and the cable configurations that exist in a plant. The following approach was employed in the present case:

1) Construct a conservative envelope model

2) Calculate the Peak insulation Temperature

3) Establish conservatism of the model by comparison with available NEC data.

4) Study the impact of various parameters l

on the predicted peak temperature l

l l

l l L

I Models and Analysis Procedure A sketch of a typical duct filed with control cables and conduits with the power cables inside is shown in Figure 2.

The present model consists of two steps; l) calculation of l

the local temperature rise inside duct over the control room ambient temperature (M D T ) due to the dissipation of I'R T

R heat in the power cables inside the conduits and 2) calculation of the temperature rise in the power cable iijisul tion over the peak ambient temperature in the duct 9

( I-M D). These two temperatures are combined to predict the resultant peak insulation temperature inside the duct.

Duct Ambient Temperature Rise This model calculates the location and the magnitude of the peak ambient temperature rise (M D T ) inside the duct. The T

R model is primarily that of heat conduction in a rectangular slab with uniform heat generation corresponding to the total heat (I*R) dissipation in the power cables inside the duct.

Thermal conductivity for heat flow across arrays of metal conductors embedded in insulating material and surrounded by stagnant air were calculated following the procedures and empirical data given in reference 3 above.

The metal /

insulation composite for the type of cables in the trays were shown to have thermal conductivities 20 times that of air.

Moreover as the fill ratio increases with additional control cables the percent metal by volume increases and thermal conductivity for the overall composite increases significantly. Effective duct conduction coefficients for composite cable ccmpositions of 40%, 50%, 60% fills inside the duct were calculated. Stagnant air was assumed inside the ducts. Heat transfer from the duct cover, which is the control room floor, is by natural convection.

Two boundary conditions were considered in arriving at the peak ambient tenperature inside the duct; 1) adiabatic boundaries at the bottom and on one side, and 2) adiabatic boundaries at both sides and at the bottom of the duct.

The

" hot" power cable conduit location was also varied: the first residing in the corner and the second located at the bottom center. The top boundary was the PGCC floor duct plate consisting of an aluminum honeycomb matrix " sandwiched" between two 0.032 inch steel plates.

Temperature Rise inside the Power Conduit This model to calculates the temperature drop inside the )ower cable conduit,(Tr-T, from the cable insulation tot 1econduitsurface.Thismohe)lisbasedontheempirical data and correlations developed in Reference 4 to predict maximum temperature drops across multiple power conductors inside a flexible steel conduit.

T In all our calculations Tc is set equal to M D to retain conservatism in the model prediction.

The' peak temperature rises calculated by the above two models are summed to predict the peak insulation temperature rise inside a conduit traversing the control room duct along with other power conduits and control cailes. Thus, T I + I T -T I (T; - T I peak = (TygD MD R R

Results The above methodology h.s been used to determine the peak temperature rise in the power cable insulation inside a conduit in a cable duct as a function of duct fill and the number of conduits in the duct. Three power cables per conduit were used conservatively in calculating power dissipation although some conduits carry less than three cables. The peak insulation temperature rises are plotted as a function of % fill and the number of conduits per auct in Fig. 3.

6.

A summary of the results for the case of three power cables per conduit is presented below:

- % Duct fill vs. Maximum Insulation Temperature Rise (11 conduits / duct) 40% - 64 *F 50% - 60 *F 60% - 56 *F

- Number of Conduits / Duct vs. Maximum Insulation Temperature Rise (40% Fill) 4-31 *F 6-40 *F 11 - 64 *F 13 - 73 *F Discussion There is no published data available to evaluate our current model directly. However there are some specific test results which can be utilized to qualify the model in parts.

The duct ambient temperature model for calculating the peak local temperature rise inside the duct was compared with the test results published in Reference 2.

