ML20112E701
| ML20112E701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20112E685 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8503270109 | |
| Download: ML20112E701 (2) | |
Text
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o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS.101 AND 83 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69 BALTIM0RE GAS AND ELECTRIC LOMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application for license amendment dated June 29, 1984, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BC&E) requested a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2.
The proposed change to TS 4.7.11.3c.2, "Halon Systems," would revise the surveillance requirements for the Switchgear Room halon and Cable Spreading Room total flood halon fire suppression systems.
Discussion On July 8,1983, the NRC issued Generic Letter 83-28 (GL 83-28), " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." One requirement, associated with Item 3.2 (Post-maintenance Testing) of GL 83-28, required licensees to identify "... existing Technical Specifications which are perceived to degrade rather than enhance safety." By application dated June 29, 1984, BG&E identified two TS Surveillance Requirements which are believed by BG&E to degrade rather than enhance safety.
One such Surveillance Requirement, TS 4.7.11.3c.2, is applicable to the Switchgear Room Halon and Cable Spreading Room total ficod halon fire suppression systems. The current TS require a flow test every 18 months to detect blockage of the Halon flow path. The proposed TS would substitute an annual visual inspection of the nozzles and visible flow path of these halon systems. A flow test would still be required following major maintenance or modification of the system.
To perform the presently required flow test, the system integrity r.ust be broken, the line purged with nitrogen, and then system integrity re-established following the test.
Breaking system integrity involves removing the halon bottle connection (s) from the flexline. This is a threaded connection and the more frequently this surveillance is performed the more likely premature degradation of the thread becomes. During the period the flow test is performed, the halon system is unavailable. By performing a visual inspection, system unavailability and thread degradation will be reduced. Moreover, unless major maintenance or system modification is undertaken, it is unlikely 8503270109 850307 ADOCK 0500 7
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' that a flow blockage would occur. The Cable Spreading Room is supplied by filtered air through a common air conditioning system serving the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room. Similar filters serve the Switchgear Room, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning system supply line.
Foreign materials blocking the nozzle would be detected by visual inspection. Because of the physical size of the discharge nozzle ports (approximately one inch in diameter) clogging by dust or dirt is not likely.
Since the reliability of the halon system will not be degraded, and since the proposed TS change in no way reduces the effectiveness of the halon systems, the proposed TS change in no way reduces the effectiveness of the halon systems, the proposed change to TS 4.7.11.3c.2 is acceptable.
Environmental Consideration The amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area and a change in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact state-ment or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the is uance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: March 7, 1985 Principal Contributor:
D. H. Jaffe