ML20113D983

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Forwards Revised Response to IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Due to Misinterpretation of Components Addressed by Bulletin
ML20113D983
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/07/1985
From: Foster D
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
GN-543, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8504150748
Download: ML20113D983 (3)


Text

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  • Georgia Power Company Route 2, Box 299A Waynesboro. Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554 9%1. Ent. 3360 404 724-8114. Ext. 3360 m

D. O. Foster Georgia Power er'e an go the souttem erectrc system Vogtle Project March 7, 1985 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Reference:

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII: JPO: ,

Region II - Suite 2900 50-424, 50-425 101 Marietta Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30323 File: X7BC 4 Log: GN-543 Attention: Mr. J. Nelson Grace In our correspondence of February 12, 1985 (X7BC24, GN-524),

Georgia Power Company informed the USNRC that our evaluation of I&E Bulletin 84-03, " Refueling Cavity Water Seal", had been re-initiated due to a misinterpretation of the components addressed by the Bulletin.

Georgia Power Company has completed its evaluation and wishes to submit the attached revised response to I&E Bulletin 84-03.

This response contains no proprietary information and may be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Yours ruly, o /

L f

. O. Fost REF/D0F/tdm lg4150748850307 G ADOCK 05000424 PDR 1 \

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'Page Two D. O. Foster states that he is the Vice President a,1. Project General Manager of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and is authorized to executa this oath on behalf of Georgia Power Company and that to the best of his knowledge and belief the facts set forth in this letter are true.

GPC:

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Sworn and subscribed before me this F/2 day of March, 1985.

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xc: . S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 R. J. Kelly J. A. Bailey G. Bockhold R. E. Conway 0. Batum P. D. Rice G. F. Head H. H. Gregory C. S. McCall (OPC)

J. T. Beckham W. T. Nickerson E. L. Blake, Jr.

R. A. Thomas D. R. Altman (Shaw, et. al.)

D. E. Dutton D. L. Kinnsch (BPC) J. E. Joiner W. F. Sanders (NRC) J. L. Vota (W) (Troutman, et. al . )

R. H. Pinson L. T. Gucwa D. C. Teper (GANE)

B. M. Guthrie C. E. Belflower L. Fowler (LEAF)

E. D. Groover F. B. Marsh (BPC) T. Johnson (ECPG)

R. W. McManus

Response to IE Bulletin 84-03

Subject:

USNRC IE Bulletin 84-03; Refueling Cavity Water Seal

Purpose:

The subject bulletin was provided to: (1) notify licensees of an incident in which the refueling cavity water seal failed and rapidly drained the refueling cavity, and (2) request licensees to take certain actions to assure fuel uncovery during refueling remains an unlikely event.

Applicability:

Catastrophic failure of the VEGP refueling cavity seal is not considered credible.

The seal assembly is of the passive mechanical type and consists of an angle plate welded to the cavity liner plate on the bottom and the reactor vessel seci ledge on top. Therefore, the VEGP seal assembly is not subject to active failure mechanisns.

Any leakage of the seal resulting from undetected failure of the angle plate or welds would be directed to the reactor cavity sump. The cavity sump is monitored by redundant nonsafety grade level switches, which actuate the cavity sump pumps, and a separate safety grade level transmitter. Seal leakage in excess of the sump pumps capacity (100 gpm total) would be alarmed in the control room when the sump reaches the high level. .

The refueling canal is normally filled by using a residual heat removal (RHR) pump aligned to the refueling water storage tank. Therefore, makeup capacity would exceed any credible leakage for the duration of the event.

The top of the fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool are at the same elevation as the refueling cavity seal'.

Therefore seal failure would not result in uncovering the stored spent fuel assemblies.

The refueling cavity can be drained down to the level of the refueling cavity seal in under two hours by using one RHR pump to return the water to the refueling water storage tank.

From the above considerations, the current VEGP design is capable of mitigating any credible failure of the refueling cavity seal without uncovering fuel and no corrective action in response to this bulletin is required.