This model wts used to calculate the peak tenperature rise in a 3 inch by 12 inch duct w* th the cable size of 10 AWG and a current of 10 amperes. The current nodel predicts a temperature rise of 52 degrees above the room an.olent. This is 12 degrees higher than the measured temperature rise of 40 degrees F in the published test results.

4

l The temperature rise inside the conduit over the duct ambient was compared to the test data published in Reference 5.

The IPCEA committee carried out extensive tests with 1 inch conduits containing Cross Linked Polyethylene (XPE) insulated cables. The tests were with the conduit in open air and for power dissipations per conduit corresponding to the present case (1.5 watts /ft). The peak insulation temperature rise measured in the tests over the ambient temperature outside the conduit was 9 degrees F. This is 20% less than the 11 degrees F predicted by the model developed here.

Detailed calculations and verification of these are filed in Ref. 6.

Conclusions

1) Conservatism of the present models has been established

2) Maximum temperature rise decreases with increased duct fill provided the number of power conduits and the number of power cables per conduit remain constant.

3) For the typical Perry duct carrying 6 power cable conduits and 40% fill the insulation peak temperature rise was calculated to be 40 F above the ambient conditions.

4) In no case will the maximum temperature rise approach the continuous temperature rating of the cable insulation.

(

Assuming a control room temperature of 100'F, the peak i

insulation temperature in tie Perry Control Room duct will not (6(

exceed 164*F which is 76*F below the continuous allowable insulation temperature.

The peak local temperature is expected to be even lower at points where looping exists. This conclusion appears to contradict common thinking that an increase in cable duct fill would naturally increase the insulation peak temperature. The assumption that leads to that conclusion is that the heat generation rate in a duct increases as the fill ratio increases.

This is not true if the increase in fill ratio is at the expense of increased control cables and not power conductors.

O Verified by:

W. FrMoff Hgineer R. Mural 1dharan, Sr. Engr.

Plant Safety'Aystems Plant Safety Systems 1

APPENDIX A Below is a list of input information as provided by U. Verceles. The bounding model and boundary ccnditions for the subject problem are as follows:

- Layout or arrangement information of raceways / trays General information - NEDO 10466A Floorplate - GE DRF # 157C4732AA Floorsection - GE DRF # 127D1533AA Notes / drawings From Ray Mercado Panel module U711 - 865E744

- Control wire size; GE Doc.# 272A7917 parts #020/#016 (40%/60%)

- Power wire size AWG 10; GE Doc. # 272A7917 part #010

- Wire insulation material; TEFZEL, GE Doc.# 272A7909,272A7920

- Maximum number of wires in a power conduit; 3 wires / conduit as per GE Doc.# 272A7919 Pg.4 part #0320

- Maximum number of power conduits in a duct at 40% fill; 10% of total cables in duct

- Specifications of power conduit; International Metal Hose Co.

Catalog No. HWS 3/4 (GE DRF # 248A9332')

- Maximum width and depth of limiting duct i.e.. duct with most severe boundary conditions and dimensions; 15" by 8" as per above references

