ML20113D132

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Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Plant Reactor Containment Bldg Equipment Hatch Doors to Remain Open During Fuel Handling & Core Alterations
ML20113D132
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  
Issue date: 06/28/1996
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20113D131 List:
References
NUDOCS 9607030029
Download: ML20113D132 (13)


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PROPOSED TECHNICAL S])ECIFICATION CHANGES l

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4 3.8.6 During th3 hendling of irredicted fusi in tha reactor building, et least one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be capable of being i

closed. The equipment hatch cover shall also be capable of being cicead. l At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the reactor pressure vessel.

I; 3.8.7 Isolation valvea in lines containing automatic containment

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isolation valves shall be operable, or at least one shall be l

closed.

I 3.8.8 When two irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved simultaneously by the bridges within the fuel transfer canal, a minimum of 10 feet j

separation shall be maintained between the assemblies at all times.

l 3.S.9 If any of the above specified limiting conditions for fuel loading I

and refueling are not met, movement of fuel into the reactor core i

shall cease; action shall be initiated to correct the conditions so that the specified limits are met, and no operations whi:h may increase the reactivity of the core shall be made. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.10 The reactor building purge isolation system, including the radiation monitors shall be tested and verified to be operable within 7 days prior to refueling operations. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.11 Irradiated fuel chall not be removed from the reactor until the unit has been suberitical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.

In the event of a enmplete core offload, a full core to be discharged shall be suberitical a minimum of 175 hours0.00203 days <br />0.0486 hours <br />2.893519e-4 weeks <br />6.65875e-5 months <br /> prior to discharge of more than 70 assemblies to the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.12 All fuel handling in the Auxiliary Building shall cease upon notification of the issuance of a tornado wetch for Pope, Yel,

Johnson, or Logan counties in Arkansas.

Fuel handling operations in progress will be completed to the extent necessary to place the fuel handling bridge and crane in their normal parked and locked position. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.13 No loaded spent fuel shipping cask shall be carried above or into the Auxiliary Building equipment shaft unless atmospheric dispersion conditions are equal to or better than those produced by Pasquill Type D stability accompanied by a wind velocity of 2 m/sec.

In addition, the railroad spur door of the Turbine Building shall be closed and the fuel handling area ventilation system shall be in operation. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.14 Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited frem travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

Amendment No. 44,4,7,46, tr7, %, %4-59

r:plecoment. Tha ksff with cll rods in tha coro.cnd with refuoling boron concentration is approximately 0.9.

Specification 3.8.5 allows the control room operator to inform the reactor building personnel of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.

The specification requiring testing reactor building purge termination is to verify that these components will function as required should a fuel handling accident occur which resulted in the release of significant fission prodcets.

Because of physical dimensions of the fuel bridges, it is physically impossible for fuel assemblies tc be within 10 feet of each other while being handled.

Per specification 3.8.6, the reacter building personnel and/or emergency airlock doors and the equipment hatch may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor building provided at least one door of each airlock as.d the equipment hatch are capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accioent and the plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN with 23 feet of water above the fuel seatea within the reactor pressure vessel. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside the reactor building, at least one of the personnel and/or emergency airlock

-doors and the equipment hatch will be closed following evacuation of the reactor l

building.

Specification 3.8.11 is required as:

1) the safety analysis for the fuel handling accident was based on the assumption that the reactor had been shutdown for 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> (8); and, 2) to assure that the maximum design heat load of the spent fuel pool cooling system will not be exceeded during a full core offload.

Specification 3.8.14 will assure that damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool will not be caused by dropping heavy objects onto the fuel. Administrative controls will prohibit the storage of fuel in locations adjoining the walls

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at the north and south ends of the pool, in the vicinity of cask storage area and fuel tilt pool access gates, l

Specifications 3.8.15 and 3.8.16 assure fuel enrichment and fuel burnup limits assumed in the spent fuel safety analyses will not be exceeded.

Specification 3.8.17 assures the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool will remain within the limits of the spent fusi pool accident and criticality analyses.

REFERENCES (1)

FSAR, Section 9.5 (2)

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3 (3)

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.3 Amendment No. %,W,%,4M 59b

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REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I

3.9.4 The. containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a.

The equipment door is capable of being closed, l

b.

A minimum of one door in each airlock is capable of being closed, and c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1.

Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or l

2.

Exhausting through OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3'are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at-least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

4.9.*.?

The containment purge and exhaust system shall be de3onstrated OPERABLE at the following frequencies:

a.

At least once per 18 montiis er (1) after any structure.1 maintenance on the HEPA filter or chatcoal adsorber housings, or

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(2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. % 6

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i 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 4

3/4.9.1 BORON OONCENTRATION j

l The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure l

.thatt 1) the reactor will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and i

'2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION j

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the l

arsumptions used in the accident analyses.

i The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of more than 70 irradiated fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products such that the heat generated will not exceed the cooling capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling system. This decay time arad total assembly limitation is conservatively within the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through the J

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

Operation of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

The containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided a minimum of one door in the airlock and the equipment door are capable of being closed in l

the event of a fuel handling accident and the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of i

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water above the fuel seated within the reactor pressure vessel.

