ML20115F140

Forwards Affidavit in Connection W/Enforcement Conference Held Re D Fields & R Weiss to Be Submitted to Records

ML20115F140
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/01/1996
From:	Hendrix R AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Gibson A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20115F088	List: ML20115F102 ML20115F115 ML20115F140
References
NUDOCS 9607170106
Download: ML20115F140 (7)

Text

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uwomens FINCH, McCRANIE, BROWN &HENDRIX 22$ PEAcirlREE ETREET. N.E.

CHAaLEs I. two anam 1700 SOUM TOWER E38

,g gY,amm ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 WAN gasasas DAvon.xAvut A)SaEWT. noters (404) 658-9070 sosassanoamcz 221 CIAYTUef M BUN.ED00 aAXTIa E. FDetz May 1,1996

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NTWM Albert F. Oth Director - Division of Reactor Safety United States Nucles.r Regulatory Comuussion RegionII 101 Manena Street. N.W., Ste. 2900 Atlanta. GA 30323-0199 Re:

Pre-Decisional Enforcement Cosimuce David A. Fields and Robert Weiss

Dear Mr. Gihon:

In connection with the Enforcement Conference held regardmg my clients David Fields and Rob Weiss, I enclose an afBdavit which I would like to subnut into the record for consideration by the panel. You will recall durmg our prhon that we mentioned that we were nying to secure the affidavit to supplement the record. I hereby supplement the record formally herewith by subnussion of this afBdavit.

Please advise should you have any questions.

Sincerely ~,

H.McCRANIE. BROWN & HENDRIX

"_ -h RichAd W. Hendnx RWH/kl Enclosure ec: Carol Evans cmoocawwauowsmossow.irr 9607170106 960710 PDR ADOCK 05000302 G

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j My nome le Lawrence 40ng. I am C.

.e this ofAdevit freely and volunterity, f

without any threate, ;.

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or coerolonto Mr. Thomme Devine, who hee idendSed himeeff to me se Legal Director of the Govem Project.

I em en inspector with the U.S. Nuoiser Regulatory Commi fNRC"), based out of Atiente, Georgia regional offlos.

However, I am submitting this offidavit to express my views se e i

ano not as e representative of the NRC. I am euhmming tnis etstemem I

Devine se a matter of conesience se to what i ese se a grose 6nju

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error that could have reeutted in serious con j

i had not been corrected. The operatore had tried numerous t management and the NRC with their conoems to correct what they ee significent estety noneem. When both these avenues teged th t

to prove their concem by using opproved procedures and taking p j

stodoning operators at required positions, Both the utility management and the NRC acted irresponsitaly in this sit The NRC sated in an terseponsible menner in jumping to conclusions w j

invesegeting the incident. Their actione caused the uttitty to take irresp j

sodon on the operatore which they most tlkely would not have done were fc

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ene NRC cherectenzing this se a Chemobyl type action.

There is no comparison between the two. Although the utility had all the inivu. 2n et hand they took actions against the operatore without thoroughly in j

the incident in ettempting to be responsive to the NRC. The NRC in tum i

reacted without investigating and now to forced to save fees by blaming the i

operators.

i I con telate to tne position of the operatore coceuse in 1983 I was fired fro 4

i my position se Site Operations Director at TMl2 when I refuseo to fire en Engineering Director who identifled eefety concerns wtth the polar crane.

l Inoldom the three people involved received no support from the NRC further invesogatione proved their coneems valid and might have averte j.

sooident.

i I am the only individust of those three who is still in the nuclear industry. The other two were forced out and their careers ruined. I migttt h reesived the some treatmem had my wife not overheard a converestion between NRC afficiste when I was testifying before Congress. An NRC offle stated to the EDO of the NRC that I would never get another job in the nuoiser Industry.

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The NRC has a hissoty of ignoring v.t'T_i...;. and condonmg udg 1

managemem sodon in reprisale agaenet whladediowers. The presem situe i

at MRiesene le en exemple of this where reasonalbie indMduels resorte 4

j media after several attempts on their part to correst annous safety c were ignored and management repriseis egeinet thoes intiMduals we il condoned. In one particular incident that i em swore of a coneuttan worked with tried for years to correct a faulty design. Meetings we ali levels of NRC management and his concems were ignored. He i

to go to the media and write a boolr,. The messa 3

safety concems.

A simiist plant to Cryotel River is Qoones. I talked to the resident at Coone j

snd found that they had identified this problem months ago and contacte j

NRC at Crystal River. Apparently either through ignorance of the situad

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fature to followup the problem was not corrected. In addition the opera sttempts to rectfy the situation were ignored when they comseted the NRC and they were asked if they were meldng allegatons.

i I don't know their response but can only assume they said no considering the history of "n9%e people who make allegations.

i The NRC's own intamal policies discourage diesent among their own

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inspectors. Their policy of Differing Professional Viewpoints does not even j

j allow the individual who identiflee the problem to be present to decide if his concem is valid. The operstors.st Crystal River are heros in my opinion and I

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consider it a privilege to wnts this affidavit in support of them and would be honored if I am allowed to test fy on their behalf.