- Tray end fill material; RTV Silicone Rubber Compound 6-

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ATTACH!!EMT FOP ITE!! D6.2-1 [ PO!ER A~OINDUSTRIAL SYSTE25 DIYl5 TOM - READING DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD PAGE 1 OF PROJECT: PERRN M0 CLEAR b SU5 JECT: Loo 9 C1Rco nTR Y S c. P A R A T I 0 M RN ALVil 5 5Ega NAME AND NUMBER w Q. Et e e. e u G. 'o911 on.SLSo P. 143. Y E R(v tr R. R A McMe sa O RtOIN A T$ PROJECT ENGINEER THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS PRELIMINARY DATA / ASSUMPTIONS: NO YE5 P A GE(5) A COMPUTER PROGRAM WAS: V NOT USED USED (CERTIFIED PER CAu) USED (NOT CERTIFIED.TO BE VERIFIED etTH CALCULATION) PROGRAM 5YSTEM NAME R E V. R E V. (Il =__ (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) f l VERIFICATION PACKAGE (IDENTIFY E ACH ITEMI _ DOCUMENTS TO BE VERIFIED R E V. REV. g3 Ge4co.T Ao A L 4 515 J~c R o (43 g IDI ITEM D6.1-I ($) m R. e vsa.traa. alales neuo ro sp. ssi. (si $UPPORTING DOCUMENTS R E V. R E V. (1) B-Zo8. Zo G SH 4L [ g73 (2) B - Z oo - 2 o (- SH-6 8 A (s) (3) dCU 1J138 -%- 4 0 3 C (9) (4) (10) (5) (11s (6) (12) ,$C h NM // La Yg/?6 c sl V /0 .P f ORIG [ATOR'S SIGN ATURE DATE B.] NO VERIFICATION REQUIRED PER DCP 2.05: REASON: l VERIFICATION REQUIRED (CHECK METHOD (5)): l OE51GN REVIEW ALTERN ATE CALCULATION _ QUALIFICATION TESTING IDENTIFICATION OF VERIFIER /VERf FICATION TE AM: W b-N N E U kKI G 'A> 8 C a' fk.&,h$# L/.(0 -~ f f { omOJ ECT ENGINEER'S SIGN ATURE DATE L

, 1. PAGE 2 OF 1 C: CONCURRE.CE WITH SELECTION OF VERIFIER (S): 'l ff SECTION M AN AGER's saGN ATIJRE DATE D. EXTENT OF VERIFICATION: $1 AMAAfsn wM c#sedO AGA/MT THf A'f/fRfAJCff' A UD SDhMRTI AIG w Documcurs, /xt AnrssowocY wss EXA nmth As trATfD /AJ THE Co Mf G U EhcG T. RESULTS OF VERIFICATION: Es A'f!stl 7! o/ TAW ANAL rrn AA'E c efprA BJ /. herwwt Ana Aso urnsesprs es I /// 394 (/f74 frANMRD) MOVE 811Af MT ATTESTATION: THIS DESIGN VERIFICATION WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OCP 2.05. /F YNw 4-#-J5~ [VEMER'S SIGN ATUR DATE E. COMPLETION OF VERIFICATION: hG Ib V- /C - 93' PROJECT ENGINEER'S SIGN A TU RE DATE

SUBJECT IDE N TIFIE R PAGE ) Gilbert Associates,Inc. Circuit Analysis for IDIItem D6.2-1 1 op Reading, Pennsylvania REVl d j ] [ 4 CALCULATION "^

• ORIG!NATOR g,it/. y(462<

DATE e/'-/O-8 5 A. PURPOSE: This analysis supplements that dated 2/4/84 by B. 5. Kohout and subsequent revision by R. W. Yerger dated 4/4/85(Termination of Redundant Class IE Wiring on Common Device, Ref: ECN 21138-86-403/C) regarding the separation of wiring to contacts on the under voltage relay. This analysis evaluates the consequences of the unlikely event of the Division 1 and 2 contacts becoming electrically connected. B.

REFERENCES:

