ML20112E833
| ML20112E833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1985 |
| From: | Parker M ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| To: | Olshan L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0876, RTR-NUREG-876, RTR-NUREG-CR-2913 DOE-85-038, DOE-85-38, NUDOCS 8503270189 | |
| Download: ML20112E833 (2) | |
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py. l A?SfV STATE OF lLLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 546-8100 TERRY R. LASH DAN L. WILLIAMS DIRECTOR DEPUTY DlHECTOR March 19, 1985 Mr. Leonard N. 01shan, Project Manager Byron Station Units 1 & 2 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comerission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Comments of Supplement 6 to NUREG-0876, Byron Station Units 1 & 2 Safety Evaluation Report In Reply Please Refer To: DOE-85-038
Dear Mr. 01shan:
After a review of stbject document, the following comments are offered for your consideration:
1) 3 design criteria for structures, systems, & components 3.6 Protection Aaainst Effects Associated with the Postulated Rimture of Pipina 3.6.2 Determination of break locations and dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping.
Comment:
NUREG/CR 2913, "Two Phase Jet Loads" was used in Byron design verification, although it is not currently approved for general use and is under review by NRC.
NRC states tha. NUREG/CR 2913 use was an acceptable al ternative provided the separation distance is at least 8 pipe diameters (source pipe size).
IDNS questions the use of NUREG/CR 2913 since it is not currently approved by NRC.
Although it was not used directly# for design purposes, rather design verification, it would appear unacceptable even for that purpose.
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. 2) 4 Reactor 4.4 Thermal & Hydraulic Desian 4.4.1 Departure from nucleate boiling methodology comment:
The method of detecting venturi
- fouling, "by reaching through the inspection port & touching the venturi surface", appears to be a too subjective method and in relation to the visual methods proposed should be expanded to be more definitive as to acceptance criteria.
3) 6 Engineered Safety Features 6.5 Fission Production Removal & Control System 6.5.1 Engineered Safety Features Atmospheric Cleanup System cnament There should be a better explanation regarding the three ventilation. systems which traverse the upper cable spreading room not af fecting the control room.
Thank you for the oppor tuni ty to review the Byron Unit 1 & 2 safety evaluation report.
Your consideration of the above comments are appreciated.
Since ly i
Mi hael C. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering MCP:RRM:bkw cc:
T. Lash G. Wright J. Keppler, NRC Region III R. Lickus, NRC Region III l
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