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These coerstors deserve a commendation for going beyond the call of duty i

when conventional authorities were seisep at the wheel. They would not have i

been forced to take this action if the utility management and the NRC had i

headed their concems and acted in a responalble menner. Instead. thoes some euthorities are proposing to punish the individuals who may have prevemed and aooident from tuming to disaster.-

I am more conoemed about the chilling effect this has on other operators who see these concoms and wlit ignore them. The NRC does not have the l

experience of these operators and is supposed to rely on people who are more

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familiar with the problems coming forth. Thors is no evidence to show that whistleblowers are encouraged although they are necessary if we are to avoid 5

1 another Chemobyl or TM12 considering the emphasis by utilities to cut costs.

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My more specific cosaarns are listed below j

1. The operators did not engage in any man adal misacaduct i

They followed normal operating procedures to solve a serious

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problem that could have been crystal River's Achilles's heal 1

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during en accident. Although the sac has characterised their w as an unapproved 'teet," that is baloney. The operators engaged 4

j in the eene problem solving work that cecurs regularly without i

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prior NRC approval. The only significant difference here was that they made e record of the results, to prove there is a problea 1

i drum overi.essurised hya%. If the operators had been asking I

up their actions as they went, i

it would be different. But they didn't. They followed normal procedures and were conscientious j

enough to make a record of public safety threats that becoms j

obvious f=am doing the work. It undermines the Inc's missian to brand their diligence as miseenduct that should be punished.

2. If anything were wrong, the NRC is applying inacasistent standards. There have been 11 incidents at crystal River involving 30 out of 33 operators who engaged with impunity in 1

i much more extreme behavior that.the NRC is accusing these 1

i individuals. To illustrate. P.r. Fialds and the other operators in this instance stopped the procedure as soon as an alarm went off i

j In the past.

operators have c=*1m M work for up to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with the alarm on. Tha commission should not start enforcing

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technicalitias it previously has ignored, when the alleged 1

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misM"-t solves a public safety threat.

3. If punishment is appegiate, it should be directed at k

these who covered up any informazion that should have been 1

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l disclosed to the NRC. That unans the licensee's responsible

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engineering and management personnel. The operators did not afsver i

anything up. They initially raised the issue with the engineering deportaast. which was unwilling to canande or act on its error.

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The licensen had full ammess to the written results of the operators' activities, and in iact undartook corrective action to fix the problem after they proved it existed. Licenses management has responsibility to notify the NRC =f any questionable 3

activities. Licensee enginsering personnel are responsible for i'

testing. A written record of all the operators' actions were 1

available to plant management and engineering. Neither told the 3RC of the prr,blem fixed thanks to the operators.

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4. Thid case is tainted by a rush to judgment. The mac's Atlanta regianal office decidad to act ?-4==t the operators j

hefore there had been a full investigation of what happened. The j

eubsequent "factf4=unga was compromised, because NRC regional management made up its mind before learning the facts.

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5. The NRC's own passivity is responsible for this controversy. N operators had gone to the NRC Resident Inspecter three times about this critical safety threat, and he did not act. Indeed, he suggested filing a grievanca. The government had 3

the responsibility to go straig6e to the plant

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Manager to obtain resolution. At a a4=41=r f acility, the oconee

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nuclear iacility, the NRc took appropriate action on a similar i

problem. Instead, the NRC sat en the problas and now proposes to j

j discipline those who defended the public.

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6. There should not be any confusion. Crystal River 3 was operating in a asianer that violated nuclear safety law, by undar=4=+=e the facility's ability to keep water flowing through the system when it is needed for a safe shutdown. The plant is operating in a lawful manner today only because Mr. Fields and the other operators actions proved this vulnerability.

'l. Punishamns in this case would have a chilling effect on other n@=mv power plant operators. The clear message to the industry is that operators will not get in troubla if they act like sheep. On' the other hand, they can and will be psmiahad 12 they emarcise independant judgment through approved procedures to expcse serious problems that corporate and gover= ment bureaucracies do not went to hear about. That is exactly the opposite message that tha NRC should be s=d4a; to the nuclear industry.

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8. I am not alone in believing that the NRC's p v sal is wrong, based on the evidence. To illustrate, another NRC inspector, Mr. Curt Rapp, has been-serving as the agency's 4

technical expert on the dispute.-He was so disturbed by the agency's b=ndling of this dispute that the agency made his concerns a Differing Professional View. Nor is Mr. Rapp alone.

our credibility as an agency enforcing nuclear safety 1.aws is at 7

stake.

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n I hve rund the above five page affidavit, and it is true, aneurate and complate to the best of my knowledge and belias.

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