1. Attachment 1, SK-1,3/18/85

2. B-208-206, Sh. 46

3. B-208-206, Sh. 68

4. B. S. Kohout Analysis dated 2/4/85 S. ECN-21138-86-403/C

6. R. W. Yerger revision to Ref. 4 dated 4/4/85 C.

ANALYSIS: shows the two sets of contacts (27+1,27-M1,27-R1, Bus EH11) from the Division 1 under-voltage relay shown on Ref. 2. One set of contacts (3,13) from this relay is used in the Division 1 undervoltage circuit. These contacts close and energize the GE type SAM 11 A (2X) relay upon loss of power to 4.16 kV Bus EH11. The second set of undervoltage contacts (4,14 to T.B 1/RB and 2/RB)is utilized in the Division 2 " Loop" logic shown in Attachment 1 and Ref. 3. These contacts close and provide a signal to the Div. 2 Loop logic upon loss of voltage to 4.16 kV Bus EH 11. The table below evaluates the consequences of the Division I and 2 27 L1/MI/R1 contacts becoming electrically connected between various points with and without voltage on Buses EH11 and EH12. The Division 1 and 2 batteries in both units are ungrounded. The interaction is between the 27-L1/M1/R1 contacts to Divisions 1 and 2. Connection Between Volt. on Volt. on Div.1 & 2 contacts Bus EH11 Bus EH12 At contact points: Consequences

1) YES YES Div.1-3, Div. 2-4 Division 1 ( + ) voltage will be introduced at Div. 2 contact point 4. With voltage on Buses EH11 and EH12, contacts 27X2B and 27 L1/M1/R1 will be open. The ( + ) and (-)

of the Div. 2 battery will remain isolated from the Div.1 ( + ).

2) YES YES Div.1-3, Div. 2-14 Div.1 ( + ) voltage will be introduced at Div 2 contact point 14 With voltage on EH11 and EH12,27X2B and 27 L1/M1/R1 will be open. Div.1 ( + ) voltage will be seen on the Div. 2 ( + ) side of the red indicating lights and relay 27BA2.

Since all batteries are ungrounded, there is no return path and neither the lights nor relay 27BA2 become energized. There is no circulating current between the ( + ) and (-) of the 2 separate batteries. PROPRIETARYINFORMATION OE G:L8ERT Assoc ATES int FOR.NrERNA bsE ON+ v THIS IS A PERMANENT RECORD DO NO T DES TROY

sUBJELT IDENTiflER PAGE ) Gilbert Associates Inc. op Reading, Pennsylvania 4 "^

• CALCULATION oRIGINATORf!k), y{eCr[t DATE e/-/O-85 Connection Between Volt. on Volt. on Div.1 & 2 Contacts Bus EH11 Bus EH12 At Contact Points Consequences

3) YES YES Div.1-13, Div. 2-4 With voltage on EH11 &EH 12, all 27 contacts are open; ( + ) and (-) of Div.1 and 2 batteries are isolated from each other; and there is no current flow between batteries.

4) YES YES Div.1-13, Div. 2-14 With voltage on EH11 & EH12, all 27 contacts are open; the ( + ) side of Div 1 relay 2X is connected to ( + ) side of Div. 2 red ind. lights and relay 27BA2. All 27 relays are open, nu ( + ) voltage available from either division, no components energized, and no circulating current between batteries.

5) NO YES Div.1-3, Div. 2-4 Division 1 relay 2X energizes as required. Div.1

( + ) voltage will be introduced at Div. 2 contact point 4. With voltage on Bus EH12 and undervoltage on EH11, Div. 2 contact 27X2B will be open and 27 L1/MI/R1 in Div. 2 will be closed. Div.1 ( + ) voltage will be sen on the ( + ) side of the Div. 2 lights and relay 27BA2. Since batteies (-) are isolated fro each other, there is no current flow between batteries, and Div. 2 components remain de-energized, as required.

6) NO YES Div.1-3, Div. 2-14 Same as Case 5 Div.1-13, Div. 2-14 Same as Case 5 Div.1-13, Div. 2-14 Same as Case 5

7) YES NO Div.1-3, Div. 2-4 With voltage on Bus EH11 and undervoltage on EH12, Div. 2 contact 27X2B is closed and contacts 27 L1/M1/R1 are open in both divisions. Div. 2

( + ) will be connected to Div.1 ( + ). Since batteries are ungrounded, and 27 contacts remain open, further isolating the path to (-), there is no return path and thus no circulating current flow between batteries.

8) YES NO Div.1-3, Div. 2-14 Same as Case 2. Div 2 contact 27X2B is closed, but results are the same as Case 2.

