ML20114B314
| ML20114B314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1985 |
| From: | Wallace P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 84-11, NUDOCS 8501290066 | |
| Download: ML20114B314 (2) | |
Text
~-
. TENNESSEE VALLEY. AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 January-18, 1985 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 84-11 The enclosed special. report provides details ' concerning the inoperability -
of a fire penetration in excess of seven days., This event is reported in accordance with Sequoyah Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.12 and 6.it.2.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY-AUTHORITY P. R. Wallace Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW
~ Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah B501290066 850118 PDR ADOCK 05000327 s
PDR 1983-TVA SOTH ANNIVERSARY
.[b O An Equal Opportunity Empff yer
'l
- ~
y m
a-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
'SPECIAL REPORT 84-11 UNIT 1 Event Description On December'19, 1984, Operations: personnel-were notified by.TVA Office of Construction personnel of a failure to close a fire penetration bcaach
- within the allotted seven (7) days in accordance'with Technical Specifica-
' tion L.C.O. 3.7.12, Action 'a'. - The penetration was. breached at 1400 CST on December 11, 1984, in accordance with procedure PHYSI-13,- Attachment F,'
and closed at 0900 CST on December. 19, 1984.
Upon event discovery, Construction personnel immediately' sealed the penetration, which was a-three (3) inch mechanical pipe sleeve into the fifth vital battery room.
A visual inspection verified the penetration' to be functional,-and the breaching permit closed at 0900 CST on December 19, 1984.
Probable Cause The cause of the failure to close the fire penetration within the required timeframe was due to an oversight of the expiration date on the breaching permit by the Construction personnel' foreman. As stated in previous special' reports, Operations personnel were to review the breaching permit-log on a daily basis to provide early warning of expiration dates; however, this corrective action failed to preclude this incident.
This was caused by the lack of emphasis by Operations personnel to perform this task. The failure to close the breach in a timely manner and the failure to adequately follow plant procedures are considered as personnel errors.
Corrective Action Upon event discovery, the penetration was immediately sealed and verified to be functional.
The Construction personnel involved in this^ incident have been instructed to be more aware of breach expiration dates. A special meeting was held for all Construction general foremen on January 16. 1985, to discuss fire penetration breaching permits, and to re-emphasize the importance of ensuring that penetrations are sealed within the seven (7) day timeframe.
The process of a daily review by Operations personnel of the breaching permit log will be continued with further emphasis'being placed'upon ensuring that permits'are closed in a timely manner.
Since this has been a recurring problem, the SQN ISEG has been assigned the task to determine root causes and. provide recommendations for effective corrective action on fire breaching problems at SQN.
This task should be completed by.
March 10, 1985.
1r Q