Should a fuel i

handling accident occur inside containment, a minimum of one personnel airlock j

door and the equipment door will be closed following an evacuation of l

j containment.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. +3,%6

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MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FORINFO ONLY) l l

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3.8.6 During tha h:ndling of irridicted fusi in th3 rotetor building, et 1ssot l

one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be capable of being closed. The equipment hatch cover shall A122 be in pi;;; with : :, inia.u; j

sf f;;r b;1t; ;;;uring th; ;;v;; t; th; ;;;1ing surf;;;; capable of beine E1233g. At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies ceated within the reactor pressure vessel.

3.8.7 Isolation valves in lines containing automatic containment isolation valves shall be operable, or at least one shall be closed.

3.8.8 When two irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved simultaneously by the bridges within the fuel transfer canal, a minimum of 10 feet

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separation shall be maintained between the assemblies at all times.

3.8.9 If any of the above specified limiting conditions for fuel loading and refueling are not mot, movement of fuel into the reactor core shall cease; action shall be initiated to correct the conditions so that the specified limits are met, and no operations which may increase the reactivity of the core shall be made.

The provisions i

of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.10 The reactor building purge isolation system, including the radiation monitors shall be tested and verified to be operable within 7 days prior to refueling operations. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.11 Irradiated fuel shall not be removed from the reactor until the unit has been suberitical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.

In the event of a complete core offload, a full core to be discharged shall be subcritical a minimum of 175 hours0.00203 days <br />0.0486 hours <br />2.893519e-4 weeks <br />6.65875e-5 months <br /> prior to discharge of more than 70 assemblies to the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

l 3.8.12 All fuel handling in the Auxiliary Building shall cease upon notification of the issuance of a tornado watch for Pope, Yell, Johnson, or Logan counties in Arkansas. Fuel handling operations in progress will be completed to the extent necessary to place the fuel handling bridge and crane in their normal parked and locked position. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

l 3.8.13 No loaded spent fuel shipping cask shall be carried ebove or into the Auxiliary Building equipment shaft unless atmospheric dispersion conditions are equal to or better than those produced by Pasquill Type D stability accompanied by a wind velocity of 2 m/sec.

In addition, the railroad spur door of the Turbine Building shall be closed and the fuel handling area ventilation system shall be in operation. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.14 Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

Amendment No. M,M,%,W,%,%t 59

replccament. Tha k:ff with all roda in thm coro end with refu211ng boron concentration is approximately 0.9.

Specification 3.8.5 allows'the control room operator to inform the reactor building personnel of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.

The specification requiring testing reactor buildir.g purge termination is to Marify that these components will function as required should a fuel handling accident occur which resulted in the release of significant fission products.

Because of physical dimensions of the fuel bridges, it is physically impossible for fuel assemblies to be within 10 feet of each other while being handled.

Per specification 3.d.6, the reactor building personnel and/or emergency airlock doors and the eautoment hatch may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor building provided at least one door of each airlock and the eouloment hatch are-te capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident and the plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN with 23 feet of water above the fuel seated within the reactor pressure vessel.

Should a fuel handling accident occur inside the reactor building, at least one of the personnel and/or emergency airlock doors and the souloment hatch will be closed following evacuation of the reactor l

building.

Specification 3.8.11 is required as:

1) the safety analysis foi the fuel handling accident was based on the assumption that the reactor had been shutdown for 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> (8); and, 2) to assure that the maximum design heat load of the spent fuel pool cooling system will not be exceeded during a full core offload.

Specification 3.8.14 will assure that damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool will not be caused by dropping heavy objects onto the fuel.

Administrative controls will prohibit the storage of fuel in locations adjoining the walls at the north and south ends of the pool, in the vicinity of cask storage area and fuel tilt pool access gates.

Specifications 3.8.15 and 3.8.16 assure fuel enrichment and fuel burnup limits assumed in the spent fue safety analyses will not be exceeded.

Specification 3.8.17 assures the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool will remain within the limits of the spent fuel pool accident and criticality analyses.

REFERENCES (1)

FSAR, Section 9.5 (2)

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3 (3)

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.3 J

Amendment No. %,M,%,44-3 59b

MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-2 RCHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FOR INFO ONLY) i

REFUELING OPERATIONS l-CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS l

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a.

The equipment door ;1;;;d and h;ld in pl;;; by ; min'---

Of f;;;

behe is capable of beina closed, b.

A minimum of one door in each airlock is capable of being closed, and 1

c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

l l

1.

Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, l

or 2.

Exhausting through OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

1 APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

I With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not l

applicable.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated l

OPERABLE at the following frequencies a.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

ARKANSAS'- UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. +M i

1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS I

BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and

2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of more than 70 irradiated fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products such that the heat generated will not exceed the cooling capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling system. This decay time and total assembly limitation is conservatively within tae assumptions used in the accident analyses.

1 3/4.9,4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through the i

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

Operation of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

The containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided a minimum of one door in the airlock and the eeuinment door are +e capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident and the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel seated within the reactor pressure vessel.

Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, a minimum of one personnel airlock door and the equipment door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 43,4 %

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