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF G!LBERT AssOOATEs M. - FOk NrtRNAL Ust ONLY THIS IS A PERMANENT RECORD DO NOT DESTROY

4 sV8 JECT IDENilfiER PAGE ) Gilbert Associates,lnc. op Reading, Pennsylvania REV-l ] [ ] 4 "^

• CALCULATION ORIGIN ATOR g.M. W#6cM DATE v' -/J - $ 5" Volt. on Volt, on Div.1 & 2 Contacts Bus EH11 Bus EH12 At Contact Points Consequences

9) Yr5 NO Div 1-13, Div. 2-4 Div. 2 ( + ) voltage will be introduced at 27 LI/M1/R1 contact point 13. With voltage on Bus EH11 and undervoltage on Bus EH12, contacts 27 L1/M 1/R1 will be open and Div. 2 contact 27X2B will be closed. Since all batteries are ungrounded, there is no return path, no current flow, and Div. I relay 2X will remain de-energized as required.

10) Y H NO Div.1-13, Div. 2-14 With voltage on EH11 and undervoltage on EH12, Div. 2 27X2B is closed and 27 L1/M1/R1 contacts are open. The same results as in Case 4 above, i.e. no circulating current and components remain in the required state.

11) NO NO Div.1-3, Div. 2-4 With undervoltage on both buses EH11 and Div.1-3, Div. 2-14 EH :2, all 27 contacts (27 L1/M1/R1 and Div.1-3, Div. 2-4 27X2B are dosed. The( + ) of Div.1 will Div.1-13, Div. 2-14 to connected to the ( + ) of Div. 2. Since the batteries are ungrounded, no cross-paths aetween Div. I and 2 exist and no circulating currents between the two batteries. Both the Div. I and Div. 2 " Loop" circuits as well as the divisional undervoltage circuit function as required.

12) The above analyses (Cases I to 11) are also applicable to the following with the same results:

a. For the Division 1 and 2 contacts from the undervoltage relay located in Div. 2 switchgear EH12 (i.e.,27 L1/M1/RI-Bus EH12).

b. For the undervoltage contacts from Unit 2 buses EH21 and EH22 (i.e.,27 L1/M1/R1, Bus EH21 &

EH22). D. CONCLUSIONS As described above, a failure which results in the division 1 and 2 contacts of the undervoltage relay becoming electrically connected, does not prevent the division 1 and 2 " Loop" logic from performing its required safety function, nor does it prevent each divisional undervoltage circuit from performing its required function. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF GIL8ERT ASSOCIATES :Nc FOR INTERNAL UsE ONL - TH_ ISIS A PERMANENT RECORD DO NO TDESTROY

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H18'i110randUH1 Q Gilbert / Commonwealth April 4,1985 i i to. File Spec. 552 from: R. W. Yerger sub;ect: Termination of Redundant Class lE Wiring on Common Device Clarification and revision of B. S. Kohout memo, same subject dated February 4,1985 Ref: ECN 21138-86-403/C GE Co. undervoltage relays type NGV (GE Bulletin GET-90805) were installed inside 4.16KV Class 1E switchgears EHil 6 Elll2. Relay contacts are used in control circuitry of redundant divisions. The internal relay wiring, contacts and external interconnections ter-l minated on these relays bring wiring of redundant divisions within the minimum separation distance. Articles 5.6.4 and 5.6.2 of IEEE 384-1974 standard stipulate provisions l and requirements applicable to described conditions. The undervoltage relays are Class 1E devices qualified for all postulated environmental conditions and anticipated seismic accelerations. Relays internal wiring is CE Co. type vulkene rated 600V with proven fire retardancy (PYOGAI/CEI 16995T). Other materials internal to the switchgear assembly were subjected to flame retardant tests. All materials passed and the test. results are documented in BBC 5KV switchgear qualification repo rt No. Yl-51958-QS. External circuits are routed in random lay trays. The maximum voltage these circuits would be exposed to in case of " hot short" is 480V. Both relays and their cables are rated 600V, demonstrating that any postulated electrical failure in one division will not affect performance of the redundant channel. It should also be noted that the relays are rated for a contact-to-contact flashover voltage of 1500 volts which far exceeds the postulated level of fault voltages to which these contacts could be exposed. The undervoltage relays are energized under normal operating conditions. Since normally opened contacts are not wired, contact welding cannot occur, assuring that tripping of relay contacts will not be restricted. Upon de-tection of undervoltage, relays will trip and through connection of normally closed contacts, the LOOP signal is initiated. Gal 35 17n5

s. File Spec. 552 Page 2 'the Class IE function of the relays la to initiate the LOOP signal. As l common devices to both redundant division, their performance under postulated and analyzed conditions will not be degraded. The design and application complies with provisions and requirements of IEEE 384-1974 standard. l I

k. (b, R. W.

erger Electrical Engineer RWY:sr cc: J. Ioannidi D. L. Mohn R. A. McNabb R. Getty B. Kohout i 9 Y +

i ATTACIDIENT FOR ITEM D6.2-2 POWER AND INDUSTRI AL SYSTEMS DIVISION - READING

• [.

DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD k PROJECTS Pener Not.LMR Pcwee PLMr w SU BJ ECT: (Rh'?j Sunst E FMLoas Assivsis na Paa H18-Pu8r869 SECTies uAuE ANo nu=BER w.o. cco rRoz. sysrtm s 6'i23 &l-5256 -438 V. H. w,LLEM S RTG6 / V O RIGIN ATOR PROJECT ENGINEER THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS PRELIMINARY DATA / ASSUMPTIONS: NO YES P A GE(S) A COMPUTER PROGRAM WAS: NOT USED USED (CERTIFIED PER CAM) USED (NOT CERTIFIED-TO BE VERIFIED WITH CALCULATION) PROGRAM SYSTEM NAME R E V. REV. (1) (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) VERIFICATION PACKAGE (IDENTIFY EACH ITEM) DOCUMENTS TO BE VERIFIED R E V. REV. (1) CALG&TKA%/AlMns E7/CEL'50A O (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS REV. REV. (}} Tits 3 W 0 72 (7) MC?-OI3 Sn 83t Ho '7 F (2) f52CU-670 -9 4 3/ A -2ce C (s) l 82/ //O E // (3) O N 20 / C (9) i LElk/O 8 d h l 8:7/ A2C-% C (10) V SA///// 4 (4) 22 / 6/ 39e O gn) 6 (5) (6) b D ~013 8321 //C/3 E (12) u 5% - s hs hr V ORIGIN ATOR*$ SIGN A 't 6 4E / O N'r E 1 Ej NO VERIFICATION REQUIRED PER DCP 2.05: R E ASON: M VERIFICATION REQUIRED (CHECK METHOD (51): DESIGN REVIEW K ALTERNATE CALCULATION QU ALIFICATION TESTING IDENTIFICATION OF VERIFIER / VERIFICATION TEAM: TC. RE)Tr MA s-r-Y5 PROJECT ENGl ER'S SIGN ATURE DATE t

a PAGE 2 OF { C. CONCURRENCE WITH SELECTION OF VERIFIER (S): k&tt'~ 9/29/fS' SECTION M AN AGER'S SIGN ATURE DATE D. EXTENT OF VERIFICATION: ~ ft*t/t CD 0? 7"~it s A<uat vsis ro n.s so,ei 77m.r r;+.x A ssis t v si s t5 /Lt n s e,a a as t E c o m.) <> az e as

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r14e iivi'a r SJ,)00vtTtw (, OOcv mxn r t RESULTS OF VERIFICATION: 774,E Asvst-L Y Ses S4 7/ s A r / \\ rN C Si.V <; L < 44stu,u C rLI ToL it. t at ' CG I li si E 3 *) 9 ATTESTATION: THIS DESIGN VERIFICATION WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DCP 2.05. / Y 3-8[ VERIFIER'S SIGN ATURE DATE I E. COMPLETION OF VERIFICATION: [ I~ I-U RRmecTE~epeER..,,ATURE om

a i ENTIFIER PAGE 5

• ECT Singic Failura Analysis for Panel H13-P868 6869 E31C8502 1

r Tk Gilbert / Commonwealth R"l Lal _d .=_) _d .m., _.m. PAGES 3 MICROFILMED CALCULATION ORIGIN AToa V. H. Willens 3-21-85 ears OBJECTIVE: Analyze H13-P868 and H13-P869 panels for postulated single faults within a panel to verify that actuation of the main steam isolationwill not be defeated.

REFERENCES:

Drawing Sheet Revision B208-070 E31A200 C B208-070 E31A201 C B208-070 E31A202 C B208-217. R61370 D B208-013 B21H06 F B208-013 B21H07 F B208-013 B21H08 H B208-013 B21H10 F B208-013 B21H11 G ANALYSIS: Attached Figure 1 is a composite of the signal raths associated with Div 1 and Div 3 required to actuate the inboard and outboard isolation valves. Actuation of either valve provides 100% of the safety function. Actuation of Div 2 & Div 4 provide a redundant 100% safety function. Two types of faults may be postulated. The first type of fault consists in shorts between contacts of the Riley bistable unite located in Panel P868 and P869. The second type of fault consists in shorts between power supply and any terminal in a panel (P868 or P869 or P693 or P691 or PS22 or F623). Following is the detailed analysis of tbase faults: 1. Postulating contact point to contact ~ point shorts on a single device. (a) DC power from annuncirror isolators circuits present no problem for postulated faultr (contact to contact on any single device) since the DC power is ungrounded and any shcrt to the AC trip circuits will not r2sult in a current flow path which would prevent de-energining or tripping of the AC logic circuit. 2. Postulating a hot short of any available AC power supply to any terminal within a cabinet or barriered section of a cabinet. ut 446 7-84 ' PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF GILBERT / COMMONWEALTH - FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

a i ENTIFIER PAGE suwEcr Single Failuro Analysis for n Panels H13-P868 & 869 E31C8509 2,,. Gilbert / Commonwealth sadmisensicomeuuame b b ( MICROFILMED PAGES .) CALCULATION o,,,,,,7o, ygg oATE 3-21-85 i (a) In the Div 1 section of the 1H13-P869 panel the only'AC source is ~ Div 1 AC. One potential fault would be one that prevented tripping or de-energizing relay K200A. However, since relay K200C in 1H13-P868 would still be available to de-energize and trip relay K7C in lH13-P693, and providing Div 2 and Div 4 signals operate as required (no multiple faults), closure of both inboard and outboard MSIV's is assured. (b) Postulating a similar fault in the Div 3 section of 1H13-P868 which would prevent relay K200C from de-energizing or tripping results in a similar situation via relays K200A and K7A in 1H13-P869 and 1H13-P691 respectively. Again providing no multiple faults, i.e., Div 2 and Div 4 signals operate, closure of both inboard and outboard MSlV's is assured. 3. Postulating shorts to ground on any single terminal. (a) Since the logic is designed to de-energize to activate, grounds will not prevent de-energization or tripping of any actuation device in the. logic. Further postulating single faults in 1H13-P691 or 1H13-P693 or relay K51A or alternately K7C or K51B will never result in more tha'n either the inboard or outboard MSlV's being disabled. CONCLUSION: Design satisfies single failure criteria since no failure on Div 1 & Div 3 will affect actuation on Div 2 & Div 4. AnonfNPT a fsv ossenne s a vient oc egg acQT pr*An st 4AWpal Tl4. FOA INTFANAl llRF ONI Y f>At-446 7-84

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